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I, B ernhard  W eiss, h e r e b y  c e r t ify  th a t th is  th e s is ,  w h ich  is  
approxim ately  80 000 w ord s in  le n g th , h as b een  w r itten  b y  me, th a t it  is  
th e  reco rd  of w ork  ca rr ied  o u t b y  me and th a t it  h as not b een  
su b m itted  in  a n y  p r e v io u s  a p p lica tion  for  a h ig h er  d e g r e e .
date s ig n a tu r e  o f ca n d id a te
I w as adm itted  a s  a r e se a r c h  s tu d e n t  u n d er  ord in an ce  No. 12 in  O ctober  
1986 and a s  a c a n d id a te  fo r  th e  d e g r e e  o f Ph.D. in  June 1988; th e  
h ig h er  s tu d y  for  w h ich  th is  is  a record  w as ca rr ied  o u t in  th e  
U n iv e r s ity  o f S t. A n drew s b e tw een  1986 and 1990.
date  ................   s ig n a tu r e  o f ca n d id a te
I h e r e b y  c e r t ify  th a t th e  ca n d id a te  h as fu lf illed  th e  c o n d itio n s  o f th e  
R esolu tion  and R egu la tion s a p p ro p r ia te  for th e  d e g r e e  o f Ph.D. in  th e  
U n iv e r s ity  o f S t. A n drew s and th a t  th e  can d id ate  is  q u a lified  to subm it 
th is  th e s is  in  a p p lica tion  for  th a t d e g r e e .
d ate  .........    s ig n a tu r e  o f su p e r v iso r
date .........    s ig n a tu r e  o f su p e r v iso r
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A b stract
In  th is  t h e s is  I in v e s t ig a te  th e  im plication s, for  o n e ’s  acco u n t o f  
m athem atics, o f h o ld in g  an  a n t i-r e a lis t  v iew . The prim ary aim is  to  
ap p ra ise  th e  sco p e  o f r e v is io n  im posed  b y  a n ti-rea lism  on c la ss ic a l  
in fe r e n tia l p r a c tic e  in  m athem atics. That a p p ra isa l h a s c o n se q u e n c e s  both  
for  our u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f th e  n a tu re  o f  m athem atics and for  our a ttitu d e  
tow ard s a n ti-rea lism  it s e lf .  I f  an  a n t i-r e a lis t  p o s itio n  seem s in e v ita b ly  to  
be a b su r d ly  re  v is io n a r y  th e n  we h a v e  g r o u n d s  for  s u s p e c t in g  th e  
co h e r en ce  o f arg u m en ts  c a n v a sse d  in  fa v o u r  of a n ti-rea lism . I attem pt to  
d efen d  th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  p o s itio n  b y  a r g u in g , i) th a t it  is  not in te r n a lly  
in c o h e re n t fo r  a n ti-rea lism  to b e  a  p o ten tia lly  r e v is io n a r y  p o sitio n , and  
ii) th a t an  a n t i-r e a lis t  p o s itio n  can , p la u s ib ly , be se e n  to  r e su lt  in  a 
s ta b le  in tu it io n is t ic  p o s itio n  w ith  re g a rd  to th e  lo g ic  it  co n d o n es . The 
u se  o f im p red ica tiv e  m ethods in  c la ss ic a l m athem atics is  a s ite  o f  
tra d itio n a l in tu it io n is t ic  a tta c k s . I u n d er ta k e  an exam ination o f w hat th e  
a n t i-r e a lis t  a ttitu d e  tow ard s su c h  m ethods sh ou ld  be. T his q u e stio n  is  of 
in te r e s t  both  b e c a u se  su c h  m ethods are d eep ly  im plicated  in  c la ss ic a l  
m athem atical th e o r y  o f a n a ly s is  and b eca u se  in tu it io n is t ic  sem antic  
th e o r ie s  make u se  o f im p red ica tiv e  m ethods. I attem pt to c o n s tr u c t  th e  
o u tlin e s  o f a s e t  th e o r y  w h ich  is  a n t i-r e a lis t ic a lly  a ccep ta b le  bu t w h ich , 
a lth o u g h  h a v in g  no a n te c e d e n t  re p u g n a n c e  for im p red ica tive  m ethods as  
su c h , a p p ea rs  to  be too w eak  to o ffe r  an  a n t i-r e a lis t ic  v in d ica tio n  of 
im p red ica tive  m ethods in  g en e r a l, I attem pt to exo n era te  in tu it io n is t ic  
sem antic th e o r ie s  in  th e ir  u se  o f im p red ica tive  m ethods b y  sh ow in g  th at  
a p artia l ord er  r e ly in g  on th e  n a tu re  o f our g r a sp  o f th e  in tu it io n is t ic  
m eaning s t ip u la t io n s  for  th e  lo g ic a l c o n sta n ts  p r e c lu d e s  a p o ss ib le  
c ir c u la r ity .
Ill
A ckn ow led gem ents
D uring my time a t S t. A n drew s I h ave  had th e  b e n e fit  o f b e in g  ta u g h t  
b y  a num ber o f p eop le , a ll o f whom d e se r v e  my th a n k s. S te p h en  Read 
tu to red  me for  my f ir s t  term  h e r e  and w as my f ir s t  e v e r  tu to r  in  
p h ilo so p h y . His th o ro u g h  re a d in g  o f  my e s s a y s  and , in  p a rticu la r , th e  
s t r e s s  he laid on p r e s e n tin g  o n e ’s  th o u g h t (or m uddle) c le a r ly  w ere  a  
good in tro d u ctio n  to  th e  d iff ic u lt  b u s in e s s  o f th in k in g  and w r itin g  about  
p h ilo so p h y .
When I look  back  to my f ir s t  y e a r  in  S t. A n drew s I am aw are o f ju s t
how lu c k y  I am to h a v e  had th e  o p p o r tu n ity , so  soon  a fte r  h a v in g
b eg u n  to  s tu d y  p h ilo so p h y , o f ta lk in g  r e g u la r ly  w ith  C risp in  W right. I 
rem em ber th a t p er iod  a s  h a v in g  b een  a  p eriod  o f in te n s e  in te llec tu a l-  
excitm en t. That excitm en t h a s  p ro d u ced  a la s t in g  en th u sia sm  in  me for  
th e  su b je c t . Of c o u r se  I am c o n v in c ed  th a t th a t en th u sia sm  is  p rovok ed  
b y  som eth in g  in tr in s ic  to  th e  s u b je c t  b u t I m ust th an k  C risp in  W right 
for  h a v in g  com m unicated th a t som eth in g  so  th o ro u g h ly .
For th is  th e s is  I h ave  b een  su p e r v is e d  b y  both  P e ter  Clark and Bob 
Hale. P e ter  h as b een  arou n d  from  th e  b e g in in g  o f th e  th e s is  to i t s  end . 
I am g r a te fu l to  him fo r  h a v in g  b een  so  e n c o u ra g in g  ab ou t th e  form er  
and for  th o se  r e a ss u r in g  s e s s io n s  w h en  I le f t  h is  o ff ic e  w ith  a b so lu te  
co n fid e n c e  th a t th e  la tte r  w as g o in g  to hap p en . P e ter  in it ia lly  sh ap ed
th e  form  o f th is  p r o je c t  b u t h a s  en co u ra g ed  its  em p hasis to  be
determ in ed  b y  my p a rticu la r  in te r e s t s ,  allow ing it  to becom e my own.
Bob Hale h as f la tte r e d  me b y  h is  im m ensely th orou gh  rea d in g  of my 
w ork. His c r itic ism s o f my th o u g h ts  h ave a lw ays b een  a cu te  and u se fu l  
so  th at th e  pain  o f re a liz in g  th e  e x te n t  of my m uddle and th e  v a g u e n e ss  
and o b s c u r ity  o f my w r itin g  h as a lw ays b een  a llayed  b y  know in g th a t
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my e ffo r ts  w ere  b e in g  ta k en  se r io u s ly . Bob h as h ig h  s ta n d a r d s  o f  
lu c id ity  and a h u g e  a p p e tite  for  p h ilo so p h y  so  is  an e x h a u stin g  p erso n  
w ith  whom to  h ave  a su p e r v is io n  s e s s io n , bu t th a t t ir e d n e s s  h as a lw ays  
b een  accom panied  b y  som e fe e lin g  o f p r o g r e ss .
At v a r io u s  s ta g e s  o f my y e a r s  in  th e  D epartm ent o f Logic and  
M etap h ysics th e r e  h as b een  a va lu a b le  b od y  of g ra d u a te  s tu d e n ts . Two 
fellow  s tu d e n ts  d e s e r v e  sp e c ia l m ention  h ere . M ichael R ob ertson , b y  h is  
fo c u sse d  r e s is ta n c e  to  th e  so r t  o f th e o r is in g  w h ich  I h ave  g on e  in  for  
and th r o u g h  h is  ex trem ely  a r tic u la te  n a u sea  ab ou t u s in g  term s su c h  a s  
"canonical", h as made me th in k  far  more d ee p ly  th an  I o th e rw ise  m ight 
h ave  done ab ou t th e  p la u s ib ility  o f  my ap proach  and i t s  re la tio n  to more 
g e n e r a l p h ilo so p h ica l c o n c e rn s . To M arguerite N eslin g  I ow e an  
u n q u a n tifia b le  d eb t. Her th in k in g  ab ou t th is  s u b je c t  h as a lw ays s tr u c k  
me as p e n e tr a t in g , c lea r  and e x c it in g . In  m any c h a ts  w ith  h er  I h ave  
b een  im p ressed  both  b y  th e  su b s ta n c e  o f h er  v iew s  and b y  h er  u t te r ly  
g e n u in e  and ir r e p r e ss ib le  d e s ir e  sim ply  to u n d ersta n d .
I sh ou ld  a lso  lik e  to  th an k  my exam iner. Dr. T im othy Williamson, 
w h ose  com m ents made a p p aren t a  num ber o f g a p s  and e r r o r s  in  th e  f ir s t  
v e r s io n  of th is  th e s is .
T h is, in  lieu  o f a g ra n d ch ild , is  for  my p a r e n ts .
... (for o n ly  N obody know s  
w h ere  tr u th  grow s w h y  
b ir d s  f ly  and
e s p e c ia lly  who th e  moon is .  
(Cummings 1931, LVIX)
... w ill you  come w ith  me in to  
th e  ex trem ely  l it t le  h ou se  o f  
my m ind. ...
(Cummings 1931, LVI)
In trod u ction :
...th e  o b je c tio n  to îm p r e d îc a t iv i ty ,  w h ich  is  th e  in tu it io n is t  grou n d  
for  r e je c t in g  m uch o f c la s s ic a l s e t  th eo ry , h as lit t le  or no 
co n n ec tio n  w ith  th e  in s is te n c e  upon  v er ifica tio n ism  its e lf .  In deed  
in tu it io n is t ic  m athem atics is  i t s e l f  " im predicative" , in  a s  much as  th e  
in tu it io n is t  n o tion  o f c o n s tr u c t iv e  p roof p r e su p p o se s  c o n s tr u c t iv e  
p ro o fs  w h ich  r e fe r  to th e  to ta lity  of all c o n s tr u c t iv e  p ro o fs . (Putnam  
1983, p .21)
T his ta n ta liz in g  p a ragrap h , o c c u r r in g  tow ards th e  en d  of H ilary  
Putnam ’s sp len d id  "Models and R eality", s u g g e s t s  a program m e in  th e  
p h ilo so p h y  o f m athem atics. The prom ise o f th e  program m e is  a fin a l  
p osition  w hich  v in d ic a te s  m ost o f th e  m ethods of c la s s ic a l m athem atics  
y e t  w h ich  ta k e s  fu ll acco u n t o f th e  m odern sem antic a rgu m en ts  for  
in tu ition ism  p rop ou n d ed  m ost fo r c e fu lly  by M ichael Dummett.
What is  th e  n a tu re  o f tra d itio n a l in tu it io n is t ic  and c o n s tr u c t iv e  
o b je c tio n s  to  th e  u se  o f im p red ica tive  m ethods in  c la s s ic a l tru th  
con d ition a l s e tt in g s? ;  How do th e se  o b je c tio n s  tr a n sfe r  to  a n o n -c la ss ic a l  
approach?; Or, c r u d e ly , if  we ch a n g e  our p ercep tio n  of th e  p ra c tice  (to  
one g iv e n  by an  in tu it io n is t ic  sem an tics) do we s till  need  to r e v is e  th e  
p ra ctice  itse lf? ; W here do tra d itio n a l in tu it io n is t ic  a cco u n ts  h ave  u se  for  
im p red ica tive  m ethods?; Is  th is  u se  in ev itab le? ; Is it  ju stif ia b le ?
T h ese  im portant q u e s t io n s  ab ou t the co h eren ce  and n a tu re  o f our  
program m e are am ong th o se  I h ave  in  mind in  much o f w hat fo llow s. But 
th e  form of my d isc u ss io n  is  n ot m oulded by th e se  q u e stio n s . In stea d  I 
adopt a Dum m ettian fram ework: I e lu c id a te , b r ie fly , Dummett’s "negative"  
argum en t a g a in s t  and h is  ch a ra c ter iza tio n  of realism  and th en  attem pt  
an a p p ra isa l o f th e  p o s it iv e  program m e of g iv in g  an accou n t o f  
m athem atics. The fe c u n d ity  o f Dum m ett's p h ilo so p h y  has two a sp e c ts , the  
f ir s t  is  h is p o w erfu l and g en e r a l argu m en t a g a in st  realism  but, alm ost o f
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grea ter  im portance, is  th e  fram ew ork e s ta b lish e d  in  th e  c o u r se  o f th is  
argum en t. Dummett su c c e e d s  in  g iv in g  u s a p r e c ise  c la r ifica tio n  of th e  
n atu re  o f th e  m eta p h y sica l d isp u te  ab ou t realism  by sh ow in g  how a 
m etap h ysica l d isa g reem en t can  be tra ced  back to a d iv e r g e n c e  in  th e  
notion  of tru th  a c c ep te d  by each  p a r ty  to th e  d isp u te , how th e  n otion  
o f tru th  is  lin k ed  to a m odel of u n d e r s ta n d in g  and how g e n e r a l sem antic  
co n s id er a tio n s  p r o v id e  p r in c ip le s  for  d ec id in g  su c h  d isp u te s . I 
en d ea v o u r  to exp lo it th e  in s ig h t  g iv e n  u s  by Dummett, so  w h ere  som e of  
th e  q u e stio n s  o f th e  p r e v io u s  p aragrap h  su r fa c e  th e  Dummettian  
fram ew ork sh ou ld  h elp  c la r ify  th e  n a tu re  o f th e  is s u e  b e in g  ra ise d . For 
in s ta n c e , it  is  o fte n  u n c lea r  w hat form  of ju s tif ic a tio n  o f a p r a c tice  is  
req u ired  or o f how we are  to  make u se  of a m etap h ysica l p ic tu r e . So 
o b je c tio n s  to or arg u m en ts  in  su p p o r t o f im p red ica tiv ity  becom e d iff icu lt  
to  a p p ra ise  from  a n y  p e r s p e c t iv e  o th er  than  th a t g iv e n  by a p aricu lar  
u se  o f a p a rticu la r  m eta p h y sica l p ic tu r e . The reg io n  of d isagreem en t  
th r e a te n s  to becom e h o p e le s s ly  v a g u e . B ecau se  Dummett c o n c e n tr a te s  
f ir s t  on d e lin ea tin g  an area  o f m utual u n d er sta n d in g  th e  ap p earan ce  o f  
c o n tr o v e r sy  is  c le a r ly  m arked.
H owever th e  c o h eren ce  o f Dummett’s  p h ilo so p h y  d e p e n d s  on th e  
p o ss ib ility  o f c a r r y in g  ou t h is  p o s it iv e  program m e, i .e ., if  it  is  not 
p o ss ib le  to d e sc r ib e  a p r a c tice  in  a m anner th a t s a t is f ie s  Dummettian  
a d eq u acy  c o n s tr a in ts  on a sem antic  accou n t th en  ra th er  th an  q u estio n  
th e  p r a c tice  a s  a w hole we sh ou ld  w onder w h eth er  or not th o se  
c o n str a in ts  are a ccep ta b le . So I w ant both to u se  th e  Dummettian  
fram ew ork a s  far  a s  p o ss ib le  to  illum inate a s p e c ts  o f m athem atical 
p ra c tice  and , in  th e  lig h t  o f i t s  a b ility  or in a b ility  to  acou n t for  th e  
p ra c tice , to r e f le c t  on th e  co h e r en ce  o f Dummett’s sem antic  p o sitio n . So 
th e  im plication s and fe a s ib ility  o f th is  p o s itiv e  program m e form th e  
c e n tr a l and m otivatin g  is s u e s  o f th is  w ork.
Had the em p h asis o f my in te r e s ts  been le s s  c lo se ly  lin k ed  to a s s e s in g  
the v ia b ility  and c o n se q u e n c e s  o f a n ti-rea lism  it w ould h ave been
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p o ss ib le  to h ave ch o sen  a more h is to r ica l approach . The basic q u estio n  
sim ply c o n c e rn s  w h ich  s e t  o f in fe r e n tia l tec h n iq u es  we take to be 
ju s tif ie d  in  m athem atics. One w ay of look in g  a t th a t problem  is  to 
co n sid er  w h eth er  and w h y we are fo rced  to r e v is e  c la s s ic a l in fe r e n tia l  
p r in c ip le s . H istorica l and m eth od olog ica l r e a so n s  com bine to make th is  an  
in v it in g  s tr a te g y . The m ethodolog ica l rea so n  is  th a t we are co n cern ed  
w ith p o ss ib le  w ays o f m otiva tin g  or o f c r it ic iz in g  a r e a lis t  ou tlook . Below  
I g iv e  an a cco u n t o f Dummett’s  ch a ra cter iza tio n  o f realism  and h is  
r e a so n s  for  th in k in g  th a t w e n eed  to  d ep art from  th a t p e r s p e c t iv e . I 
h ave  th u s  s tr e s s e d  a p articu lar  m ethodologica l ap p roach  to th e  q u estio n  
of ju s tif ic a tio n  and r e v is io n  o f in fe r e n c e .
But h is to r ica lly  it  h as a lso  b een  tru e  th at r e a lis t  v iew s  h a v e , at le a s t  
impie it ly , dom inated th e  d evelop m en t of m athem atics. T h ose r e a lis t  
p r e su p p o s it io n s  w ere ch a lle n g e d  by th e  em ergen ce o f c o n tra d ic tio n s  in  
th e  fou n d ation a l e d if ic e s  w h ose  c o n str u c t io n  w as attem p ted  in  th e  secon d  
half o f th e  la s t  c e n tu r y . M athem aticians in v o lv e d  in  th e  fou n d ation a l
e ffo r t  w ere , to be su r e , o fte n  m otivated  by or led  tow ard s a p articu lar  
p h ilo so p h ica l or m etap h ysica l v iew  of m athem atics. But th a t v iew ,
b ecau se  o f th e  basic  a g reem en t ab ou t a ccep ta b le  m athem atical m ethods, 
could  la r g e ly  be ig n o red  w h en  a p p ra is in g  th e  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f th e  
m athem atical w ork its e lf .  W hatever p h ilo sop h ica l m otivation  W eierstrass  
may h ave  e n ter ta in ed  is  la r g e ly  ir r e le v a n t  to h is  w ork in  m aking th e  
ca lcu lu s  r ig o r o u s . D ed ek in d ’s v iew  th a t rea l num bers are fr e e  crea tio n s  
of human th o u g h t can  be and h as been  ig n o red  by m athem aticians 
u tilis in g  h is  m eans o f "cuts" for  d e fin in g  natu ra l num bers. C antor’s 
th eo lo g ica l p e r s p e c t iv e  n ot o n ly  fa iled  to im p ress m athem aticians but was 
n e v er  an in te g r a l p a rt o f u n d e r s ta n d in g  Cantorian s e t  th e o r y  and o n ly
became a fe a tu r e  of C antor’s in te lle c tu a l life  a fte r  h is d isc o v e r y  o f h is
paradox (and th u s  h is need  for a notion  of th e  a b so lu te ly  in fin ite ) . The 
d isc o v e r y  of th e  p arad oxes led  to a q u estio n in g  of th e  ju stif ic a tio n  of 
m athem atical m ethods th e m se lv e s  (ra th er  th an  th e  ju stif ic a tio n  of
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p articu iar  m athem atical m ethods in  term s o f more g e n e r a lly  a ccep ted  
th e o ry ). R ather th an  b e in g  in te r e s te d  in  th e  m etap h ysica l a t t itu d e s  of 
m athem aticians we are co n c e rn ed  w ith  the m etap h ysica l com m itm ents 
u n d er ly in g  th e ir  u se  o f c e r ta in  te c h n iq u e s .
T h us, h is to r ica lly , p h ilo so p h y  becam e d eep ly  and e x p lic it ly  im plicated  
in  th e  fo u n d a tio n s  o f m athem atics w ith  th e  need  to d ep art, in  p ra c tice , 
from an ou t and ou t realism  ab ou t m athem atics. But le t  u s  be a lit t le  
c learer  ab ou t th e  co n tex t in  w h ich  th e  p arad oxes em erged . The problem  
m athem aticians had been  p reo c cu p ie d  w ith  w as b r in g in g  r ig o u r  to  
m athem atical a n a ly s is . The param ount con cern  h ere  w as to e s ta b lish  
a n a ly s is  w ith ou t r e ly in g  on geom etr ica l in tu itio n  or w ith ou t r e ly in g  on  
th e  d u b io u s n otion  o f in fin ite s im a ls . T his ar ith m etiza tion  of a n a ly s is  led  
to D ed ek in d ’s  m ethod of d e fin in g  th e  rea ls  in  term s of d iv is io n s  o f th e  
rationale  in to  two d is jo in t  c la s s e s ,  w h ere  an y  num ber o f th e  one c la s s  is  
le s s  th an  a n y  member of th e  o th e r . I t  a lso  led  to C antor’s d evelop m en t  
of tr a n sf in ite  ar ith m etic  and , in  th is  th e o ry , to th e  s e t  c o n cep t as b e in g  
fundam ental for  m athem atics. F r e g e ’s  w ork, w h ilst b ein g  sym p ath etic  to 
many of th e  tec h n ic a l r e s u lt s  a c h iev e d  by Cantor, d if fe r s  fu n d am en ta lly  
in  not ta k in g  s e t s  a s  b asic  a g g r e g a te s  but ra th er  c o n s id e r s  c la s s e s  as  
e x te n s io n s  o f p r e d ic a te s . E sse n tia l to th is  move w as F r e g e ’s develop m en t  
of th e  log ic  o f q u an tifica tion . T h u s, for  F rege  th e  fou n d ation a l problem  
c h a n g e s  s in ce , ra th er  th an  in v o lv in g  a red u ctio n  o f one reg io n  of
m athem atics to a n o th er  realm  o f  e s se n t ia lly  m athem atical e n t it ie s , F rege
s e e s  th a t arith m etic  sh ou ld  be r e d u c ib le  to p u r e ly  lo g ica l c o n c e p ts , i .e ., 
to c o n c e p ts  w h ich  can  be d efin ed  p u r e ly  by log ica l m eans.
It is  s u r e ly  tru e  th a t p h ilo so p h y  became d eep ly  in v o lv ed  in  F r e g e ’s  
lo g ic is t  fou n d ation a l e n te r p r is e  and th u s  does p r e -d a te  th e  em ergen ce o f 
th e  p arad oxes. T his is  e v id e n c e d  by F r e g e ’s sy stem a tic  develop m en t of
p h ilo sop h ica l p r in c ip le s  w h ich  are in ten d ed  to gu id e  both th e  a n a ly s is  o f
m athem atics and of la n g u a g e  q u ite  g en era lly . So F r e g e ’s, program m e  
m akes as ex p lic it  a s  p o ss ib le  some of th e  r e a lis t  a ssu m p tion s o f c la ss ica l
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m athem atics and a ttem p ts to j u s t i fy  them  sy stem a tica lly . It is  for  th is
rea so n  th a t th e  em ergen ce  o f th e  p arad oxes in  h is  sy stem  are  so
p h ilo so p h ica lly  com p ellin g . T h ey  dem and some r e v is io n  in  r e a lis t  v iew s
h ith erto  ta c it ly  a c c ep te d  in  a c c e p tin g  c la ss ica l log ica l p r a c tice . So, one
of the le s s o n s  th a t Dummett draw s from  F reg e  is  a c h a ra c ter iza tio n  of
realism .
The p ara d o x es, or, r a th er  R u sse ll's  a ttem pt to  deal w ith  the  
p arad oxes, th u s  p r o v id e  an a p p o s ite  point o f d ep a r tu re  for  th is  
d isc u ss io n . S in ce  my in te r e s t  h ere  is  more n arrow ly  con fin ed  to  
su r v e y in g  some o f th e  c o n se q u e n c e s  and th e  c o h eren ce  o f th e  
a n t i-r e a lis t  v iew  I have' not a ttem p ted  a  sy stem a tic  ca ta logu e  o f a ttem p ts  
to  acco u n t for  and so lv e  th e  p arad oxes. In stea d  I h ave  draw n from  my 
d isc u ss io n  o f R u sse ll a scep tic ism  ab ou t an y  p o ss ib le  fou n d ation a l rô le  
for lo g ic  and h a v e  u se d  th a t to m otivate a Dummettian d esc r ip tio n  o f th e  
re la tion  b etw een  lo g ic  and a th e o r y  o f m eaning.
My u se  o f th e  term s " an ti-rea list"  and " intu ition ist"  r e q u ir e s  some 
comment. The form er is  a lw ays u se d  to r e fe r  to a sem antic p o sitio n  
w hich  a c c e p ts  c e r ta in  ep istem ic  c o n s tr a in ts  on th e  c en tra l notion  of th e  
sem antic th e o r y , or, b e tte r , it  is  a n y  p o sitio n  w h ich  c h a lle n g e s  a r e a lis t  
sem an tics for  u s in g  a n o t io n . w h ich  is  not exp la ined  a p p ro p r ia te ly  in  
term s o f our r eco g n itio n a l c a p a c it ie s . I u se  th e  secon d  term  far  more 
lo o se ly . On o cca sio n  it  is  to be tak en  a s  synonom ous w ith  an ti-rea lism  
(as ap p lied  to m athem atics) but more g e n e r a lly  it  is  ta k en  to be a 
p osition  w h ich  a d h e r e s  to som e v e r s io n  of in tu it io n is t ic  log ic  and th u s  is  
a p o sitio n  m arked ou t sim ply  by th e  e x te n t of it s  d ep a rtu re  from  
c la ss ic a l lo g ic , ra th er  th an  by i t s  m otivation  for  th a t d ep a rtu re . I hope  
th a t c o n tex t p r o v id e s  s u f f ic ie n t  d isam biguation . The on ly  po in t, th ou gh , 
at w hich th e  d is t in c tio n  is  c ru c ia l is  in  my d isc u ss io n  of s tr ic t  fin itism  
w h ere th e  q u e stio n  is  w h eth er  a n ti-r e a lis m  c o lla p ses  in to  a s tr ic t  f in it is t  
p o s itio n  or w h eth er  it  m otivates an in tu it io n is t  p osition .
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R ussell: From Ttie P r in c ip le s  o f  M a th em atics  to  P rin c ip ia  M athem atica:
The main fo c u s  o f my d isc u ss io n  in  th is  ch a p ter  is  th e  d evelop m en t o f  
R u sse ll’s  th o u g h t from  The P r in c ip le s  o f  M ath em atics  to  P rin c ip ia  
M athem atica. I h op e, th o u g h , to  show  th a t th e  in te r e s t  o f th is  
in v e s t ig a t io n  is  n ot c o n fin e d  p u r e ly  to  th e  b iograp h y  o f R u sse ll.
I assu m e th a t th e  c la s s ic a l  th e o r y  o f c la s s e s , th e  (so -c a lle d ) n a ive  
th e o r y  o f c la s s e s  b e to k en s , w hat M ichael Dummett w ould ca ll, a n a ive  
realism  w ith  r e s p e c t  to  c la s s e s . S in ce  th a t th e o r y  lea d s  to  co n tra d ic tio n  
n a ive  realism  ab ou t c la s s e s  m ust be w ron g . That is ,  th e  p arad oxes  
dem and "some ch a n g e  in  c u r r e n t  lo g ic a l assum p tions"  (to u se  R u sse ll's  
p h r a se ). The in te r e s t in g  q u e stio n  th e n  seem s to  be: How is  th is  r e v is io n  
in  log ica l p r a c tic e  to  be m otivated?
Now an y o n e  fam iliar w ith  Dum m ett’s w ork w ill be aw are o f h is  fo rc e fu l  
argu m en ts fo r  th e  v iew  th a t q u e s t io n s  o f th e  so u n d n e ss  o f a  lo g ica l 
sy stem  sh ou ld  be a p p ra ised  from  w ith in  th e  th e o r y  o f  m eaning. In  
p articu lar  in  The P h ilo so p h ic a l B a s is  o f  I n tu it io n is t ic  L og ic  h e  a r g u e s  
th a t an attem pt to  m otivate  a d e p a r tu r e  from  c la ss ic a l lo g ic  in  fa v o u r  o f  
in tu it io n is t ic  lo g ic  th a t is  n o t  b ased  on a v iew  ab ou t m eaning but i s  
b ased  on  a s p e c if ic  o n to lo g ica l v iew  o f  th e  s ta tu s  o f m athem atical o b je c ts  
m ust e ith e r  fa il to  m otivate a n y  r e v is io n  or m ust be b ased  on  a s e v e r e  
scep tic ism  (in  th is  c a se  ab ou t th e  tr u th  v a lu e s  o f su b ju n c t iv e  
co n d itio n a ls).
The prom ise o f th e  m eaning th e o r e t ic  ap proach  is  th u s , f ir s t  th a t it  
o ffe r s  a w ell-m otiva ted  r e a so n  for  r e je c t in g  realism  an d , se c o n d ly , that  
th e  r e v is io n  im posed  on  ou r f ir s t  o r d er  p r a c tice  is , a rg u a b ly , not too  
rad ica l. (A ssum ing, o f c o u r se , th a t you  h ave  no a n te c e d e n t  r ep u g n a n ce  
for a n y  p h ilo so p h ica lly  in sp ir e d  r e v is io n .)
What I th in k  we fin d  in  R u sse ll is  an attem pt to m otivate a r e v is io n  
in  log ica l p ra c tice  w h ich  is  n o t  based  on m ea n in g -th eo re tic  argu m en ts. 
His w ork th u s  o f fe r s  a p o ss ib le  cou n terexam ple to Dummett’s broad
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p osition . S in ce  R u sse llia n s  are now a fa ir ly  rare  p h ilo sop h ica l s p e c ie s , it  
w ould seem  th a t th is  is  not a counterexam ple w orth  ta k in g  v e r y  
s e r io u s ly . What I t r y  to d em on stra te  h ere  is  th a t d ia g n o sin g  th e  lacuna  
in  R u sse ll’s program m e i s  in s tr u c t iv e  in  th a t it  o f fe r s  some su p p o rt for  
th e  Dummettian program m e and in d ic a te s  how a Dummettian m ight deal 
w ith some of th e  prob lem s to do w ith  im p red ica tiv ity .
§1 C on stra in ts on  a S o lu tion  to th e  Paradoxes:
R u sse ll (1906a) a fte r  h a v in g  exam ined a se le c tio n  of th e  s e t  th e o re tic  
p arad oxes c o n c lu d e s ,
... th a t all o f  them  belon g  to  a certa in  ty p e , and th a t none o f them  
are e s s e n t ia lly  arith m etica l, but all belong  to lo g ic , and are to be 
so lv e d , th e r e fo r e , by some ch a n g e  in  c u r r en t log ica l a ssu m p tion s, 
(p .144)
The r ea so n  th a t R u sse ll g iv e s  fo r  h o ld in g  th a t th e  p arad oxes p o in t to  a 
fa ilin g  in  " cu rren t lo g ica l assum p tions"  is  th at all th e  know n  
c o n tra d ic tio n s  can  be m an u factu red  acco rd in g  to a "recipe" for  
c o n s tr u c t in g  w hat R u sse ll ca lls  " se lf-rep ro d u ctiv e"  c la s s e s  and  
p r o c e ss e s . That is , c u r r e n t  lo g ica l a ssu m p tion s perm it p r o p e r tie s  w h ich  
s a t is fy  th e  fo llow in g ,
G iven a p r o p e r ty  cp and a fu n c tio n  f, su ch  th at, if  cp b elo n g s to all 
th e  m em bers o f u, f  u a lw ays e x is t s , has th e  p r o p e r ty  cp, and is  not 
a member of u; th e n  the su p p o sit io n  th at th ere  is  a c la s s  w  o f all 
term s h a v in g  th e  p r o p e r ty  cp and th at f w  e x is t s  lead s to the  
co n c lu sio n  th a t f w  both  h as and has not the p r o p e r ty  cp. (1906c, 
p.199)
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e .g ., ta k e  cp to  be n o n -se lf-m e m b er sh ip , f  to be th e  id e n t ity  map. T hen if 
all th e  m em bers o f a c la s s  u h ave th e  p r o p e r ty  cp, i .e ., are  
n p n -se lf-m em b ered , th en , in  p a r ticu la r , u is  not a member o f  u (s in ce  if  
it  w ere a member of i t s e lf  we w ould c o n tra d ic t the a ssu m p tion  th a t all 
m em bers o f u h ave  th e  p r o p e r ty  cp, i .e ., are n o n -se lf-m em b ered ). So f  u 
( i.e ., u) e x is t s  and h as th e  p r o p e r ty  cp. w  is  th en  th e  paradoxical c la ss  
of n on -se lf-m em  bered  c la s s e s . S in ce , on th e  one hand , w e can  su b s t itu te  
w  for  u and d ed u ce  th a t w  is  n o t a member of w. W hilst, c o n v e r se ly , 
s in ce  cp, i .e ., n o n -se lf-m e m b er sh ip  b e lo n g s  to all m em bers o f w, we know  
th a t w  sh ou ld  h ave  th e  p r o p e r ty  cp and th u s  is  a member of w. For th e  
B u ra li-F orti co n tra d ic tio n  tak e  cp to be th e  p r o p e r ty  of b ein g  a  
w ell-o r d e re d  s e r ie s  o f o rd in a ls , f  to  be th e  map from  a w e ll-o rd ered  
s e r ie s  to i t s  ord in a l num ber, th en  i f  u is  a s e r ie s  of o rd in a ls  th e  map f  
from u to it s  ord in a l ta k e s  u to a s e t  h av in g  th e  p r o p e r ty  o f b ein g  a 
w ell o rd ered  s e r ie s  o f o rd in a ls  w h ich  is  not in c lu d ed  in  u (s in ce  th e  
ord in a l o f a s e r ie s  o f o rd in a ls  ca n n o t be in c lu d ed  in  th a t s e r ie s ) , w  w ill 
be th e  s e r ie s  o f a ll o rd in a ls , f w  th en  both is  and is  n ot a s e r ie s  o f  
ord in a ls  b eca u se , on th e  one hand , w  is  th e  s e r ie s  o f all o rd in a ls  so f w  
m ust be in c lu d ed  in  w. But, on  th e  o th er  hand, s in ce  f w  is  th e  ord inal 
of w  it  m ust o ccu r  in  th e  s e r ie s  a fte r  w, so  can n ot be in c lu d ed  in  w.
R u sse ll ta k es  th is  sp e c if ic a tio n  of th e  g e n era l form  of the  
co n tra d ic tio n s  to be im portant b eca u se  he r e g a rd s  it  a s  sh ow in g  th a t all 
th e  co n tra d ic tio n s  a r ise  from c e r ta in  log ica l a ssu m p tion s; f ir s t ,  about  
w hich  p r o p e r tie s  e x is t  and, se co n d , th a t a p r o p e r ty  a lw ays cieterm ines a 
c la ss . T hus th e  co n tra d ic tio n s  are to be trea ted  a s  a ch a llen g e  to  
sp e c if ic a lly  log ica l a ssu m p tion s: ar ith m etic  a ssu m p tion s ab ou t th e  n atu re  
of th e  tr a n sf in ite  are not im plicated  in the ab ove sp ec ifica tio n . In  
(1906c) R u sse ll u r g e s  th a t P o incaré is  w rong in la y in g  th e  blame for  the  
paradoxes on the assu m p tion  th a t th e re  is  an actu a l in fin ite  s in ce , in  h is  
view , the sem antic  p arad oxes (w hich R u sse ll ta k es  to be o f a p iece  w ith  
th e  s e t  th eo re tic  parad oxes) and , in  p articu lar , the liar paradox do not
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in v o lv e  c la s s e s  a t a ll (a lth o u g h  th e y  can  be c o n str u e d  a s  in v o lv in g
q u a n tifica tio n ). The problem  th u s  l ie s  in  some so r t  o f s e lf -r e fe r e n c e .
H owever R u sse ll, in  th e  sam e p ap er , d oes su b sc r ib e  to P o in ca re’s
d ia g n o sis  o f th e  so u r c e  o f th e  p arad oxes as ly in g  in  some k ind  of
v ic io u s  c ir c u la r ity . The p r e c ise  form ulation  of th e  V icious Circle
P rin c ip le  (VCP) n eed  n ot d eta in  u s  h ere . For now, all I w ant to note is
th a t R u sse ll d oes n ot s e e  h is  ta sk  a s  h a v in g  been  com pleted  on
form ulating  th e  VCP. The VCP, if  im plem ented a s  a m eans o f q u a lify in g
d e fin it io n s  so  a s  to  exem pt p arad oxica l c a s e s  w ill co n tra v e n e  th e
p r in c ip le  it  e x p r e s s e s , .
H aving f ir s t  p u t E="all n u m b ers d efin ab le  in  a f in ite  num ber of  
w ords" , we a r r iv e  a t a paradox, due, s a y s  M, P o in caré, to  our  
h a v in g  in c lu d ed  a num ber o n ly  d efin ab le  in  a f in ite  num ber of  
w ord s by m eans o f E. T h is v ic io u s  c irc le  he p r o p o se s  to avoid  by  
d efin in g  E a s  "all num bers d efin a b le  in  a f in ite  num ber of w ords  
w ith ou t m en tion ing E." To th e  u n in itia ted , th is  d e fin itio n  look s more 
c ircu la r  th an  e v e r . (1906c, pp . 196-7)
R u sse ll w an ts  to s o lv e  th e  p a ra d o x es. That is ,  he w an ts to  d eve lop  a 
log ica l sy stem  w h ich  .is in te r n a lly  c o n stra in ed  in  a m anner w h ich  e n su r e s  
th a t th e  VCP can n ot be c o n tra v e n e d . R u sse ll th u s  ta k es  th e  VCP it s e lf  to  
perform  a p u r e ly  n e g a tiv e  ro le  in  th a t it  is  n eed ed  to  ru le  ou t p o ss ib le  
sy ste m s.
But R u sse ll d o es  not o n ly  r e q u ir e  th a t a so lu tion  o b e y s  th e  VCP and  
is  th u s  co n tra d ic tio n  fr e e . The tec h n ic a l reform  we are d r iv en  to ca rry  
o u t in  th e  lo g ic  i t s e lf  m ust be w ell m otivated: in  c a n v a ss in g  p o ss ib le  .
IG _o b je c tio n s  to th e  Z ig -za g  Theory-*- R u sse ll n o tes  th at th e  axioms it ca lls  
for  "cannot be recom m ended by a n y  in tr in s ic  p lau sib ility"  (1906a, p .147); 
th e  T h eory  o f Lim itation of Size^ he f in d s , c o n tra ry  to f ir s t  im p ressio n s, 
to lack  p la u s ib ility . S im ilarly , w hen  R u sse ll a d v o c a tes  a v e r s io n  of w hat 
has come to  be know n as h is  su b st itu t io n a l th e o r y  he recom m ends it  not 
sim ply for  a v o id in g  th e  co n tra d ic tio n s  but a lso  for th e  sim plification  it  
b r in g s  ab ou t in  "the fu n dam enta l a ssu m p tio n s, th e  prim itive p ro p o sitio n s  
up on  w h ich  th e  e d ific e  is  built" . R u sse ll n o tes  th a t, "we do n ot d en y  
th at th e r e  are su ch  e n t it ie s  Las c la s s e s  and r e la tio n s] , we m erely  a b sta in  
from  affirm ing  th a t th e r e  are" (1906b, p . 188),
T hus R u sse ll ta k e s  se r io u s ly  th e  need  to a rg u e  for  a n y  p rop osed  
tech n ica l so lu tio n  from  a p e r s p e c t iv e  o th er  th an  th at sim ply of sh ow in g  
th a t th e  p ro p o sa l m anages to ban th e  em ergen ce o f co n tra d ic tio n s . 
R u sse ll w an ts h is  so lu tion  to h ave  "a c e r ta in  co n so n a n ce  w ith  common 
sen se" , A fin a l c o n str a in t  p laced  by R u sse ll on an a ccep ta b le  so lu tion  is  
th at th e  r e su lt in g  sy stem  sh ou ld  allow th e  d evelop m ent o f an  
•’a c c e p ta b ly ” la rg e  p ortion  o f m athem atics. The s o r ts  o f co n sid era tio n  
w hich  R u sse ll u s e s  and is  ab le  to  u se  in  c o n str u c t in g  su c h  m otivational 
argu m en ts w ill be th e  c e n tra l c o n cern  of th is  ch a p ter . In  ord er  to tea se  
ou t th e  develop m en t o f su c h  c o n s id er a tio n s  I now need  to c a n v a ss  some 
o f R u sse ll’s e a r ly  v iew s . In p a r ticu la r , I b eg in  by tra c in g  h is ea r ly  
o n to log ica l p e r s p e c t iv e .
1. T his is  th e  th e o r y  th a t p re p o s itio n a l fu n c tio n s  "determ ine c la se s  w hen  
th e y  are fa ir ly  sim ple and o n ly  fa il to do so  w h en  th e y  are  com plicated  
or recon d ite ."  The problem  it fa c e s  is ,  a s  R u sse ll n o te s , th a t se le c tio n  of 
th e  axioms w h ich  ch a ra c te r iz e  s im p lic ity  is  g u id ed  o n ly  by avo id an ce  of 
the c o n tra d ic tio n s .
2. T his is  th e  th e o r y  th at .all p rop er  c la s s e s  h ave  a certa in  s ize  
p r o p e r ty  e .g ., "of b ein g  cap ab le  o f b ein g  a rran ged  in  a w e ll-o rd ered  
s e r ie s  o rd in a lly  sim ilar to a seg m en t o f th e  s e r ie s  o f o rd in a ls  in  ord er  
of m agnitude". ’ ,
11§2 R u sse ll’s  E arly O ntological Views;
My s ta r t in g  p o in t is  R u sse ll’s  P r in c ip le s  o f  M ath em atics  (1903). I w ant to 
look at th e  w ay in  w h ich  co n tra d ic tio n s  of two s o r ts  (th e  f ir s t  so r t  
b ein g  th e  r e fle x iv e  p arad oxes m entioned ab ove w h ils t  th e  seco n d  so r t  
co n c e rn s  p lu ra l o b je c ts  and th e  d istin c tio n  b etw een  th e  c la s s  a s  m an y  
and a s  one) make th e ir  a p p earan ce  w ith in  th a t sy stem  and th en  to  go on  
to  show  how R u sse ll a ttem p ts to  u se  th e  in n ovation  of th e  notion  o f an  
incom plete sym bol, in ti’o d u ced  in  "On Denoting" (1905), to so lv e  both  
so r ts  of co n tra d ic tio n . One of th e  main ta sk s  of th is  d isc u ss io n  is  to  
show  th a t R u sse ll im plem ents th is  program m e by p la c in g  ep istem olog ica l 
c o n str a in ts  on h is  sy stem  of lo g ic . T h ese  ep istem olog ica l co n s tr ia n ts , we 
sh a ll s e e , are prob lem atic  to  a p p ly  and and fa il to  g iv e  an  a d eq u ate  
m otivation  for  R u sse ll’s fin a l sy stem .
The o n to lo g y  o f The P r in c ip le s  is  determ in ed  by th e  fo llow in g  
d octr in e .
W hatever may be an o b je c t  o f th o u g h t, or may occu r  in  a n y  tru e  or  
fa lse  p ro p o sitio n , or can  be cou n ted  as one, I sh a ll ca ll a term . 
(1903, p.43)
T hus for R u sse ll n o th in g  can  b e  exem pted from b ein g  a term  (or, 
syn o n y m o u sly , an e n tity )  s in ce  to d en y  th a t som eth in g  is  a term  or an  
e n t ity  w ould be to make th a t th in g  th e  su b je c t  o f a p ro p o sitio n . T hus  
th e  den ia l o f term hood w ould p r e su p p o se  th e  term hood of th e  th in g  
i t s e lf  and w ould th u s  be se lf -c o n tr a d ic to r y .
Terms come in  two v a r ie tie s ;  th in g s  and c o n c e p ts . A th in g  may o n ly  
occu r in  a p ro p o sitio n  as th e  s u b je c t  of the p rop osition . C on cepts may 
occu r  in p r o p o sitio n s  both  a s  th e  su b je c t  of th e  p ro p o sitio n  and as  
p re d ica te s  (a d je c t iv e s )  or r e la tin g  re la tio n s (v e r b s ) , i .e ., a s  re la tio n s  in  
in ten sio n . A co n c e p t in  i t s  nom inal form  is  id en tica l w ith  i t s  v e r b a l or
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a d je c tiv a l form . T h us "hum anity" and "being human" are both sym b ols  
for th e  same co n c e p t, th e  form er g iv e s  the nom inal form , th e  la tter  th e  
a d je c tiv a l form . The rea so n  for  th is  is  th at it  p r o v e s  im p ossib le  to  
a s s e r t  th at th e re  is  a d iffe r e n c e  betw een  th e  tw o form s. R u sse ll sum s  
th is  up,
... i f  th e r e  w ere  a n y  a d je c t iv e s  w hich  could  n ot be made in to  
s u b s ta n t iv e s  w ith ou t c h a n g e  o f m eaning, all p r o p o sitio n s  c o n cern in g  
su ch  a d je c t iv e s  (s in c e  th e y  w ould n e c e ssa r ily  tu r n  them  in to  
s u b s ta n t iv e s )  w ould be fa lse , and so  would th e  p rop osition  th a t all 
su c h  p r o p o s itio n s  are fa lse , s in ce  th is  in  i t s e lf  tu r n s  th e  a d je c t iv e s  
in to  s u b s ta n t iv e s . B ut th is  s ta te  o f th in g s  is  s e lf -c o n tr a d ic to r y .  
(1903, p .46)
The p o in t is  th a t if  we t r y  to  a s s e r t  th a t one  a s  a d je c t iv e  d iffe r s  from  
1 as term  th e n  on e  a s  a d je c t iv e  is  b ein g  u sed  su b sta n tiv a lly . T his m eans  
th at e ith e r  th e  p ro p o sitio n  is  fa ls e  b ecau se  w h en  u se d  ' a s a term  one  
becom es id en tica l w ith  1, or e ls e  th e r e  is  a fu r th e r  d iffe r en ce  betw een  
on e  and 1 o v e r  and a b ove  th e  fa c t  th a t th e  f ir s t  is  u sed  as an a d je c tiv e  
and th e  secon d  a s  a term . But th is  m eans th at all p ro p o sitio n s  about one  
as a d je c t iv e  are fa lse  s in ce  su ch  p r o p o sitio n s  trea t one  su b s ta n tiv a lly  
and th u s  make it  a term . So for  R u sse ll e v e r y th in g  m ust be cap ab le of  
a p p ear in g  a s  th e  s u b je c t  o f a p rop osition . The w ord "term" h as th e  
w id est p o ss ib le  sco p e .
Two d iff ic u lt ie s  fo llow  from  th is  v iew  s in ce  both the u n ity  o f th e  
p rop osition  and th e  e x is te n c e  o f p lu ra l o b je c ts  are som ew hat m y stify in g  
on th is  p ic tu r e . The u n ity  o f th e  p ro p o sitio n  is  problem atic b ecau se  th e  
p rop osition  can n ot be tre a te d  sim ply  a s  a l is t  o f term s w hich  o ccu r  in  
it. A minimal a cco u n t w ill a t le a s t  have to be s e n s it iv e  to th e  fa c t  th a t  
some term  is  not occu rrin g , in  th e  p rop osition  su b sta n tiv a lly . But th is  
m eans th a t th ere  is  som e ( in effa b le ) d iffe r en ce  betw een  th e  term  u sed
13 . -su b s ta n tiv a lly  and th e  term  u se d  a d je c t iv a lly  or v e r b a lly . The secon d
d iff ic u lty  c o n c e rn in g  p lu ra l o b je c ts  a r is e s  b ecau se  c e r ta in  p r e d ica tio n s
w hich  hold o f a co llectio n , p arad igm atica lly , p red ica tio n  o f a sp e c if ic
n u m erosity , can n ot be tre a te d  a s  d is tr ib u t iv e  p red ica tio n s  o v er  th e
m em bers o f th e  co llectio n . For in s ta n c e , "Horace and H erbert are two"
can n ot be read  a s  "Horace is  two and H erbert is  two". T his in d ica te s
th a t we n eed  to  h ave  a co n c e p tio n  of th e  co llection  a s  m any (p r e c ise ly
b ecau se  if  we o n ly  had a c o n cep tio n  of th e  co llectio n  as one we could
not sa y  th a t th e r e  w as a n y th in g  o th er  than  one o b je c t) . So we m ust
h ave  a n otion  of o b je c t  w h ich  in c lu d e s  both term s and e s se n t ia lly  p lu ra l
‘O b jects , i .e ., th e  w ord "object" m ust h ave a w ider sco p e  th an  th a t of
."term" (cf. (1903) p .55). T h is, for  R u sse ll, is  a m atter o f some s ig n if ic a n t
d e g r e e  o f lo g ica l p u zzlem en t. I sh a ll r e tu r n  to  th is  q u e stio n  w hen
d is c u ss in g  R u sse ll’s f ir s t  th e o r y  o f ty p e s .
I need  now to  tu rn  to  th e  from  o f R u sse ll’s th e o ry  and , in  p articu lar , 
to th e  a cco u n t o f com plex e n t it ie s .  Of param ount im portance w ill be 
R u sse ll’s a cco u n t o f p r o p o s itio n s  a s  com plex e n t it ie s . R u sse ll’s  prim ary  
con cern  is  not w ith  la n g u a g e . In d eed  he n o tes  th at "m eaning in  th e  
s e n s e  in  w h ich  w ord s h ave m ean ing, is  ir r e le v a n t  to logic" (19Ü3, p .47). 
R u ssell is  in te r e s te d  in  c a ta lo g u in g  th e  m anner in  w h ich  e n t it ie s  com bine  
to form com plex e n t it ie s . A p ro p o s itio n  is  p art o f th e  realm o f r e fe r e n c e , 
it  is  w hat c e r ta in  e x p r e ss io n s  in  our la n g u a g e  . m ight mean. The 
p rop osition  is  n ot com posed  o f w ord s but o f e n t it ie s  and is  i t s e lf  a 
com plex e n t ity . We can  th u s  se e  R u sse ll’s log ica l program m e as s e r v in g  
on to log ica l en d s: lo g ic  g iv e s  an  a cco u n t of w hat so r t  o f e n t it ie s  th e re  
are and how th e se  may be com bined to form com plex e n t it ie s . L ogic, by  
a p r o c e ss  of a n a ly s is , r e v e a ls  in  term s of th e  u tm ost g e n e r a lity  w hat 
th ere  is .
In ad d ition , R u sse ll w an ts to a n a ly se  ju d gem en t on th e  model of 
acq u a in tan ce, th a t is , he w an ts  to a n a ly se  ju d gem en t as a two p lace  
rela tion  h o ld in g  betw een  th e  ju d g e r  and the o b je c t  o f ju d gem en t, th e
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p rop osition . T h us w h en  we ju d g e  fa ls e ly  (b u t m ean in gfu lly ) th e re  m ust 
n e v e r - t h e - le s s  be an o b je c t  o f ju d gem en t. F a lse  p r o p o sitio n s , th e re fo r e , 
m ust h ave  b e in g , i .e ., are com plex e n t it ie s  in  th e  same s e n s e  th a t tru e  
p r o p o sitio n s  are com plex e n t it ie s  w h ich  are p o ss ib le  o b je c ts  o f  
ju d gem en t. T here is  no o n to lo g ica l d is tin c tio n  b etw een  tru e  and fa lse  
p ro p o sitio n s . R ather, tru th  and fa ls ity  are prim itive p r o p e r tie s  of 
p ro p o sitio n s . E ven  g r a n tin g  th e  im p lau sib ility  of th e r e  b e in g  fa lse  
p ro p o sitio n s  th is  p o s itio n  is  p a te n tly  u n sa tis fa c to r y  s in ce  it  g iv e s  no 
accou n t o f th e  ro le  o f th e  notion  o f tr u th , it  is  u t te r ly  m y ster io u s  a s  to 
w h y we sh ou ld  p r e fe r  tru e  to  fa ls e  p ro p o sitio n s . R u sse ll is  far from  
blind to th e se  prob lem s and th e y  in c r e a s in g ly  dem and h is  a tten tio n . 
Thus R u sse ll in  1910 v a u n ts  h is  M ultiple R elation th e o ry  o f ju d gem en t as  
o ffe r in g  th e  o u tlin e s  o f an a cco u n t of ju d gem en t (and of p ro p o sitio n s)  
w hich  d oes d is t in g u ish  b etw een  tru e  and fa lse  p r o p o sitio n s  in  term s of 
w h eth er or n ot th e  r e su lt in g  com plex c o r re sp o n d s  to a  fa c t . The nub of 
th at th e o r y  aga in  c o n s is its  in  an  exp lo ita tion  of incom plete  sym bols; 
p rep o sitio n a l e x p r e ss io n s  are tr e a te d  a s  incom plete. T ru th  i s  th u s  fin a lly  
exp la ined  in  term s of c o r re sp o n d en ce . H owever w e’v e  s t i l l  some d ista n ce  
to tra v e l b efore  we m eet th a t R u sse ll. The R u sse ll o f th e  f ir s t  few  y e a r s  
of th e  c e n tu r y  (ce r ta in ly  u n til 1907) drew  a tten tio n  to th e se  a s p e c ts  of 
h is v iew  of ju d gem en t (and th u s  o f p ro p o sitio n s) but did not a ccep t  
them as o ffe r in g  a deep  ch a lle n g e  to th at view : he w as in c lin ed  to  
a ccep t th a t our p r e fe r e n c e  for  tr u e  p ro p o sitio n s  is  p erh a p s to be 
exp la ined  a s  "an ultim ate e th ica l proposition"  (1904, p .76),
§3 D enoting  C oncepts:
We need  now to look a t R u sse ll’s exp lan ation  of how p r o p o sitio n s  can  be 
ab ou t e n t it ie s  w h ich  are not c o n s t itu e n ts  o f the pi’op osition . It is  
e s s e n t ia l  th a t R u sse ll sh ou ld  r e c o g n iz e  th is  p o ss ib ility  for  (at lea st) two 
r e a so n s . F ir st, it  is  th is  fe a tu r e  o f p ro p o sitio n s  w hich allow s th o u g h t to
15  ‘tra n sc e n d  th e  b ou n d s o f im m ediate acq u a in tan ce and th u s  is  an  
im portant e ielm ent in  R u sse ll’s  a n ti-id ea lism . In The P r in c ip le s  R u sse ll 
o n ly  h in ts  at th is . The th o u g h t is  far  more fu lly  d ev e lo p ed  in  "On 
Denoting" w h ere it  is  c le a r ly  a c o n se q u e n c e  o f th e  p r in c ip le  of 
acq u a in tan ce  w hich  he th e re  form u la tes . The P rin cip le  o f A cqu ain tance  
s ta te s  th a t,
in  e v e r y  p ro p o sitio n  th a t we can  ap p reh en d  (i.e . not o n ly  th o se  
w h ose tr u th  or fa lseh o o d  we ca n  ju d g e  o f, but in  all th a t we can  
th in k  ab ou t), a ll th e  c o n s t itu e n ts  are  rea lly  e n t it ie s  w ith  w h ich  we 
h ave  im m ediate a cq u a in ta n ce . (1905, pp  55-6)
T hus if  a p ro p o sitio n  cou ld  n e v e r  be ab ou t som eth ing  w h ich  w as not one  
o f i t s  c o n s t itu e n ts  we cou ld  n ot c o n c e iv e  o f com plexes w ith  w h ich  we 
w ere not (or cou ld  not be) a cq u a in ted . T his notion  of a p rop osition  
bein g  "about" som eth in g  o th er  th an  a c o n stitu e n t  th u s  g iv e s  r is e  to 
R u sse ll’s  d is tin c tio n  b etw een  k n o w led g e  by acq u a in ta n ce  and know ledge  
b y  d escrip tion : we can  h ave  k n o w led g e  about cer ta in  e n t it ie s  (R u ssell 
m entions th e  c e n tr e  o f m ass o f th e  so lar  system ) w ith  w h ich  we h ave  no 
a cq u a in tan ce. But a lso  we a p p reh en d  com plexes w h ose  tru th  va lu e  we 
are u n ab le  to determ in e s in ce  th e y  are about e n t it ie s  w ith  w h ich  we 
h ave  no a cq u a in tan ce. (This a n t i- id e a lis t  p o sitio n  in fla te s  in to  a 
fu ll-b lo w n  realism  w h en  com bined w ith  R u sse ll’s u n argu ed  for assu m p tion  
th a t c la s s ic a l log ic  is  va lid  u n d er  its  orth odox  tru th  con d ition al 
in te r p r e ta tio n . S in ce  th en  all p ro p o s itio n s  are d eterm in ate ly  e ith er  tru e  
or fa lse .)
A lthough  R u sse ll n e v e r  e x p lic it ly  form ulates th e  p r in c ip le  of 
a cq u a in tan ce  in  The P r in c ip le s  th a t work d oes seem  to be ta c it ly  
inform ed by su c h  a v iew . One r ea so n  for  ho ld ing  th is  is  c ircu m stan tia l, 
in  th at R u sse ll d oes n ot a n n ou n ce  th e  p r in c ip le  as a ch a n g e  in  h is v iew . 
But more im p ortan tly  R u sse ll’s  a n a ly s is  o f p r o p o sitio n s  is  gu id ed
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(d e sp ite  h is  p r o fe s s e d  lack  of in te r e s t  in  la n g u a g e) by gram m atical form  
and c o n s id er a tio n s  ab ou t re la tio n s  b etw een  p r o p o sitio n s  (e .g ., su c h  as  
w hen I sa y  "I met a man." I am sp e a k in g  about a p a rticu la r  man w ith , 
sa y , a d ru n k en  w ife  and a pub  e tc .) . When, h ow ever  he com es to  
exam ining w hat it  is  to a p p reh en d  a p ro p o sitio n  (as he d oes w h en  he  
exam ines M einong’s  v iew s) he ta k e s  assu m in g  a p ro p o sitio n  -w h ich  is  no 
more th an  a p p r e h e n d in g  i t -  to  be eq u iv a le n t to p r e s e n tin g  the  
p rop osition  to o n e se lf . P r e se n tin g  a com plex is  se en  on  th e  model o f  
p r e se n tin g  a p a rticu la r  (and to be p r e se n te d  w ith  a p a rticu la r  is  ju s t  to  
be acq u a in ted  w ith  it) . R u sse ll d oes n ot commit h im self to- a p articu lar  
v iew  of w hat is  in v o lv e d  in  p r e s e n tin g  a com plex. He r e je c ts  th e  id ea  
th a t p r e se n ta tio n  o f a com plex is  a com plex o f p r e se n ta t io n s  s in ce  th e  
la tter  is  not g u a ra n teed  th e  u n ity  o f th e  form er. H ow ever he is  a lso  
d u b iou s about su p p o s in g  th a t a p r e sen ta tio n  of a com plex is  to  be 
reg a rd ed  a s  a sim ple p r e sen ta tio n . It seem s lik e ly  th at a p r e se n ta tio n  of  
a com plex dem ands a t le a s t  th e  p o s s ib il ity  o f th e  p r e sen ta tio n  of th e  
c o n s titu e n ts . In d eed  it  is  hard  to  e n v isa g e  w hat th e  p r o c e ss  o f a n a ly s is  
a c h ie v e s  u n le s s  it  is  lin k ed  to  som e su ch  p o ss ib ility . T his su p p o r ts  th e  
id ea  th a t th e  ep istem o lo g y  im plicit in  The P r in c ip le s  is  at lea st  
c o n s is te n t  w ith  th e  p r in c ip le  of acq u a in tan ce. F u rth er  it  is  c lear  from  
R u sse ll's  d isc u ss io n  of in fin ite  c la s s e s  th a t he su p p o se s  th a t  
p r o p o sitio n s , or a t le a s t  p ro p o s itio n s  w hich we g r a sp , can  not be 
in fin ite ly  com plex. He claim s th a t w h ere  we u se  a c o n cep t to d en ote  an  
in fin ite  c la s s  th a t co n c e p t m ust do so  by g iv in g  an in te n s io n a l  
sp e c if ic a tio n  of th e  c la s s , th a t, "the co n cep t a ll n u m b ers , th o u g h  not 
i t s e lf  in fin ite ly  com plex, y e t  d e n o te s  an in fin ite ly  com plex ob ject"  (1903 
p .73). "This," he claim s, "is th e  inm ost s e c r e t  o f our pow er to deal w ith  
in fin ity"  s in ce  an  in f in ite ly  com plex co n cep t "could not be m anipulated  
by th e  human in te llig en ce"  (1903, p .73). If it  w ere not th e  ca se  th at  
a p p reh en sio n  of a com plex dem anded some mode of acq u a in tan ce  w ith  its  
c o n s t itu e n ts  it  w ould be d iff ic u lt  to se e  w hy we cou ld  not g r a sp  a
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com plex w h ich  w as show n , on a n a ly s is , to be in fin ite ly  com plex. The fa c t
th at a r e g r e s s  o f a n a ly s is  (as o p p o sed  to im plication) is  anathem a to
R u sse ll p resu m ab ly  has th e  sam e ep istem olog ica l so u r c e . (A lthough
R u sse ll (1918) in  r e sp o n se  to a q u estio n  r e v o k e s  th is  a b h o rren ce  and
adm its th a t it  is  q u ite  p o ss ib le  th a t a n a ly s is  sh ou ld  be w ith ou t en d . By
th at tim e, h ow ever , R u sse ll had ad op ted  the m etap h ysica l p o s itio n  o f
log ica l atomism.)
T hus th e  th e o r y  o f d en o tin g  c o n c e p ts  from  it s  v e r y  in cep tio n  
p erform s som eth in g  of an ep istem olog ica l ro le  in  a c c o u n tin g  for  our  
a p p r e h en sio n  of c e r ta in  com p lexes. That role is  made m uch more ex p lic it  
in  th e  a cco u n t o f d en o tin g  g iv e n  in  "On Denoting" but th a t ro le  is  
n e v e r  far  from  R u sse iT s m ind, as th is  p a ss in g  rem ark in  th e  op en in g  
p aragrap h  o f th e  c h a p ter  on d en o tin g  in  The P r in c ip le s  g iv e s  w itn e ss  
to.
T his n otion  Li.e. th e  lo g ica l n o tion  of denotingJ lie s  at th e  bottom ... 
of th e  o p p o sitio n  betw een  th in g s  and id ea s, d is c u r s iv e  th o u g h t and  
im m ediate p e r c ep tio n . (1903, p .53)
The secon d  rea so n  w h y d en o tin g  c o n c e p ts  are im portant for  R u sse ll 
is  th a t a d en o tin g  p h ra se  su c h  as "a dog" o c c u r s  in  th e  su b je c t  
p o sitio n  of a p ro p o sitio n , e .g ., "A dog bit her  cat." . The se n te n c e  is  
about a s p e c fic  dog (as R u sse ll m ight have sa id , a sp e c if ic  dog w ith  a 
k en n el in  th e  g a rd en  and a gru m p y, c a t-h a tin g  ow ner) and th a t dog is , 
of co u r se , a s p e c if ic  e n t ity . What R u sse ll n eed s  to exp la in  i s  how an  
e n t ity  c o r re sp o n d in g  to "a dog" can  o ccu r  in th e  su b je c t  p o sitio n  o f a 
p ro p o sitio n  w ith ou t th a t p ro p o sitio n  th en  being  ab ou t th a t e n t ity . 
D enoting c o n c e p ts  h a v e  th e  p ecu liar  p r o p e r ty  th a t w h en  th e y  o ccu r  in  a 
p rop osition  the p ro p o sitio n  is  n e v e r  about th e  d en otin g  c o n cep t its e lf  
but ab ou t th e  o b je c t  d en oted  by th e  d en otin g  co n cep t. The re la tion  of 
d en otation  o b ta in in g  b etw een  th e se  two e n t it ie s  a lw ays rem ains som ew hat
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m y ster io u s so  it  is  q u estio n a b le  w h eth er  R u sse ll in  h is  u se  o f th a t  
notion  has done more than  label a phenom enon. I sh a ll r e tu r n  to 
R u sse ll’s own cr itic ism  of The P r in c ip le s  th e o ry  of d en o tin g  c o n c e p ts  
below.
F irst, we m ust look a little  more c lo se ly  at th e  d eta il o f th a t th e o ry . 
If a is  a p re d ica te  th en  a n y  of th e  fo llow ing is  a d en o tin g  con cep t; all 
a, e v e r y  a, a n y  a, an a, some a, th e  a. R u sse ll’s in itia l d isc u ss io n  of 
d en o tin g  c o n c e p ts  is  c o n fin ed , f ir s t ,  to  illu s tr a t in g  th e  d iffe r e n c e s  
betw een  th e  v a r io u s  d en o tin g  c o n c e p ts  and, se co n d ly , to sh ow in g  th a t  
th e se  d iffe r e n c e s  are to  be a cco u n ted  for  not in  term s of a d iffe r e n t  
m anner o f d en o tin g  in  each  ca se  but in  term s of d iffe r e n t  o b je c ts  
den oted  in  each  ca se . The o b je c ts  d en oted  w ill in  an y  g iv e n  c a se  be a 
p articu lar  com bination  o f term s, th e  n atu re  o f th e  com bination  is  
determ in ed  by th e  p a rticu la r  d en o tin g  co n cep t. The com b inations so  
form ed are n ot, or , at an y  ra te , are not a lw ays, th em se lv e s  term s. T hus  
we h a v e  p lu ra l and am biguous o b je c ts  w h ich  are not term s. (I noted  
ab ove  th e  s tr a in  th is  p la ces  on R u sse ll’s  notion  of term  s in ce  it  im plies
th a t th e  n otion  of o b je c t  is  w ider th an  th e  su p p o se d ly  maximally
ap p licab le  notion  of term . R u sse ll th in k s  th at he can liv e  w ith  th is
anom aly s in ce  in  an y  p ro p o sitio n  ab ou t a p lu ra l o b je c t , sa y , "A and B
are 2" th e r e  is  no  s u b je c t  s in ce  we can  take none o f A, B or A~and~B  to 
be th e  su b je c t .)
What so r t  of o b je c ts  do th e  v a r io u s  d en o tin g  c o n c e p ts  denote?  "All 
a’s" d e n o tes  th e  p lu ra l o b je c t  form ed by a d d it iv e ly  com bining all e n t it ie s  
w h ich  are a's. In o th er  w ord s, "all a’s" is  th e  co n cep t of the c la s s  of  
a’8 (a is  ca lled  th e  c la s s  co n cep t) and th e  o b je c t  den oted  is  th e  c la s s  of 
a's co n s id er e d  a s  a c la s s  a s  one. "E very a" d is tr ib u t iv e ly  d e n o tes  each  
term  of th e  c la ss  o f a’s , i t  d e n o te s  th e  c la s s  of a’s co n s id er e d  as a c la s s  
as many. "Any a" d e n o te s  an am biguous a, i.e ., it  d en o tes  th e  p erm iss iv e  
d is ju n ctio n  of th e  term s in  th e  c la s s  of a’s in  the s e n s e  th a t it  is  
ir r e le v a n t  w h ich  a we fo c u s  on  in  p articu lar  and we may fo cu s  on  anj’’
19  .one. "An a" d e n o te s  th e  d is ju n ctio n  of e n t it ie s  w hich  are a’s  w h ere  the  
d is ju n ctio n  is  tak en  n o n -p e r m iss iv e ly  as in s is t in g  th a t no on e p articu lar  
a m ust be tak en . F in a lly , "some a" d en o tes  th e  d is ju n ctio n  o f e n t it ie s  
w hich  are  a w h ere  th e  d is ju n ctio n  is  tak en  d is tr ib u t iv e ly , i .e ., w h ere  it  
not ir r e le v a n t  w h ich  a is  to  be c o n s id er e d  but th e  m anner o f d en ota tion  
r e fu s e s  to s p e c ify  w h ich ,
R u sse ll d is c u s s e s  d en o tin g  c o n c e p ts  o f th e  form  "the a" sep a r a te ly . 
His d isc u ss io n  is  brief. D enoting  c o n c e p ts  o f th is  form  fu n ctio n  o n ly  
w hen we h ave  a p r o p e r ty  w h ich  is  u n iq u e ly  sa tis f ie d . When th a t is  so  
we can  form  p r o p o s itio n s  ab ou t th e  p articu lar  o b je c t  w h ich  s a t is f ie s  th e  
p ro p erty  by m eans o f th e  d e fin ite  d e scr ip tio n . T his is  u se fu l s in ce  many 
d efin it io n s  are fe r t ile  ju s t  b eca u se  th e y  en ab le  u s  to fo c u s  on  one  
e n t ity  w h o se  p r e c ise  n a tu re  is  n ot o f im portance sa v e  for  th e  fa c t  th at  
th e y  u n iq u e ly  p o s s e s s  a c e r ta in  p r o p e r ty . S ta tem en ts o f id e n tity  are  
show n to  be in form ative  w h en  th e  r e su lt in g  p ro p o sitio n  in c lu d e s  e ith er  
two d e fin ite  d e sc r ip tio n  d en o tin g  c o n c e p ts  (w hich, o f c o u r se  d en ote  th e  
same e n tity )  or one d e fin ite  d e sc r ip tio n  d en otin g  co n c e p t and th e  e n t ity  
i t s e lf . So we may ap p reh en d  p ro p o sitio n s  co n ta in in g  th e  d en otin g  
c o n cep t w ith ou t b e in g  aw are o f w h ich  o b je c t  is  th u s  d en oted . The 
id e n tity  sta tem en t e ith e r  r e v e a ls  th is  to u s  or e q u a te s  two m odes of 
d en otation . E ither w ay we seem  to  learn  som eth ing.
§4 G en era lity . and N ecessity :
What I w ant to go  on to d is c u s s  is  R u sse ll’s  treatm ent in  The P iù n c ip ies  
of th e  co n tra d ic tio n s . B efore d o in g  so  and in ord er  to a s s e s s  how w ell 
h is p rop osed  so lu tion  c o h e r e s  w ith  o th er  a sp e c ts  o f The P r in c ip le s  v iew  
I sh a ll need  to c o n s id e r  th e  re la tion  of h is v iew s o f lo g ic , n e c e s s ity  and  
g e n e r a lity .
R u sse ll a c c e p ts  two sim ple argu m en ts w hich th en  g u id e  h is  
c o n str u c tio n  o f th e  th e o ry  o f The P r in c ip le s . The f ir s t  p u rp o r ts  to
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e s ta b lish  th e  s e lf -c o n tr a d ic to r y  n a tu re  of a n y  a s se r t io n  o f n on-term hood . 
The secon d  h o ld s th a t q u a n tifica tio n  m ust a lw ays be u n r e s tr ic te d  s in ce  
an y  con d ition  u se d  to r e s tr ic t  th e  ra n g e  o f q u an tifica tion  can  be 
in corp ora ted  in to  a con d ition a l sta tem en t of th e  q u an tified  se n te n c e  
w hich  m ust th en  be in te r p r e te d  a s  h a v in g  a g r e a te r  ra n g e  (i.e ., we can  
alw ays m ove from  {'^ xbD)F{x ) to  '^ x {xbD.o.F {x }}). We are  th u s  led  to the  
v iew  th a t th e r e  is  a s in g le  u n iv e r se  o f (both sim ple and com plex) 
e n t it ie s . That sim ple p ic tu r e  is  com plicated  by h a v in g  to a c c ep t th a t  
ob jecth ood  h as a w ider sco p e  th an  term hood, i .e .,  th a t som e, o b je c ts  are  
not term s. A lso we h ave  to a c c e p t  th a t c e r ta in  e n t it ie s  stan d  in  a 
re la tion  o f d en o tin g  to  o th er  e n t it ie s  (and th a t th e  e n t ity  w h ich  d en o tes  
is  o n ly  exp la in ed  in  term s o f h a v in g  th is  re la tion  w ith  th e  den oted  
e n t ity /ie s :  th is  m eans th a t th e  n a tu re  both o f th e  d en o tin g  re la tion  and  
of th e  d en o tin g  c o n c e p t  are le f t  m y ster io u s).
To a p p rec ia te  fu lly  th e  im portance for R u sse ll o f h a v in g  a s in g le  
domain o f q u a n tifica tio n  one n e e d s  to  h ave  some c o n c e p t io n . o f h is  idea  
of n e c e s s i ty  and o f lo g ic . The P r in c ip le s  b eg in s w ith  a d e fin itio n  of  
m athem atics as ,
th e  c la s s  o f all p ro p o s itio n s  o f th e  form "p im plies q," w h ere p  and  
q are p ro p o s itio n s  co n ta in in g  one or more v a r ia b le s , th e  same in  the  
two p r o p o s itio n s , and n e ith e r  p  nor q con ta in s a n y  c o n sta n ts  ex cep t  
lo g ica l c o n s ta n ts . And log ica l c o n sta n ts  are d efin ab le  in  term s of the  
fo llow ing: Im plication , th e  re la tio n  of a term  to a c la s s  o f w h ich  it  is  
a member, th e  notion  of su c h  th a t, th e  notion  of re la tion  and su ch  
fu r th e r  n o tio n s a s  may be in v o lv e d  in  th e  g e n e r a l notion  of  
p r o p o sitio n s  o f th e  ab ove  form . In ad d ition  to th e se  m athem atics  
u s e s  a  n otion  w h ich  is  not a c o n s titu e n t  o f th e  p ro p o sitio n s  it  
c o n s id e r s , nam ely th e  n otion  of tru th . (1903, p .3)
The n atu ra l q u e stio n  ra ised  by th is  is , w hat co u n ts  a s  a log ica l
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con stan t?  Take th e  fo llow in g  exam ple w h ich  m ost of u s  w ould be h ap p y  
to co n s id er  as a lo g ica l tru th . "If th e  c la s s  o f G reeks is  con ta in ed  in
th e c la s s  o f men th en , x  is  a G reek im plies x  is  a man, for a ll v a lu e s  of
X." R u sse ll w ill n ot co u n t th is  a s  a log ica l tru th  b ecau se , f ir s t ,  it  
co n ta in s th e  n o n -lo g ic a l c a n s ta n ts  G re e k s  and men  and , s e c o n d ly  (and  
r e la te d ly ) , th e  p ro p o s itio n s  w h ich  tak e  th e  p lace o f p  and q do not  
con ta in  a v a r ia b le  (and th u s  do n ot con ta in  a common v a r ia b le ). We 
a r r iv e  a t a lo g ica l p ro p o sitio n  by g e n e r a liz in g  on G re e k s  and men  to
ob ta in , "If th e  c la s s  a is  co n ta in ed  in  th e  c la ss  b  th e n , x  is  an  a im plies
X is  a b for  all v a lu e s  o f x, and th is  ho ld s for all v a lu e s  o f a and b .” 
R u sse ll h as no co n cep tio n  o f a d is tin c tio n  betw een  a p ro p o sitio n  being  
tru e  and it  b ein g  n e c e ss a r ily  tr u e . So our attem pt to ju s t i fy  h o ld in g  th e  
f ir s t  p ro p o sitio n  tru e  by sa y in g  th a t it  is  tru e  in  a ll p o ss ib le  w orlds  
will be u n in te llig ib le  for  R u sse ll. For R u sse ll,
th ere  seem s to be no tru e  p ro p o sitio n  o f w h ich  th e r e  is  a n y  se n se  
in  sa y in g  th a t it  m ight h ave  been  fa lse . One m ight as w ell sa y  th a t  
r e d n e s s  m ight h a v e  been  a ta s te  and not a co lou r. What is  tru e , is  
true; w hat is  fa lse , is  fa lse ; and c o n cern in g  fu n d am en ta ls , th e re  is  
n o th in g  more to  be sa id . (1903, p .454)
He im m ediately g o e s  on to g iv e  h is  p o s itiv e  v iew  of n e c e s s i ty  w h ich  he 
a ttr ib u te s  to Moore,
The o n ly  lo g ica l m eaning of n e c e s s i ty  seem s to be d er iv ed  from  
im plication . A p ro p o sitio n  is  more or le s s  n e c e s s a r y  a cco rd in g  as th e  
c la s s  o f p ro p o s itio n s  for w h ich  it  is  a p r e m is s  is  g r e a te r  or sm aller. 
(1903, p.454)
In im portant r e s p e c ts  th is  is  ju s t  th e  v iew  of n e c e s s ity  a rg u ed  for by  
Moore in  N e c e s s i ty  (1900). T h ere, Moore a r g u e s  th at n e c e s s i ty  is  d er ived
22from a cer ta in  lo g ica l re la tion  o f p r io r ity  w h ich  one p ro p o sitio n  may
have to an o th er  and th a t on e p ro p o sitio n  is  more n e c e s s a r y  than  
an other if  it  is  lo g ic a lly  p rior to  th e  secon d . Some p r o p o s itio n s  may be 
a b so lu te ly  n e c e s s a r y  in  v ir tu e  o f h a v in g  th is  re la tion  to a ll o th er
p ro p o sitio n s . The re la tio n  a llu d ed  to is  based  on im plication , a lth o u g h  
Moore d oes n ot g iv e  a d eta iled  a cco u n t of im plication  its e lf . R u sse ll’s
b r ief acco u n t r e ta in s  im portant e lem en ts o f th is  con cep tion ; the
r e la t iv ity  o f n e c e s s i ty  and th e  lin k in g  of th e  d e g r e e  o f n e c e s s i ty  w ith  
some notion  of g e n e r a lity . For M oore, a p ro p o sitio n  A is  more n e c e ssa r y  
th an  a p ro p o sitio n  B i f  ju d g in g  B to  be tru e  im plies (and is  n ot im plied  
by) a ju d gem en t th a t A is  tr u e , so  e .g ., ju d g in g  th at th is  is  black and  
th at is  w h ite  so  th is  is  d iffe r e n t  from  th a t, im plies th e re  are p r o p e r tie s  
o f b la ck n ess  and w h ite n e ss  and th a t black is  d iffe r e n t  from  w hite  
(w hich is  th u s  lo g ic a lly  prior and so  more n e c e s s a r y  th an  th e  f ir s t  
ju d gem en t) and u ltim ately  th a t th in g s  w ith  d iffe r in g  p r o p e r tie s  are
d iffe r e n t  (w hich is  th u s  more n e c e s s a r y  th an  both p r e v io u s  ju d g em en ts). 
R u sse ll’s d e sc r ip tio n  of th is  in  term s o f w h eth er  or n ot one p ro p o sitio n  
is  or is  not a p rem iss  o f th e  o th er  in  an im plication  w ill not tak e u s
beyond th e  v iew  th a t a p ro p o sitio n  i f  tru e , is  tru e , and if  fa lse , is  fa lse .
S in ce , b ecau se  im plication  is  p u r e ly  m aterial, w h eth er  or not one  
p rop osition  im plies an o th er  w ill d ep en d  so le ly  on w h eth er  or n ot it  is  
tru e . In  R u sse ll’s term in o logy , we are not so  much co n cern ed  w ith  
im p lie s  a s w ith  th e re fo re ,  i .e ., we are co n cern ed  w ith  g ro u n d s  for
h o ld in g  th e  tru th  o f a g iv e n  p rop osition . F undam ental log ica l 
p r o p o sitio n s  th u s  are th o se  th a t are basic in  th a t th e y  have no 
g ro u n d s, log ica l (and m athem atical) p ro p o sitio n s  h ave  on ly  log ica l 
p r o p o sitio n s  as th e ir  g r o u n d s  and w hich  in  tu r n  fu n c tio n  a s  (part of 
th e) th e  g ro u n d s for a la rg e  num ber of o th er  p r o p o sitio n s . Logical 
p r io r ity  and n e c e s s ity  are th u s  a p t to seem  e s se n t ia lly  ep istem ic  notions: 
one p rop osition  is  lo g ic a lly  prior to an oth er  if  it  is  p art of th e  (p erh ap s  
ideal) ju s tif ic a tio n  of our k n ow led ge  o f th e  la tter . T his p erh a p s exp la in s
23  •the fa c t  th a t Moore term s a b so lu te ly  n e c e ss a r y  p r o p o sitio n s  a p r io r i, 
R u ssell h ow ever a ttem p ts to draw  a c o n tr a s t  b etw een  im p lie s  and
th e re fo r e  on n o n -p sy c h o lo g ic a l g r o u n d s . The form er h o ld s betw een  
u n a sse r te d  p r o p o sitio n s  and th e  la tte r  b etw een  a s s e r te d  p ro p o sitio n s  
w h ere th e  n otion  o f a s se r t io n  is  tak en  a s  being  log ica l ra th er  th an  
p sy ch o lo g ica l. But w hat th is  m in d -in d ep en d en t n otion  o f a s se r t io n  
am ounts to is  a r id d le  R u sse ll a ck n o w led g es  but sh u n ts  o u t o f h is  path  
b y  o b se r v in g  th a t s in ce  it  is  p u r e ly  log ica l is  not d ir e c t ly  r e le v a n t  to  
h is sp e c if ic  program m e o f g iv in g  an accou n t o f m athem atics. The
problem , o f c o u r se , is  th a t R u sse ll is  su p p o sed  to  be g iv in g  a lo g ica l  
a ccou n t o f m athem atics so  can n ot be so ca v a lier  in  h is  trea tm en t of 
log ica l prob lem s.
I w ant to  sa v e  from  th is  d is c u ss io n  a rea liza tion  of th e  d ep th  of th e  
co n n ectio n  b etw een  R u sseiT s n o tio n s o f log ic  and o f g e n e r a lity . Recall 
our p ro p o sitio n  ab ou t G reeks and men, R u sse ll w ould d ism iss  th is  a s not 
b ein g  lo g ica l b eca u se  it  in v o lv e s  th e  sp e c if ic  n a tu re  o f G reek  and of 
men. But h is  r ea so n  for  th a t v iew  is  th a t th e  p ro p o sitio n  is  not of
ultim ate g e n era lity ; it  can  be s e e n  a s  an in sta n c e  o f a more g e n era l
p ro p o sitio n . (It is  hard to  se e  w h y  th is  v iew  does not d e fea t  R u sseiT s
logicism  from  th e  o u ts e t  s in ce  th e  m em bership re la tion  is  a sp e c if ic
in sta n c e  o f r e la tio n s  in  g en era l. T hus if  m athem atics r e q u ir e s  th is  
sp e c if ic  re la tio n  it  can n ot be p u r e ly  log ica l.)  We h ave  now eq u a ted  logic  
w ith th e  id ea  th a t th ere  are p r o p o s itio n s  o f th is  u ltim ate le v e l of 
g en era lity : a lo g ica l p ro p o sitio n  in c lu d e s  no e n t it ie s  w h ich  h ave  n ot been  
elim inated in  fa v o u r  o f th e  (u n iq u e) var iab le . If we a c c ep t th a t the  
p arad oxes dem and th a t we ack n ow led ge  a h iera rch y  of d iffe r e n t  
v a r ia b le s  (and, a s we sh a ll se e , th e  R u sse ll of The P r in c ip le s  seem s to
th in k  th a t th is  is  so) th en  we h ave  to h ave  some m eans o f lim iting the
sco p e  of our log ic . The problem  th e n  is ,  g iv e n  th e  id e n tif ic a tio n  of log ic  
w ith p r o p o sitio n s  o f ultim ate g e n e r a lity , how do we limit th e  sco p e  of 
the log ic  and s t il l  m aintain th a t we are do ing  logic?  The problem  is  not
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ir r e so lv a b le  for R u sse ll but th e  p o sitio n  is  not co n g en ia l to him. 
Seem in gly  th e  so lu tio n  has to  d ep en d  upon sh ow in g  th a t our p u ta tiv e  
p r o p o sitio n s  are o f maximal g e n e r a lity  in  th a t p r o p o sitio n s  p u rp o r tin g  to  
h ave  g r e a te r  g e n e r a lity  are in  fa c t  n o n -se n s ic a l. T h us R u sse ll is  o b lig ed  
to e lu c id a te  th e  lo g ica l re la tion  of m eaning.
§5 The O rigin o f R u sse iT s F ir st  T h eory  of T ypes:
At th is  p o in t we n eed  to c o n s id er  some problem s th a t a tten d  R u sseiT s  
v iew  of c la s s e s . R u sse ll a ssu m es th a t a n y  co n cep t w h ich  is  a p red ica te  
u n p rob lem atica lly  d e f in e s  a c la s s  {a s  m any) (1903, p .54). S uch  c o n c e p ts  
a lw ays g iv e  r is e  to c la s s -c o n c e p ts . A co n cep t w hich  d e n o tes  a g iv e n  
c la s s  is  ca lled  th e  co n c e p t o f th e  c la s s , th is  c o n cep t may be d er iv ed  
from th e  c la ss-co n ce .p t, e .g ., men  is  an  example o f th e  form er and man is  
th e  a sso c ia ted  exam ple o f th e  la tte r . Men, the o b je c t  d en o ted  by men, is  
th e  c la s s  it s e lf . But th e  d is t in c tio n s  do not end h ere , we s t i l l  n eed  to  
d is t in g u ish  th e  c la s s  a s  m an y  from  th e c la ss  a s  one. The m ost fr u it fu l  
w ay o f v iew in g  th is  d is tin c tio n  is  in  term s of th e  d iffe r e n t  s o r ts  o f  
p red ica tio n  th a t can  be made of c la s s e s . In th é  d isc u ss io n  o f d en o tin g  I 
noted  th a t in  o rd er  to make s e n s e  of some p r e d ic a te s  we need  to  
d is t in g u ish  betw een  o b je c ts  and term s (s tr ic t ly , b etw een  o b je c ts  th a t  
are term s and o b je c ts  th at are n o t). O bjects c o n s is t  o f com binations of 
term s, we can  a p p ly  a p r ed ica te  to th e  o b jec t w h ich  d o es not a p p ly  to  
a n y  of th e  in d iv id u a l term s (i.e ., we can make a n o n -d is tr ib u t iv e  
p red ica tio n ). The m ost o b v io u s  exam ple o f th is  is  num erical p red ica tion . 
In  m aking su c h  a p red ica tio n  it  is  e s se n t ia l  th a t we r e g a rd  th e  o b je c t  
as a com bination o f term s. H ow ever we seem  a lso  to be ab le  to tre a t  th e  
c la s s  as a term  in  its  own r ig h t  and can a s s e r t , for in s ta n c e , th a t it  is  
a member o f a n o th er  c la ss . The form er so r t  of p red ica tion  ca lls  for th e  
co n c e p t o f th e  c la s s  a s  many (e .g ., men or all men) w h ilst th e  la tter  for  
th e  c la ss  a s  on e  (e .g ., th e  c la s s  o f m en).
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A llow ing the v a lid ity  o f th e  c la s s  a s  one  is  (as ju s t  n oted ) to tre a t  
th e  c la s s  a s  one a s  an e n t ity . Two problem s (g ra v e  o n es) a r ise . F ir st, 
co n s id er  th e  c la s s  paradox of th e  c la s s  o f all n o n -se lf-m em b ered  c la s s e s .  
Here we h ave a p r e d ica te  (n o n -se lf-m em b ersh ip ) w hich  th u s  d e fin e s  a 
c la ss  a s  m any. If we assum e th a t th e  co rre sp o n d in g  c la s s  a s  on e  e x is ts  
and (as we h ave  no rea so n  to s u s p e c t  o th erw ise ) can  be in c lu d ed  in  th e  
c la s s  a s  m a n y  th e n  we h ave  th e  paradox (i.e ., th e  c la s s  is  a member of  
i t s e lf  i f f  it  is  n o t). So th e  paradox sh ow s e ith er  th a t n ot a ll c la s s e s  a s  
m a n y  are a sso c ia te d  w ith  a c la s s  a s  one  or th a t th e  c la ss  a s  one  m ust 
be tre a te d  a s  a d is t in g u ish e d  so r t  o f e n t ity . S eco n d ly , R u sse ll s e e s  
c la s s e s  a s  m a n y  p u r e ly  e x te n s io n a lly , i .e ., he id e n tif ie s  th e  c la s s  w ith  a 
car ta in  num erical co n ju n ctio n  o f i t s  m em bers. But if, now, we c o n sid er  a 
c la ss  a  co n ta in in g  more th an  one term  th en  it m ust be id en tica l w ith  the  
c la s s  co n ta in in g  o n ly  a. So th e  c la s s  a is  id en tica l w ith  a c la ss  
co n ta in in g  o n ly  one member. But th is  c o n tra d ic ts  th e  assu m p tion  th a t a 
c o n ta in s  more th an  one member. The co n c lu sio n  th a t th e re  are  no c la s s e s  
co n ta in in g  more th an  one member is  o b v io u s ly  in to lerab le .
The so lu tion  to th is  secon d  problem  to w hich  R u sse ll is  draw n in  the  
main body of The P r in c ip le s  in v o lv e s  a c c ep tin g  an ultim ate d istin c tio n  
b etw een  th e  c la s s  a s  m a n y  and th e  c la s s  a s  one. In th e  ab ove argum en t 
we n eed  f ir s t  to c o n s id er  a  as a c la s s  a s  m an y  and th en , in  c o n s id er in g  
it  a s  a member of th e  c la s s  co n ta in in g  o n ly  a, as a c la s s  a s  one. It is  
w ith  th e  c la s s  a  a s  on e  th a t, in  v iew  of ex ten sio n a lity , we id e n tify  th e  
c la s s  co n ta in in g  o n ly  a. T his d oes n ot co n tra d ic t th e  fa c t  th a t th e  c la ss  
a a s  m an y  co n ta in s  more th an  one term .
In th e  a p p en d ix  on F reg e  w h ich  R u sse ll w rote la ter  he r e je c ts  th is
so lu tion . Here he r e p u d ia te s  th e  notion  of the c la s s  a s  one. T h is move is  
in  ten sio n  w ith  some of th e  basic te n e ts  o f The P r in c ip le s . R u sse ll n eed s  
the notion  o f th e  c la s s  a s  one b eca u se  he n eed s  to be ab le  to ta lk  about
th e  c la s s  i t s e lf ,  th a t is , he n e e d s  to be ab le  to make th e  c la ss  the
su b je c t  o f a p rop osition . A n yth in g  th at can be made a log ica l su b je c t  is
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a term . If we g iv e  up th e  c a p a c ity  to  make c la s s e s  log ica l s u b je c t s  most 
of m athem atics w ill sim ply becom e im p ossib le , e .g ., if  we are to g iv e  an 
accou n t o f num ber in  term s of c la s s e s  we sh a ll need  to  be ab le  to make 
c la s s e s  th e  lo g ica l s u b je c ts  o f a p rop osition . R u sse ll fa c e s  th is  d iff ic u lty  
b y reform in g  h is  notion  of lo g ica l su b je c t . Recall th a t R u sse ll a ttem p ts  
to d e fu se  th e  im pend ing  co n tra d ic tio n  of h a v in g  a lo g ica l su b je c t  
(nam ely a p lu ra l o b jec t)  w h ich  is  not a term  by  a r g u in g  th at  
p ro p o sitio n s  in v o lv in g  p lu ra l o b je c ts  h ave  no log ica l su b je c t . R u sse ll 
now a c c e p ts  th a t th e  n otion  o f ob jecth ood  fo r c e s  an  on to log ica l 
d is tin c tio n  to  be draw n , betw een  p o ss ib le  log ica l s u b je c ts ,
The s u b je c t  o f a p ro p o sitio n  may be not a s in g le  term , but 
e s se n t ia lly  m any term s. ...B u t th e  p r e d ica te s  or c la s s -c o n c e p ts  or 
r e la tio n s  w h ich  can  o ccu r  in  p ro p o sitio n s  h a v in g  p lu ra l s u b je c ts  are  
d iffe r e n t  ... from  th o se  th a t can  occu r  in  p r o p o sitio n s  h a v in g  s in g le  
term s a s  s u b je c ts . (1903, p.516)
So our domain o f p o ss ib le  lo g ica l su b je c ts  m ust be s tr a t if ie d  and  
sym b ols for  p r e d ic a te s  (and r e la tio n s  e tc .)  w h ich  seem in g ly  are  
u n iv e r sa lly  ap p licab le  m ust be ta k en  to stan d  for  a r a n g e  o f p r e d ica tes  
(re la tio n s  e tc .)  w h ich  h ave d e fin ite  m ean ings o n ly  r e la t iv e  to log ica l 
s u b je c ts  o f a g iv e n  so r t  or ty p e . The str a tif ica tio n  of log ica l s u b je c ts  
p r o c e ed s  sim ply by c o n s id e r in g  e n t it ie s , th en  c la s s e s  o f e n t it ie s , th en  
c la s s e s  o f c la s s e s  o f e n t it ie s  e tc , .
T h is th o r o u g h g o in g  revam p in g  o f some of th e  basic lo g ica l d o c tr in es  
of The P r in c ip le s  is  in ten d ed  to  so lv e  th e  basic problem  o f R u sseiT s  
ea r lier  v iew  of c la s s e s , v iz ., th e  co n tra d ic tio n  r e su lt in g  from  c o n s id er in g  
th e  c la ss  o f n o n -se lf-m em b ered  c la s s e s . T his it  o b v io u s ly  a c h ie v e s  in  a 
p u r e ly  tech n ica l s e n s e  s in ce  th e  c la s s  co n cep t x^x is  not m eaningful; e 
i s  a re la tion  w h ich  is  n o n se n se  u n le s s  a s se r te d  to hold betw een  one  
o b je c t  and a n o th er  o f ty p e  one d e g r e e  h ig h er  th an  the f ir s t  (and.
27p la in ly , we can n ot n e g a te  n o n se n se ) .
T his so lu tio n  seem s to be m otivated  by th e  th o u g h t th a t th e re  is  
som eth in g  in c o h e re n t in  our notion  o f th e  c la s s  a s  on e  w h ich  shou ld  
th u s  be elim inated . The e f fe c t  o f th e  so lu tion  is  to sa lv a g e  a g r e a t deal 
of w hat we fin d  m athem atically  u s e fu l to  sa y  ab ou t th e  c la s s  a s  one. 
T his is  a ch iev e d  by b road en in g  our notion  of log ica l su b je c t . It is  th u s  
hard to read  th e  p ro p o sa l a s on e w h ich  b r in g s ab ou t a slimmer o n to lo g y , 
in d eed , q u ite  th e  r e v e r s e  seem s to be th e  ca se . N either on to log ica l 
econom y nor an ep istem olog ica l co n sid er a tio n  is  th e  prim ary m otivation  
h ere. R ather w h ere  R u sse ll d oes t r y  to  m otivate th e  v iew  he d oes so  by  
ap p ea lin g  d ir e c t ly  to  th e  su p p o se d  log ica l n a tu re  o f th e  th in g  
con cern ed : th e  c la s s  is  e s s e n t ia l ly  m any and can n ot, w ith ou t la p s in g  in to  
n o n se n se , be tre a te d  sim ply as an e n t ity , i .e .,  as a one. The problem  
now is  th a t R u sse ll seem s to p r o v id e  u s  w ith  th e  m eans for ta lk in g  
s e n s ib ly  ab ou t th e  c la s s  as one p r o v id ed , o f c o u r se , th a t w e -r e a liz e  th at  
one  a s ap p lied  to  c la s s e s  d if fe r s  from  one  a s app lied  to e n t it ie s . But our
g ra sp  of w hat an e n t ity  is  w as g iv e n  so le ly  in  term s of w hat could  be
trea ted  as on e. T h is now m ust be m odified to w hat can  be trea ted  as  
one a s  a p p lie d  to  e n ti t ie s .  And e v id e n tly  th is  is  c ircu la r . T hus R u sseiT s  
ty p in g  o f o b je c ts  is  ap t to seem  som ew hat m y ster io u s (u n le ss  p erh a p s  
view ed  c o n s tr u c t iv e ly  as based  on a p r e g iv e n  domain of e n t it ie s , a 
p osition  u n co n g en ia l to  R u sseiT s realism ). The so u rce  o f th e  problem  
seem s to be th a t in  ord er  to  r e s t r ic t  th e  sco p e  of h is  log ic  (c o n s is te n tly  
w ith th e  v iew  th a t he i s  s t i l l  d o in g  log ic) R u sse ll n e ed s  to d e lin ea te  the  
lim its o f s e n s e  or m ea n in g fu ln ess . But he c a n ’t do th is  m erely  by
ap p ea lin g  to th e  lo g ica l n a tu re  of th e  th in g s  th em se lv es  s in ce  th is  w ill 
e ith er  assum e a n te c e d e n t  g r a sp  o f a ty p e  of o b je c t  (m ost n a tu ra lly
e n tit ie s )  or o f a ty p e  of o b je c t  v ia  th e  a p p lica b ility  o f some g iv e n  
p red ica te . In e ith e r  c a se  we are  tr y in g  to m otivate, lim its on  
m ea n in g fu ln ess  from  a p r e su p p o se d  a n te ce d e n t u n d er sta n d in g . That 
u n d er sta n d in g  is  th u s  exem pted  from  an y  r e su lt in g  r e s tr ic t io n s  o f ty p e
28( ju s t  b eca u se  th e  r e s tr ic t io n s  are  g iv e n  in  term s o f th is  g r a sp ). T hus  
e ith er  we p r e su p p o se  a d h er e n c e  to  ty p e  r e s tr ic t io n s  (in  w h ich  c a se  th e y  
becom e in a c c e ss ib le )  or d iv is io n s  o f ty p e  th r ea te n  to co lla p se . If, in  
co n tra st, th e  ty p e s  are  show n to co rre la te  w ith  ep istem ic  fe a tu r e s  we 
may be ab le  to a r g u e  th a t a n te c e d e n t  g r a sp  of a domain o f o b je c ts  m ust 
co in cid e  w ith  a g iv e n  ty p e .
In P rin c ip ia  M athem atica  {PM) R u sse ll a d d r e s s e s  ju s t  th is  q u e stio n  
and claim s, f ir s t ,  th a t it  is  r e la t iv e  ty p in g  th a t is ,  in  p r a c tic e , of
prim ary im portance. That is ,  in  m any co n tex ts  it  is  un im portant to  
determ ine th a t a c tu a l ty p e  o f th e  e x p r e ss io n  but it  is  e s se n t ia l  to know  
w hat ty p e  it  h as r e la t iv e  to an o th er  ex p r e ss io n . S eco n d ly , R u sse ll 
r e so r ts  to  h is  nom inalism  to  show  th a t th e  domain o f in d iv id u a ls  (w hich , 
in  e ffe c t , is  sim ply  assum ed) d o es n ot co n tra v en e  ty p e  r e s tr ic t io n s  
(1910, p. 162). We m ight u s e fu lly  c o n tr a s t  th is  log ica l d iv is io n  b ased  on  
ty p e  w ith  o th er  lo g ica l c a te g o r ie s  su ch  as F r e g e ’s d is tin c tio n  betw een  
co n cep t and o b je c t  or R u sseiT s d is tin c tio n  betw een  c o n c e p ts  and th in g s .  
Now, a lth o u g h  th e se  d is tin c tio n  are  d iffe r e n t  th e y  do sh a re  an im portant 
c h a r a c te r is t ic  in  th a t th e  " w h a te v e r -it- is - in -th e -w o r ld "  w ears i t s
on to log ica l s ta tu s  on  i t s  s le e v e . That is , th e  on to lo g ica l c a te g o r ie s
co rresp o n d  to th e  m anner in  w hich  sym b ols for  th e
" w h a te v e r -it- is - in -th e -w o r ld "  may ap p ear in  s e n te n c e s . So th e  
on to log ica l d is tin c tio n  is  o n ly  p a r a s it ic  on l in g u is t ic  com p eten ce. Im agine, 
for  in sta n c e , w hat a F regean  m ight sa y  to som eone who m aintained th at  
"Frege R ussell" w as a m ean ingfu l se n te n c e .
But th e se  a rg u m en ts  a s id e , I i llu s tr a te d  in the p r e v io u s  se c tio n  th at  
adm itting  a c o n str a in t  on th e  g e n e r a lity  of log ic  w ill be a so u rce  of 
ten sio n  w ith  R u sse iT s v iew  o f th e  n atu re  o f log ic . T h us R u sse ll w ould  
an yw ay h ave  good r ea so n  for p r e fe r r in g  an a lte r n a tiv e  so lu tion . A 
s u g g e s t io n  of a ro u te  tow ards th a t is  to be found  in  The P r in c ip le s  
its e lf .
We a r r iv e  at th e  sy ste m  of ty p in g  by f ir s t  co n s id er in g  th e  d istin c tio n
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b etw een  s in g u la r  and p lu ra l o b je c ts  and th en  e x ten d in g  th is  sim ple  
tw ofold  d iv is io n  by r e a liz in g  th a t we can  h ave p lu ra l o b je c ts  o f p lural 
o b je c ts  and so  on up  th e  h iera rch y . N othing has been  sa id  d ir e c t ly  
about p u ta tiv e  o b je c ts  w h ich  do not f it  n ea tly  in to  th is  schem e of 
th in g s , in  p a rticu la r , th e  n a tu re  o f p rop osition a l fu n c tio n s  h as been  le ft  
ou t o f th e  accou n t. T h ere is  a p o ten tia l w orry  about p rop osition a l
fu n c tio n s  b ecau se  th e  co n tra d ic tio n  a lso  o c c u r s  in  a form  r e la tin g  to  
p rop osition a l fu n c tio n s . That is , if  p rop osition a l fu n c tio n s  can  be app lied  
to o th er  p ro p o sitio n a l fu n c tio n s  it  seem s we can  form th e  p rop osition a l  
fu n c tio n  w hich  a p p lie s  ju s t  to th o se  p rep o sitio n a l fu n c tio n s  w h ich  do not 
a p p ly  to th e m se lv e s . But th en  th is  p rop osition a l fu n c tio n  m ust both
ap p ly  and n ot a p p ly  to  it s e lf . T h ere is  a good rea so n  w h y  R u sse ll does  
not m ention th is  form  o f th e  co n tra d ic tio n  in  h is d isc u ss io n  of th e  
h ie ra r c h y  o f c la s s e s  and th is  is  th a t he th in k s  he h as so lv ed  th is
paradox at th e  en d  of h is  d isc u ss io n  of p rop osition a l fu n c tio n s ,
i t  is  to be o b se r v e d  th a t, a cco rd in g  to th e  th e o r y  o f p rop osition a l  
fu n c tio n s  h ere  a d v o ca ted , th e  cp in  (px is  not a sep a ra b le  en tity : it  
lie s  in  th e  p ro p o sitio n  of th e  form  cpx, and can n ot s u r v iv e  a n a ly s is , 
(19U3,p.88)
A lthough  R u sse ll im m ediately w o n d ers w h eth er  p erh a p s th is  p osition , 
w hich  am ounts to d e n y in g  th e  term hood of som eth in g , lea d s to  
co n tra d ic tio n  he d oes te n ta t iv e ly  su p p o rt it. The s tr a te g y  in v o lv e s  
tre a tin g  th e  s ig n  for  a p rop osition a l fu n c tio n  as m ean ingfu l (in  th a t it  
o c c u r s  in  m ean in gfu l s e n te n c e s )  a lth o u g h  it  fa ils  to stan d  for  a n y th in g . 
T hus th e  sta tem en t p r e f ig u r e s  th e  s tr a te g y  for d ea lin g  w ith  the
paradoxes w h ich  R u sse ll w as la ter  to adopt, For w hat we h ave h ere is  in  
e s se n t ia ls  th e  f ir s t  acco u n t of w hat R u ssell la ter  ca lls  an incom plete  
sym bol, th a t is , a sym bol o cc u r in g  in  a p rop osition a l s ig n  but w hich  
does not s u r v iv e  a n a ly s is  so  th at th e  sym bol need  not stan d  for a term
30w h ich  is  a  c o n s t itu e n t  o f th e  p ro p o sitio n , it  has, in  th is  s e n s e , no 
m eaning ap art from  it s  u s e  in  co n tex t.
The a ttr a c tio n  of u s in g  th e  n otion  o f incom plete sym b ols to  so lv e  th e  
co n tra d ic tio n s  is  th a t it  p rom ises a m eans o f r e ta in in g  an u n str a tif ie d  
u n iv e r se  o f e n t it ie s . The d ra w -b a ck  is  th a t it  r e q u ir e s  th a t we r e s tr ic t  
ou r o n to lo g y . B ut, a s  we sh a ll s e e , R u sse ll v o ic e s  d is illu sion m en t w ith  
th e  M einongian v iew  th a t e v e r y  o b je c t  o f th o u g h t m ust be an  e n t ity  and
th u s  h as in d e p e n d e n t  r e a so n  for  se a rc h in g  for  some on to lo g ica l
c o n str a in ts . "On D en o tin g ” a r tic u la te s  id ea s th a t are p iv o ta l in  R u sseiT s  
th o u g h t s in ce  it  r e p u d ia te s  some o f th e  te n e ts  o f The P r in c ip le s  w h ils t  
also  p r o v id in g , in  i t s  d evelop m en t o f th e  notion  of incom plete  sym bol, 
w hat seem s, p rim a  fa cie , to  be a  m eans o f r e sc u in g  o th er  a s p e c ts  o f  th a t  
program m e.
§6 On "On D enoting":
In "On D enoting" R u sse ll le v e ls  a tta c k s  on both F r e g e ’s  d is tin c tio n  
betw een  s e n s e  and r e fe r e n c e  and M einong’s  v iew  th a t for  e v e r y
e x p r e ss io n  fu n c tio n in g  s y n ta c t ic a lly  a s  a s in g u la r  term  th e r e  m ust be an
o b je c t  o f th o u g h t. In  d o in g  so  h e  s ig n a ls  a d ep a rtu re  from  v iew s  he  
held  in  The P r in c ip le s ,  The M einongian v iew  is  a c c u sed  of lea d in g  to  
co n tra d ic tio n  s in c e  it  dem ands, fo r  in sta n c e , th a t th e  e x is te n t  sq u a re  
c irc le  both  e x is t s  and d oes n ot e x is t . "On D enoting" is  th u s  o fte n  read  
as an attem pt by  R u sse ll to  r e sc u e  th e  m ea n in g fu ln ess  o f p r o p o sitio n s  
in v o lv in g  p o ss ib le  M einongian o b je c ts  (w hat I mean by th is  term  w ill be 
c la r ified  in  th e  e n s u in g  d isc u ss io n )  w ith ou t h a v in g  to assum e th a t th e re  
are c o r re sp o n d in g  e n t it ie s . H ow ever sim ply to read  it a s  su ch  w ould , a s  
m any r e a d e r s  h ave  p o in ted  o u t (e .g . H ylton (1990), G riffith s (1981), lead  
to a m iscon stru a l o f R u sseiT s prim ary m otives in  d ev e lo p in g  th e  later  
th eo ry .
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§6.1 G riffith s on R u sse ll’s E arly  O ntology
In  d is c u s s in g  th e  n otion  o f th e  n u ll s e t  in  The P r in c ip le s  R u sse ll n o tes  
"that a co n c e p t m ay d en o te  a lth o u g h  it  d oes not d en o te  an yth in g"  (1903, 
p .73). T his b e in g  so  it  w ould seem  c lear  th a t e v e n  in  The P r in c ip le s  
R u sse ll h as no n eed  to su b sc r ib e  to  M einongian o n to lo g ica l e x c e s s . 
P ro p o sitio n s w h ich  are p u ta t iv e ly  ab ou t M einongian o b je c ts  can  be 
accou n ted  for  in  term s o f in c lu d in g  c o n c e p ts  w h ich  fa il to  d en ote  
a n y th in g .
H owever th is  is  n o t th e  v iew  w h ich  R u sse ll s u b s c r ib e s  to  a t le a s t  
r e la t iv e  to  th e  n u ll s e t . I f  w e h a v e  a c la s s  c o n cep t a  w h ich  is  fa lse  o f  
e v e r y th in g  th en  i t  w ould seem  th a t "all a’s" is  a  d en o tin g  co n c e p t w h ich  
d en o tes  n oth in g: w hat it  p u r p o r ts  to  d en ote  is  a c la s s  la ck in g  in
m em bers, bu t, in  fa c t , i t  m ust d en o te  n o th in g  s in c e  a c la s s  is  to  be 
v iew ed  e x te n s io n a lly , i .e .,  n ot o n ly  d o es R u sse ll a c c ep t co ex te n s io n a lity  
a s a c r iter io n  o f  id e n tity  fo r  c la s s e s  he ta k e s  th e  c la s s  to b e  a  
num erical co n ju n c tio n  of i t s  e lem en ts . T hus a n y  p ro p o sitio n  in c lu d in g  
th e  d en o tin g  c o n c e p t "all a’s" is  ab ou t n o th in g . R u sse ll c o n s id e r s  
in te r p r e tin g  a p ro p o s itio n  su c h  a s  "all a’s  are  h’s" a s  a form al 
im plication , "x is  an  a im plies x  is  a  b, for  all v a lu e s  o f  x" but r e je c ts  
th is  in te r p r e ta t io n  b eca u se  h e  h o ld s th a t p ro p o sitio n s  in c lu d in g  d en o tin g  
co n c e p ts  (form ed by  all, e v e r y  and  an y)  are about sp e c if ic  o b je c ts  or 
com binations o f term s and , a lth o u g h  e q u iv a le n t to th e  r e le v a n t  form al 
im plication s, are d is t in c t  s in c e  th o se  are u n iv e r sa lly  v a lid  w h ils t, to  
r e iter a te , th e  p ro p o sitio n  in c lu d in g  th e  d en o tin g  c o n cep t is  ab ou t a 
sp e c if ic  o b je c t . The so lu tio n  th a t R u sse ll a r r iv e s  at is  to  r e je c t  th e  
p rop osition  w h ils t  r e ta in in g  th e  in te r p r e ta t io n s  w hich  w ould h ave  been  
eq u iv a le n t had th e  d en o tin g  co n c e p t a c tu a lly  d en oted  som eth in g .
We sh a ll sa y , th e n , th a t, o f th e  bundle o f norm ally eq u iv a le n t
in te r p r e ta t io n s  o f th e  log ica l sym bolic form ulae, th e  c la s s  o f
32in te r p r e ta t io n s  c o n s id e r e d  in  th e  p r e se n t  ch a p ter , ■ w h ich  are  
d ep e n d e n t u pon  a ctu a l c la s s e s ,  ta il w h ere  w e are  co n cern ed  w ith  
null c la s s -c o n c e p ts , on  th e  grou n d  th at th ere  is  no a ctu a l n u ll c la s s . 
(1903, p p .7 4 -5 )
R u sse ll’s  p o in t seem s to  be th a t in  in te r p r e tin g  a se n te n c e  or form ula  
w e are e n t it le d , w h en  th e  c la s s  e x is t s  to  u se  a n y  o f th e  eq u iv a le n t  
in te r p r e ta t io n s  a s  s u it s  u s , H ow ever w h en  we h ave  a n u ll c la s s -c o n c e p t  
we m ust g iv e  an in te r p r e ta t io n  w h ich  u s e s  a form al im plication  or g iv e s  
an in te n s io n a l in te r p r e ta t io n  in  term s o f c la s s -c o n c e p ts . So no r e v is io n  
of our sy m b o lic  p r a c tic e  is  n e ed ed . The com plex co r re sp o n d in g , sa y , to  
"all a’s are  h’s" c o n ta in s  leg itim ate  p rop osition a l c o n s t itu e n ts  but does  
not e x p r e ss  a p ro p o sitio n , (S ee  G riffith s  (1981, p .149) fo r  more d e ta ils  o f  
th is  argu m en t.) The p o in t th a t G riffith s  (1981) g o e s  on  to make is  th a t  
R u sse ll seem s f in a lly  to  h ave  to  e n d o r se  a M einongian o n to lo g y  in  ord er  
to  make s e n s e  o f p r o p o s itio n s  a s s e r t in g  n e g a tiv e  e x is te n tia ls  w h ich
can n ot be r e je c te d  in  th e  m anner ju s t  d e sc r ib e d . G riffith s th e n  a r g u e s  
th a t th e  th e o r y  o f d e sc r ip t io n s  d ev e lo p ed  in  "On D enoting" is  ir r e le v a n t  
to  th e  ta sk  o f elim inatin g  M einongian o b je c ts  s in ce  th a t d ep e n d s  on an  
in te r p r e ta tio n  o f e x is te n c e . If  e x is te n c e  is  tak en  to be a p r o p e r ty  o f
p r o p e r tie s  th e n  no on to lo g ica l comm itm ent is  en jo in ed  w h eth er  or not
one s u b s c r ib e s  to The P r in c ip le s  or to th e  "On Denoting" th e o ry .
C on verse ly , tr e a t in g  e x is te n c e  a s  a  p red ica te  e n ta ils  th at th e  th e o r y  of  
"On D enoting" is  ju s t  a s  o n to lo g ica lly  com m itting a s  The P r in c ip le s  
th eory , F in a lly , he claim s th a t th e  q u estio n  o f how e x is te n c e  sh ou ld  be 
trea ted  i s  i t s e lf  n e u tr a l b etw een  th e  two th e o r ie s .
I am s tr o n g ly  sym p ath etic  to m uch o f G riffith s’ argum en t. G riffith s  
d is t in g u is h e s  two p o ss ib le  r o u te s  to  o n to log ica l e x c e s s . The f ir s t  he ca lls  
th e  M einongian ro u te  in  w h ich  it  is  claim ed th at if a p rop osition  is  about 
an e n t ity  th en  it  m ust in c lu d e  th a t e n t ity . The secon d  is  th e  F regean  
rou te  w h ich , a lth o u g h  a c c ep tin g  th a t a p rop osition  may be ab ou t an
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o b je c t  w h ich  it  d o es  not in c lu d e  (in  v ir tu e  of in c lu d in g  a c o n cep t w h ich  
d en o tes  th a t o b je c t) , s t i l l  r e s u lt s  in  on to log ica l e x c e s s  b eca u se  it  in s is t s  
th a t d en o tin g  c o n c e p ts  can n ot be em pty. I have g iv e n  a b rief  
d e sc r ip tio n  of G riffith ’s d isc u ss io n  o f th e  la tter . The co n c lu sio n  w as th at  
R u sse ll is  fo rced  to ad op t a M einongian o n to lo g y  not b ecau se  he tr a v e ls  
a lon g  th e  F reg ea n  r o u te  but b eca u se  he is  u nab le  to r e je c t  n e g a tiv e  
e x is te n tia l p ro p o s itio n s  s in ce  th e y  are tru e . The u n d er ly in g  rea so n  for  
o n to log ica l e x c e s s  is  tr e a t in g  e x is te n c e  as a p red ica te . My w orry  h ere  is  
th a t prim a fa c ie  tr u th  o f a p ro p o sitio n  co n ta in in g  an  em p ty  d en otin g  
co n cep t is  not tak en  to be su f f ic ie n t  g ro u n d s for  n ot r e je c t in g  it: "all 
chim aeras are animals" is  a p p a r e n tly  tru e  a cco rd in g  to  R u sse ll but m ust 
n e v e r - t h e - le s s  be r e je c te d . We m inim ise th e  v io le n c e  th is  is  apt to  
p rod u ce in  our sym b olic  sy stem  by  r e in te r p r e t in g  a n y  form ula in  term s  
of, sa y , a form al im plication  {x  is  a chim aera im plies x  is  an  animal, for  
all v a lu e s  o f x) w h ich  w ould be e q u iv a le n t to th e  p ro p o sitio n  w ere th e  
d en o tin g  co n c e p t n ot em pty. Now if  th is  p r o c e ss  can be g en era lized  to 
all d en o tin g  c o n c e p ts  and if  e x is te n c e  is  to be tre a te d  a s  ju s t  an oth er  
p red ica te  th en  th e  s tr a te g y  m ust aga in  be ava ilab le  for  n e g a tiv e  
e x is te n tia l p r o p o s itio n s . G riffith ’s su p p o rts  h is  v iew  th a t n e g a tiv e  
e x is te n tia ls  are cr u c ia l by q u o tin g  from  R u sseiT s b r ief d isc u ss io n  of 
being  and e x is te n c e  w h ich  o c c u r s  in  th e  le t te r ’s  d isc u ss io n  of sp a ce  (a 
good w ay in to  The P r in c ip le s ) , R u sse ll is  a tta ck in g  th e  th e o r y  th at  
e v e r y  p ro p o sitio n  c o n c e rn s  som eth in g  w hich  e x is ts .
For if  th is  th e o r y  w ere tru e , it  w ould s t il l  be tru e  th a t e x is te n c e
i t s e lf  is  an  e n t ity , and it  m ust be adm itted th at e x is te n c e  d oes not 
e x is t . T hus th e  c o n sid era tio n  of e x is te n c e  it s e lf  lead s to 
n o n -e x is te n tia l p r o p o s itio n s , and so  c o n tra d ic ts  th e  th eo ry . The 
th e o ry  seem s, in  fa c t , to h ave a r ise n  from n e g le c t  of th e  d istin c tio n  
b etw een  e x is te n c e  and b ein g . Yet th is  d is tin c tio n  is  e s se n tia l, if we
are e v e r  to d e n y  th e  e x is te n c e  o f a n y th in g . (19Ü3,’ p .450)
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T his p a ssa g e  m akes no m ention of n o n -e x is te n t  e n t it ie s  in d ica ted  by  
d en o tin g  p h r a se s . I t  su c c e e d s  in  e s ta b lish in g  M einongian o b je c ts , in  th e  
s e n se  o f n o n -e x is te n t , i .e ., s u b s is te n t , e n t it ie s , but fa ils  to p er su a d e  one  
th a t th e se  can be d en oted  ra th er  than  named. All c o n s t itu e n ts  of  
p ro p o sitio n s  are e n t it ie s  but, as th e  argum en t p o in ts  o u t in  th e  c a se  of 
e x is te n c e  it s e lf ,  n ot all e n t it ie s  are e x is ta n ts . R u sse ll adm its, in  d e fin in g  
a th in g  to  be a n y th in g  th at can  be nam ed, to be u s in g  nam es in  a 
broader s e n s e  th an  u su a l. T h in gs are nam eable and th in g s  in c lu d e  
" particu lar e x is te n ts  gen era lly"  a s  w ell as "many term s w h ich  do not 
ex ist" . So term s w h ich  do n ot e x is t  are s t i l l  nam eable. It  is  th u s  
p lau sib le  to read  R u sseiT s argu m en t p u r e ly  in  term s of n o n -e x is te n ts  
w hich  can  e ith e r  be nam ed o r  are c o n c e p ts . T his e s ta b lish e s  a 
M einongian o n to lo g y  by  allow ing n o n -e x is te n t  e n t it ie s  but r e tr e a ts  from  
th e  w o rst e x c e s s e s  o f th a t th e o r y  in  not su b sc r ib in g  to c o n tra d ic to ry  
e n t it ie s , for  w h ich  we can  o n ly  form  d en otin g  p h r a se s . In d eed  I can  fin d  
no in d ica tion  th a t R u sse ll w as e v e r  a ttach ed  to an o n to lo g y  o f th a t form  
and, g iv e n  h is  unam biguous r e je c tio n  of c e r ta in  p ro p o sitio n s  b ecau se  
th e y  con ta in  em p ty  d en o tin g  c o n c e p ts , it  w ould be hard to a ttr ib u te  
su c h  a v iew  to him. B ut, g iv e n  h is  lack  of e x p lic itn e ss  about d e fin ite  
d e sc r ip t io n s  in  The P r in c ip le s , it  is  d iff icu lt  to a ttr ib u te  a n y  sp e c if ic  
on to log ica l v iew  to R u sse ll w ith  an y  g rea t d eg r e e  o f co n fid en ce . What 
th is  in d e f in ite n e s s  d oes p e r h a p s show  th ou gh  is  th at m atters o n to log ica l 
w ere not forem ost in  R u sseiT s mind. A fin a l co n sid era tio n  a g a in st  an  
id en tifica tio n  o f The P r in c ip le s  o n to lo g y  w ith  th a t o f M einong is  th a t in  
"On Denoting" R u sse ll q u ick ly  p o in ts  ou t th a t h is ea r lier  P r in c ip le s  
th e o ry  is  sim ilar in  im portant r e s p e c ts  to the F regean  v iew  he is  
c r it ic iz in g  but n ow here d oes he make a sim ilar claim ab ou t th e  
M einongian v iew .
§6.2 A Recom m ended R ead ing, of "On D enoting":
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How th en  sh ou ld  we read  "On D enoting"? The f ir s t  th in g  to n ote  is  th at  
it  is  a m istake to read  "On D enoting" prim arily  a s  an  e ffo r t  to e sca p e  an  
on to log ica l ju n g le  (in th is  I a g r e e  w ith  G riffith s), The fo c u s  o f a tten tio n  
in  th e  pap er is  d en o tin g  c o n c e p ts  (or p h r a se s  or com p lexes), R u sse ll  
rep u d ia te s  both h is  ea r lier  notion  o f d en o tin g  c o n c e p ts  and h is r e je c tio n  
of com plexes co n ta in in g  em pty  d en o tin g  p h r a se s . R u sse ll r e je c ts  a 
com plex by claim ing th a t it  d oes not e x p r e ss  a p ro p o sitio n  but he 
re ta in s  v a r io u s  in te r p r e ta t io n s  w h ich  would o th erw ise  h ave  been  
e q u iv a len t. R u sse ll may h ave  become d is illu sio n ed  w ith  th is  p o s itio n  
s in ce  it  is  ju s t  n ot c lear  w hat ex tra  a com plex r e q u ir e s  for  it  to  su cceed  
in  e x p r e ss in g  a p rop osition : in  m any in s ta n c e s  it  is  a  p u r e ly  em pirical 
q u estio n  w h eth er  a com plex d oes or does not e x p r e ss  a p rop osition . The 
th o u g h t h ere  is  th a t once we h ave  th e  u n ity  o f th e  p rop osition a l 
c o n s t itu e n ts  th e r e  is  n o th in g  more for  the p rop osition  to be. H ow ever it  
is  not sa fe  to  a ttr ib u te  a n y  p r e c ise  m otives to R u sse ll on th e  b asis  o n ly  
o f "On D enoting" and o th er  w r it in g s  p u b lish ed  at around th is  time. 
T here is ,  th o u g h , a c lo se  re la tion  b etw een  th e  th e o r y  o f d e sc r ip tio n s  
and th e  m ethod of r e je c t in g  d e n o ta tio n le ss  p ro p o sitio n s . The con n ectio n  
is  th is , if  R u sse ll w as la ter  d is illu sio n ed  w ith  th e  n otion  of r e je c t in g  
certa in  p r o p o sitio n s  h e  m ight ch o o se  to tre a t  th e  p ro p o sitio n  (or to 
se le c t  and tre a t one am ong th e  p ro p o sitio n s) w h ich  th a t m ethod r e ta in s , 
not as a fa iled  in te r p r e ta tio n , but as an a n a ly s is  of th e  orig in a l 
p rop osition . The c o s t  o f th is  is  th a t we no lo n g er  can tre a t a 
p rop osition  c o n ta in in g  a d en o tin g  c o n cep t as about a ce r ta in  o b je c t  or 
com plex o f term s, ra th er  we h ave  a g en era l p ro p o sitio n  co n ta in in g  an  
ap p aren t va r ia b le . T h is, p r e c is e ly , is  th e  s tr a te g y  o f th e  th e o ry  o f  
d e sc r ip tio n s .
So, a s a r e su lt  of th e  th e o r y  o f d e sc r ip tio n s  we adm it th a t th ere  are  
g en u in e  p ro p o s itio n s  w ith  em pty  d en o tin g  p h r a se s . H ow ever, e x is te n c e  is  
s t il l  b e in g  trea ted  as a p red ica te  (se e  R u sse ll (1905b) w h ere  he draw s a 
d istin c tio n  betw een  e x is te n c e  as a p red ica te  and e x is te n c e  u sed  in
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sym bolic log ic  as a p r o p e r ty  o f p r o p e r tie s ) . G riffith s claim s th a t th is  is  
on to lo g ica lly  com m itting s in c e  th e  m ost natu ra l in te r p r e ta tio n  of "The a 
d oes not exist"  (if we are tr e a t in g  e x is te n c e  sim ply as a p red ica te ) g iv e s  
th e  d efin ite  d e sc r ip t io n  prim ary o c c u r en ce , i .e ., "There is  one and on ly  
one X su c h  th a t x  is  a and x  d o es  n ot exist"  (ra th er  th an  "It is  fa lse  
th at th ere  is  one and o n ly  one x  su ch  th at x  is  a"). G riffith s is  su r e ly
r ig h t  in  p o in tin g  o u t th a t it  is  n ot c lear w h en  and w h y we sh ou ld
a n a ly se  th e  d e fin ite  d e sc r ip t io n  a s  h av in g  prim ary or seco n d a ry  
o c c u rren ce  but R u sse ll h as made som e p r o g r e ss  in  th a t he h as g iv e n  a 
p o ss ib le  in te r p r e ta t io n  w h ich  is  n ot e x is te n tia lly  com m itting.
One c o n se q u e n c e  o f th e se  co n s id er a tio n s  is  th a t th e  a lte r n a tiv e  
a n a ly s is  o ffe r e d  of d en o tin g  p h r a se s  in  "On D enoting" m ust be ap p ra ised  
re la tiv e  to how s u c c e s fu l  one r e g a r d s  h is  rep u d ia tion  of th e  
F r e g e a n /d e n o tin g  c o n c e p ts  v iew . I sh a ll not attem pt to a p p ra ise  th is  
argum en t nor sh a ll I ex p lica te  it  now. H owever I sh a ll re tu r n  to th e  
argum en t below to co n sid er  w h eth er  or not it  su p p lie s  a . c r itiq u e  of 
R u sseiT s th e o r y  o f d e sc r ip t io n s  it s e lf .  At th is  p o in t I sim ply w ant to  
note th e  im portance th a t th e  argu m en t h as for  R u sseiT s d ep a rtu re  from  
th e  F regean  v iew  and th a t th e  argu m en t seem s to su p p ly  a p e r fe c t ly
g e n era l a tta ck  on th e  id ea  th a t on e e n tity  can be ab ou t, can d en ote ,
an oth er  e n t ity  or com plex o f e n t it ie s .
§7 The E p istem ological Role o f th e  T h eory  of Incom plete Sym bols:
In a s e n s e  R u sse ll h as no th e o r y  o f m eaning. His problem  is  not w ith  
our u n d er sta n d in g  of la n g u a g e  but w ith  our a p p reh en sio n  o f com plexity , 
w h ere com p lex ity  is  an o b je c t iv e  fea tu r e  o f th e  w orld . À n e c e ssa r y  
con d ition , R u sse ll claim s (ex p lic it ly  in  th e  penultim ate p aragrap h  of "On 
D enoting"), for a p p re h e n s io n  of a com plex e n t ity  is  acq u a in tan ce  w ith its  
c o n s t itu e n ts . R u sseiT s in te r e s t  is  th u s  prim arily  ep istem olog ica l. M eaning  
is  a co n cern  for  R u sse ll but .on ly  in  the se n se  th a t some p rop osition s
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may be "about" e n t it ie s  w h ich  are not am ong th e ir  c o n s t itu e n ts . The 
P r in c ip le s  can n ot be sa id  tr u ly  to o ffe r  an exp lan ation  of th is  notion  of  
a b o u tn e ss , ra th er  a b o u tn e ss  is  taken  to be a p ro d u ct o f the  
p ro p o s itio n ’s in c u ld in g  a s p e c if ic  so r t  o f e n t ity , a d en o tin g  co n cep t, 
w hich  s ta n d s  in  a c e r ta in  (m yster iou s) re la tion  to th e  den oted  o b ject. 
T his is  th e  lo g ica l re la tio n  o f m eaning. "On Denoting" can  be read  as an  
attem pt to elim inate m eaning. T h is, a t f ir s t  s ig h t , ap p ea rs odd s in ce  the  
a n a ly s is  o ffe r e d  in  "On D enotng" is  one w hich  allow s th a t a p rop osition  
may be ab ou t som eth in g  o th er  th an  i t s  c o n s titu e n ts . So m eaning at the  
le v e l  o f p ro p o s itio n s  is. inelim inable  and s ta n d s  in  n eed  of exp lanation . 
In d eed  th e  seco n d  p a ragrap h  of "On Denoting" exp la in s th e  im portance  
of th is  ju s t  b ecau se  it  is  n e c e s s a r y  for  u s  to exp la in  how we can  h ave  
k n ow led ge ab ou t and how we can  th in k  ab ou t o b je c ts  w ith  w h ich  we 
h ave no a cq u a in tan ce. And, in  th e  penu ltim ate p aragrap h  of th a t p aper, 
R u sse ll r e tu r n s  to th e  same is s u e , co n ten t th a t th e  th e o r y  of 
d e sc r ip tio n s  s a t is f ie s  h is  ep istem olog ica l c o n str a in t on th e  a p p reh en sio n  
of p r o p o sitio n s  (or com plexes) w h ils t  a llow ing th a t p r o p o sitio n s  may be 
ab ou t th a t w ith  w h ich  we h ave  no acq u a in tan ce.
The p o sitio n  w h ich  we f in a lly  a rr iv e  at is  one in  w h ich  w e adm it a 
w hole r a n g e  o f p ro p o s itio n s  w h ich  we ap p reh en d  but w hich  are about 
e n t it ie s  w h ich  do not ex ist: th e  e x is te n c e  o f th e  e n t ity  co n cern ed  may be 
r e le v a n t for  d eterm in in g  th e  tr u th  v a lu e  o f th e  p ro p o sitio n  but is  not 
r e le v a n t to  our a p p r e h e n s io n  o f the p rop osition  its e lf . We may 
c o h e r en tly  be in  th is  p o s itio n  for  w hole r e g io n s  o f d isc o u r se  accord in g  
to R u sse ll. In d eed , a s  we sh a ll se e , we are in  p r e c is e ly  th is  p osition  
w ith  reg a rd  to m athem atical p r o p o s itio n s  in v o lv in g  c la s s e s .
R u sseiT s o n to lo g y  and th u s  h is  log ic  are e p is te m ic a lly  c o n stra in ed . It 
ta k es  R u sse ll some time to rea lize  the fu ll p o ten tia l o ffe r e d  by the  
th e o ry  o f d e sc r ip t io n s  (in (1906d), "The T heory of Im plication", he m akes 
;a c lo s in g  rem ark w h ich  in d ica te s  th at he is  s till  hop ing for  a so lu tion  in 
the form of th e  h ie ra r c h y  sk e tc h e d  in  The P r in c ip les)  but on ce  he does
38so  th e  ta sk  o f g iv in g  an ep istem olog ica l fou n d ation  and  m otivation  for  
th e  r e su lt in g  log ic  becom es a c u te . The 1913 m an u scrip t a p p ea rs to have  
b een  an u n s u c c e s fu l attem pt to c a r r y  th is  program m e th ro u g h  for  the  
log ic  o f PM.
I w ant now to  look in  more d eta il at R u sseiT s a tttem p ted  so lu tio n  of  
th e  p arad oxes in  term s o f h is  "No C lasses"  th e o r y  and to show  how th a t  
so lu tion  draw s su p p o rt from ep istem olog ica l co n s id er a tio n s. When R u sse ll 
f ir s t  m oots th e  th e o r y  in  (1906a) he n o te s ,
... th e  th e o r y  is  c o n stitu te d  m erely  by a b stin e n c e  from  a d ou b tfu l 
assu m p tion , and th u s  w h a tev er  o f m athem atics it  perm its u s  to  
ob ta in  is  in d u b ita b le  in  a w ay w h ich  a n y th in g  in v o lv in g  c la s s e s  or 
re la tio n s can n ot be. (1906a)
R u sse ll seem s to th in k  th a t we can n ot know w h eth er  or not c la s s e s  
ex is t , we can o n ly  know  c e r ta in  (n o n -ex isten tia l)  p ro p o s itio n s  about 
c la s s e s . T his v iew  ab ou t our lack  o f ep istem ic  co n ta ct w ith  c la s s e s  is  a 
c o n s is te n t  a sp e c t  o f R u sseiT s p h ilo so p h y . In The P r in c ip le s  we p r e c is e ly  
need  d en o tin g  c o n c e p ts  to tak e  th e  p lace of c la s s e s  in  p r o p o sitio n s  
b ecau se  we can n ot be p resum ed  to  h ave  acq u a in tan ce  w ith  c la s s e s ,  
a lth o u g h  we can  h ave  a cq u a in tan ce  w ith  p ro p o sitio n s  w h ich  are tru e  of  
or are about c la s s e s . L ater, h ow ever , R u sse ll m akes th is  ep istem olog ica l  
d oub t a m otivating  fa c to r  in  h is  trea tm en t of c la s s  term s as incom plete. 
C artw right (1987, p. 116) n o te s  th a t th e  th e o r y  of incom plete sym bols  
r e su lt s  in  a m uch "thinner" n otion  o f "aboutness" . In  The P r in c ip le s  
som eth ing  may be th e  s u b je c t  o f a p rop osition  e ith er  if  it  o c c u r s  as a 
term  in  th e  p ro p o sitio n  o r  if  it  is  den oted  by a d en o tin g  co n cep t  
o ccu r in g  in th e  s u b je c t  p o sitio n  o f th e  proposition .- C artw right claim s 
th a t an u p sh o t o f th e  th e o r y  o f incom plete sym bols is  th at, in  an  
im portant s e n se , a p ro p o sitio n  for R u ssell can no lo n g er  be about  
a n y th in g  o th er  th an  a c o n stitu e n t. The ta sk  o f the th e o r y  is  to limit
39our m athem atics to p ro p o sitio n s  w h ich  do not commit u s  to h o ld in g  th at  
c la s s e s  a c tu a lly  e x is t . The p ro p o sitio n  may s t i l l  be about, e .g ., the
d en ota tion  o f a d e fin ite  d e sc r ip tio n , but o n ly  in  th e  s e n s e  th a t th at
e n t ity  is  a c o n s titu e n t  o f a tru e  p ro p o sitio n  if  th e  o r ig in a l p rop osition  is  
i t s e lf  to  be tru e . C artw right n o tes  th a t th is  co n se q u e n c e  sh ou ld  n ot be 
ru ed  s in ce  th e  o r ig in a l notion  o f a b o u tn e ss  w as not a p p ro p r ia te ly  link ed  
to in ten tio n a l p r o p e r tie s  o f th e  p ro p o sitio n , i .e .,i t  "implied n o th in g  about 
th e  b e lie fs  o f one who e n ter ta in ed  th e  proposition"  (1987, p .116). The 
p oin t I w ant to  make h ere  is  th a t a s  a co n se q u e n c e  o f "On D enoting"
R u sselT s v iew  o f th e  n a tu re  o f p r o p o sitio n s  and h en ce  h is  lo g ica l th e o ry
is  g o v e r n e d  m uch more s tr ic t ly  by  th o se  re la tio n s  of a cq u a in tan ce  w hich  
R u sse ll th in k s  we can  leg itim a te ly  a sc r ib e  to o u r se lv e s .
The tec h n ic a l d evelop m en t o f th e  "No C lasses"  th e o ry  d ep e n d s  on the  
notion  o f su b s t itu t io n . R ather th an  u s in g  c la s s  sym b ols or sym b ols for  
p rop osition a l fu n c tio n s  a s  sep a ra b le  e n t it ie s  (an  ^a ssu m p tion  w hich  
R u ssell, at th is  s ta g e , claim s is  tantam ount to th e  assu m p tion  of c la s se s )  
we m ust c o n s id er  s u b s t itu t io n s  o f one e n t i t y  for  an o th er  in  a 
p rop osition . (Note th at th e  id ea  is  n o t  th a t one lin g u is t ic  item  is  
su b s t itu te d  for  an o th er , th e  n otion  o f su b st itu t io n  is  o b je c t iv e .)  T h us we 
have th e  sym b ols p { x /a ) \q  and p /a> x\q  both of w h ich  mean th a t q  r e su lt s  
from p  by s u b s t itu t in g  x  for  a. (e .g ., i f  p  is  f(a) th en  q  is  t \x ) ,)  We can  
th en  w rite  q sim ply  as p {x /a )  pr p/a^x, i .e ., as th e  r e su lt  o f su b s t itu t in g  
X  for a in  p. So by c o n c e n tr a tin g  on a p rop osition  and th e  rep lacem ent  
of one of i t s  c o n s t itu e n ts  we can  th in k  of th e  p r o p o sitio n s  th a t would  
r e su lt  by a p p rop r ia te  s u b s t itu t io n s . T hus p /a  is  ca lled  a m atrix and  
p la y s  a ro le  an a logou s to a p rop osition a l fu n c tio n  in  th a t i t  is  u sed  to 
d eterm in e a c la s s . Note th e  th e  sym bol p /a  is  incom plete s in ce  it  sim ply  
m eans "the r e su lt  o f su b s t itu t in g  a in p  by" and th is  n e e d s  com pletion  
.to make s e n s e . We can , how ever, u se  th e  ex p r e ss io n  to  d efin e  a re la tion  
of m em bership . T hus "x  is  a member of p/a" is  d efin ed  to mean "the 
r e su lt  of su b s t itu t in g  a in  p  by x  is  true" (See R u ssell (1906b,
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p p l6 8 -7 1 )) , i .e .,
xE p/a p {x /a )  is  tru e .
H aving g iv e n  a c o n tex tu a l d e fin itio n  o f th e  re la tion  o f  m em bership  we 
can  th en  sim ply  en o u g h  stip u la te  th a t m atrices sh ou ld  be eq u a l ju s t  
w h en  th e y  h ave  th e  sam e m em bers, i .e ., 
p /a ^ q /b  {Vx){p(x/a)  = q { x /  b)).
This d e fin itio n  h as a n a tu ra l e x te n s io n  to m atrices o f more th a n  one  
su b st itu t io n  p lace . C la sses  o f e n t it ie s  (i.e ., in d iv id u a ls  and p rop osition s}  
can  th u s  be tre a te d  a s  m atrices w ith  one su b s t itu t io n  in s ta n c e  w h ich  
th em se lv es  o n ly  h ave  a m eaning in  u se . T hus c la s s  term s are  not 
su p p o sed  to sta n d  fo r  s u b s is t in g  e n t it ie s . Dual r e la tio n s  in  e x te n s io n  can  
be trea ted  a s  m atrices w ith  two su b st itu t io n  p la ces , and so  on for  
r e la tio n s  o f h ig h e r  ord er .
C lasses  o f c la s s e s  can  a lso  be tre a te d  in  term s o f m atrices. R u sse ll  
g iv e s  th e  fo llow in g  acco u n t,
"The m atrix q / {p , a )  is  ca lled  a c la s s  o f  c la s s e s  if , for  a ll v a lu e s  o f  
r , c, r", c% p ro v id ed  r/c=^r’/c%  th e n  q /(p ,a )K r ,c) is  e q u iv a le n t to  
g /(p ,a ) ; (y ,c ') ."  (1905b, p .l7 6 )
and,
th e  c la s s  p / a  is  a  m em ber  o f  th e  m atrix q/(j%,aQ) if  not o n ly  q /ip ^ ,  
ay)î(p»a) is  tr u e , but a lso , w h en ev er  p ’/a ' - P /a  q/{PQ ,aQ)»{p',a’) is  
tru e . (1905b, p .178)
So a m atrix, p /a ,  is  a member of an o th er  m atrix, q/{PQ,aQ), ju s t  w hen  
th e  m atrix w h ich  r e s u lt s  from  th e  ap p rop ria te  su b s t itu t io n s  is  tru e  a n d  
w hen all m atrices co ex ten sio n a l w ith  p / a  sim ilarly  r e su lt  in  tru e  
p ro p o sitio n s  w h en  su b s t itu te d  in  q/(PQ,aq). So, for exam ple, we m ight 
h ave  q  a s  "There is  at le a s t  on e n ig h tin g a le  in  B erk ley  Square"; pq a s
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"Pope John P aul is  a  n ig h tin g a le  in  B erk ley  Square"; and sq is  Pope  
John Paul. T hen th e  c la s s  p / a  w h ere  p  is  "Plato is  an  e g g  in  th e  
basket" and a  is  P lato w ill, p ro v id ed  th e re  is  in d eed  an e g g  in  th e  
b ask et, be a member o f th e  c la s s  o f c la s s e s  <7/(po ,^ ) ( ju s t  b eca u se  in  
th is  c a se  "There is  a t le a s t  on e e g g  in  th e  basket" will be tru e .)
Note th a t th e  d e fin itio n  o f id e n t ity  o f m atrices o n ly  m akes s e n s e  
w hen th e  m atrices co n cern ed  h a v e  p r e c is e ly  th e  same num ber o f  
su b s t itu t io n  p la c es . T hus th e  d e fin tio n  of a c la s s  o f in d iv id u a ls  o n ly  
m akes s e n s e  w h en  ap p lied  to  m atrices w ith  on e  su b st itu t io n  p lace  and, 
fu r th e r , th e  c la s s  o f  c la s s e s  m ust h a v e  tw o  su b st itu t io n  p la c es . Sim ilarly  
a c la s s  o f c la s s e s  o f c la s s e s  m ust h ave  th r e e  su b st itu t io n  p la c e s , and so  
on up (w hat can  now be s e e n  a s) th e  h iera rch y . The e f fe c t  o f th is  
ty p in g  is  to ru le  o u t th e  c la s s  paradoxes; it  is  sim ply s e n s e le s s  to  
co n s id er , s a y , a  c la s s  a s  b e in g  a member of i t s e lf  s in ce  it  can  o n ly  be a 
can d id a te  fo r  m em bership  o f a m atrix co n ta in in g  p r e c is e ly  on e more 
s u b s t itu t io n  p lace  th an  it  i t s e lf  h as.
Im p ortan tly  th is  ty p in g  o f m atrices d oes not need  to be ex p lic it ly  
s ta te d  s in c e  it  is  sim ply a c o n se q u e n c e  o f tre a tin g  m atrices as  
im com plete sym b o ls, i .e .,  o f th e  co n tex tu a l d e fin itio n  o f c la s s e s . R u ssse ll, 
a fte r  h a v in g  o u tlin ed  th e  th e o ry , c o n c lu d e s .
T hus w h ere  m atrices o ccu r , s ig n if ic a n c e  dem ands hom ogen eity  o f 
typ e: th is  d o es  n ot need  to be s ta te d  as a p r in c ip le , but r e su lt s  in  
each  c a se  from  th e  n e c e s s i ty  o f g e tt in g  rid  of m atrices in  o rd er  to 
f in d  o u t w hat th e  p ro p o sitio n  r e a lly  m eans. {1906b, p .178)
The r e a so n  w h y  th is  is  im portant is  made c lear by R u sse ll in  a s lig h t ly  
la ter  p ap er , (1906c). T h is p ap er d iffe r s  from (1906b) in  two s ig n if ic a n t  
and re la ted  r e s p e c ts . F ir st , in  (1906b) R u ssell b eg in s  by  s e t t in g  ou t h is  
so lu tion  to  th e  p arad oxes th r o u g h  th e  treatm ent o f c e r ta in  sym b ols as  
incom plete. T his mode of so lu tion  is  recom m ended by R u sse lT s d ia g n o sis
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of th e  so u rce  o f th e  p arad oxes as r e su lt in g  from m aking cer ta in  "false  
a b s tr a c t io n s ”, i .e ., tr e a t in g  p ro p o sitio n a l fu n c tio n s  and c la s s e s  as  
e n t it ie s . In  (1906c) R u sse ll e n d o r s e s  P o in care's  d ia g n o sis  o f th e  so u rce  
o f th e  p arad oxes a s  r e su lt in g  from  a v ic io u s  c ir c le . T h is is  now  
form ulated  lo o se ly  as a p r in c ip le ,
"W hatever in v o lv e s  an a p p a ren t var iab le  m ust n ot be am ong the  
p o ss ib le  v a lu e s  o f th a t variab le ."  (1905c, p .198)
R u sse ll now r e c o g n iz e s  th a t a so lu tio n  to the p arad oxes m ust is s u e  in  a 
th e o ry  o f th e  (ap p aren t) v a r ia b le  w h ich  m eets th is  co n str a in t. Later
R u sse ll a r g u e s  th a t a th e o ry  w h ich  attem p ts to g iv e  a d ir ec t , ex p lic it
r e s tr ic t io n  o f th e  ra n g e  o f th e  v a r ia b le  is  bound to  fa il s in ce  a n y  
exp lic it r e s tr ic t io n  on th e  v a r ia b le  can  be in c lu d ed  as a con d ition  in  the  
gen era lized  p ro p o sitio n  w hich  m ust th en  be se en  as co n ta in in g  a 
p rop osition  o f more in c lu s iv e  ra n g e , (e .g ., If we had "For all x, Fx" 
p rov id ed  x  is  an i, th e n  we cou ld  th e n  h ave "For all x, if  x  is  an i  th en  
Fx" and in  th is  la tte r  p ro p o sitio n , R u sse ll n o tes , th e  var iab le  m ust have  
a more in c lu s iv e  r a n g e .)  T hus th e  var iab le  m ust have an u n r e s tr ic te d  
range: i t s  lim its are th e  lim its o f s e n s e . T his is  reco n ciled  w ith  th e
V icious Circle P r in c ip le  (VCP) by tr e a t in g  cer ta in  s ig n s  as, incom plete, 
s in ce  su c h  s ig n s  are not p resu m ed  to  stan d  for e n t it ie s  th e y  can n ot be 
presum ed to sta n d  for  p o ss ib le  v a lu e s  of th e  var iab le . R u sse ll
recom m ends th e  th e o r y  in  th e se  term s,
... to reco n c ile  th e  u n r e s tr ic te d  ran ge  of th e  var iab le  w ith  the  
v ic io u s  c ir c le  p r in c ip le , w h ich  m ight seem  im p ossib le  a t f ir s t  s ig h t, 
we h a v e  to c o n s tr u c t  a th e o r y  in  which e v e r y  e x p r e ss io n  w hich  
c o n ta in s an ap p a ren t v a r ia b le  (i.e . w hich con ta in s su ch  w ords a s  ail, 
a n y , som e, the)  is  show n to be a mere façon  de  p a r le r , a th in g  w ith  
no more in d e p e n d e n t r e a lity  than  b elon gs to (say) d /  d x  or For
43  ,in  th at c a se , if  (say ) >^x is  tru e  for  e v e r y  va lu e  o f x, i t  w ill be not 
tru e  but m ea n in g less, if  we su b s t itu te  for x  an  ex p r e ss io n
con ta in in g  an  a p p a ren t v a r ia b le . And su ch  e x p r e ss io n s  in c lu d e  all
d e sc r ip t iv e  p h r a se s  (th e  s o -a n d -s o ) , all c la s s e s , all re la tio n s  in  
ex ten sio n , and all g'eneraJ p r o p o s itio n s , i.e . all p r o p o sitio n s  of th e
form "(px is  tru e  fo r  all (or some) v a lu e s  o f x". (1906c, p .2 0 6 ).l
I have q u oted  th is  p a ssa g e  a t som e le n g th  b ecau se  I th in k  it  is
r e v ea lin g  o f R u sselT s basic  m otives and b ecau se  it  is  r e le v a n t to  th e
secon d  fea tu r e  w h ich  d is t in g u is h e s  (1906c) from  (1906b), th a t is  th e
co n sid era tio n  w h ich  R u sse ll g iv e s  to  th e  sem a n tic  p arad oxes in  th e  la ter  
paper. B efore look in g  at R u sselT s trea tm en t o f th e  sem antic p arad oxes  
le t  me r e ite r a te  w hat I tak e to be th e  main a s p e c ts  o f R u sselT s p osition  
h ere. R u sselT s a c c ep ta n c e  o f th e  VCP r e q u ir e s  th a t h is  th e o r y  is s u e  in  a 
treatm ent o f th e  (ap p aren t) v a r ia b le  w hich  com plies w ith  th e  VCP. But 
th is  com pliance m ust em erge in d ir e c t ly  from  th e  n a tu re  o f th e  th e o ry  o f  
i t s e lf  ra th er  th an  b ein g  an  ex p lic it  im position  on th e  th e o ry . R u sselT s  
m eans for a c h ie v in g  th is  in th e  su b stitu tio n a l a ccou n t is  by tre a tin g
certa in  sym b ols a s  n ot s ta n d in g  for  e n t it ie s . In  th is  w ay th e  r a n g e  of 
th e  var iab le  is  p erm itted  to be u n r e s tr ic te d  w ith ou t th e r e b y  e n fr in g in g  
th e  VCP.
(1906c) m akes an attem pt to deal w ith  the sem antic p arad oxes w hich  
are p a ssed  o v er  w ith ou t comm ent in  (1906b). What H ylton (1980) ca lls  th e
1. It is  w orth  w o n d erin g  w h eth er  R u sse ll has in  fa c t done en ou gh  to  
ju s t i fy  h is  claim o f m e a n in g le s sn e s s  in  tak in g  an incom plete ex p r e ss io n  
to den ote  a p o ss ib le  v a lu e  o f th e  v ar iab le . It ju s t  is  not c lear  w h y  it  
becom es m ea n in g less, a s  op p osed  to b ein g  u n ju s t if ie d , to take (say ) The 
cp as a v a lu e  o f th e  var iab le . The la tter  w ould a lso  be more in c o n cert
w ith R u sselT s s u g g e s t io n  th a t th e  th e o ry  is  m otivated o n ly  by r e fra in in g
from m aking an u n ju s t if ie d  assu m p tion  (of th e  e x is te n c e  of c la s s e s ,
p rop osition a l fu n c tio n s  e tc .) . A fu r th e r  (re la ted ) q u estio n  is  w hy, if
R u ssell ta k es th is  assu m p tion  to lead to paradox, he d oes not take th is  
as a d em on stration  o f the f a l s i t y  o f the a ssu m p tion , i.e ., w hy is  he not  
ju s tif ie d  not m erely  in r e fra in in g  from  b e liev in g  th at (say ) c la s s e s  e x is t  
but a lso  in th e  den ia l th a t c la s s e s  ex ist .
44sim ple su b st itu t io n a l th e o r y  (as o p p o sed  to th e  ram ified su b st itu t io n a l  
th e o ry  w h ich  we sh a ll , m eet sh o r tly )  ta k e s  th e  u n iv e r se  tq c o n s is t  in  
adomain of in d iv id u a ls  and p ro p o sitio n s . Q uantification  o v er  all 
p ro p o sitio n s  is  th u s  deem ed a leg itim ate  op eration  and th is  can  q u ick ly  
be se e n  to lead to  d evelop m en t o f th e  sem antic p aradoxes, For in sta n c e  
we could  h ave ,
(Vp)(cppHp is  fa lse )  (.4)
Once we h ave  fixed  cp A is  a p ro p o sitio n  w h ich  th u s  fa lls  w ith in  th e  
domain of i t s  own q u a n tifier . We can  p ick  cp su c h  th a t it  is  u n iq u e ly  
sa tis f ie d  by A i t s e lf .  We th e n  h ave a paradox: assum e th a t A is  tru e . 
Then, in  p a rticu la r  we m ust h ave  cpA->A is  fa lse . We know th a t cpA (by th e  
ch o ice  o f cp) so  we m ust h ave  A is  fa lse . C on verse ly , assum e th a t A is  
fa lse . Now we know  th a t cpp->p is  fa lse  is  tru e  for all v a lu e s  o f p  
d iffe r e n t from  A b eca u se , by th e  ch o ice  of cp, cpp is  fa lse  fo r  all v a lu e s  
of p  o th er  th an  A. So if  A is  to  be fa lse  we m ust h ave  not-(cpA-»A is  
fa lse ) , i .e ., we m ust have n o t-(A  is  fa lse ) , i .e ., A is  tru e . So A is  tru e  if f  
A is  fa lse . N oth ing in  th e  sim ple su b stitu tio n a l accou n t p r e v e n ts  th e  
c o n str u c tio n  of A (and v a r ia n ts ) .
In th e  ram ified th e o r y  R u sse ll d is t in g u ish e s  betw een  e lem en tary  
p ro p o sitio n s  w h ich  are bona f id e  e n t it ie s  and gen era lized  p ro p o sitio n s  
(or sta tem en ts) w h ich  are not e n t it ie s . The la tter  are to be trea ted  o n ly  
as fa ç o n s  d e  p a r le r  and th u s  can n ot be taken  to  fa ll w ith in  th e  sco p e  o f  
th eir  own q u a n tifie r s ,
S u ch  sta tem en ts  a s  "W hatever x  may be, x=x", or "For all v a lu e s  of 
X, x=x", I take to be an am biguous sta tem en t of a n y  o f th e  v a r io u s  
p ro p o sitio n s  of th e  form "x=x". T here is  th u s  not a new p rop osition  
but an unlim ited  u n d eterm in ed  ch o ice  among a num ber of 
p ro p o sitio n s . (1906c, p .207)
T hus R u sse ll w an ts to tre a t  e x p r e ss io n s  for g en era lized  p ro p o s itio n s , on
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th e  m odel o f incom plete  e x p r e ss io n s , a s  fa ilin g  to stan d  for  a n y th in g . 
B ut h is  m eans for a c h ie v in g  th is  sim ilar end d iffe r s  in  e ith er  ca se . 
E xploitation o f th e  tec h n ic a l d e v ice  of incom plete e x p r e ss io n s  r e q u ir e s  
th at th e re  be a su ita b le  co n tex t o f u se  in  w h ich  th e  m eaning of the  
ex p r e ss io n  can  be exp la in ed . R u sse ll, a t th is  s ta g e  o f h is  ca r ee r , s e e s  no 
co n tex t in  w h ich  to exp la in  th e  m eaning of g en era lized  p ro p o sitio n s  
(w hich  a fte r  a ll fu n c tio n  sim ilarly  to e lem en tary  p r o p o sitio n s  in  term s of 
b ein g  cap ab le  o f tr u th  and fa ls ity  and in  being  u sed  in  in feren ce: both  
form s of e x p r e ss io n  seem  to be lin g u is t ic  u n its  p o s s e s s in g  th e ir  own  
in te g r ity ) . R u sse ll ta k e s  g e n e r a lize d  p ro p o sitio n s  to be ” am biguous  
statm ents"  w h ich  determ in e an unlim ited  u n d eterm in ed  ch o ice  am ong a 
num ber of p ro p o sitio n s" . Later (19ü6c, p.2Ü8) he ta lk s  of a gen era lized  
p rop osition  as "am biguously  d enotin g"  its  in s ta n c e s . But th e se  
p ron ou n cem en ts are m y ster io u s . S u r e ly  we are not su p p o sed  to v iew  
su c h  p sy c h o lo g ic a l so u n d in g  p h r a se s  as "choice" a s  b e in g  p sy ch o lo g ica l. 
That is , 1 do not th in k  R u sse ll can  be tak en  to be s u g g e s t in g  th a t th e  
g en era lized  p ro p o sitio n  is  sim ply  an in str u c tio n  or licen ce  to  make some 
ch o ice . What we are e n tit le d  to e x p e c t  from R u sse ll is  an a cco u n t o f th e  
lo g ica l  re la tion  h o ld in g  betw een  th e  gen era lized  p ro p o sitio n  (w h atever  it  
is) and its  v a lu e s . To tak e th e  p sy c h o lo g ic a l ro u te  would be e ith er  to 
ig n o re  th e  lo g ica l re la tion  or to make th at re la tion  d ep en d  on a  
p sy c h o lo g ica l re la tion . R u sse ll w ould th en  have to r e lin q u ish  h is b elief  
in  th e  o b je c t iv ity  o f lo g ic .
R u sse ll n e v e r  g iv e s  an ad eq u ate  accou n t of th is  re la tion  of am biguous
d en otation . We can  g e t  an id ea  o f w h y th is  may h ave been  so  by a sk in g
w hat m eans are a t R u sselT s d isp o sa l to explain  the re la tion  o f am biguous
denotation? Two m ethods s u g g e s t  th em se lv es , both, h ow ever, would have
been anathem a to R u sse ll at th is  time. The f ir s t  is  to s e e  am biguous
d en ota tion  as an in s ta n c e  of a cer ta in  so r t of d en o tin g  co n cep t. But 
.clearly , h a v in g  a lrea d y  -repudiated  the th eo ry  o f d en o tin g  con cep ts^ , 
l .I n  the next se c tio n , th o u g h , I sh a ll be q u estio n in g  the e x te n t o f th is  
rep u d ia tion . : ;
46R u ssell w as in  no p o sitio n  to make su ch  a move. The secon d  s tr a te g y  is  
s u g g e s te d  by th e  la ter  a cco u n t o f p rop osition a l fu n c tio n s  in  PM  w h ere  
R u sse ll s ta te s  th a t an a s se r t io n  o f a p rop osition a l am b igu ou sly  d en o tes  {
its  v a lu e s  (PM, p. 17). That i s , ' t h e  ta c tic  would be to make th e  acco u n t |
o f th e  a p p a ren t v a r ia b le  d e p e n d e n t on th a t o f th e  rea l var iab le . But th is  Ii
would be to r e s u r r e c t  p ro p o sitio n a l fu n c tio n s . (P erh aps th is  is  p a rt o f i
th e  exp lanation  of R u sselT s trea tm en t o f p rop osition a l fu n c tio n s  in  PM as  
real.) H owever th e r e  is  no w ay th a t R u sse ll in  h is  su b stitu tio n a l p h a se  
could  a ccep t su ch  a so lu tion .
H ylton (1980) p o in ts  o u t th a t th e  treatm ent o f (all, not sim ply  
g en era lized ) p ro p o s itio n s  as incom plete  (as on ly  h a v in g  a m eaning in  th e  
con tex t o f ju d gem en t, b e lie f e tc .)  can n ot h ave been  th e  m otive for  
R u sselT s abandonm ent o f th e  ram ified  su b stitu tio n a l th e o r y  s in ce  ev e n  in  
h is (1908) th e o r y  o f ty p e s  R u sse ll s t i l l  trea ted  p ro p o sitio n s  a s  com plexes.
R ather, H ylton claim s th a t th e  re a so n  for  R u sse ll ab an d on in g  th e  th e o ry  
r e su lts  from more in tern a l te n s io n s  betw een , on th e  one hand , h a v in g  to  
"acknow ledge d is t in c tio n s  o f ty p e  am ong th e  p ro p o sitio n s  w hich th e  
th eo ry  a ssu m es to exist"  (1980, p .26), and R u sselT s argum en t for a  
s in g le , u n s tr a tif ie d  u n iv e r se  w h ich  form s th e  ran ge  o f th e  var iab le .
H ylton's cr itic ism  is ,  in  one s e n s e , moot s in ce  R u sse ll d oes h ave to  
a ccep t th a t we can  leg itim a te ly  q u a n tify  ov er  sta tem en ts  o f a g iv e n  ty p e  
(w here th e  ty p e  is  d eterm in ed  by  th e  num ber of ap p aren t v a r ia b le s  in  
th e  sta tem ent) th u s  form ing a sta tem en t of a h ig h er  ty p e . W itness th is  
rem ark made in  th e  c o u r se  o f exp la in in g  aw ay th e  liar paradox,
LA man who s a y s  "I am ly ing"  j cannot mean: "I am now m aking a 
sta tem en t w h ich  is  fa lse" , b eca u se  th ere  is  no w ay of sp ea k in g  of 
sta tem en ts  in  gen era l:  we can  sp eak  of sta tem en ts  of p ro p o sitio n s, 
or sta tem en ts  co n ta in in g  one, tw o, th ree  ... ap p aren t v a r ia b le s , but
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not of sta tem en ts  in  g en era l. If we w ant to  sa y  w hat is  e q u iv a le n t  
to "I am m aking a fa lse  sta tem en t co n ta in in g  n ap p aren t var iab les" , 
we m ust sa y  som eth in g  like: "There is  a p rop osition a l fu n c tio n  q)(X]^ , 
X2 , su ch  th a t I a s s e r t  th a t is  tru e  for a n y
v a lu e s  of X]^ , x^, ...x^ , and th is  is  in  fa c t  fa lse" . T his sta tem en t  
co n ta in s n+1 ap p a ren t v a r ia b le s , nam ely x%, x^, •••x j^ and (p. Hence it  
d oes not a p p ly  to it s e lf , (1906c,p .208)
So th e  ram ified  su b st itu t io n a l th e o r y  d oes req u ire  th at we have  
v a r ia b le s  w h ich  r a n g e  o v e r  p ro p o sitio n a l fu n c tio n s  or, b e tter , s in ce  
th e se  are exp la in ed  in  term s o f p ro p o s itio n s  and sta tem en ts , w h ich  ran ge  
ov er  s ta tem en ts . So H ylton is  p a r t ly  c o r re c t  s in ce  th e  p ra c tic e  o f th e  
th e o ry  seem s to  in v o lv e  u s  in  r e c o g n iz in g  su ch  e x p r e ss io n s  as  
e x p r e ss io n s  for e n t it ie s . H ow ever it  is  a lso  c lear  th a t R u sse ll ex p lic it ly  
d e n ie s  th at sta tem en ts  are e n t it ie s . His problem  is  th o u g h  th at he can n ot  
exp la in  th e ir  u se  w ith ou t tr e a t in g  them  as e n t it ie s . Here th e  problem  
about th e  lack  of an exp lan ation  of am bigu ous d en ota tion  r e c u r s .
So, a lth o u g h  it  seem s th a t th is  p ic tu r e  p r e s e n ts  u s  w ith  a s in g le  
domain com p risin g  o f in d iv id u a ls  (sim ple e n tit ie s )  and p ro p o sitio n s , th e  
r e a lity  o f th e  s itu a tio n  for th e  p u r p o se s  of q u an tifica tion  is  th a t we 
h a v e  a s tr a t if ie d  domain. At each  s ta g e  we may leg itim ate ly  q u a n tify  
o v er  s ta tem en ts  w h ich  in c lu d e  a sp e c if ie d  num ber of ap p a ren t v a r ia b le s . 
But in  doing  so we form  a sta tem en t o f a d eg ree  one h ig h er  than th a t  
o v er  w h ich  it  q u a n tifie s . T hus we avo id  th e  paradox but we a lso  d eve lop  
th e  need  for a t le a s t  a cou n tab le  num ber of d is tin c t  (apparent)  
v a r ia b le s .
§8 The V ariable a s  a D enoting  Concept:
The th e o ry  o f ty p e s  (1908) w h ich  is  th e  next tech n ica l d evelop m ent of 
R u sselT s program m e a ttem p ts to lim it sy stem a tica lly  the ra n g e  of
48v a r ia b le s . T his sh ou ld  be s e e n  a s  a d is t in c t  secon d  s tra n d  to the  
program m e. On th e  one hand we h ave  th e  trea tm en t o f cer ta in  sym bols  
as incom plete  and , on th e  o th er , we h ave th e  ty p in g  of v a r ia b le s , i .e ., 
th e  r e s tr ic t io n  o f v a r ia b le s  im p licitly  to a ra n g e  o f s ig n if ic a n c e . The 
in v e st ig a tio n  of th e  su b st itu t io n a l th e o r y  show ed  th a t th e  f ir s t  fea tu r e  
w ill n ot su ff ic e  in  a n y  sim ple w ay to m otivate th e  seco n d . In stea d  each  
h a s  to  be  se en  a s  a ih s in g  o u t o f  th e  sam e epistem olog'ica l r e s t r ic t io n s  on 
th e  s c o p e  o f  log ic . The program m e u ltim ately  fa ils  b ecau se  R u sselT s  
attem pt to m otivate ty p e  r e s tr ic t io n s  from  an ep istem olog ica l p o in t of 
view  in  th e  1913 m an u scrip t u s e s  th e  m ultip le r e la tio n s  th e o r y  of  
ju d gem en t. R u sse ll in te n d s  to  u s e  th a t th e o ry  to s e t  lim its on w hat it  
m akes s e n s e  to ju d g e: c o n s tr a in ts  o f ty p e  w ould th en  em erge. But th e  
m ultiple r e la tio n s  th e o r y  i t s e lf  n e e d s  to assum e ty p e  r e tr ic t io n s  in  ord er  
to a rr iv e  at a s u f f ic ie n t ly  f in e  g ra in ed  m eans o f d is t in g u ish in g  b etw een  
ju d g em en ts  and to e n su r e  th a t it  d oes not d e sc r ib e  n o n se n s ica l  
ju d g em en ts . I sh a ll r e tu r n  to th is  below.
It sh ou ld  be c lear  th a t th e  notion  o f th e  var ia b le  is  cru cia l. T his is  
h ard ly  su r p r is in g  g iv e n  th a t R u sse ll c o n n e c ts  log ic  to g e n e r a lity  but is  
also  to  be e x p ec ted  in  th e  w ake of "On D enoting". The ach ievem en t of 
th at paper can be r e g a rd ed  a s  th e  elim ination of com plex  d en o tin g  
c o n c e p ts  in  fa v o u r  o f th e  v a r ia b le . (See H ylton (1990) for d isc u ss io n  of 
th is .)  The r e le v a n c e  for R u sse lT s program m e o f d ea lin g  w ith  the  
p arad oxes is  th a t th e  lim it o f th e  s tr a te g y  of tre a tin g  sym b ols as  
incom plete is  rea ch ed  w ith  th e  v a r ia b le  (w hich is  th u s  in  some s e n s e  the  
ultim ate d en o tin g  c o n c e p t) . T h is ca lls  for  th e  secon d  stra n d  o f R u sselT s  
programme: th e  r a n g e  of th e  v a r ia b le  m ust be lim ited to th e  ra n g e  o f  
s ig n if ic a n c e  o f e x p r e ss io n s  in  w h ich  it  o c c u r s . But, c o n v e r se ly , it  seem s  
that th e  n a tu re  o f th e  v a r ia b le  m ust i t s e lf  s e t  lim its on our  
u n d er sta n d in g  o f com plex e x p r e ss io n s  or on our a p p r eh en sio n  of 
com plexes. The p o in t is  th a t on the one hand we w ant to sa y  th a t th e  
ran ge  o f the v ar iab le  is  s e t  by th e  ra n g e  o f s ig n if ic a n c e  o f p rop osition a l
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fu n c tio n s  in  w h ich  it  o c c u r s , w h ils t , on  th e  o th er  we w ant to sa y  th a t  
the ty p e  o f th e  va r ia b le  i t s e lf  s h o w s  w h y certa in  fu n c tio n s  are  
n o n se n s ica l w hen ap p lied  to c e r ta in  argu m en ts .
T here is  th en  an a p p a ren t c ir c u la r ity  in  th e  program m e. It is  w orth  
b ein g  a lit t le  more c a r e fu l ab ou t th e  n atu re  of th e  c ir c u la r ity  w h ich  
seem s to  be b eck on in g . In  a s e n s e , it  w ould se r v e  R u sselT s p u r p o se s  
w ere he ab le  to  c o n s tr u c t  a sy ste m , w h ich  w as su f f ic ie n t ly  r ich  to  
su p p o rt "enough" m athem atics, and w h ich  th ro u g h  bu ilt in , in tern a l  
r e s tr ic t io n s  on  th e  v a r ia b le  p r o h ib ite d  th e  co n tra d ic tio n s . The c ir c u la r ity  
ju s t  a llu d ed  to w ould th e n  o n ly  a f fe c t  th e  inform al m otivation  for th e  
th eo ry . The c ir c u la r ity  cou ld  th e n  be in te r p r e te d  a s  r e la tin g  to an  
ultim ate in e ffa b ility  or p rim itive  o f lo g ic . R u sselT s p ra c tice , e v e n  if  not 
e x p lic it ly  inform ed by su c h  a v iew , d o es  seem  to co h ere  w ith  it  s in ce  he  
n e v er  a r g u e s  but sim ply  s t ip u la te s  th a t th e  ty p e  r e s tr ic t io n s  s e t  up  in  
th e  lo g ica l sy stem  co in c id e  w ith  r a n g e s  o f s ig n if ic a n c e . R u sselT s w r itin g s  
at th is  time are dom inated by tec h n ic a l develop m ent of th e  th e o r y  of 
ty p e s  com bined w ith  sk e tc h e d  a ttem p ts to m otivate th e  th e o r y  and  
p rom issory  n o tes  to  c a r r y  ou t th a t p h ilo sop h ica l e n te r p r ise . R u sse ll 
c o n c lu d es  (1908) by n o tin g  th a t th e  develop m en t of th e  th e o r y  o f ty p e s  
le a v e s  op en  a num ber of p h ilo so p h ica l q u e stio n s  about i t s  in te r p r e ta tio n . 
He a n tic ip a tes  a fu tu r e  exam ination  o f th o se  q u e stio n s  w ith ou t being  
more sp e c if ic  about th e  q u e s t io n s  th e m se lv e s . So we h ave  some r ea so n  to  
su p p o se  th a t R u sse ll w as s t i l l  v e r y  co n cern ed  about g iv in g  an inform al 
m otivation for  h is  sy ste m  w h ich  is  cap ab le  o f sta n d in g  up to ca refu l  
p h ilo sop h ica l s c r u tin y .
I h ave claim ed th a t th e  v a r ia b le  is  a d en o tin g  co n cep t. In  "On 
Denoting" R u sse ll a r g u e s  q u ite  g e n e r a lly , it  seem s, a g a in st  h is  ear lier  
view  and th e  F reg ea n  v iew  w h ich  r e q u ire  a d istin c tio n  betw een  m eaning  
and den ota tion . (Here th e  m eaning of a d en o tin g  p h ra se  is  the d en otin g  
co n cep t, th e  o b je c t  d en o ted  is  th e  den ota tion . So th in k  of m eaning as  
(sim ilar to) F reg ea n  s e n s e  and d en ota tion  as (sim ilar to) F regean
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r e fe r en ce .)  I m ust now show  how th e  var iab le  i t s e lf  d oes not fa ll fou l o f  
th is  argum en t.
The nub o f R u sse lT s argu m en t is  th a t we cannot sp eak  ab ou t the  
m eaning of a d en o tin g  p h r a se  s in c e  in  an y  attem pt to do so  we fa ce  a 
dilemma; e ith e r  we co lla p se  th e  m ea n in g /d en o ta tio n  d is tin c tio n  or we 
loose s ig h t  o f th e  lo g ica l  c o n n ec tio n  betw een  m eaning and d en ota tion  
w h ich  th u s  becom es w h olly  m y ster io u s . Take a d en otin g  com plex, C, if  C 
is  a c o n s titu e n t  o f a p ro p o sitio n  th en  th e  p ro p o sitio n  is  not about th e  
m eaning o f C (or, e q u iv a le n tly , is  n ot about C -  s in ce  w hat we are  
c o n s id er in g  are m ean in gs w h ich  may or may not h ave  a d en ota tion ). 
S uch  a p ro p o sitio n  is  ab ou t th e  d en ota tion  o f C (if a n y ). To be ab le  to  
sp eak  ab ou t th e  m eaning o f "O' we need  a new  e x p r e ss io n  (su ch  a s  "the 
m eaning o f '(7" or "C") w h ich  d e n o te s  the m eaning of C. But now C 
cannot be a c o n s t itu e n t  o f th is  e x p r e ss io n  (a fa c t  w h ich  we r e co g n iz e  
in form ally  by u s in g  q u o tes) s in ce  th e n  th e  p ro p o sitio n  is  not ab ou t C 
but about i t s  d en o ta tion  and th e r e  is  no w ay of w ork in g  back from  
d en o ta tio n s to m ean in gs s in c e  a n y  e n t ity  or o b je c t  may be d en oted  by  
in d e fin ite ly  m any d en o tin g  p h r a se s . A lso we can n ot tak e it  th a t form ing  
a d en ota tion  for th e  m eaning by u s in g  a d ev ice  su ch  a s  quotation  m arks 
u n p rob lem atica lly  a llow s u s to  i llu s tr a te  th e  re la tio n  o f d en ota tion  s in ce  
f ir s t ,  th is  re la tio n  p r e s u p p o s e s  th e  re la tio n  of d en ota tion  w hich  we are  
tr y in g  to exp la in . And, se c o n d ly , it  o n ly  seem s unproblem atic b ecau se  of 
th e  lin g u is t ic  re la tio n  b etw een  th e  two d en o tin g  p h r a se s . But th is  is  to  
make th e  co n n ectio n  " p u rely  lin g u is t ic  th ro u g h  th e  p h rase" , th a t is ,  it  
ig n o r e s  th e  lo g ic a l  r e la tio n  of d en ota tion . (See B lackburn  and Code 
(1978) for  a good r e c o n str u c tio n  of th e  argum en t.)
I do not in ten d  to a p p ra ise  th is  argum en t for two r e a so n s . F ir st, the  
v a lid ity  o f th e  argu m en t is  n ot my in te r e s t:  I am in te r e s te d  in  w h eth er  
dr not it  p r o v id e s  a cr itic ism  o f R u sselT s u se  o f the va r ia b le . S eco n d ly , 
some F r e g ea n s  (i.e ., a d h e r e n ts  of some v e r s io n  of th e  s e n s e /r e fe r e n c e  
d istin c tio n ) have a c c ep te d  th e  argu m en t as sh ow in g  th at it  w ould be
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im p ossib le  to g iv e  a d ir e c t  sp e c if ic a t io n  o f s e n s e . (Dummett (1973, p .227)
and E van s (1982) exem p lify  th is  so r t  o f F regean .) In stea d  Dummett (w ith
E van s’s app rova l) m akes u se  o f W ittg en ste in ’s d is tin c tio n  b etw een  sa y in g  
and sh ow in g  in o rd er  to  g iv e  c o n te n t  to th e  n otion  of se n se : th e  m anner  
in  w h ich  we s p e c ify  th e  r e fe r e n c e  o f th e  e x p r e ss io n  w ith in  th e  sem antic  
th e o ry  sh ow s i t s  s e n s e . R e g a r d le ss  o f w h eth er  or not th is  is  an  
ad eq u ate  r e sp o n se  to  R u sse ll’s  d o u b ts  it  is  c le a r ly  one w h ich  R u sse ll a t  
th is  p o in t did n ot e v e n  b eg in  to c o n s id er .
For R u sse lT s argu m en t to  go  th r o u g h  w e n eed  to  h ave , f ir s t ,  a 
d is tin c tio n  betw een  m ean ing and d en ota tion , (i.e ., we need  to h ave  one  
e n t ity  w h ich  s ta n d s  in  a g iv e n  re la tion  to o th e r s  su c h  th a t a n y  
p ro p o sitio n  in c lu d in g  th a t e n t ity  is  ab ou t th o se  o th e rs)  se co n d ly , we 
m ust a c c ep t th a t th e r e  is  no ro u te  back from d en ota tion  to  m eaning. 
M ost d en o tin g  c o n c e p ts  p r e c is e ly  s a t is fy  th e se  tw o co n d itio n s . The 
var iab le , h ow ever , d oes not.
A p ro p o sitio n  co n ta in in g  th e  v a r ia b le  is  in d eed  not ab ou t th e  var iab le  
i t s e lf  but s a y s  som eth in g  ab o u t th e  p o ss ib le  ra n g e  of v a lu e s  o f th e
yariab le . So we s a y  (or R u sse ll s a y s )  th a t th e  var iab le  (am biguously)
d e n o te s  a n y  o f i t s  v a lu e s . But th e  id e n tity  o f th e  v ar iab le  is  fixed  by
its  ran ge  o f v a lu e s , th a t is , v a r ia b le s  sh a r in g  th e  same ra n g e  o f v a lu e s  
are id en tica l. T h us in  th e  c a se  o f th e  var iab le  we do h ave  a ro u te  back  
from d en ota tion  to m eaning. R u sse lT s argum en t d ep en d s e s se n t ia lly  on  
th e  com plexity  o f th e  d en o tin g  c o n c e p t s in ce  if  we adm it com p lexity  we 
m ust adm it th a t a n y  o b je c t  can  be d en oted  in  in d e fin ite ly  m any w ays (so  
th a t th ere  is  no ro u te  back from  d en ota tion  to m eaning).
§8.1 H ylton’s In ter p r e ta tio n  and Complex D enoting C oncepts;
H ylton (1990) draw s a tte n tio n  to th e  im portance o f th e  th eo ry  of 
d e sc r ip tio n s  in  elim inatin g  n o n -p r o p o s itio n a l com plexity  (so  th a t the
v ariab le  becom es fu n d am en ta l) bu t claim s that "Ltjhe argu m en ts a g a in st  
th e  th e o ry  o f d en o tin g  c o n c e p ts  ... a p p ly  eq u a lly  to sim ple (non-com plex)
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d en o tin g  c o n c e p ts , su c h  as th e  variab le"  (1990, p. 263). In th is  I claim  
H ylton is  m istaken . H ylton p e r s is t e n t ly  a r g u e s  th a t th e re  is  a deep  
ten sio n  betw een  w hat he term s R u sselT s o b je c t  based  m eta p h y sic s  
(w hich r e q u ir e s  th a t each  e n t ity  is  w hat it  is  in d e p e n d e n tly  o f all 
oth ers: th a t all r e la tio n s  are , in  th e  id e a lis t ’s s e n s e , ex tern a l) and a 
th ree  s ta g e  a n a ly s is  o f la n g u a g e  in  w h ich  we h ave  a s e n te n c e  w h ich  
e x p r e ss e s  a p r o p o sitio n  but w h ich  is  not about th is  p ro p o sitio n  but 
ab ou t some fu r th e r  a s p e c t  o f r e a lity . H ylton p resu m es th a t R u sse ll is  
d is sa t is f ie d  w ith  th e  notion  o f d en o tin g  c o n c e p ts  b ecau se  it  r e q u ir e s  
th a t one e n t ity  s ta n d s  in  th e  d e n o tin g  re la tion  to o th e r s . But it  is  hard  
to se e  th e  so u r c e  o f R u sselT s d iff ic u lt ie s  in  su ch  sim ple term s b ecau se  
th is  is  su c h  an o v e r t  a s p e c t  o f w hat d en o tin g  c o n c e p ts  are th a t R u sse ll  
su r e ly  w ould n ot h ave  m ooted th e  id ea  if  it  w as in  su c h  d eep  te n sio n  
w ith h is  u n d e r ly in g  m eta p h y sic s . S eco n d ly  th e  a b o u tn e ss  re la tio n  is  
inelim inable at th e  le v e l  o f p r o p o s itio n s  and w ill th u s  h ave to be 
a ccou n ted  for  in  term s o f a d en o tin g  re la tio n  of some p rop osition a l  
c o n s t itu e n ts . L a stly , th e  argu m en t R u sse ll g iv e s  a g a in st  d en o tin g  
c o n c e p ts  m akes no m ention of a n y  m etap h ysica l su sp ic io n s  he may h ave  
ab ou t d en ota tion . T rue, it  d o es  o fte n  seem  th a t R u sse ll s e e s  h is  
argum en t a s  d em olish in g  th e  v e r y  d is tin c tio n  betw een  m eaning and  
d en ota tion . He c o n c lu d e s  th e  argu m en t, "the w hole d is tin c tio n  of m eaning  
and d en ota tion  h as been  w r o n g ly  con ceived "  (1905, p .50). But th e  
argum en t is ,  in  fa c t , fram ed e n t ir e ly  in  term s of d en o tin g  p h r a s e s  and  
co m p lex es  and th u s  w ould seem , a t le a s t  im p licitly , p r e c is e ly  to exem pt 
the v a r ia b le . The problem  is  th a t a t th is  p o in t R u sse ll had d ec id ed  to  
trea t th e  va r ia b le  as fu n d am en ta l but w as a lso  u n su re  o f how to accou n t  
for it. T h us it  w ould  not h ave o c cu rred  to  him th a t he sh ou ld  a lso  be 
c o n s id er in g  a m ea n in g /d en o ta tio n  d is tin c tio n  r e la t iv e  to th e  v ar iab le . The 
argum en t is  sim ply  d ir ec ted  at d en o tin g  com plexes and m akes 
assu m p tion s s p e c if ic  to d en o tin g  com plexes.
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§9 A T en sion  in  R u sselT s A ttem pt to M otivate h is Later T h eory  o f T yp es:
In (1908) R u sse ll d e f in e s  a t y p e  a s  th e  ra n g e  o f s ig n if ic a n c e  o f a 
p rop osition a l fu n c tio n . R u sse ll a r r iv e s  a t th is  d e fin itio n  by f ir s t  e n d o r s in g  
th e  id ea  th a t c o n tra v e n tio n  of th e  VCP is  r e sp o n s ib le  for  th e  fa lla cy  
in v o lv ed  in  th e  p arad oxes. The n e t  e f fe c t  o f th is  is  th a t c e r ta in  p u ta t iv e  
to ta lit ie s  are re g a rd ed  a s  illeg itim a te , i .e ., no ap p aren t va r ia b le  can  be 
tak en  to ra n g e  o v e r  them . S e c o n d ly , R u sse ll g o es  on to exam ine th e  n atu re  
of rea l and a p p a ren t v a r ia b le s  and o f the m eaning o f g e n e ra lized  
p ro p o sitio n s. The outcom e of th is  in v e s t ig a tio n  is  th a t we can n ot c r e d it  
o u r se lv e s  w ith  g r a sp  o f a s in g le  u n r e s tr ic te d  var ia b le  but n e ith er  can  we  
g iv e  an ex p lic it  r e s tr ic t io n  o f th e  r a n g e  o f th e  v a r ia b le  (s in ce  a n y  su ch  
r e str ic t io n  can  be in co rp o ra ted  w ith in  a con d ition a l p r o p o sitio n s  w h ich  can  
th en  be se e n  - i f  th e  r e s tr ic it io n  had a n y  fo rce  a t a ll-  to h ave  a more 
in c lu s iv e  r a n g e ). (S ee  §7 for  more e lu c id a tio n  o f th is  argum en t.)
In PM R u sse ll is  le s s  e x p lic it  ab ou t lin k in g  a ty p e  to th e  r a n g e  o f  
s ig n if ic a n c e  o f a p ro p o sitio n a l fu n c tio n . A p o ss ib le  rea so n  for  th is  is  th a t  
in  (1908) th e re  is  an e v id e n t  te n s io n  in  d e fin in g  th e  ty p e  in  term s o f th e  
ra n g e  o f s ig n if ic a n c e  o f a p ro p o sitio n a l fu n c tio n . T his te n s io n  a r ise s  
b eca u se  R u sse ll ta k e s  th e  r e s tr ic t io n  to a f fe c t  th e  ra n g e  o f ap p aren t  
v a r ia b le s . T hus we can  no lo n g er  e n u n c ia te , sa y , th e  law of exc lu d ed  m iddle 
as (p )(p  is  tru e  or p  is  fa lse )  s in c e  th is  in v o lv e s  q u an tifica tion  o v er  an  
illeg itim ate  to ta lity . R u sse ll a ttem p ts to a llev ia te  th is  d iff ic u lty  by ex p lo itin g  
th e  d is tin c tio n  betw een  a ll and a n y , i .e ., th e  d is tin c tio n  b etw een  ap p a ren t  
and rea l v a r ia b le s . If we a s s e r t  a n y  v a lu e  o f "p  is  tru e  or p  is  fa lse"  we 
a s s e r t  not a new  p ro p o sitio n  but a n y  v a lu e  o f a p ro p osition a l fu n c tio n  
s in ce  in th is  sta tem en t p  is  a rea l v a r ia b le  (1908, p .67). But, if  we q u a n tify  
o v er  ty p e s  and if  ty p e s  are  lim ited by th e  ran ge  o f s ig n if ic a n t  argu m en ts  
of a p rop osition a l fu n c tio n  th en  we sh o u ld  be ab le to q u a n tify  o v er  the  
ran ge  o f s ig n if ic a n c e  o f "p is  tr u e  or p  is  fa lse" , i .e ., we shou ld  be ab le  to 
q u a n tify  o v er  all p ro p o s itio n s .
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In (1908) R u sse ll p r o v id e s  an  a lte r n a tiv e  rou te  ou t o f th is  d iff ic u lty . It  
i s  o n ly  th is  la tte r  m eans th a t is  exp lo ited  in  FM, Here R u sse ll u s e s  th e  
notion  of sy ste m a tic  am b igu ity  o f th e  n otion s o f tr u th , fa lseh o o d , "or", 
"not", e tc , R u sse ll s a y s  th a t it  may ap p ear  th a t th e se  may be held  to  ap p ly  
to an y  p ro p o sitio n  o f w h a tev er  o rd er  (th e  ord er  o f a p ro p o sitio n  is  
determ ined  by th e  ty p e s  o f a p p a ren t v a r ia b le s  w h ich  are . in c lu d ed  in  it, 
p r e se n tly , I sh a ll o u tlin e  th e  h ie r a r c h y  of ty p e s)  but th is  im p ression  is  
fa lse . T h ese n o tio n s  n eed  to  be d isam b igu ated  r e la tiv e  to p r o p o sitio n s  o f a 
g iv e n  ord er . Now, h ow ever , it  a p p ea rs  th a t ty p e s  can n ot be d efin ed  in  
term s o f th e  ra n g e  o f s ig n if ic a n c e  o f a p rop osition a l fu n c tio n  p r e c is e ly  
b ecau se  we r e q u ire  th e  notion  o f ty p e  to d isam biguate a c la s s  o f (v ita lly  
im portant) p ro p o sitio n a l fu n c tio n s . Of c o u r se , a ty p e  w ill co in cid e  w ith  th e  
ra n g e  o f s ig n if ic a n c e  o f a p ro p o sitio n a l fu n c tio n  but th e  la tte r  notion  
can n ot be u sed  to m otivate or d e fin e  th e  form er. Our p r e se n t  co n cern  is  
w ith how th e  h ie ra r c h y  o f ty p e s  is  e s ta b lish e d .
§9.1 In d iv id u a ls  and U n iversa le :
In d iv id u a ls  are th e  fundam enta l ty p e  w ith in  th e  h iera rch y . R u sse ll 
in tr o d u ce s  th e  n otion  o f a m a tr ix  a s  a fu n c tio n  (of an y  num ber of 
va r ia b le s) w h ich  in v o lv e s  no a p p a ren t v a r ia b le s . Our f ir s t  ty p e  c o n s is t s  o f  
all th o se  m atrices w h ose  v a r ia b le s  r a n g e  o v er  in d iv id u a ls  (eg . cp!(x), mj!(x,.f), 
e tc .)  p lu s  all th o se  fu n c tio n s  form ed by g en e r a liz in g  on. one or more (but 
not all) o f th e  v a r ia b le s  (eg . (y)(p(x,.v), {3z}{y}^ ){x ,y ,z}  e tc .) . The n ext le v e l  
of th e  h ie ra r c h y  in c lu d e s , f ir s t ,  a ll th o se  m atrices w h ich  in c lu d e  v a r ia b le s  
for f ir s t  o rd er  fu n c tio n s  (and, p e r h a p s , in d iv id u a ls)  (eg . F!((p!x,y)), 
se co n d ly , it  in c lu d e s  fu n c tio n s  d er iv ed  from  su ch  m atrices by g e n e r a liz in g  
on one or more (b u t not all) o f th e  v a r ia b le s  (eg . (y)F(cp!x,.F), 
(Hep) (z)G(x,z,(p! jd e tc .) . Note th a t seco n d  ord er  fu n c tio n s  may be e ith er  
fu n c tio n s  o f f ir s t  ord er  fu n c tio n s  or fu n c tio n s  of in d iv id u a ls  (or both).
. In PM R u sse ll g iv e s  two inform al p r e sen ta tio n s  o f the h iera rch y  of 
ty p e s . In th e  seco n d  p r e se n ta t io n  (w hich I have ju s t  sk e tc h e d ) a
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p r e d ica tiv e  fu n c tio n  is  id e n tif ie d  w ith  a m atrix, but in  th e  f ir s t  
p r e sen ta tio n  a p r e d ic a t iv e  e x p r e ss io n  is  tak en  to be a fu n c tio n  w h ose  o rd er  
is  one h ig h er  than  th a t o f th e  h ig h e s t  o rd er  of it s  argu m en ts , so  th a t  
(3.F)F!((p!3r,.F) is  p r e d ica tiv e  in  th is  la tte r  s e n s e , w h ereas {cp)F(tp!x,.F) is  not,
I sh a ll be c o n c e n tr a t in g  on  two a s p e c ts  of R u sse ll’s  th e o r y  of ty p e s .  
F ir st , I w ant to  look at th e  fu n d am en ta l o n to lo g y  in v o lv ed  in  th e  th e o ry  of 
ty p e s , in  p a rticu la r , I w ant to c o n s id e r  th e  c o n stitu tio n  and  sp e c if ic a tio n  of 
th e  basic domain o f in d iv id u a ls . S e c o n d ly  I sh a ll w ant to look at th e  ro le  o f  
th e  VCP in  m otiva tin g  th e  th e o r y  o f ty p e s .
It is  u n c lea r  w hat R u sse ll took  to be in c lu d ed  in  th e  domain o f  
in d iv id u a ls . In d iv id u a ls  are  d e r iv e d  from  elem en tary  p r o p o s itio n s , i .e .,  from  
p ro p o sitio n s  in c lu d in g  no a p p a ren t v a r ia b le s . So our g ra sp  of in d iv id u a ls  is  
o n ly  a s  p r e c ise  as is  our g r a sp  o f e lem en ta ry  p ro p o sitio n s . In d iv id u a ls  are  
in tro d u ced  a s  n o n -fu n c tio n a l c o n s t itu e n ts  of e lem en tary  p r o p o sitio n s .
The term s o f e lem en tary  p r o p o s itio n s  we w ill ca ll in d iv id u a ls . (1908, 
.1x76)
...th e  term s o f [e lem en tary  p r o p o s itio n s ], o th er  th an  fu n c tio n s , we w ill 
ca ll in d iv id u a J s . {PM, p. 161)
The v o ca b u la ry  u sed  h ere  is  rem in iscen t o f that u sed  in  The P r in c ip le s , 
in d eed  in  (1908) R u sse ll r e fe r s  to  th e  r e le v a n t se c tio n  of th a t w ork in a 
foo tn o te . Recall th a t in  The P r in c ip le s  a  term  of a p ro p o sitio n  is  tak en  as  
th e  log ica l s u b je c t  o f th e  p r o p o sitio n , a th in g  is  sa id  a lw ays to o ccu r  as a 
term  in a p ro p o sitio n , w h ils t  a c o n c e p t is  se e n  a s  h a v in g  a dual n atu re  in  
th a t it  can both o ccu r  a s  th e  lo g ica l su b je c t  of th e  p ro p o sitio n  and be
a s s e r te d  of th e  lo g ica l su b je c t . T h us a cco rd in g  to the ab ove  d e fin itio n s  it
w ould seem  th a t a th in g  or partip u lar  is  an in d iv id u a l w h ilst a co n c e p t or
u n iv e r sa l e ith e r  is  or is  not an in d iv id u a l acco rd in g  to w h eth er  or not it  is
id e n tif ie d  w ith  a p ro p o sitio n a l fu n c tio n . T here seem  to be eq u a lly  se r io u s
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problem s a tte n d in g  e ith e r  op tion .
A ssum e, th e n , th a t u n iv e r sa ls  are p ro p o sitio n a l fu n c tio n s . Now s in ce ,
The u n iv e r se  c o n s is t s  o f o b je c ts  h a v in g  v a r io u s q u a litie s  and sta n d in g  
in  v a r io u s  r e la tio n s. {PM, p .43)
fu n ctio n a l e x p r e ss io n s  m ust sta n d  for  s u b s is t in g  e n t it ie s  (q u a lit ie s  and  
r e la tio n s) . So su c h  sym b ols are no lo n g er  to be reg a rd ed  as incom plete  and  
fu n c tio n s  are g e n u in e  c o n s t itu e n ts  o f p ro p o sitio n s . An a n a ly s is  o f th e  
p r o p o sitio n , s a y , " S ocrates is  m ortal” w ill show  th a t th e  p rop osition  
co n ta in s S o c r a te s  and m ortality , But th e  la tter  is  now b ein g  id e n tif ie d  w ith  
th e  fu n c tio n  "x is  mortal" so  a p p r e h e n d in g  th e  p rop osition  m ust in v o lv e  (if 
th e  P r in c ip le  o f A cq u a in tan ce is  g ra n ted ) g r a sp in g  the com plex a s  a v a lu e  
of th e  p ro p o sitio n a l fu n c tio n . T h is is  in  m arked ten sio n  w ith  R u sse ll’s 
a cco u n t o f th e  VCP.
To s e e  w h y , c o n s id e r  th e  re la tio n  of a p rop osition a l fu n c tio n  to its  
v a lu e s . R u sse ll n o te s  th a t s in ce  a p rep o sitio n a l fu n c tio n  am b igu ou sly  
d en o tes  a n y  o f i t s  v a lu e s  no v a lu e  o f th e  p rop osition a l fu n c tio n  m ust 
p r e su p p o se  th e  fu n c tio n  it s e lf .  "This is  a p articu lar  ca se  but p e r h a p s the  
m ost fu n d am en ta l c a se  o f th e  v ic io u s  c ir c le  princip le"  {PM, 39). But on the  
ab ove , a cco u n t g r a sp  of th e  p ro p o sitio n  seem s to r e ly  on g r a sp in g  th e  
p rop osition  a s  a v a lu e  o f a c e r ta in  p rop osition a l fu n c tio n . So th e
d e f in ite n e ss  o f th e  p ro p o sitio n a l fu n c tio n  r e q u ir e s  the prior d e f in ite n e s s  of 
its  v a lu e s  w h ich  in tu r n  re q u ire  th e  p r ior  d e f in ite n e ss  of th e  fu n c tio n . The 
c ir c u la r ity  is  e v id e n t.
It m ight be th o u g h t th a t th is  v iew  o v ersim p lifie s  the p o sitio n  b ecau se  it  
a ssu m es th a t th e r e  is  o n ly  one "mode" in w hich an e n t i t y ’ may be a 
c o n s titu e n t  o f a p ro p o sitio n . One m ight w ant to co u n ter  th e  th r ea t of
c ir c u la r ity  by h o ld in g  th a t the fu n c tio n  is  not a c o n s titu e n t  o f the  
p rop osition  in  the same s e n s e  a s  is  a term , so  th at g r a sp  of th e  p rop osition
d oes not re q u ire  a cq u a in ta n ce  w ith  th e  fu n c tio n  in  the same w ay as it  does
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of th e  term  of th e  p ro p o sitio n . In d eed  in  th e  1925 in tro d u ctio n  to the  
secon d  ed ition  of PM R u sse ll seem s to h ave  m oved in  th is  d irec tio n  by- 
ex p lo itin g  W ittg en ste in ’s d is tin c tio n  betw een  com p onents o f a p ro p o sitio n  
and c o n s t itu e n ts  o f a p rop osition : th e  r e la tin g  re la tion  of th e  p ro p o sitio n  is  
a com ponent o f th e  p ro p o sitio n , th e  term s o f th e  re la tion  are c o n s t itu e n ts  
of th e  p rop osition . W hatever u se  th is  n otion  may be p u t to it  c le a r ly  is  not 
a d istin c tio n  R u sse ll is  ab le  to exp lo it to  a n y  e ffe c t  w h ils t  he is  w ed d ed  to 
h is M ultiple R elations T h eory  of Jud gem en t.
The M ultiple R elations T h eory  o f Judgem ent is  an a ttem pt to  tre a t  
p ro p o sitio n a l e x p r e ss io n s  as incom plete . In stea d  of tre a tin g  p r o p o sitio n s  as  
o b je c tiv e  com plexes i t  g iv e s  an a cco u n t o f th e  u se  o f th e  p ro p o sitio n a l s ig n  
in  th e  c o n tex t o f a s s e r t io n , ju d g em en t, b elief, e tc . w ith ou t su p p o sin g  th at  
th e  p ro p o sitio n  i t s e l f  e x is ts . R ather th an  g iv e  an a cco u n t o f th e se  
p rop osition a l a t t itu d e s  in  term s o f a two p lace re la tion  h o ld in g  b etw een  a 
ju d g e r  (b e lie v er  e tc .)  and a p ro p o sitio n  we now are g iv e n  a m ultiple  
re la tio n  h o ld in g  b etw een  th e  s u b je c t  and th e  c o n s t itu e n ts  of th e  
p rop osition  he ju d g e s  (b e lie v e s  e tc .) . So, for  in sta n c e , "A is  sim ilar to  B" is  
a n a ly sed  as ,
U [S, A, B, s im ilarity , R(x",.y)}) 
w h ere R (x,y) s ta n d s  for  th e  (log ica l) form of a two p lace re la tion  
"Som ething s ta n d s  to som eth in g  in  som e relation" . Prima fa c ie  it  would seem  
from  th is  th a t R u sse ll d id  d is t in g u is h  betw een  fu n c tio n s  and u n iv e r sa ls . 
Why e lse  w ould he u se  th e  e x p r e ss io n  "sim ilarity" ra th er  th an  sim ply g iv e  
the fu n ction ?  A lso if  R u sse ll th o u g h t th a t th e  fu n c tio n  w as id en tica l w ith  
th e  u n iv e r sa l it  is  n ot c lear  w h y  he did not sim ply tak e it  th a t the  
fu n c tio n  i t s e lf  d eterm in ed  th e  lo g ica l form  of the p rop osition . W hatever th e  
c o r re c t  an sw er  is  to  th o se  q u e s t io n s  it  is  e v id e n t  th at i f  R u sse ll id en tified  
fu n c tio n s  w ith  u n iv e r sa ls  th en  th e  M ultiple R elations T h eory  is  in c o n s is te n t  
w ith the VCP. The M ultiple R elations T h eory  su p p o se s  th a t we have  
a cq u a in tan ce  w ith  th e  e lem en ts o f th e  a n a ly sed  p rop osition . T his is  w hy, 
for in sta n c e , R u sse ll w a n ts  to  broaden  h is  notion  of a cq u a in tan ce  to  in c lu d e
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s e lf -e v id e n t  a cq u a in ta n ce  w ith  lo g ica l form s. We make a ju d gem en t of a 
p ro p o sitio n  by su b su m in g  th e  e lem en ts  o f th e  p ro p o sitio n  u n d er  the  
re la tion  of ju d g in g . But th is  m ust in v o lv e  g r a sp in g  th e  p ro p o sitio n  a s  a 
v a lu e  o f th e  p ro p o sitio n a l fu n c tio n . T h is, to g e th e r  w ith  th e  VCP, r e su r r e c ts  
th e  c ir c u la r ity  I d e sc r ib e d  ab ove .
The problem  h ere  is  th a t in  cla im ing th a t a p rop osition a l fu n c tio n  is  
on ly  d e fin ite  on ce  i t s  v a lu e s  are d e fin ite  we are im plicitly  ta k in g  it  th a t  
th o se  v a lu e s , i .e ., th o se  p r o p o s itio n s , are com plete in  th e m se lv e s  (th at th e y
are o b je c t iv e ly  in d e p e n d e n t). But th is  is  in  sh arp  c o n tr a s t  w ith  th e
M ultiple R elations T h eory . We can  o n ly  r e so lv e  th is  te n s io n  if  a 
p rop osition a l fu n c tio n  is  n ot ta k en  to be a c o n s titu e n t  o f th e  p rop osition . 
For th en , we can  allow  th a t a p ro p o sitio n a l fu n c tio n  " p resu p p oses"  its  
v a lu e s  a n d  g iv e  an a n a ly s is  o f th e  p ro p o sitio n  in  term s of u n iv e r sa ls , 
p a r ticu la rs  and lo g ica l form , But th is  d ep e n d s  on  an u ltim ate d is tin c tio n  
b etw een  fu n c tio n s  and u n iv e r sa ls .
. In v iew  o f th e  fa c t  th a t in d iv id u a ls  a re  d efin ed  to be n o n -fu n c tio n a l  
term s of p r o p o s itio n s  it  now seem s th a t u n iv e r sa ls  are a c e r ta in  so r t of 
in d iv id u a l. W ittgen ste in , in  h is  N o te b o o k s  on Logic, c r it ic iz e s  th e  sy stem  of 
PM a s th u s  in te r p r e te d . For, on th is  in te r p r e ta tio n , th e  th e o r y  o f ty p e s  
allow s u s to a s s e r t  n o n se n se ,
. . ..if  I a n a ly se  th e  p ro p o sitio n  S o c r a te s  is  m ortal in to  S o cra tes , m ortality  
and (3 x ,y )E i(x ,y ) I w ant a th e o r y  o f ty p e s  to te ll me th a t "m ortality is  
S ocrates"  is  n o n se n s ica l, b eca u se  i f  I trea t m ortality  a s  a p rop er  name 
... th e re  is  n o th in g  to p r e v e n t  me to make th e  su b s t itu t io n  th e  w rong
w ay round . (W ittgen ste in , 1961, p .122)
In th e  same p a ssa g e  W ittgen ste in  o f fe r s  an a lte r n a tiv e  a n a ly s is  of the  
u n iv e r sa l a s  a cop u la  (w hich  is  th en  tak en  as being  sim ple). He o b je c ts  to  
R u sselT s th e o ry  of ju d g em en t b eca u se  it r e q u ir e s  one to d is tin g u ish  
betw een  d iffe r e n t  T y p es  o f th in g s  -  so  th a t for R u ssell a lth o u g h  m ortality
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and S o cra tes  are fu n d am en ta lly  d iffe r e n t  (in term s o f th e ir  lo g ica l grammar) 
both are d en oted  by p ro p er  nam es. The c o n se q u e n c e  o f th is  w ith in  the  
th e o ry  o f ty p e s  is  th a t it  a llow s on e to ju d g e  n o n se n se . T h us as far as  
W ittgen ste in  is  co n cern ed  it  fa ils  e v e n  th e  m ost basic a d eq u a cy  con d ition  
on  a th e o ry  o f ju d gem en t. (S ee  G riffin  1980)
T h ere are fu r th e r  prob lem s w ith  th e  th e o ry  o f ju d g em en t it s e lf . T h ese  
problem s w ere g r a v e  e n o u g h  to h ave  b rou gh t R u sselT s w ork on th e  1913 
m an u scrip t to  a halt. H ow ever, a s k e tc h y  v e r s io n  o f th e  th e o r y  s u r v iv e s  
in to  R u sselT s L ogical A tom istic p er iod  (se e  1918, p p .2 24 -6 ). He r e ta in s  th e  
b elie f th a t w hen on e ju d g e s  or b e lie v e s  som eth in g  fa lse  th e  re la tio n  of 
ju d gem en t or b e lie f d o es  n ot r e la te  th e  ju d g e r  or b e liev er  to  a com plex  
o b je c t  but th a t th e  re la tio n  h o ld s b etw een  th e  s u b je c t  and th e  c o n s t itu e n ts  
of h is  b e lie f or ju d g em en t. The m ajor problem  w ith  th e  th e o r y  co n c e rn s  
R u sselT s n otion  o f lo g ica l form . For R u sse ll th e  lo g ica l form  o f a p rop osition  
is  a g en e r a lize d  e x is te n tia l p r o p o sitio n . So, in  in fe r r in g  from  a p ro p o sitio n  
o f one form  as p rem iss  to  a p r o p o sitio n  o f a n o th er  form , e .g ., a R b v-a R b  
from  aRb, we need  to in tr o d u ce  a s  an ex tra  p rem iss th e  form of the  
in fe r r ed  p ro p o sitio n . (S ee  P ea rs (1989).)
I sh ou ld , for  th e  sa k e  o f c o m p le ten ess , c o n s id er  on e fin a l v iew  of 
R u sselT s trea tm en t of u n iv e r sa ls . L in sk y  (1988) a tta c k s  C occh iarella ’s (1980) 
v iew  th a t R u sse ll id e n t if ie s  fu n c tio n s  w ith  u n iv e r sa ls . The r e a so n s  L in sk y  
g iv e s  for h is  v iew  are , in  th e  . main, q u estio n a b le  s in ce  th e y  re la te  to 
R u sselT s w r itin g s  w ell a fte r  th e  1913 m anuscrip t. But we need  not mind 
th is  s in ce  we h ave  a lrea d y  fou n d  r ea so n  en ou gh  to be d is sa t is f ie d  w ith  
th a t p o sitio n . L in sk y , h o w ev er , a lso  r e je c ts  the -op p osin g  accou n t  
(cham pioned by G riffin  (1980)) a cc o rd in g  to w h ich  u n iv e r sa ls  are  
in d iv id u a ls . The p o sitio n  fa v o u red  by L in sk y  a c c e p ts  th a t u n iv e r sa ls  are  
fundam enta l to the o n to lo g y  of PA4 bu t m aintains th a t PM p r o v id e s  no log ic  
for. u n iv e r sa ls . T h is may w ell be th e  m ost c o h e r en t in te r p r e ta tio n  of the  
sy stem  o f PM (ce r ta in ly  th e re  are se r io u s  prob lem s w ith  th e  a lte r n a tiv e s)  
but it  s u r e ly  lack s c r e d ib ility  in  th e  c o n tex t of R u sselT s o v e r a ll program m e.
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For R u sse ll log ic  is  g lobal. The o n ly  m anner of r e s tr ic t in g  th e  sco p e  of 
log ic  th at we h ave  th u s  far  m anaged to u n co v er  stem s from an  ep istem ica lly  
d r iv en  need  to p r e sc in d  from  m aking c e r ta in  o n to log ica l com m itm ents. Now 
it  may w ell be a moot p o in t a s  to  w h eth er  R u sse ll is  s u c c e s fu l  in  th is  
program m e (g iv e n  my in te r e s ts  th is  is  h ig h ly  m oot), but w hat is  beyond  
q u estio n  is  th a t R u sse ll h as no w ay of ack n o w led g in g  th e  leg itim acy  of a 
c erta in  o n to lo g y  a n d  exem p tin g  e n t it ie s  o f th e  o n to lo g y  from  treatm en t  
w ith in  h is lo g ica l sy stem . T h is, for  R u sse ll, w ould be an  in to lera b le  p osition . 
T here w ould be no w ay o f d is t in g u is h in g  e s se n t ia lly  lo g ica l in v e s t ig a t io n s  
from th o se  w h ich  p r e su p p o se  a r e s tr ic te d  o n to lo g y  w ith  w h ich  th e y  are  
e sp e c ia lly  co n cern ed . L in sk y  th in k s  th a t R u sse ll is  in  ju s t  th is  p o s itio n  in  
PM. If he is  r ig h t  th en  PM is  in  a cu te  te n sio n  w ith  R u sse ll’s basic v iew s of 
log ic . M oreover, it  is  ex trem ely  d iff ic u lt  to se e  how th e  sy stem  could  be 
am eliorated so  a s  to  d is so lv e  th is  ten sio n .
The ab ove  d is c u ss io n  in v o k ed  a  b a tte r y  o f c o n s id er a tio n s  r e la tin g  to 1)
an attem pt to  m otivate th e  VCP in  term s of p rop ositio n a l fu n c tio n s , 2) the  
b asic o n to lo g y  o f th e  th e o r y  o f ty p e s  and 3) th e  M ultiple R elations T h eory  
of Judgem ent. It is  e v id e n t  th a t th e se  a s p e c ts  o f R u sselT s v iew s  ra th er  
than  form ing a m utually  in te g r a te d  w hole a c tu a lly  v ie  a g a in s t  each  o th er . It  
is  tem p tin g  to v iew  th e  prob lem s a s  stem m ing u ltim ately  from  th e M ultiple 
R elation T h eory  of Jud gem en t (w hich , a s  n oted , is , for  in d e p e n d e n t r e a so n s , 
u n h appy) so  th a t je t t is o n in g  th a t th e o r y  w ould ea se  th e  s itu a tio n . But the  
im portance o f th e  M ultiple R elations T h eory  is  th a t it  sh ow s how to tre a t  
p ro p o sitio n s  a s  incom plete  sym b ols. Once we em bark on  t h a t . p r o jec t  we 
r a ise  th e  q u e stio n  of w hat term s th e  p rop osition  is  to be a n a ly sed  in to . If 
we make u se  o f p ro p o sitio n a l fu n c tio n s  th en , in  co n ju n ctio n  w ith  th e  VCP,
we a rr iv e  a t a c ir c u la r ity , w h ils t  if  we h ave  r e co u rse  to u n iv e r sa ls  it  is
un clear  w h ere to f it  th e se  in to  th e  lo g ica l th eo ry . T hus it  seem s th a t th e  
mere treatm ent o f e x p r e ss io n s  for  p r o p o sitio n s  as incom plete  sym b ols is  the  
so u rce  of th e  d iff ic u lty .
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§9.2 T ruth  and F alsity :
R u sse ll, h ow ever , can n ot but tr e a t  p r o p o sitio n s  as incom plete s in ce  he u s e s  
the. in co m p le ten ess  o f p ro p o s itio n s  to e n su r e  th a t p r o p o s it io n s  do not fa ll 
w ith in  th e  ra n g e  o f th e  in d iv id u a l var iab le  (and th u s  th e  sem antic  
p arad oxes are a v o id ed ). T h us th e  in co m p leten ess  o f p ro p o sitio n s  is  cru c ia l 
in  R u sse ll’s  a cco u n t o f th e  b asic  ty p e  w ith in  th e  h iera rch y  of ty p e s .
W itness th is  rem ark.
We may exp la in  th e  in d iv id u a l a s  som eth ing  w h ich  e x is t s  on its  own  
account; it  is  th u s  o b v io u s ly  n ot a p rop osition , s in ce  p r o p o sitio n s  ... 
are incom plete  sym b o ls, h a v in g  no m eaning ex cep t in  u se . H ence in  
a p p ly in g  th e  p r o c e ss  o f g e n era liza tio n  to in d iv id u a ls  we ru n  no r isk  o f  
in c u r r in g  r e fle x iv e  fa lla c ie s , {PM, p .162)
Compare th is  w ith .
We may d efin e  an in d iv id u a l a s  som eth ing  w hich  is  d e s t itu te  of
com plexity; it  is  th u s  o b v io u s ly  n ot a p ro p o sitio n , s in ce  p ro p o sitio n s  
are e s s e n t ia lly  com plex. H ence ... (1908, p .76)
Why does R u sse ll make th is  sw itch  from  th e  com p lexity  of. th e  p rop osition  to  
i t s  in co m p leten ess?  The rea so n  is  th a t by th e  time he came to w rite  PM
R u sse ll no lo n g er  th o u g h t o f p ro p o s itio n s  as com plexes. R ather a com plex, a 
fa c t , c o r r e sp o n d s  to a p ro p o sitio n  j u s t  w hen it  is  tru e  so , for  in sta n c e , aP b  
is  tru e  ju s t  w h en  th e r e  is  a c o r re sp o n d in g  com plex  
a - in -th e -r e la t io n -i? “ to -d . T ruth  is  now g iv e n  an exp lanation  in  term s of
cori’e sp o n d e n c e  ra th er  th an  b ein g  trea ted  as a prim itive p r o p e r ty  of 
p ro p o sitio n s . T h is en a b les  R u sse ll to g iv e  an accou n t of fa lse  ju d g em en ts  
w ith ou t assu m in g  th e  s u b s is te n c e  of fa lse  p r o p o sitio n s . T hus the  
p rop osition  is  not a com plex s in ce  it  is  not an o b je c t iv e  fe a tu r e  o f rea lity . 
The in co m p leten ess  o f p r o p o sitio n s  p r o v id e s  a m eans of a c c o u n tin g  for  fa lse
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p ro p o sitio n s  and sim u lta n eo u sly  p r o v id e s  a d istin c tio n  betw een  in d iv id u a ls  
and p ro p o sitio n s .
I h ave tra ced  R u sselT s u se  o f th e  notion  of incom plete  sym bol to trim  
h is on to lo g ica l com m itm ents. That p r o c e ss  seem s to h ave  an unprob lem atic  
e x ten sio n  to  th e  ca se  o f p r o p o s itio n s , th u s  allow ing for  a trea tm en t o f
ju d gem en t w h ich  d o es  n ot in v o lv e  th e  s u b s is te n c e  of fa lse  p ro p o sitio n s .
H owever e x te n d in g  th e  u se  o f incom plete  sym b ols in  th is  w ay i s  a
d ep a rtu re  from  ea lier  u s e s  o f th e  notion . O riginally , a s in tro d u ced  in
(1905), th e  n otion  is  ap p lied  to sym b ols (d e fin ite  and in d e fin ite
d e sc r ip tio n s)  w h ich , w ere  th e y  to stan d  for e n t it ie s , w ould stan d  for
e n t it ie s  w h ich  are o f th e  same "sort" a s  th o se  for w h ich  we h ave  p rop er
nam es (or th o se  w ith  w h ich  we h ave  acq u a in ta n ce). T his u se  is  th en
ex ten d ed  to  c o v e r  c la s s  term s. The r e fe r e n ts  of th e se  e x p r e ss io n s , if  th e re  
be an y , are o f a d iffe r e n t  "sort" to th o se  e n t it ie s  w ith  w h ich  we h ave  
acq u a in tan ce. The p o in t is  th a t in  th e  f ir s t  s e t  o f c a s e s  we are co n cern ed  
w ith a p u ta tiv e  in d iv id u a l e n t ity  w ith  w h ich  we lack  acq u a in tan ce  e ith er  
b ecau se  it  fa ils  to e x is t  or b ecau se  we h ave  no ep istem ic  co n ta ct w ith  it. In  
th e  secon d  c a se  we tr y  to  avoid  th e  on to log ica l com m itm ents o f an e n tire  
r eg io n  o f d isc o u r se  b eca u se  o f p o ss ib le  scep tic ism  ab ou t the e x is te n c e  of 
su ch  e n t it ie s . We r e fr a in  from  com m itting o u r s e lv e s  to th e  e x is te n c e  o f a 
w hole ra n g e  o f e n t it ie s  b ecau se  we h ave  a g en era l argu m en t to th e  e f fe c t  
th a t we lack  g r o u n d s  for  su p p o s in g  th a t su ch  e n t it ie s  ex ist . (See H ylton  
(1990) for more d isc u ss io n  o f th is .)  T his m arks a s h ift  in  the u se  o f th e  
notion  of incom plete sym bol but is  a c h a n g e  th at can  s t il l  p la u sib ly  be seen  
as an e x ten sio n  of th e  p r e v io u s  u se . The prim ary m otivation is  s til l  
ep istem ic  e v e n  if  th is  a ssu m es a sc e p tic a l form  in  th e  secon d  ca se .
The trea tm en t o f p r o p o s itio n s  a s  incom plete  is  q u ite  a d iffe r e n t  m atter  
fo r . h ere  we are p r e se n te d  w ith  w hat p u rp o rts  to be an a n a ly s is  o f the  
o n to log ica l n a tu re  o f p r o p o sitio n s . The cru x  of th e  m atter is  th a t our  
acco u n t o f th e  notion  of tru th  h in g e s  on the treatm en t of p rop osition a l  
s ig n s  as incom plete . The u se  o f in co m p le ten ess  r e la tiv e  to p ro p o sitio n s  is
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not. m otivated  by an ep istem olog ica l d ou b t ab ou t our a b ility  to have  
acq u a in tan ce  w ith a c e r ta in  so r t  o f e n t ity , it  is  m otivated  by d ou b ts  about  
th e  v e r y  c o h eren ce  o f su p p o s in g  th e r e  to be su c h  th in g s  as fa lse  
p r o p o sitio n s . Or ra th er  (s in ce  th is  p e r h a p s  o v er  s ta te s  th e  ca se) our  
m otivation  stem s from  a d oub t ab ou t th e  s e n s e  in  su p p o sin g  th a t th e re  are  
fa lse  p ro p o sitio n s  s in c e  th a t a ssu m p tion  b e g g a r s  u s  for an accou n t o f th e  
d is tin c tio n  b etw een  tru th  and fa ls ity . We m ight p u t th e  p o in t like th is , in  
p r e v io u s  u s e s  we h a v e  sim ply fou n d  a w ay of r e fr a in in g  from m aking a 
d o u b tfu l a ssu m p tion  but now we are n ot sim ply re fr a in in g  from assu m in g  
th a t p r o p o sitio n s  are o b je c t iv e  com p lexes we a re  a ssu m in g  th a t th e y  are  
n o t  o b je c t iv e  com p lexes. I t  is  th is  a ssu m p tion  w hich  d e liv e r s  th e  a cco u n t o f 
tru th  in  term s of c o r re sp o n d en ce . (The o n ly  a lte r n a tiv e  to th is  seem s to be 
to g iv e  tru th  it s e lf  a r e d u c tiv e  a c c o u n t in  term s o f ep istem ic  p r o p e r tie s .
C learly R u sse ll n e v e r  c o n s id er e d  a program m e of th a t so r t. But it  would
an yw ay  be a re lin q u ish m en t o f h is  basic  realism .)
§9.3 The V icious C ircle P r in c ip le , Incom p lete  Sym bols and th e  S ystem  o f PM: 
In th is  se c tio n  and th e  fo llow in g  one I sh a ll be ’ look in g  a lit tle  more c lo se ly
a t th e  sy stem  p r e se n te d  in  PM. My r e a so n s  for d o in g  so  are prim arily
d ia g n o stic . That is ,  I th in k  I h a v e  g iv e n  good g ro u n d s  for  th in k in g  th a t  
th e  sy stem  of PM is  in a d e q u a te ly  m otivated  and w ant now to look at th e  
m an ifestation  o f th a t in a d eq u a cy  in  th e  r e su lt in g  a c c o u n t .o f  m athem atics.
R u sse ll g iv e s  th e  fo llow in g  form ulation  of th e  VCP
"W hatever in v o lv e s  all o f a co llec tio n  m ust not be one o f th e
c o lle c t io n ”; or, c o n v e r se ly :  "If, p ro v id ed  a cer ta in  co llectio n  had a tota l,
it  w ould have m em bers o n ly  d e fin a b le  in  term s of th a t tota l, th e n  th e
said  co llectio n  h as no total."  (PM, p .37)
One rea d in g  of th e  p r in c ip le  (one p a r ticu la r ly  eco u ra g ed  by the la tter  
v e r s io n  of th e  sta tem en t) is  th a t it  r u le s  ou t im p red ica tiye  d e fin it io n s , th at
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is , d e fin itio n s  w h ich  d e fin e  a member of a to ta lity  by q u a n tify in g  o v er  a 
domain w hich in c lu d e s  th a t to ta lity . The u n d e r ly in g  in tu itio n  seem s to be 
th a t we cou ld  n e v e r  g r a sp  su c h  a to ta lity  s in ce  a p u ta tiv e  g r a sp  of th e  
to ta lity  w ould , in  some s e n s e , n e g le c t  im p red ica tiv e ly  d efin ab le  m em bers or, 
i f  it  o s te n s ib ly  en com p assed  su c h  e lem en ts  w ould p r e su p p o se  an a n te ce d e n t  
g r a sp  of th e  domain and th u s  w ould be c ircu la r . As R u sse ll p u ts  in  a 
fo o tn o te  to th e  a b ove  form ulation  in  (1908) "When I sa y  a co llectio n  has no 
to ta l, I mean th a t s ta te m e n ts  ab ou t a ll i t s  m em bers are  n on sen se"  (p ,63). 
S u ch  to ta lit ie s  are  u n g r a sp a b le , ta lk  o f them  is  n o n sen sica l.
Let u s  a c c ep t th a t th e  im port o f th e  VCP is  th a t im p red ica tive  
sp e c if ic a t io n /d e f in it io n  o f an  e n t ity  is  illeg itim ate . It is ,  h ow ever , im portant 
to r e a lise  th a t th e  VCP i t s e l f  d o es  not im m ediately c o n stra in  th e  
in tro d u ctio n  of in com p lete  sym b ols to  p r e d ica tiv e  m odes of sp ec ifica tio n . 
The rea so n  is  c lear . S u ch  sym b ols are  in tro d u ced  by c o n te x tu a l  d e fin it io n s  
w h ich  are o n ly  r e q u ire d  to exp la in  th e  u se  o f th e  sym b ols in  th e  co n tex t o f  
p r o p o sitio n s  (or ju d g em en ts) in v o lv in g  them . We p re sc in d  p r e c is e ly  from  
th e  a ssu m p tion  th a t th e  com bination  o f sym b ols so  d efin ed  d e n o tes  an  
e n tity .
So PM *14.01 g iv e s  th e  d e fin itio n  (in u se) o f th e  d e fin ite  d esc r ip tio n  
(Lx)((px) ("the cp") a s,
* 1 4 ,0 1  L ( I %) ((p;^ ) 1 ,qj ( L x^ ) (cpx^ ).=: ( 3 6) :cp%. blip b Df.
Now th e  RHS o f th is  d e fin itio n  q u a n tifie s  o v er  th e  domain w h ich , p ro v id ed  
th e  e x p r e ss io n  {ix){(px} h as a d en o ta tio n , in c lu d es  the e n t ity  th u s  d efin ed . 
If th e  d efin itio n  sp e c if ie d  an e n t ity  for w h ich  we liad an a lte r n a tiv e  
d efin itio n  th en  it  w ould not be in  v io la tio n  o f th e  VCP sim ply b ecau se  the  
VCP in s is t s  th at th e  im p red ica tive  d e fin itio n  be our o n ly  d efin itio n a l a c c e s s . 
But the d efin itio n  d oes not p r e su p p o se  th a t we h ave  in d e p e n d e n t a c c e s s  to 
th e  d en ota tion  o f the d e fin ite  d e sc r ip t io n  s in c e , f ir s t ,  th is  w ould ren d er  the  
u se  of d e fin ite  d e sc r ip t io n s  r e d u n d a n t, and, se co n d ly , the e x is te n tia l
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q u a n tifier  may be d em on strab ly  s a t is f ie d  w ith ou t our h a v in g  to p rod u ce  th e  
s a t is fy in g  in sta n c e . At *20.5 we h a v e  th e  fo llow in g  sp e c if ic a tio n  of th e  
con d ition  for  tr e a t in g  th e  d e fin ite  d e sc r ip t io n  as d en o tin g  a member o f a 
g iv e n  c la ss  (w hich , in  v iew  of *14.01, is  in c lu d ed  in  th e  domain o v er  w h ich  
w e q u a n tify  in  d e fin in g  th e  d e fin ite  d e sc r ip t io n ),
* 2 0 . 5  I- : ( L ;sr) ( cpxr) E è (  qj ^ ) . = .  MJ1 ( L X-) ( cp x^) 1
The rea so n  w h y  th e se  c o n s id er a tio n s  fa il to  show  th a t we h ave u n co v ered  a 
v io la tion  of th e  VCP is ,  as n o ted , th a t we r e fra in  from  tr e a tin g  th e  d efin ed  
term  as d en otin g  an e n t ity . G iven a n y  p ro p o sitio n  in c lu d in g  a d e fin ite  
d e sc r ip tio n  we can , a cc o rd in g  to  th e  d efin itio n , rew rite  th e  p ro p o sitio n  so  
a s  to  elim inate all p u ta t iv e  r e fe r e n c e  to  an e n t ity  den oted  by th e  d e fin ite  
d escr ip tio n . The e lim in ab ility  of d e f in ite  d e sc r ip t io n s  sh ow s th a t th e  VCP is  
h ere  in ap p licab le .
C lasses are a lso  in tro d u ced  in  PM v ia  co n tex tu a l d efin ition ,
*20.01 /l2r(qJ2r)}.=:(3cp):cp!jf.= ,^ q^jx:/'lcp!^ } Df.
So th e  ap p lica tion  o f a fu n c tio n , / ,  to  a c la s s  term  is  exp la in ed  in  term s of 
th e  ap p lica tion  of th a t fu n c tio n  to  a p r e d ic a t iv e  fu n c tio n , cp, w hich  is  
c o e x te n s iv e  w ith  th e  d e fin in g  fu n c tio n , ip, of th e  c la ss . P rop osition s
in v o lv in g  c la s s  term s are th u s  élim ina ble in  fa v o u r  o f e x is te n tia lly
g en era lized  p r o p o s itio n s  m aking no su c h  p u ta tiv e  r e fe r e n c e  to c la s s e s  as  
e n tit ie s .
Both u s e s  o f co n tex tu a l d e fin itio n  g iv e  th e  d efin ition  in  term s of an
e x is te n tia l p ro p o sitio n  w h ich  g iv e s  a co n ju n ctio n  of two co n d itio n s r e q u is ite  
for  the sa tis fa c t io n  o f th e  e x is te n tia l claim . The d isa n a lo g y  betw een  th e  two 
c a s e s  is  th a t in  th e  d e s c r ip t iv e  c a se  sa tis fa c tio n  of the f ir s t  con d ition , th e  
u n iq u e n e ss  con d ition , may be allow ed to rem ain a g en u in e  q u estio n . In the  
ca se  o f c la s s e s  th e  f ir s t  con d ition , th e  e x is te n c e  o f a co ex ten sio n a l
66p r e d ica tiv e  fu n c tio n , m ust ' not be: allow ed to determ ine th e  tru th  v a lu e  o f  
th e  p ro p o sitio n  a s  a w hole. If we h a v e  no g en e r a l g u a ra n tee  th a t for any  
fu n c tio n , ip, th ere  is  a c o e x te n s iv e  p r e d ic a t iv e  fu n c tio n  th en  it  may be th a t  
f{z{y\iz)} is  fa lse  a n d  n o t-ilz (ip z )} . is  fa lse . In th is  ca se  ipz w ould fa il to
d efin e  a c la s s . (Note th a t in  th e  an a logou s c a se  for  d e sc r ip t io n s  the
d e sc r ip tio n  sim ply fa ils  to  h ave  a d en ota tion .) A ccep tin g  th e  axiom of  
r e d u c ib ility  p r e c is e ly  fu r n is h e s  su c h  a g u a ra n tee . T his is. g iv e n  as ,
*12.1 k:(3f):(px.5^flx Pp.
The axiom h as o th er  u s e s . It e n b ie s  u s , a t le a s t  in so fa r  as we are o n ly  
in te r e s te d  in  th e  ex te n s io n a l a s p e c ts  o f an  e n t ity ’s p r o p e r tie s , to rep la ce  
th e  attem pt to  ta lk  ab ou t all i t s  p r o p e r tie s  (w hich w ould c o n tra v en e  th e  
th e o r y  o f ty p e s )  w ith  ta lk  ab ou t i t s  p r e d ica tiv e  p r o p e r tie s  w ith ou t lo ss  of 
s ig n if ic a n c e . Sim ilarly, th e  axiom is  a lso  n eed ed  in  R u sse ll's  accou n t of 
id e n tity  w hich he w an ts to  g iv e  à la L eibn iz  as ,
* 1 3 i0 1  x=.F.=:(cp):cp!.Y.=).(pky D f.
(Note th e  need  to tre a t  (p a s  an  a p p a ren t var ia b le  if  we are to g iv e  a 
d e fin itio n  o f id e n tity .)  The r e s tr ic t io n  o f th e  a p p aren t v ar iab le  to  
p re d ica tiv e  fu n c tio n s  w h ich  is  req u ire d  by th e  th e o ry  o f ty p e s  d oes not 
w eaken  th e  axiom p ro v id ed  th e  axiom o f r e d u c ib ility  is  in  p lace, s in ce  in  
th a t ca se  we can  e a s ily  p ro v e ,
*13.101 1:
The problem  in both th e  a b o v e  c a se s  is  th a t we w ant to be ab le to
c o n sid er  p rep o sitio n a l fu n c tio n s  d efin ed  by m eans of q u a n tify in g  o v er  a
domain of p rep o sitio n a l fu n c tio n s  a s  m em bers of th at to ta lity . And th is  the  
VCP o b v io u s ly  fo r b id s . The r e s u lt  is  th at the h iera rch y  of ty p e s  for
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p rop osition a i fu n c tio n s  h as a ram ified  (as op p osed  to a sim ple) s tr u c tu r e .  
T his is  c lear  e v e n  from  th e  c u r s o r y  sk e tc h  of th e  th e o ry  o f ty p e s  w h ich  I 
g a v e  ab ove . The e f fe c t  o f th is  ram ification  is  th a t p rop osition a i fu n c tio n s  o f 
a g iv e n  e n t ity  o ccu r  at all le v e ls  o f th e  h ie ra r c h y  w hich  are h ig h er  th an  
the' ord er  o f th e  e n t ity  i t s e lf .
A p o in t w h ich  w ill be r e tu r n e d  to la te r  but w h ich  n e e d s  to be m entioned  
h ere  is  th a t th e  a p p lica b ility  o f th e  VCP to p ro p o sitio n a i fu n c tio n s  (and its  
co r re sp o n d in g  in a p p lic a b ility  to c a s e s  o f co n tex tu a lly  d efin ed  term s) sh ow s  
th at p ro p o sitio n a i fu n c tio n s  h a v e  a v e r y  d iffe r e n t  on to lo g ica l s ta tu s . In d eed  
it  w ould seem  th a t th e  a p p lica b ility  o f th e  VCP to a g iv e n  c a se  b eto k en s a  
r e a lis t ic  a ttitu d e  to th o se  e n t it ie s .  (I u se  ita lic s  b eca u se  i t  is  o fte n  
su p p o se d  th a t th e  VCP can  o n ly  be ju s t if ie d  from som e n o n -r e a lis t  or 
c o n s tr u c t iv is t  p e r s p e c t iv e . S ee  Go d e l (1944).)
The VCP h a s i t s  p o in t o f a p p lica tion  in  m otivatin g  th e  ram ified  h ie ra r c h y  
of p ro p o sitio n a i fu n c tio n s . The in s is te n c e  on p r e d ic a t iv ity  o f fu n c tio n a l  
e x p r e ss io n s  r e n d e r s  th e  d eve lop m en t o f m uch m athem atics im p ossib le  u n le s s  
su p p lem en ted  by th e  axiom of r e d u c ib ility . In d eed  it  is  q u estio n a b le  a s  to 
w h eth er  the sy stem  a llow s for  th e  d eve lop m en t o f an in te llig ib le  th e o r y  of 
c la s s e s  in  th e  a b se n c e  o f th is  axiom. B ut a lth o u g h  th e  axiom d o es not  
co n tra d ic t th e  VCP it  cou ld  be a rg u ed  th a t it  is  in  s tr o n g  ten sio n  w ith  it. 
For th e  axiom seem s to g u a r a n te e  th e  e x is te n c e  o f p r e d ica tiv e  fu n c tio n s  
a c c e s s  to w h ich  is  p u r e ly  im p red ica tiv e . T h is is  v a g u e . The id ea , th o u g h , is  
th a t we m ust, in  v iew  o f th e  axiom, g r a sp  th e  domain of p r e d ica tiv e  
fu n c tio n s  as in c lu d in g  c e r ta in  fu n c tio n s , o f w h ich  the o n ly  acco u n t we are  
g iv en , is  th a t th e y  are c o e x te n s iv e  w ith  fu n c tio n s  form ed by q u a n tify in g  
o v er  th at v e r y  domain. But th is  s u g g e s t s  th a t in  o rd er  to g r a sp  fu lly  th e  
n atu re  o f th e  domain we need  to g r a sp  fu n c tio n s  sp e c if ie d  by q u a n tify in g  
o v er  the domain.
Is  th is  not c ircu lar?; If not, w h y not? and; Would th is  rea so n  p r o v id e  a 
g en e r a l m eans of u n d e r c u ttin g  th e  VCP? T h ese  q u e stio n s  can n ot be 
an sw ered  u n til we h ave  an a cco u n t o f w hat notion  of p r e su p p o s itio n  R u ssell
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th in k s  is  harm ful and th is  R u sse ll d o es  not g iv e  u s. But it  is  c lear  th at  
th ere  is  no b la tan t c ir c u la r ity , if  o n ly  for  th e  rea so n  th a t we are not  
su p p o sed  to h ave  a g r a sp  of th e  p r e d ic a t iv e  fu n c tio n s  v ia  th is  ro u te , we 
on ly  h ave  a m eans o f d eterm in in g  th e ir  e x te n s io n s .
Both Quine and Ram sey recom m end r e je c tio n  of th e  VCP and th u s  h ave  
no need  for th e  (m o tiv e less) axiom of r e d u c ib ility . The r e su lt in g  fu n ctio n a l  
h ie ra r c h y  is  sim ple. The e f fe c t  o f th is  is  h ow ever to r eq u ire  a fundam enta l 
d is tin c tio n  betw een  th e  sem antic  and s e t - th e o r e t ic  p arad oxes (a d is tin c tio n  
in tro d u ced  by R am sey). R u sse ll id e n tif ie d  both form s o f th e  paradox as  
stem m ing from  th e  sam e so u r c e , or , r a th er , he did not ack n ow led ge  su c h  a 
d istin c tio n  at all. T h is w as n ot sim p ly  an o v e r s ig h t  on R u sse ll’s p art. His 
v iew s  on th e  u n iv e r sa lity  o f lo g ic , th a t a n y th in g  e x p r e ss ib le  sh ou ld  be 
e x p r e ss ib le  in  a s in g le  lo g ica l sy s te m , w ould h ave p r e v e n te d  him from  
ad op tin g  th e  R am sey/Q uine ap p roach .
§9.4 G oldfarb’s A ccount o f Ram ification in  PM:
My in te r e s t  h ere  is  an yw ay  p rim arily  d ia g n o stic . So ra th er  than  c a n v a ss  
su p p o rt in  a d v o c a c y  o f a p a rticu la r  so lu tio n  I am q u estio n in g  th e  co h eren ce  
and n a tu re  of R u sse ll’s basic  ap p roach . W arren G oldfarb in  a r e c e n t  paper  
(1989) on " R u ssell's  R easons for  Ram ification" is  h e lp fu l h ere . Goldfarb  
attem p ts to g iv e  som e ra tion a le  for  ram ification  w hich tra d es  on th e  
d is tin c tio n  b etw een  in te n s io n a l and e x ten sio n a l item s and th u s  d o es not 
im port c o n s tr u c t iv is t  s c r u p le s . (I u se  th e  h o rr ib ly  but, in th is  co n tex t, 
h e lp fu lly  bland w ord "item" to  avo id  th e  s u g g e s t io n  th a t .we are n e c e ssa r ily  
d is c u ss in g  e n t it ie s .)  The c ru c ia l d iffe r e n c e  b etw een  th e se  two so r ts  o f item  
seem s to be th at g r a sp  o f an  in te n s io n a l item s u f f ic e s  for  g r a sp  o f which  
item it is . The id e n tity  o f an in te n s io n a l item th u s  is  g iv e n  by its  m anner  
of sp e c ifica tio n  or, b e tte r , p r e se n ta t io n . E xtension al item s, in  c o n tra st , can  
be g ra sp ed  b efore  we g r a sp  w hich  item  is  g r a sp e d . That is  to sa y  th at we 
may g r a sp  a sp e c if ic a t io n  of a g iv e n  ex ten sio n a l item  and s till  h ave w ork to 
do in d eterm in in g  w h eth er  or not it  is  th e  same item as th at g iv e n  by
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an oth er  sp e c if ic a tio n . G oldfarb a r g u e s  th a t th is  d iffe r en ce  in  q u e stio n s  of  
id e n tity  r e la tin g  to in te n s io n a l and ex ten sio n a l item s e n a b les  one to ju s t ify  
ram ification  for  in te n s io n a l item s w h ils t  a c cep tin g  no ram ification  for
ex ten sio n a l item s. T hus th e  ju s t if ic a t io n  o ffered  im ports no n o n -r e a lis t  
m eta p h y sics. The p r e d ic a t iv ity  req u irem en t on in ten sio n a l item s a r is e s  from  
co n s id er in g  th e  id e n t ity  o f th e  item  as determ ined  (p artia lly ) by th e
id e n tity  o f th e  v a r ia b le s  it  in c lu d e s . G oldfarb’s s u g g e s t io n  is  th u s  th a t, in  
h is in s is te n c e  on  ram ification , R u sse ll is  s e n s it iv e  to  th e se  su b tle  q u e s t io n s  
of id e n tity  co n d itio n s  and th u s  b e tr a y s  no commitment to  a c o n s tr u c t iv e  
view .
In ap p a ren t c o n tr a s t  to  G oldfarb I h ave  lin k ed  th e  a p p lica b ility  o f th e  
VCP (or, e q u iv a le n tly  th e  req u irem en t o f p r e d ica tiv ity )  to  th e  q u e stio n  o f  
w h eth er  or n ot R u sse ll v ie w s  th e  sym b ols co n cern ed  (re a lis tica lly ) a s  
d en otin g  e n t it ie s  or a s  o n ly  h a v in g  a m eaning in  u se . T h is, h ow ever , b e lie s  
an u n d er ly in g  sym p a th y  b etw een  th e  tw o v iew s, G oldfarb w an ts to sa y  th a t  
ram ification  in  R u sse ll’s  sy stem  is  n o t  the p ro d u ct of c o n s tr u c t iv e
m eta p h y sics  but is  c o n so n a n t w ith  R u sse ll’s basic realism . In d eed  G oldfarb
tr ie s  to show  th a t ram ification  is  a c o n se q u e n c e  of R u sse ll’s (extrem e) 
realism  w ith  r e p e c t  to v a r ia b le s  w h ich  R u sse ll s e e s  a s  c o n stitu e n t  e n t it ie s  
of p ro p o s itio n s . G oldfarb c o n je c tu r e s  a lso  th a t p erh a p s R u sse ll saw  
v a r ia b le s  a s, in  som e s e n s e , in c lu d in g  th e ir  domain of q u an tifica tion  in  
w hich  ca se  "even  th e  w e a k e st  form  o f th e  VCP s u f f ic e s  to  y ield  
ram ification" (1989, p .37). My d e sc r ip t io n  a lso  lin k s  R u sse ll’s ram ification  to  
a r e a lis tic  a ttitu d e  (a lth o u g h  I h a v e  o ffe r e d  th is  o n ly  a s  a p iece  of 
e x e g e s is ) . The d iffe r e n c e  b etw een  th e  two v iew s th u s  ap p ea rs to be th a t I 
em p hasize th e  ro le  o f c o n tex tu a l d e fin itio n  in  c o u n te r in g  an y  te n d e n c y  
tow ard s ram ification  w h erea s  G oldfarb w an ts to a ttr ib u te  th is  to the  
p o s s e ss io n  of an e x te n s io n a l c r ite r io n  o f id e n tity .
.1 th in k  th a t G oldfarb is  p r e c is e ly  c o r r e c t  in  b r in g in g  to th e  fo re  the  
is s u e  o f id e n tity  co n d itio n s  o f in te n s io n a l and ex ten sio n a l item s. T here is  a 
c lo se  re la tion  o f th is  is s u e  to th e  b u s in e s s  of co n tex tu a l d e fin itio n  and
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re flec tio n  on th a t, I th in k , sh ow s th a t th e  th e  two v iew s do come to g e th e r . 
An ex ten sio n a l item  can  be g r a sp e d  p rior  to h a v in g  g r a sp ed  w hich  item is  
g ra p se d . For item s in tro d u ced  by  co n tex tu a l d e fin itio n  we p r o v e  s ta tem en ts  
sp e c ify in g  c o n d itio n s  o f id e n tity  as sp e c ia l c a se s  of p ro p o sitio n s  in v o lv in g  
the, r e le v a n t incom plete  sym b o ls. So for c la s s e s  we p ro v e , g iv e n  th e  axiom  
of r e d u c ib ility , th a t c la s s e s  are  id e n tic a l ju s t  w hen th e y  are determ ined  by  
form ally e q u iv a le n t fu n c tio n s  (w hich  is  a v e r s io n  of c o e x te n sio n a lity ). 
In d eed  R u sse ll ta k e s  th e  a b ility  o f h is  con tex tu a l d e fin itio n  o f c la s s e s  to
fu r n ish  a p roof o f th is , "the e s se n t ia l  p r o p e r ty  o f c la sses"  to be a
ju stif ic a tio n  of it. T h us th e  sy ste m  o f PM  is  g iv e n  a m easure, o f su p p o rt  
th ro u g h  its  a b ility  to  co h ere  w ith  a n te c e d e n t  n o tion s of id e n tity  for  certa in  
s o r ts  o f item.
T his is  not an u n a ttr a c t iv e  p o sitio n  s in ce  it  sh ow s, at le a s t , th a t R u sse ll 
d oes make a co n tr ib u tio n  to  th e  s tu d y  of th e  log ic  of ex ten sio n a l item s as  
d er iv ed  from th e  law s g o v e r n in g  in ten sio n a l e n t it ie s . In sum, the  
o b serv a tio n  sh ow s th a t trea tm en t o f c e r ta in  sym b ols a s  incom plete  is  o n ly  a 
p artia l m otivation  for  t h e . sy stem  o f PM. We need  to u se  some a d eq u a cy  
c o n str a in t on th e  r a n g e  o f, v a r ia b le s  and R u sse ll g iv e s  th is  as th e  VCP, The 
ram ification th u s  in tr o d u ce d  d oes n ot h ow ever a p p ly  to d e sc r ip t io n s  (sin ce  
th e y  are incom plete  sym b ols) and ca n n o t be allow ed to in fe c t  c la s s  term s. 
The axiom of r e d u c ib ility  is  in tr o d u ce d  to en ab le  a co h e r en t th e o ry  of 
c la s s e s , i .e ., for  th e  co n tex tu a l d e fin itio n  of c la s s e s  to be in te llig ib le  and
for  it  to co h ere  w ith  a n te c e d e n t  g r a sp  of th e  id e n tity  co n d itio n s  g o v e r n in g
c la s s e s . C o n v erse ly , th e  ram ified  h ie ra r c h y  of p ro p o sitio n s  and p rop osition a i 
fu n c tio n s  is  p a r tia lly  ju s t if ie d  b y  th e  in ten sio n a l n atu re  of th e se  e n tit ie s  
and, in  p a rticu la r , by th e  n eed  ; to in d iv id u a te  the v a r ia b le s  in c lu d ed  in  
su ch  e x p r e ss io n s . So th e  VCP is  in tro d u ced  as a n e c e ss a r y  c o n str a in t on  
th e  ran ge  of (ap p aren t) v a r ia b le s  but is  te s te d , in so fa r  as the sy ste m  as a 
whole is  te s te d , a g a in s t  c o n d itio n s  o f in d iv id u a tio n  of cer ta in  item s. This 
s u g g e s t s  th at th e  d irec tio n  o f argu m en t is  from the m anner of determ in ing  
the r e fe r e n t  or d en ota tion  of an e x p r e ss io n  (in a su ita b ly  b en ign  se n se  of
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d eterm in ing its  id e n tity )  to a r e s tr ic t io n  su ch  as th e  VCP. To know th e  
s e n s e  of an  e x p r e ss io n  is  to p o s s e s s  inform ation  su ff ic ie n t  to  id e n tify  th e  
re fe r e n t (in ap p rop r ia te  c ir c u m sta n c e s). An accou n t of th e  se n se  o f a 
c a te g o r y  of e x p r e ss io n s  w ill th u s  g iv e  a g en era l accou n t of th e  id e n tity  
con d ition s g o v e r n in g  th e  r e le v a n t  s o r t  o f item. The argum en t th u s  ap p ears  
to be from a th e o r y  o f s e n s e  to  r e v is io n  in  log ica l p ra c tice . R u ssell n e v e r  
d ev e lo p s  an ex p lic it  th e o r y  o f s e n s e , so  h is  sy stem  s u f fe r s  from  lack  of  
p rin c ip led  m otivation . A lso it  is  n o t c lear  th at a th e o ry  o f s e n se  w ould  
en d o rse  the VCP in  th e  form  p rop ou n d ed  by R u ssell. (I in v e s t ig a te  th is  
q u estio n  in  ch a p ter  5.)
§10 Conclusion:
The con clu sion  I w ish  to  u r g e  is ,  f ir s t ,  th a t th e  p u re ly  ep istem ic  m otive for  
r e s tr ic t in g  th e  sco p e  o f lo g ic  (th e  n eed  to  p resc in d  from  ce ta in  d o u b tfu l 
and on to lo g ica lly  com m itting a ssu m p tio n s) is  in s u f f ic ie n t . . T his is  b ecau se  it  
fa ils , i) to m otivate a p r in c ip led  a cco u n t of u n iv e r se ls ;  ii) th e  a ccou n t o f  
p ro p o sitio n s as incom plete  sym b ols is  not ep istem ic but is  prim arily  
ontological; and iii) th e  id e n tity  co n d itio n s  o f v a r io u s  so r ts  o f item s become 
cru c ia lly  im portant in  m otivatin g  and  a p p ra is in g  our ch o ice  o f log ic . This 
la st  point b r in g s  me to th e  secon d  a s p e c t  o f my con c lu sion . It is  th is , th e  
th r u s t  of R u sse ll’s  w ork a fte r  "On D enoting" is  an ap p lica tion  in  new  
c o n tex ts  of n o tion s w h ich  are d ev e lo p ed  in  th at pap er, sp e c if ic a lly , o f th e  
th e  notion  of incom plete sym b ols and of th e  elim ination of F regean  s e n s e  
(the treatm ent o f d e n o tin g  com p lexes q u a n tifica tio n a lly ). I argu ed  th at the  
ach ievem en t o f "On D enoting" adm its th e  var iab le  as fundam ental, a s , in  a  
se n se , the ultim ate d en o tin g  co n c e p t. If th is  is  so th en  th e  notion  of 
F regean  se n se  has n ot been  e lim inated . What we have is , ra th er , an
argum ent in favou r  o f the  
of the se n se  of c e r ta in
n o n -r e if ic a tio n  of s e n se  and a r e d u c tiv e  accou n t  
e x p r e ss io n s  in  term s of the se n se  of o th er
ex p r e ss io n s . The p reo ccu p a tio n  w ith  c o n d itio n s  of id e n tity  o v er  th e  la st  few
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p a g e s  is , I th in k , testim o n y  to th e  need  to co n sid er  is s u e s  to do w ith  th e
s e n se  of e x p r e ss io n s . M ost im p ortan tly , th ere  is  a lacuna in  th e  program m e
w hich m ust be filled  by an a cco u n t o f th e  se n se  o f var iab le  e x p r e ss io n s .
R u sse ll n e v e r  b roach es th is  a s p e c t  o f the program m e (in d eed  it is  hard to
see  how he could  g iv e n  th a t he th o u g h t all a p p reh en sio n  w as based  on  a
p rim itive re la tion  of a cq u a in ta n tce  w ith some o b je c t iv e  e n tity )  but it  is
p r e c ise ly  a su b sta n tia l th e o r y  o f s e n s e  th a t is  n eed ed  to g iv e  a p r in c ip led
m eans o f r e s tr ic t in g  th e  lo g ica l p r a c tice . In i t s  a b se n c e  R u sse ll’s sy stem , in
p articu lar , th o se  tw in  fe a tu r e s  o f it , nam ely, the axiom of r e d u c ib lity  and
th e  VCP, w ill appear ad hoc. To p u t th e  p o in t s lig h t ly  d iffe r e n tly , R u sse ll’s
" justification"  of h is  a cco u n t o f c la s s e s  in  term s of its  a b ility  to p ro v e  th e
e x ten sio n a lity  o f c la s s e s  sh ou ld  not be trea ted  m erely  as ex tra  sy stem a tic .
The ju stif ic a tio n  may n ot be form al but it  is  fundam ental to  h is  sy ste m  and
th u s  ca lls  for  an e x p lic it  a cco u n t o f s e n s e .
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The N ature and Role o f a T h eory  o f  M eaning
§1 The P h ilo sop h ica l Task:
C onsider th e  fo llow in g  p r o v o c a tiv e  d esc r ip tio n  o f p h ilo so p h y . G iven a  
p ra c tice  our p h ilo so p h ica l ta sk  is  to u n d ersta n d  it. When th a t p r a c tic e  is  
l in g u is t ic  we w ant an acco u n t o f th e  m ea n in g fu ln ess  o f th e  p r a c tic e , we 
w ant to be to ld  w hat c o n fe r s  m eaning on  e x p r e ss io n s  in  th e  p ra c tice . 
S uch  an a cco u n t is  d e s ired  b eca u se  it  e x p o se s  th e  " w o rk in g s” o f th e  
p ra c tice , i t  sh ow s u s  th e  ro le  o f e x p r e ss io n s  in  th e  p r a c tic e  and the  
role  o f th e  p r a c tic e  in  la n g u a g e  a s  a w hole. In  so  d o in g  it  g iv e s  u s  
a c c e s s  to th e  c o n te n t  o f th e  p r a c tic e  s in ce  it  r e s u lt s  in  an  exp lanation  
of th e  c o n c e p ts  u se d .
If our b e s t  e f fo r ts  in  th is  en d ea v o u r  are fr u s tr a te d  and th e  m anner  
of our fa ilu re  s u g g e s t s  th at su ch  an  a ccou n t is  im p ossib le  th e n  we m ust 
adm it e ith e r  th a t we can n ot g e t  a c lea r  v iew  of th e  w o rk in g s  o f ou r own  
la n g u a g e  -  th a t m eaning can  be, in  p r in c ip le , o b sc u r e  -  or th a t d e sp ite  
th e  p e r s is te n c e  o f a seem in g ly  c o h e r e n t p ra c tice  th a t p r a c tic e  s ta n d s  in  
need  o f r e v is io n . The c o n se q u e n t  o f th is  con d ition a l is  a d is ju n ctio n  of 
unw elcom e c o n c lu s io n s . The f ir s t  d is ju n c t  is  unw elcom e b ecau se  it 
s u g g e s t s  th a t m ean ings are  in d eterm in ate  (or, a t le a s t , are o n ly  
m y ste r io u s ly  determ in ed ) and th is  m akes it  im p ossib le  fo r  u s  to know  
w hat we are  sa y in g . The seco n d  d is ju n c t  in c u r s  an ob lig a tio n . What more 
can we tak e a s  a cr iter io n  o f m ean in g fu ln ess  th an  n o n -c o llu s iv e  
agreem en t in  u se?  What p e r s p e c t iv e  g iv e s  u s  p r in c ip le s  w h ich  so  en ab le  
u s  to so  c r it ic is e  a p ra ctice?  That is , we are a sk ed  to im agine a 
s itu a tio n  w h ere n o n -c o llu s iv e  agreem en t in  u se  is  sim ply a p r e -c o n d itio n  
of th ere  b e in g  a p r a c tice  w h ich  s ta n d s  in  need  o f ju stif ic a tio n . We th en  
w ant to know  w hat p e r s p e c t iv e  su p p lie s  th e  ad d ition al c r ite r ia  by w hich  
we ju d g e  a p r a c tic e  to  be m ean ingfu l or ju s tif ia b le . For exam ple, 
a lth ou gh  c la s s ic a l m athem atics is  c e r ta in ly  a p ra ctice  (s in c e  we h ave  no 
d iff ic u lty  in  d e c id in g  w h eth er  a c o n str u c t io n  is  a good p iece  o f c la ss ic a l
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w h eth er  it  is  a ju s tif ia b le  p r a c tic e .
T his sk e tc h e d  panoram a b e g s  and r a ise s  a num ber o f q u e s t io n s . It 
b e g s  an im portant q u e stio n  b eca u se  it  a ssu m es th a t a com plete
"external" a cco u n t o f th e  p r a c tic e  is  p o ss ib le . M ight it  not be th e  c a se
th a t we g a in  an u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f th e  p ra c tice  o n ly  th ro u g h  being  
in d u c ted  in to  it?  P erh a p s th e r e  is  no d is t in c t iv e ly  p h ilo so p h ica l or  
e x tern a l w ay o f u n d e r s ta n d in g  th e  p ra c tice . It  r a is e s  q u e s t io n s  b ecau se  
we n eed  to  know  w hat so r t  o f ex tern a l a ccou n t i s  req u ired ; How 
am bitious n eed  th e  p r o je c t  be so  th a t s u c c e s s  g u a r a n te es
en ligh ten m en t?  ; In  w h at term s can  we g iv e  an exp lanation?
The b u s in e ss  o f th is  c h a p ter  is  to  c a n v a ss  M ichael Dummett’s  v iew s  
on th e  c o r r e c t  a n sw e r s  to  th e s e  q u e s t io n s . So my aim is  lim ited and is  
p rim arily  e x p o s ito r y . I sh a ll, o f  c o u r se , be c o n s id e r in g  a rgu m en ts  for  
th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  p o s itio n  but make no claim to be o ffe r in g  a  th o ro u g h  
d efen ce  o f a n ti-rea lism . The ta sk  I h ave  s e t  m yse lf in  th is  ch a p ter  is  
to  be c lea r  ab ou t th e  main fe a tu r e s  of th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  v iew . T his 
c o h e r e s  w ith  th e  m ajor co n c e rn  o f th e  th e s is  w h ich  i s  n ot to o ffe r  an  
argu m en t for  a n ti-rea lism  but to  in v e s t ig a te  th e  re v is io n a r y  im plication s  
o f th a t p o sitio n . At two p o in ts  (in  c o n s id er in g  McDowell’s and H aack’s 
v iew s) I do o ffe r  a d e fen ce  o f a n ti-rea lism  but e v e n  th e r e  th e  prim ary  
aim is  to u se  th o se  a rgu m en ts  to  r e f le c t  fu r th e r  on th e  n a tu re  o f th e  
a n t i-r e a lis t  p e r s p e c t iv e . I u n d er ta k e  th a t ta sk  b ecau se  I th in k  both  
Haack’s and M cDowell’s  a tta c k s  seem  to  a ccep t (or p re te n d  to  be n eu tra l 
about) basic  e lem en ts o f Dummett’s p o s itio n  w h ilst c r it ic iz in g  th e  scop e  
or c o h e r en ce  o f a n ti-rea lism . So, e v e n  at th o se  p o in ts , my d e fen ce  is  
lim ited to sh ow in g  th a t no good re a so n  has been  g iv e n  for  d ep a rtin g  
from  th e  b a sis  o f th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  p r o jec t  (and not, in d eed , th a t we 
shou ld  a c c ep t th a t program m e).
I sh a ll tu rn  to th e  q u e stio n  of r e v is io n  tow ards th e  end  o f the  
ch a p ter , sp e c if ic a lly , to how  m uch r e v is io n  Dummett th in k s  is  ca lled  for
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th a t if  a p r o jec t  a lon g  th e se  l in e s  is  deem ed co h e r en t th en , u n le s s  we 
have g ro u n d s  for  u n b rid led  optim ism  about i t s  s u c c e s s , th e r e  ju s t  is  th e  
p o ss ib ility  th a t th e  a n te c e d e n t  o f th e  con d ition a l w ill be fu lf ille d  and so  
we sh a ll be com m itted to  i t s  c o n se q u e n t. We’v e  no r ea so n , a b  in itio , for  
im posing  a s  an a d eq u a cy  co n d itio n  on  an exp lan ation  th a t it  su c c e e d  in  
ex p la in in g  th e  w hole p r a c tic e . W hether u se  is  or is  n ot sa c ro sa n c t w ill 
em erge in  our exam ination of th e  n a tu re  o f m eaning. We h a v e , in  
ad van ce , no m otive for  s tip u la t in g  th a t m ean ingfu l u se  co in cid e  w ith  
e s ta b lish e d  u se .
§2 The Form of a T h eory  o f M eaning:
To learn  a la n g u a g e  is  to  a cq u ire  a sk ill. A sk ill fo r  w h ich  it  m akes 
s e n s e  to a sc r ib e  a c q u is it io n  sh ou ld  be one o f w h ich  we can  g iv e  an  
accou n t. To su p p o se  o th erw ise  w ould be to su p p o se  th a t c o n s titu tiv e  
a s p e c ts  o f th a t sk ill w ere in e ffa b le . T his is  a lien  to  our co n cep t of 
la n g u a g e  u se  a s  e s se n t ia lly  soc ia l s in ce  it  w ould become u tte r ly  
m y ster io u s  a s  to  how we r e lia b ly  a sc r ib e  p o sse ss io n  o f  th e  sk ill. It is  
e s se n t ia l  th a t in  sp e a k in g  a la n g u a g e  we tre a t our fe llow s as  
u n d e r s ta n d e r s  o f, a t le a s t  th e  r e le v a n t p ortion  o f, la n g u a g e . This  
p r e su p p o se s  th a t we can  r e lia b ly  a sc r ib e  u n d er sta n d in g  o f a n y  fragm en t  
of la n g u a g e .
T h ese  th o u g h ts  in d ica te  th a t we h ave room for  an accou n t o f w hat 
c o n s t itu te s  m astery  o f a la n g u a g e . How sh ou ld  su ch  an accou n t b e st  be 
tack led ?  The p r o jec t  r e q u ir e s  an a n a ly s is  o f th e  co n c e p t o f m eaning. 
T his is  done v ia  th e  c o n str u c tio n  o f a th e o ry  o f m eaning or , ra th er , th is  
c o n str u c tio n  becom es a tech n ica l d e v ice  in  a tta in in g  our e n d s . The 
actu a l c o n str u c tio n  o f th e  th e o r y  is  n e v e r  se r io u s ly  e n v isa g e d  but we 
in q u ire  in to  w hat form  th e  th e o r y  w ould take w ere it  to s a t is fy  certa in  
p red eterm in ed  c o n s tr a in ts .
We determ in e th e  c o n str a in ts  by c o n s id er in g  two re la ted  a sp e c ts  o f
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th e  explanation: how m uch ex p la in in g  need  we do?; an d , w hat can  we u se
in  our exp lanation?  Our aim is  com plete p e r sp ic u ity , i .e ., we do not
r e co g n iz e  th a t th e r e  may be sem antic  fe a tu r e s  w h ich , in  p r in c ip le , ev a d e
our acco u n t, so  we p lace  g r e a t  dem ands on  th e  c o m p re h e n s iv e n e ss  o f
th e  exp lan ation  and are  sp a r in g  in  w hat w e u se  in  th e  exp lan ation . So
a s  a m atter o f m eth od ology  an a d eq u ate  th e o r y  is  r e q u ired  to g iv e  a
com plete n o n -c ir c u la r  a cco u n t o f th e  m eaning o f e v e r y  e x p r e ss io n  in  th e
la n g u a g e . Dummett g iv e s  v o ice  to th is  a s  fo llow s,
What w ould ren d e r  th e  fu n c tio n in g  of la n g u a g e  u n in te llig ib le  w ould  
be to su p p o se  th a t th e  re la tio n  o f  (im m ediate or rem ote) d ep en d en ce  
of th e  m eaning o f one w ord on th a t o f o th e r s  m ight not be 
asym m etrical, th a t, in  tra c in g  o u t w hat is  req u ired  for  th e  
u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f a g iv e n  se n te n c e , and , th e re fo r e , o f th e  w ords in  
it , we sh ou ld  be led  in  a c ir c le , (1977, p .368)
We w ant a  d e sc r ip tio n  o f th e  la n g u a g e  w hich  m akes it  p e r sp ic u o u s ly  
learn ab le  so  i f  ou r th e o r y  in v o lv e s  i t s e lf  in  th e  so r t  o f c ir c u la r ity  ju s t  
d e sc r ib e d  it  w ill be im p ossib le  fo r  u s  to  accou n t for  how a sp ea k er  
g a in s  a c c e s s  to th e  m ean in gs o f th e  e x p r e ss io n s  co n cern ed . (This  
p o sitio n  m ight be m odified to  ta k e  in to  a ccou n t cer ta in  lim ited local 
h o lis tic  r e la tio n s  o f m eaning, e .g .,  it  is  p la u sib le  to su p p o se  th a t certa in  
c o n tra r ie s , "child" an d  "adult", sa y , m ight need  to be learn ed  to g e th e r . 
H ow ever a s itu a tio n  is  r e g a rd ed  a s  p ern ic io u s  if  it  e n ta ils  th at, in  ord er  
to  g r a sp  a  g iv e n  e x p r e ss io n , we n eed  to g r a sp  e x p r e ss io n s  o f a r b i t r a r y  
com p lexity .)
A th e o r is t  eq u ip p ed  w ith  su c h  a th e o ry  w ould h ave com plete m astery  
of the la n g u a g e . The th e o r y  is  in ten d ed  as a sy stem a tic  rep r ese n ta tio n  
of w hat a sp e a k er  know s w h en  he know s how to sp ea k  a la n g u a g e , it  is  
a th e o ry  o f u n d er s ta n d in g . We can n ot a c h iev e  th is  if  th e  exp lanation  
fa ils  to g iv e  a fu ll a cco u n t o f w hat th is  know ledge c o n s is t s  in  or g iv e s -
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an exp lan ation  by r e c o u r se  to  c o n c e p ts  w h ich  p r e su p p o se  th e  p o s s e ss io n  
of la n g u a g e . In Dummett’s term in o logy  th e  th e o r y  m ust be fu ll-b lo o d ed  
(see  Dummett 1975c, p .102). Note, th is  is  not in te n d ed  a s  an argum en t  
for  a fu ll-b lo o d ed  th e o r y  o f m eaning. The dem ands ju s t  made o f a 
th e o ry  o f m eaning do in d eed  lead  to fu ll-b lo o d e d n e ss  but an argum ent  
for  fu ll-b lo o d e d n e ss  w ould h a v e  to  tak e in to  a ccou n t w hat we w ant a 
th e o r y  o f m eaning fo r , it  w ould h a v e  to  show  w h y  a th e o r y  w hich  fa ils  
to  be fu ll-b lo o d ed  is  in a d eq u a te  -  so  th e  o n ly  a ccep ta b le  th e o r y  o f  
m eaning i s  fu ll-b lo o d ed  -  and th a t a  fu ll-b lo o d ed  th e o r y  o f m eaning is  a 
p o ss ib ility . I sh a ll e lab ora te  on th e  n a tu re  and fe a s ib ility  o f a 
fu ll-b lo o d ed  th e o r y  below.
In  c o n tr a s t  a m odest th e o r y  o f  m eaning (Dummett 1975c, p . 102) o n ly  
a ttem p ts a d e sc r ip t io n  of ou r u se  o f la n g u a g e  by  p r e su p p o s in g  c o n c e p ts  
e x p r e sse d  by c e r ta in  e x p r e ss io n s  ta k en  a s  prim itive. One th o u g h t w h y  
we m ight be d is sa t is f ie d  w ith  th is  is  th at th e se  prim itive  c o n c e p ts  
can n ot be la n g u a g e  s p e c if ic  s in c e , if  th e y  w ere, tra n sla tio n  of one  
la n g u a g e  in to  a n o th er  (if p o ss ib le )  w ould en ab le  th e  prim itive  c o n c e p ts  
o f one to be exp la in ed  in  term s o f  th e  secon d  and, by r e v e r s in g  th e  
p r o c e ss  o f tra n sla tio n , v ic e -v e r s a . T his exp lan a tory  eq u iv a le n c e  sh ow s  
th e  c o n c e p ts  to be not g e n u in e ly  d is t in c t  or e ls e  th a t in  e ith e r  la n g u a g e  
we h ave  a ch o ice  a s  to  w hat c o n c e p ts  we take a s  prim itive so  th at we 
cou ld  ch o o se  to  ta k e  th e  sam e c o n c e p ts  a s  prim itive. Now, if  th e  
c o n c e p ts  are e s s e n t ia lly  lin g u is t ic , in  th e  s e n s e  th a t g r a sp  of th e  
c o n c e p ts  m ust in v o lv e  com p eten ce in  u s in g  c e r ta in  e x p r e ss io n s , we m ust 
ga in  th at g r a sp  v ia  im m ersion in  th e  p ra c tice  o f u s in g  a c e r ta in  se t  of 
p rim itive e x p r e ss io n s . But th is , su p p o se d ly , can  be a tta in ed  th ro u g h  
com p eten ce in  u s in g  th e  p r im itives  o f a n y  la n g u a g e . For th at to  be the  
c a se  it  m ust be p o ss ib le  to r e c o g n iz e  th e  sim ilar rô le  p layed  by the  
e x p r e ss io n s  in n o n - lin g u is t ic  c o n te x ts , i .e ., in  c o n tex ts , sa y , in v o lv in g  
estim ation  of sp e a k e r s ' m otives, p u r p o se s  or in te n tio n s . In o th er  w ord s, 
if  g r a sp  o f th e  basic c o n c e p ts  n e c e s s a r y  for la n g u a g e  a c q u is is t io n  is
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not, im p lau sib ly , to  be tied  to  g r a sp  of th e  u se  o f sp e c if ic  e x p r e ss io n s  
w ith in  a g iv e n  la n g u a g e  we m ust be ab le  to r e c o g n iz e  th e  sim ilarity  in  
th e  rô le  o f th e  p rim tive  e x p r e ss io n s  in  d iffe r e n t  la n g u a g e s . For th is  to  
be p o ss ib le  we m ust be ab le  to  s itu a te  th is  rô le  in  ou r  g en era l p ra c tice  
o f in te r p r e tin g  th e  b eh av iou r o f  o th e r  sp e a k e r s , and th is  e x e r c ise  is  not 
e s se n t ia lly  l in g u is t ic . E xplanation in  th e  th e o r y  o f th is  rô le  w ould
how ever be to g iv e  an acco u n t o f w hat it  is  to g r a sp  th e se  basic
c o n c e p ts  in  term s o f c a p a c it ie s  w h ich  are  not e s s e n t ia lly  lin g u is t ic . T hus  
we w ould resum e a fu ll-b lo o d ed  a cco u n t. For exam ple, if  n ou n s for  
co lo u rs w ere  ta k en  a s  p r im itive  e x p r e ss io n s  (and th e  c o n c e p ts  o f th e  
in d iv id u a l co lo u rs a s  prim itive  c o n c e p ts )  in  a g iv e n  th e o r y  of m eaning  
th e n , if  w e assu m e th a t tw o la n g u a g e s  h ave e q u iv a le n t e x p r e ss iv e  pow er, 
th e y  m ust both in c lu d e  e x p r e ss io n s  for  th e  same co lo u rs  (ev e n  if  th e y  
d iffer  ov er  w h eth er  a  g iv e n  co lou r  is  d en o ted  by a com plex or sim ple  
e x p r e ss io n ) . To r e co g n iz e  th a t th e  two la n g u a g e s  both  su c c e e d  in
en ab lin g  talk  ab ou t co lo u rs w ould r e q u ire  th a t we show  how in  each  
lan gu age  co lour term s w ere u se d  by sp e a k e r s  in  d is t in g u ish in g  and  
id e n tify in g  v a r io u s  a p p ea ra n ces  o f co lou r. But th a t a cco u n t w ould g iv e  
an exp lanation  o f g r a sp  of co lou r c o n c e p ts  in  term s o f our a b ility  to 
r e - id e n t ify  and d iscr im in ate  betw een  in s ta n c e s  o f v a r io u s  co lo u rs . One 
w ay o f d o in g  th is  is  to  ap p ly  th e  co lou r v o ca b u la ry . We w ould th u s  g iv e  
an  exp lanation  of how a g iv e n  co n c e p t is  e x p r e sse d  by a cer ta in
e x p r e ss io n . Dummett (1978b) c o n s id e r s  a sim ilar ca se  in  our g r a sp  of th e  
co n cep t "square",
. ..it  can  o n ly  be by r e fe r e n c e  to [th e  a b ility  to a p p ly  th e  word  
"square" to sq u a re  th in g s  and not to  o th e r s )  ... th a t we can  exp la in  
w hat it  is  to  a sso c ia te  th e  c o n c e p t s q u a r e  w ith  th a t w ord. (1978b, 
p .7)
Note th at th e  th e o r y  would no d ou b t make u se  o f th e  co lou r term s of
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th e  lan g u a g e  it  w as fram ed in. T his d oes not fr u s tr a te  fu ll-b lo o d e d n e ss  
s in ce  we s t i l l  g e t  an  a n a ly s is  o f w h at it  i s  to e x e r c ise  a co lou r c o n cep t  
in  term s w h ich  do not p r e su p p o se  th a t th e  c o n cep t is  a lrea d y  p o s s e s s e d .
T his d ea ls  w ith  th e  f ir s t  a lte r n a tiv e  acco rd in g  to  w h ich  th e  basic  
c o n te n ts  w ere  assu m ed  to be e s s e n t ia lly  lin g u is t ic . So a ssu m e, now, th a t  
th e  c o n c e p ts  are  n ot e s se n t ia lly  l in g u is t ic . T his h as an a ccep ta b le  and a  
c o n tro v e r s ia l in te r p r e ta tio n . If  it  is  to  mean th a t th e  sp e a k er  m ust have  
a g ra sp  of c e r ta in  c o n c e p ts  w h ich  are  prior to  and th u s  in d e p e n d e n t o f  
a l in g u is t ic  medium and w h ich  p r o v id e  th e  b asis  for  a tta ch in g  m eaning  
to  w ord s v ia  som e p r o c e ss  ak in  to  in te r n a l o s te n s io n  or a sso c ia tio n  th en  
th e  m odest th e o r is t  h as w ork to  do in  ex p la in in g  w h y , in  v iew  o f th e  
fa c t  th a t w e can n ot g iv e  an a c co u n t o f th is , we do n ot r e s to r e  a p ostion  
w h ich  a ck n o w led g es  an in e ffa b le  sem antic  com ponent, th a t is ,  a p osition  
w h ere th e  id ea  th a t we sh a re  m ean in gs becom es a t m ost a h y p o th e s is . (I 
sh a ll c o n s id er  p o s itio n s  o f th is  so r t  sh o r tly .)  But if  th e  th o u g h t is  th a t  
w e d e sc r ib e  th e  p o s s e s s io n  o f c e r ta in  c o n c e p ts  in  term s o f e n g a g in g  in  
th e  ap p rop r ia te  n o n - lin g u is t ic  soc ia l p r a c tic e s  th en  we h ave  a  
fu ll-b lo o d ed  th e o ry  o f m eaning.
§3 A T h eory  o f M eaning is  a T h eory  o f U n d erstan d in g :
We u se  la n g u a g e  to  com m unicate. What a sp ea k er  com m unicates w hen  he  
u s e s  a se n te n c e  is  th e  m eaning o f th e  se n te n c e  as u tte r e d  by him in  
th a t co n tex t o f u tte r a n c e . The m eaning o f a s e n te n c e  seem s to  r e s id e  
ju s t  in  i t s  rô le  in  com m unication and com m unication is  p o ss ib le  on ly  
b ecau se  a s e n te n c e ’s m eaning is  p u b lic , in  a s e n s e , op en  to  v iew . What 
th is  m eans is  th at th e  m eaning of a se n te n c e  r e s id e s  in  it s  u se  and has  
no e s s e n t ia l  com ponent c o n s is t in g  o f, sa y , a m ental e v e n t  accom pan ying  
u se . (Note th at th e re  is  no d ir e c t  argum en t a g a in st  th e  p o ss ib ility  of a 
lo g ica lly  p r iv a te  la n g u a g e  from  th is  p osition . I am sim ply a ssu m in g , if  it  
can  be ca lled  an assu m p tion , th a t we do com m unicate. The is s u e  about
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o f our u se  o f la n g u a g e  in  term s o f some m ental accom panim ent o f u se .)  
The rea so n  w h y  th is  m en ta listic  v iew  is  w ron g  is  th a t it  r e s u lt s  in  it  
alw ays b ein g  a t b e st  a h y p o th e s is  th a t we sh a re  m ean ings and th is  a 
s u b v e r s io n  o f th e  com m unicative fu n c tio n  of la n g u a g e  - s o  a r e d u c tio  a d  
a b su rd u m  o f a n y  su ch  n o tion  o f m eaning: th e  assu m p tion  of m utual 
u n d er sta n d in g  d o es n o t  h a v e  th e  ch a ra cter  o f a h y p o th e s is . I f  m utual 
u n d er sta n d in g  is  o n ly  a h y p o th e s is  th en  it  o n ly  becom es rea so n a b le  if  it  
can be sh ow n  to  be an exp lan ation  o f sh ared  u se . But our u se  i s  th e  
so le  r e se r v o ir  o f e v id e n c e  so , if  agreem en t in  u se  is  e v e r  a grou n d  for  
assu m in g  th a t we sh a re  m ean in gs, th en  it  a lw ays is . So th a t elem en t o f 
u n d er sta n d in g  w h ich  is  u n ava ilab le  in  u se  d ro p s aw ay as red u n d an t. 
The idea  th a t m ean ings are d is t in c t  from  u se  seem s, in  v iew  o f th is , to  
be c o n te n tle ss . W hilst, i f  w e are  n ot ju s t if ie d  in  ta k in g  agreem en t in  u se  
a s agreem en t ab ou t m eaning, th en  we can  n e v e r  have good g r o u n d s  for  
su p p o sin g  th a t we u n d er sta n d  each  o th er . The p o in t h ere  is  not 
v e r if ic a t io n is t . What is  claim ed is  th a t if  som eone b e lie v e s  th at m eaning  
d oes not r e s id e  in  u se  and p r e fe r s  to th in k  o f m eaning in  term s of some 
m ental accom panim ent o f u se  th e n  he m ust show  how th a t accom panim ent
c o n fe r s  co n cep tu a l c o n ten t on  th e  e x p r e ss io n . The problem s w ith  th is
v iew  have been  form idab ly  a r ticu la ted  in  th e  e a r ly  se c t io n s  o f
P h ilo so p h ica l I n v e s t ig a tio n s .  The c e n tr a l problem  seem s to be th a t we  
can n ot make s e n s e  o f th e  c o n c e p t a s  a (re cu rren t) m ental e v e n t. R ather  
all we can  th in k  of is  an im age or p ic tu re  in  th e  mind of th e  sp ea k er . 
And now th e  su p p o rte r  o f th is  m en ta listic  v iew  m ust exp la in  how th e  
n atu re  o f th is  item  can  m atter in  th e  le a s t  in  a sc r ip tio n s  o f m eaning  
p rov id ed  th a t th e  sp e a k e r ’s u se  a g r e e s  w ith  th at o f o th er  sp e a k e r s .
A lso, th e  m en ta list h as w ork to  do in  exp la in in g  how th e  im age a c tu a lly  
c o n n e c ts  w ith  u se . A lthough  p ic tu r e s  o ften  seem  to be se lf-in tim a tin g  
th is  is  o n ly  b eca u se  we know  how th e y  are to be in te r p r e te d . But th is  
sh ou ld  not o b sc u r e  th e  fa c t  th at th e y  do req u ire  in terp reta tion ; we need
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to know how th e y  are  to be u se d . E xplanation of th is  w ould in v o lv e  u s  
in  a r e g r e s s .  T hus th e  exp la n a to ry  v a lu e  of th e  m en ta listic  v iew  
v a n ish e s .
So a c c o u n tin g  fo r  la n g u a g e  a s  a medium o f com m unication dem ands  
th a t we a c c ep t th a t a g reem en t in  u se  be agreem en t in  m eaning. For to |
Isu p p o se  it  is  n ot is  to  su p p o se  th a t th ere  is  some tr a n sc e n d e n t  fa c t  o f |
m eaning about w h ich  we may d isa g r e e  c o n s is te n t  w ith  agreem en t in  a ll 
our lin g u is t ic  b eh av iou r , i .e .,  th a t m utual u n d er sta n d in g  is  a h y p o th e s is .
So we a c c ep t th e  s lo g a n  "m eaning i s  use" and se ek  some c la r ifica tio n  of |
it. !
To g iv e  th e  m eaning of an e x p r e ss io n  is  to  sa y  w hat a sp ea k er  know s  
w hen he u n d e r s ta n d s  it. We w ant an accou n t o f w hat th is  k n ow led ge  
c o n s is t s  in . Dummett claim s th a t an  a sc r ip tio n  of kn ow led ge m ust, if  it  is  
not to fa ll in to  v a c u ity , show  how  th e  kn ow led ge is  m an ifestab le , i .e ., j
show  w hat d is t in c t iv e  ca p a c ity  is  in v o lv e d  in  p o s s e s s io n  o f the  
k n ow led ge , and how it  is  a cq u irab le . In  su p p o rt of th is  v iew  Dummett 
re ca lls  an exam ple o f W ittg en ste in ’s ,
... a  dog  can  e x p e c t  h is  m aster to  come home, but he can n ot ex p ect  
him to come home n ex t w eek; and  th e  reason  is  th a t th e re  is  n o th in g  
th e  dog cou ld  do to m a n ife s t  an  exp ecta tio n  th a t h is  m aster w ill 
come home n ex t w eek . I t  m a k es  no s e n s e  [my ita lic s ]  to  a ttr ib u te  to  
a crea tu r e  w ith ou t la n g u a g e  a  g r a sp  of th e  co n cep t e x p r e sse d  by  
th e  w ord s "next w eek". (1978b, p .5)
The claim is  not sim ply th a t we lack  a ju stif ic a tio n  for  a sc r ib in g  
k n ow led ge (of th e  m eaning o f an e x p ress io n ) in  c a se s  w h ere  th e  su b je c t  
is  in cap ab le  o f e x e r c is in g  a ca p a c ity  w h ich  d isp la y s  th a t k n ow led ge, but 
th a t in  su c h  c a s e s  we can n ot make s e n s e  o f the p u ta tiv e  kn ow led ge  
a scr ip tio n . So we have a (m etap h ysica l) co n str a in t on our co n cep t of 
k n ow led ge.
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M anifestation: If a sp e a k er  k n ow s th e  m eaning of an e x p r e ss io n  th en  
th ere  m ust be no a s p e c t  o f th is  k n ow led ge  th a t is  not cap ab le  o f b ein g  
d isp la y ed  in  th e  u se  th e  sp e a k e r  m akes o f th e  e x p r e ss io n . What 
dem onstrab le  c a p a c it ie s  can  w e ta k e  a s  c o n s titu tiv e  o f u n d ersta n d in g ?  
For m any e x p r e ss io n s  we can  be sa tis f ie d  w ith  an ex p lic it  v e r b a l  
exp lanation  o ffe r e d  or r e co g n iz e d  by  th e  sp ea k er , p rov id ed  th a t we h ave  
rea so n  to b e liev e  th a t  th e  sp e a k e r  u n d e r s ta n d s  the exp lan ation . C learly , 
th o u g h , on pa in  o f r e g r e s s  or c ir c u la r ity , th is  can n ot am ount to a g lobal 
a ccou n t o f m a n ifestin g  an u n d e r s ta n d in g . So fo r  some e x p r e ss io n s  
u n d er sta n d in g  can  o n ly  be m an ifested  by th e  u s e  th e  sp ea k er  m akes of 
th e  e x p r e ss io n s  in  c e r ta in  c ir c u m sta n c e s .
The th e o r y  o f m eaning g iv e s  a  th e o re tic a l r e p r ese n ta tio n  o f th is  
p ra ctica l c a p a c ity  for  c o r r e c t  u se . O bviou sly  we can n ot a sc r ib e  to  th e  
sp e a k e r s  an e x p lic it  k n ow led ge  o f th is  p rop osition a i r e p r e se n ta tio n  for  
th en  it  w ould h a v e  su ff ic e d  a s  a v erb a l exp lan ation . The sp e a k e r ’s 
p ra ctica l c a p a c ity  is  th u s  r e g a rd ed  a s  im plicit k n ow led ge o f w hat is  
e x p r e sse d  in  th e  th e o re tic a l p ro p o sitio n . So th e  p rop osition  can  o n ly  
make u se  o f c o n c e p ts  w h ich  can  be fu lly  exp la ined  in  term s o f actu a l 
c a p a c itie s  o f sp e a k e r s . So, w h ere  a se n te n c e  d e sc r ib e s  an e f fe c t iv e ly  
reco g n iza b le  s ta te  o f  a ffa ir s , th a t u n d er sta n d in g  is  m an ifested  in  the  
sp e a k e r ’s  a b ility  to  p u t h im self in  a p osition  to  e x e r c ise  th at  
reco g n itio n a l ca p a c ity  and to a s s e n t  to or d is se n t  from th e  s e n te n c e  as  
ap p rop ria te .
A cqu isition: A ctual, n ot id ea l, s p e a k e r s  ga in  a m astery  o f lan gu age . When 
we learn  a la n g u a g e  we learn  from  th e  u s e s  o th e r s  make of th e  la n g u a g e  
and from  th e  ex p la n a tio n s th e y  o ffe r  o f th at u se . Limited e x p er ien ce  of 
su ch  lin g u is t ic  u se  e n a b le s  th e  s u c c e s s fu l  learn er  to go  on to make h is  
ow n n o v e l u tte r a n c e s  and to d is t in g u is h  co r re c t  from in co rrec t u se . A 
th eo ry  o f m eaning m ust exp la in  how a sp eak er  g a in s com p etence u s in g
83
o n ly  ca p a c it ie s  he can  be c r e d ite d  w ith .
The m an ifesta tion  and a cq u is it io n  c o n s tr a in ts  are o fte n  r e g a rd ed  a s  
tw in them es in  th e  p u b lic ity  o f m eaning (se e , for  in s ta n c e , T ennant 1987, 
p. 4). It is  im portant to  be c lea r  ab ou t th e  dem ands o f p u b lic ity . We 
h ave  been  g iv e n  an argu m en t fo r  h o ld in g  th a t in  ord er  to a ccou n t for  
la n g u a g e  a s  a medium o f com m unication m eaning m ust be p u b lic . In  o th er  
w ords th e  p o s s ib il ity  o f com m unication r e q u ir e s  th a t in  ou r a ccou n t of 
la n g u a g e  we a d h ere  to  th e  "m eaning is  use" slogan  and we a p p ly  th at  
c o n str a in t v ia  th e  m an ifesta tion  and a cq u is it io n  c h a lle n g e s . But if  th is , 
w ith ou t fu r th e r  ado, i s  sim p ly  ta k en  to  r e q u ire  th a t a ll u se  be p u b l ic ly  
m an ifestab le  it  b e g s  th e  q u e stio n  a g a in s t  th e  p r iv a te  lin g u is t  -  
o b v io u s ly  th e  p r iv a te  l in g u is t  can n ot p u b lic ly  m anifest h is  g r a sp  o f h is  
e x p r e ss io n  d e fin ed  by in te r n a l o s te n s io n ; if  th is  is  tak en  a s  a cr itic ism  
o f th e  m ea n in g fu ln ess  o f h is  u s e  th e n  h is  ta sk  is , a b  in itio , im p ossib le . 
The n otion  o f a p r iv a te  l in g u is t  r e s u lt s  from  a C artesianism  w hich  se e k s  
to  gro u n d  la n g u a g e  in  a p r iv a te  ep istem ic  realm . Our c o n s tr a in ts  do not 
im m ediately ru le  o u t  th a t p o s itio n  bu t r e q u ire  th e  C artesian , f ir s t ,  to  
show  th e  item  of p r iv a te  k n ow led ge  w h ich  he ta k e s  to be c o n s t itu t iv e  or 
d eterm in ative  o f m eaning to h ave  a "hard enough" link  w ith  u se  to  
e n su r e  sa tis fa c t io n  o f ou r c o n s tr a in ts . S eco n d ly , we n eed  to  be 
co n v in ced  th a t a lo g ic a lly  p r iv a te  la n g u a g e  is  so  m uch a s  p o ss ib le . Our 
d isc u ss io n  o f la n g u a g e  th u s  fa r  h a s co n cen tra ted  on i t s  com m unicative  
rôle but we h ave u n co v e r e d  c o n s tr a in ts  on m ean ingfu l u se  p e r  se . The 
poin t is  th a t m an ifesta tion  is  a g e n e r a l req u irem en t on a sc r ip t io n s  of 
k n ow led ge and th a t th e  p r iv a te  l in g u is t  can n ot m anifest h is p u ta tiv e  
k n ow led ge to h im self s in c e  a n y  attem p t to e x e r c ise  th e  s k ills  w h ich  
co n stitu te  p o s s e s s io n  o f th a t k n ow led ge  w ill cou n t a s  b e in g  s u c c e s s fu l  
p rov id ed  o n ly  th a t th e  e x e r c ise  se e m s  s u c c e s s fu l  to th e  p r iv a te  lin g u is t . 
So he can n ot g iv e  c o n te n t  to th e  notion  o f a m istake in  e x e r c is in g  h is  
p u ta tiv e  k n ow led ge . T hus he ca n n o t r e lia b ly  s e lf -a s c r ib e  u n d er sta n d in g  
and a p r iv a te  la n g u a g e  is  not p o ss ib le . Now we are in  a p osition  to
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m otivate a c o n cern  w ith  p u b lic  m a n ife sta b iiity  a s  a c o n str a in t g o v e r n in g  
a ll m ean ingfu l u se .
§4 F u ll-B Iood ed n ess and M odesty:
The is s u e s  o f w h eth er  o n ly  a fu ll-b lo o d ed  th e o ry  o f m eaning w ill 
s a t is fy  our req u irem en ts  o f a  th e o r y  o f m eaning and  w h eth er  su c h  a 
th e o ry  is  a p o s s ib il ity  are  im portant in  th e ir  own r ig h t  but a lso  help  
c la r ify  th e  dem ands o f m a n ife sta b iiity . McDowell (McDowell, 1987) 
c r it ic iz e s  Dummett’s  in s is te n c e  on  fu ll-b lo o d e d n e ss  for  c o lla p sin g  in to  a 
b e h a v io u r istic  a c c o u n t o f u n d e r s ta n d in g  b ecau se  it  r e q u ir e s  a com plete  
behavioura l d e sc r ip t io n  o f g r a sp  o f  a co n ten t, McDowell sy m p a th ise s  w ith  
Dummett’s  a v e r s io n  fo r  a p s y c h o lo g is t ic  accou n t (i.e . an a ccou n t w h ich  
r e lie s  on g iv in g  th e  m eaning o f an  e x p r e ss io n  in  term s of some re la tion  
of th e  e x p r e ss io n  to a m ental p r o c e ss )  b ecau se  a n y  su ch  accou n t m akes  
th e  b e lie f in  sh a red  m eaning a h y p o th e s is . So, i f  we a c c ep t th e  dem ands  
of fu ll-b lo o d e d n e ss  th e  a cco u n t w e g iv e  o f th e  g r a sp  o f a n y  co n cep t  
m ust show  how th a t g r a sp  c o n s is t s  in  c a p a c itie s  w h ich  are d em onstrab le  
in  a s p e c ts  o f o v e r t  b eh av iou r . Now th is  p o stio n , McDowell te l ls  u s , 
th r e a te n s  to  lea v e  mind o u t o f th e  acco u n t a lto g e th e r , i .e ., we co lla p se  
in to  behaviourism .
Dummett a ttem p ts to  u s e  th e  n o tion  o f im plicit k n ow led ge as p ivo ta l 
in  g iv in g  an a cco u n t w h ich  a v o id s  both th e  S cy lla  o f p sy ch o lo g ism  and  
th e  C h arybd is  o f behaviou rism . Dummett n o tes  th a t im plicit k n ow led ge is  
"know ledge w hich  sh ow s i t s e lf  p a r t ly  by m an ifesta tion  of th e  p ra ctica l  
a b ility , and p a r tly  b y  a w illin g n e ss  to  ack n ow led ge  as c o r r e c t  a 
form ulation o f w hat is  know n w h en  p resen ted "  (Dummett 1978b, p .3 ). 
McDowell p o in ts  ou t th a t th is  n otion  en a b les  u s  to avoid  p sych o log ism  
s in ce  th e  m an ifesta tion  o f th e  p r a c tic a l a b ility  e n s u r e s  th a t p o s s e ss io n  
of th e  k n ow led ge is ,  a p p r o p r ia te ly , op en  to v iew . So p sych o log ism  is  
avo id ed , w h ils t  th e  fa c t  th e  form ulation  of th e  k n ow led ge p o s s e s s e d  is  
r e co g n ized  a s  c o r r e c t  sh ow s th a t th e  k n ow ledge is  fu n c tio n in g  in
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g u id in g  b eh av iou r - s o  we are  n ot sim ply p ic k in g  ou t r e g u la r it ie s  in  
b eh aviou r but a sc r ib in g  m inded a c tiv ity . T hus behaviourism  a lso  is  
avo id ed .
McDowell has two r e a so n s  for  claim ing th at th is  ap proach  fa ils . F ir st, 
he p o in ts  ou t th a t a n y  form ulation  o f w hat an  im plicit k n ow led ge  o f an  
e x p r e ss io n  c o n s is t s  in  w ill, in  m any in s ta n c e s , u se  th e  e x p r e ss io n  i t s e lf  
so  th a t if  it  is  to be r e co g n iz e d  a s  a c o r r e c t  form ulation  o f o n e ’s  
im plicit k n ow led ge it  w ill p r e su p p o se  th a t one u n d e r s ta n d s  th e  
e x p r e ss io n  c o r r e c tly . If, h ow ever , on e o b je c ts  to th is , a r g u in g  th a t th e  
l in g u is t ic  e x p r e ss io n  i t s e l f  is  n o t r e le v a n t to  th e  form ulation  o f th e  
im plicit k n ow led ge  but th a t w hat m atters is  w hat is  e x p r e sse d , i .e ., th e  
c o n te n t  o f th e  form ulation , th e n  we w ill h ave r e su r r e c te d  p sy ch o lo g ism  
- th e  id ea  th a t we can  s tr ip  aw ay w ord s to g e t  at th e  p u re  th o u g h t  
ly in g  beh ind  th e  co n v en tio n a l m eans we h ave  fo r  e x p r e ss in g  th e  
th o u g h t. M cDowell’s secon d  r e se r v a t io n  is  th at th e  outw ard  m anifesta tion  
of th e  im plicit k n ow led ge can  n e v e r  su c c ee d  in  com p letely  d isp la y in g  th e  
k n ow led ge p o s s e s s e d  by th e  sp e a k e r  s in ce  th e  sp ea k er  o n ly  e x h ib its  
f in ite  e p iso d e s  o f u se  and th e se  are recon cilab le  w ith  in fin ite ly  many 
form ulations o f w hat th e  im plicit k n ow led ge p o s s e s s e d  by th e  sp ea k er  
a c tu a lly  is .
I th in k  th at McDowell is  r ig h t  in  fo c u s in g  on  th e  im portance o f th e  
notion  o f im plicit k n ow led ge  but w ron g  in  h is acco u n t o f how it  
d eterm in es a p a th  b etw een  b eh aviou rism  and p sych o log ism . F ir s t , th e  
idea  th a t we m ight e x h ib it  im plicit kn ow led ge in  r e co g n iz in g  a 
form ulation  o f th e  k n ow led ge  ca n n o t be the w hole s to r y  o f how mind 
e n te r s  our acco u n t o f u n d e r s ta n d in g . The rea so n  for th is  is  th a t if  we 
in s is t  th a t im plicit k n ow led ge a lw ays be capab le of b ein g  exh ib ited  in  
th is  m anner th en  c ir c u la r ity  is  bound to in fe c t  our a ccou n t ju s t  as it  
d oes if  we in s is t  th a t u n d e r s ta n d in g  is  a lw ays ex p lic it k n ow led ge o f 
some v e r b a l p ara p h ra se . M oreover, we o ften  w ant to a sc r ib e  g r a sp  of a 
co n cep t to , sa y , p r e lin g u is t ic  ch ild r e n  or to anim als or, sim ply, to
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p e r so n s  who lack  th e  l in g u is t ic  r e so u r c e s  to r e co g n iz e  a form ulation  of  
th e ir  p u ta tiv e  im plicit k n ow led ge . T h us th e  a b ility  to r e c o g n iz e  a 
form ulation  of imp lie t  k n ow led ge  i s  n ot c o n s t itu t iv e  o f p o s s e s s in g  th a t  
k n ow led ge (a lth ou gh , o b v io u s ly , it  w ill, on occasio n , w arran t a sc r ip tio n  
of im plicit k n o w led g e). So th e  p o in t a t w h ich  our a cco u n t r e q u ir e s  th e  
in vo lvem en t o f mind is  n ot e x c lu s iv e ly  to  be eq u ated  w ith  th is  ca p a c ity .
We can , h ow ever , sa lv a g e  th is  in s ig h t  from  McDowelTs rem arks. The 
im portance o f th e  a b ility  to  r e c o g n iz e  a su ita b le  form ulation  o f im plicit 
k n ow led ge w as th a t it  lin k ed  a sc r ip t io n  o f im plicit k n ow led ge w ith  th e  
id ea  th a t a  sp e a k er  i s  gu id ed  in  h is  p ra c tice  by  th is  k n ow led ge . I t  is  
now o b v io u s , th o u g h , th a t th e  outw ard  m an ifesta tion  o f l in g u is t ic  
b eh aviou r is  im portant n ot sim ply  b eca u se  o f i t s  d iscern a b le  r e g u la r it ie s  
but b eca u se  o f norm ative c o n s tr a in ts  w h ich  g o v e r n  th e  c o r r e c tn e s s  o f  
th a t b eh av iou r. A fu ll  a p p rec ia tio n  o f th is  p o in t would show  w h y
McDowell’s seco n d  o b je c tio n  i s  a lso  m isgu ided  s in ce  all th a t th a t
ob jec tio n  r e v e a ls  is  an u n d er  determ in ation  o f w hat th e  u n d e r ly in g  
r e g u la r ity  in  our l in g u is t ic  b eh av iou r  is , g iv e n  o n ly  a f in ite  sam ple of  
th a t b eh av iou r. We a re  n ot in te r e s te d  in  r e g u la r it ie s  of l in g u is t ic  
b ehaviour but in  th e  c o r r e c tn e s s  o f th a t b ehaviour.
T his p o in t o b v io u s ly  n e e d s  a g r e a t  deal of e lab oration . It to u c h e s  on  
a them e r u n n in g  d eep  in  m uch p h ilo so p h ica l th o u g h t s in ce  th e  e a r ly  
y e a r s  of th e  c e n tu r y  and p erm eates  m uch of W ittgen ste in ’s la ter
w r itin g s . I can n ot ig n o re  it  but m ust k eep  my rem arks on it  brief, My 
in te r e s t  h ere  is  th e  r e v is io n a r y  c o n se q u e n c e s  of Dummett’s program m e 
but, to g a u g e  them , we n eed  to  u n d ersta n d  th e  n atu re  o f h is
program m e. U n d e rsta n d in g  a  p h ilo so p h ica l p osition  can n ot be d iv o rced  
from th e so r t  o f argu m en t c a n v a sse d  in  su p p o rt o f it, So w hat I w ant to  
do now is  sim ply to s k e tc h  an argu m en t in  su p p o rt o f Dummett’s notion  
o f fu ll-b lo o d e d n e ss  ig n o r in g  p o ss ib le  o b je c tio n s  to it  and re fin em en ts  
th at may a r ise  from  su c h  o b je c t io n s .
Im plicit k n ow led ge  p o s s e s s e s  an outw ard  m anifestab le  a sp e c t  w hich
87
r e fu te s  a c c u sa tio n s  o f p sy ch o lo g ism  y e t  th e  ch a ra c ter  o f th at  
m anifestation  ex h ib its  th e  in flu e n c e  o f mind so  h a lts  th e  s lid e  in to  
behaviourism . How is  th is  p o ss ib le ?  The problem  w ith  su ch  a p o sitio n  is  
th a t it  is  p e r fe c t ly  p o ss ib le  to  g iv e  a cco u n ts  o f b eh aviou ra l
m an ifesta tion s o f u n d e r s ta n d in g  w hich  p r e su p p o se  some co n cep tu a l 
accom plishm ent but th a t in  d o in g  so  one w ould th r ea te n  th e  req u irem en t  
o f fu ll-b lo o d e d n e ss . (This seem ed to be th e  problem  w ith  an accou n t  
w hich  re lied  on ack n ow led gem en t o f form ulations o f th e  im plicit 
k n ow led ge p o s s e s s e d .)  So w hat w e w ant is  a form of b eh aviou ra l
m an ifesta tion  w h ich  sh ow s th e  in vo lvem en t o f mind y e t  w h ich  d oes not 
p r e su p p o se  g r a sp  of c e r ta in  c o n c e p ts . We n eed , f ir s t ,  to  be c lear  ab ou t  
w hat we w ant o f a th e o r y  o f m ean ing, "We are n ot look in g  for  a th e o r y  
w ith  p r e d ic t iv e  pow er, but for  a  d e s c r ip tio n  th a t m akes s e n s e  o f th e
a c t iv ity  a s  one ca rried  on by  ra tion a l beings."  (Dummett 1987, p .260) The
p oin t th a t Dummett seem s to  be m aking h ere  is  th a t th e  v e r y  n a tu re  o f  
our in te r e s ts  in  a th e o r y  o f m eaning p rec lu d e  th e  p o s s ib il ity  o f  
b ehaviourism  s in ce  w e p r e su p p o se  we are g iv in g  an accou n t o f th e  
a c tiv ity  o f m inded b e in g s . Dummett g o es  on to am plify b r ie fly  w hat th is  
en ta ils  and to d e sc r ib e  w h y  it  i s  no c o n c e ss io n  to m od esty ,
An a d eq u ate  th e o r y  o f m eaning m ust allow for  th is  p r o c e ss  o f 
estim atin g  a sp e a k e r ’s in te n tio n s , but sh ou ld  not in corp ora te  a  
d e sc r ip tio n  o f it. The p r o c e ss  is  in  no w ay sp ec ia l to th e  p articu lar  
lan gu age; it  is  based  upon  an  u n d er sta n d in g  of th e  la n g u a g e , but 
d oes n ot in v o lv e  a n y th in g  th a t h as to be learn ed  in  lea rn in g  th a t  
la n g u a g e  ra th er  th an  a n y  o th e r . Save for  i t s  su b je c t-m a tte r , it  
in v o lv e s  n o th in g  sp e c ia l to la n g u a g e  a s  such: we estim ate  the
in te n tio n s  and m otives u n d e r ly in g  o th er  p eo p le ’s u tte r a n c e s  by th e  
same g e n e r a l m eans a s  we estim ate th o se  u n d er ly in g  th e ir  
n o n -lin g u is t ic  a c tio n s . (Dummett 1987, p. 261)
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We cou ld , it  seem s to  me, make th e  same p o in t in  th e  co n tex t o f 
tra n sla tio n  by  claim ing th a t we are  n e v e r  in  th e  p o sitio n  o f a rad ica l 
tra n sla to r  s in c e  we b rin g  to e v e r y  tra n sla tio n  s itu a tio n  th e  same 
sta n d a r d s  o f ra tio n a lity  w h ich  g o v e r n  our in te r p r e ta tio n  o f o th e r s '  
b ehaviour. We im pose on  th e  sp e a k e r  our s ta n d a rd s  o f r a tio n a lity  a s  th e  
o n ly  m eans o f m aking s e n s e  o f h is  beh aviou r. What th e  in d eterm in acy  of  
tra n sla tio n  sh ow s is  th a t, i f  we c o n stra in  th e  e v id en tia l base for
tra n sla tio n  to o v e r t  u s e s  o f la n g u a g e  in  o b se r v a b le  c ircu m sta n ces , we 
can n ot m otivate a s in g le  schem e o f tra n sla tio n  a s  b e in g  co r re c t. Our 
ch o ice  o f tra n sla tio n  m anual can  th e n  o n ly  be made on pragm atic
g ro u n d s. Were w e to  p o s s e s s  a com plete sp e c ifica tio n  of s ta n d a r d s  o f  
human ra tio n a lity  th e n  th e  argu m en t for  in d eterm in acy  o f tra n sla tio n  
would be u n d er c u t. T h ere m a y  in d eed  s t i l l  be a m easure o f
in d eterm in acy  in  a n y  g iv e n  tra n sla tio n a l p r o jec t  ( ju s t  b ecau se  our  
c o n str u c tio n  o f th e o r y  is  o fte n  s u b je c t  to pragm atic and h is to r ica l  
fa c to r s)  bu t Q uine's a rg u m e n t  fo r  th e  co n c lu sio n  th a t s ig n if ic a n t  
in d eterm in acy  i s  g u a r a n teed  w ould no lon ger  hold . So com plete
sp e c if ic a tio n  o f hum an s ta n d a r d s  o f ra tio n a lity  w ould be to g iv e  a 
g e n e r a lly  ap p licab le  m eth od o logy  o f tra n sla tio n  w h ich  we h ave  y e t  to  be 
g iv e n  rea so n  to s u s p e c t  is  in a d eq u a te . (We cou ld  v iew  th e  r e su lt in g  
p osition  a s  one w h ere  D av id son 's P r in c ip le  o f C harity , ra th er  th an  
tra d in g  on  some n otion  of agreem en t, is  g iv e n  a com p letely  e x p lic it  
en u n c ia tion .) So a c c e p tin g  th e  argu m en t for  in d eterm in acy  o f tra n sla tio n  
comm its one to  th e  v iew  th a t no com plete sp e c ifica tio n  of s ta n d a r d s  o f  
r a tio n a lity  can  be g iv e n . T h is, h ow ever , d oes not fr u s tr a te  th e  
program m e o f g iv in g  a fu ll-b lo o d e d  th e o r y  o f m eaning for  a la n g u a g e  
s in ce  th e  aim o f su c h  a th e o r y  is  to  g iv e  an accou n t o f w hat it  i s  to  
sp eak  a la n g u a g e  and it  i s  c o n s is te n t  w ith  th a t aim to  ground  la n g u a g e  
in  more g en e r a l ra tion a l p r a c tic e s  w h ich  are not d escr ib ed  in  th e  th e o r y  
its e lf .
C onsider th is  exam ple o f u n d er sta n d in g  th e  co n cep t s q u a r e  w hich
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McDowell ta k e s  from  Dum m ett's (1978b). T here Duramett n o te s  th a t to  
h ave  th e  c o n c e p t sq u a r e  i s  to  be ab le  to  d iscr im in ate  betw een  sq u a re  
th in g s  and th in g s  o f o th e r  s o r ts . One o f th e  w a y s  o f d o in g  th is  is  to  
a p p ly  th e  w ord "square" to  r e c o g n iz a b ly  sq u a re  th in g s . Two p o in ts  
sh ou ld  be n o ted . F ir st , on e  co u ld , p r e lin g u is t ic a lly , h ave th e  co n c e p t  
sq u a re  but h a v in g  th e  c o n c e p t  i s  n ot a p r e c o n d it io n  for  lea r n in g  th e  
m eaning o f  "square" . R ather lea r n in g  th e  c o r r e c t  u se  o f th e  w ord  
"square" is  on e w ay o f g r a s p in g  th e  co n c e p t sq u a re . The p o in t h ere  is  
th a t we do not u s e  th e  id ea  o f  a  p r e lin g u is t ic  g r a sp  o f  th e  c o n c e p t to  
exp la in  how  m eaning is  im bued in  la n g u a g e , i .e . ,  how sym b ols come to  
h ave  a  r e p r e se n ta tio n a l rô le , r a th e r , th e  p o s s ib il ity  o f a  p r e lin g u is t ic  
g r a sp  o f th e  c o n c e p t e n t it ie s  u s  to  claim  th a t th e  a b ility  w e are  
a sc r ib in g  d oes n ot d ep en d  u p on  a n y  sp e c if ic a lly  l in g u is t ic  ach ievem en t. 
One cou ld  s a y  th a t la n g u a g e  i s  m ean in gfu l o n ly  b ecau se  b eh av iou r  is .  
The th e o r y  o f m eaning g iv e s  an  acco u n t o n ly  o f l in g u is t ic  m eaning. 
S eco n d ly , w hat on e  m a n ife sts  in  g r a sp in g  th e  c o n c e p t s q u a r e  is  not a  
r e g u la r ity  in  b eh a v in g  d iffe r e n tly  r e la tiv e  to  sq u a re  th in g s  but a  
d is c r im in a to r y  a b ility , th a t is ,  a  s e n s it iv i ty  to  s u c c e s s  or fa ilu re  in  th is  
p ra ctice . T his s e n s it iv t y  to  c o r r e c tn e s s  (i.e ., th is  elem en t o f  ra tio n a lity )  
is  not e s se n t ia lly  l in g u is t ic  so , a lth o u g h  fundam ental to  m ean in gfu l u se  
of la n g u a g e  n eed  n ot be p a rt o f  a  com plete d e sc r ip tio n  of w hat it  i s  to  
u se  a la n g u a g e . T h u s we can  g iv e  an a cco u n t o f la n g u a g e  w h ich  
g ro u n d s  p o s s e s s io n  of l in g u is t ic a lly  e x p r e ss ib le  c o n c e p ts  in  
n o n -lin g u is t ic  b u t ra tion a l p r a c tic e s . M oreover, in  d o in g  so , we do not  
exp la in  m ean ingfu l u s e  in  term s o f  a n te c e d e n tly  g r a sp e d  c o n c e p ts .
T his co n cern  w ith  th e  d is t in c tio n  betw een  a r e g u la r ity  in  b eh av iou r  
and b eh av iou r or u s e  w h ich  is  s u b je c t  to  s ta n d a r d s  o f c o r r e c tn e s s  
re a d ily  c a lls  to  mind W ittg en ste in 's  p reo ccu p a tio n  w ith  w hat it  is  to  
follow  a ru le  in  P h ilo so p h ic a l I n v e s t ig a t io n s  and R em a rk s on th e  
F o u n d a tio n s  o f  M ath em atics, M cDowell's r e se r v a t io n s  about  
fu ll-b lo o d e d n e ss  seem  to  stem  from  h is  rea d in g  o f W ittgen ste in . In
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W ittg en ste in  on F ollow in g  a  Rule  (McDowell 1984) he a r g u e s  th a t  
W ittg en ste in 's  argu m en t m ilita tes a g a in s t  two m isco n cep tion s o f m eaning; 
i) th a t g r a sp  of m eaning a lw ays in v o lv e s  an in te r p r e ta tio n  and , ii) th a t  
g r a sp  o f m eaning e s ta b lis h e s  a sublim e m echanism  w hich  d eterm in es u se . 
The seco n d  a lte r n a tiv e  is  sim ply  a m yth and th e  f ir s t  d e liv e r s  th e  
sc e p tic a l paradox  th a t m eaning is  im p ossib le . The so lu tio n  is  to  
ack n ow led ge  th a t th e r e  is  a w ay o f g r a sp in g  a ru le  w h ich  is  not an  
in te r p r e ta tio n  and  th a t th is  in v o lv e s  a c tin g  w ith in  a p r a c tic e .  One 
p h ilo sop h ica l c o n se q u e n c e  o f  th is  is  th a t our se a rc h  for  exp lan a tion s  
e v e n tu a lly  m ust com e to an en d . We h it "bedrock" and are red u ced  to  
sa y in g  sim ply , "This i s  w hat we do." The hard q u e stio n  is  g a u g in g  ju s t  
w h en  we h ave  h it "bedrock". Commenting on W ittg en ste in ’s  
p ronoun cem ent th a t to  u se  an e x p r e ss io n  w ith ou t ju s tif ic a tio n  is  not to  
u se  it  w ith ou t r ig h t  McDowell w r ite s ,
...it  seem s c lear  th a t th e  p o in t o f th is  is  p r e c is e ly  to p r e v e n t  th e  
lea ch in g  ou t o f norm s from  our p ic tu r e  o f "bedrock" -from  our  
p ic tu r e , th a t is , o f how th in g s  are  a t th e  d e e p e s t  le v e l a t w h ich  we 
may s e n s ib ly  con tem p late  th e  p lace  o f la n g u a g e  in  th e  w orld . (McDowell 
1984, p. 341)
1 a g r e e  w ith  M cDowell's in te r p r e ta tio n  h ere  and , if  th is  is  th e  im port of 
h is  m odest ou tlook , th e n  m ust adm it to  sh a r in g  it. But 1 ta k e  Dummett’s  
in tro d u ctio n  o f th e  id ea  th a t th e  m anifesta  b ilit y  c o n str a in t in v o lv e s  
d e sc r ip tio n  of ra tion a l b eh av iou r p r e c is e ly  to accom m odate th is  p ic tu re . 
We grou n d  la n g u a g e  in  p r a c tic e s  w h ich  th em se lv es  in v o lv e  norm ative  
c o n s tr a in ts  but th a t d oes not com prom ise Dummett’s  notion  of 
fu ll-b lo o d ed  n e s s  a s  1 in te r p r e t  it. That I am in  d an ger  of h av in g  
red u ced  th e  p o in t o f co n ten tio n  b etw een  fu ll-b lo o d e d n e ss  and m od esty  to  
v a c u ity  seem s to be confirm ed by  th e  fo llow ing q uote from  McDowell, 
w hich  could  be in te r p r e te d  a s  fa v o u r in g  th e  notion  o f fu ll-b lo o d e d n e ss
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th at I a sc r ib e  to Dummett,
U n d ersta n d in g  lin g u is t ic  b eh av iou r , and h en ce  u n d er sta n d in g  
la n g u a g e s , in v o lv e s  no more than  a sp e c ia l c a se  o f w hat 
u n d e r s ta n d in g  b eh av iou r , in  g e n e r a l in v o lv e s , (McDowell 1976, p .45)
But my in te n tio n  h ere  h as n ot been  to  s id e  e ith e r  w ith  Dummett or w ith  
McDowell. 1 hope to  h a v e  u se d  th e  w r itin g s  o f both men to c la r ify  w hat  
we can  e x p e c t  and dem and o f a th e o r y  o f m eaning w h eth er  one ca lls  it  
fu ll-b lo o d ed  or m odest, (I sh a ll r e tu r n  to some o f th e  i s s u e s  in v o lv ed  in  
th is  q u estio n  o f norm ative c o n tro l o f a p ra c tice  in  con n ectio n  w ith  
C risp in  W right’s  exp lora tion  of th e  c o n se q u e n c e s  of W ittg en ste in ’s  Rule 
Follow ing C on sid era tion s.)
§5 A C hallenge fo r  a T h eory  o f M eaning:
For two c la s s e s  o f c a se  g iv in g  a  c o n te n tfu l acco u n t o f th a t in  w hich  an  
u n d er sta n d in g  o f s e n te n c e s  in  e ith e r  c la s s  c o n s is t s  p r o v e s  r e la t iv e ly  
unp rob lem atic . H ow ever th e se  c la s s e s  do not ex h a u st our lin g u is t ic  
r ep e rto ir e . The f ir s t  c la s s  c o n s is t s  o f th o se  s e n te n c e s  for  w h ich  we h ave  
a su ita b ly  n o n -c ir c u la r  and e x p lic it  v e r b a l exp lanation . U n d ersta n d in g  of 
th e se  s e n te n c e s  can  th u s  be c h a r a c te r iz e d  as an ex p lic it  kn ow led ge o f  
th is  exp lanation . B ut, a s  I h a v e  n oted  ab ove , th is , on  pain o f c ir c u la r ity  
or r e g r e s s , can n ot p r o v id e  th e  fu ll  s to r y  o f our lin g u is t ic  com p etence.
An im portant ta sk  o f  a th e o r y  o f m eaning w ill, th u s , be to determ ine  
w h en it m akes s e n s e  to a sc r ib e  im plicit kn ow led ge to  a sp ea k er . That is , 
w h ere our th e o r y  is  fo rc e d  to c h a r a c te r iz e  kn ow led ge a s  im plicit it  m ust 
te ll u s  w hen we are  ju s t if ie d  in  m aking su ch  a ttr ib u tio n s . We m ust be 
to ld  w hat m an ifestab le  c a p a c ity  c o n s t itu te s  kn ow led ge o f w hat our  
th eo re tica l r e p r e se n ta tio n  e x p r e s s e s . Our secon d  unprob lem atic c la s s  of 
s e n te n c e s  r e q u ir e s  u s  to make a ttr ib u tio n s  o f im plicit k n ow led ge. The 
s e n te n c e s  in  th is  c la s s  are d ec id a b le  so  we can  sim ply tak e th e  im plicit
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k n ow led ge to c o n s is t  in  th e  a b ility  to e x e r c ise  th e  a p p rop ria te  
r eco g n itio n a l c a p a c ity  w h ich , b y  h y p o th e s is , we h ave or can  a cq u ire .
N o n -e ffe c tiv e ly  d ec id ab le  s ta tem en ts  -  s ta tem en ts  for  w h ich  we h ave  
no m ethod g u a r a n te e in g  a d e c is io n  on tr u th -v a lu e  -  p o se  a problem  ju s t  
b ecau se  th e  a b ility  to g iv e  an ex p lic it  exp lan ation  can n ot a lw ays m an ifest  
u n d er sta n d in g  and it  is  u n c lea r  w hat a sc r ip t io n s  o f im plicit k n ow led ge  
h ere  am ount to . We can n ot a lw ays g iv e  a v e r b a l exp lan a tion  o f th e se  
s ta tem en ts  in  th e  s e n s e  o f b e in g  ab le  to  g iv e  a r e d u c tio n is t  accou n t. 
The m ost w e can  e x p e c t  is  a r e d u c t iv e  a cco u n t, i .e ., w e can  claim th a t  
th e  tr u th  o f s ta te m e n ts  in  th e  problem  c la s s  d ep e n d s  up on  th a t o f  
sta tem en ts  in  th e  u n p rob lem atic  c la s s  w ith ou t p r e su p p o s in g  a tra n sla tio n  
of s e n te n c e s  in  on e  in to  s e n te n c e s  in  th e  o th e r , {See Dummett 1982 p.70  
for  th is  d is tin c tio n .)  T his is  b e c a u se  from  a s to c k  of d ec id ab le  s e n te n c e s  
w e can  g e n e r a te  o n ly  m ore com plex but s t i l l  d ec id ab le  s e n te n c e s  u n le s s  
we in tr o d u ce  an o p era to r  (su ch  a s  q u a n tifica tio n  o v e r  in fin ite  dom ains, 
te n se  o p era to rs  and s u b ju n c t iv e  co n d itio n a lisa tio n ) " resp onsib le"  for  
u n d ec id a b ility , i .e .,  an op era to r  w h ich , a c tin g  on d ec id ab le  s e n te n c e s ,  
can p ro d u ce  u n d ec id a b le  s e n te n c e s . The m eaning o f su ch  an op era tor  
n e e d s  to  be exp la in ed  and can n ot be g iv e n  in  term s o f our b asic  s to ck  
of d ec id ab le  s e n te n c e s . (J u st b eca u se  in  an y  p u ta t iv e  exp lan ation  th e  
p r o p e r ty  o f d e c id a b ility  w ould be p r e se r v e d .)
An a ttr ib u tio n  o f im plicit k n o w led g e  m ust, a s  n oted , be ju s t if ie d  by  
sa y in g  w hat it  is  to  e x e r c ise  th a t k n ow led ge  in  d em onstrab le  w ays, if  a 
sp ea k er  is  sa id  to p o s s e s s  im plicit k n ow led ge we m ust know  w hat is  
b ein g  a sc r ib e d  to him. We can  o n ly  make c o n te n tfu l a c r ip tio n s  o f  
k n ow led ge  w h ere th e  w o u ld -b e  know er can  d is t in c t iv e ly  m anifest h is  
p o s s e s s io n  o f th a t k n ow led ge . Dummett n o te s  th a t,
Lijmplicit k n ow led ge  can n ot, h ow ever , m ean in gfu lly  be a sc r ib e d  to  
som eone u n le s s  it  is  p o ss ib le  to sa y  in  w hat m an ifesta tion  o f th at  
k n ow led ge c o n s is t s .  (1975b, p .217)
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So im plicit k n ow led ge  m ust be sp e c if ie d  as th e  a b ility  to  perform  
a p p ro p r ia te ly  in  c ir cu m sta n ces  re co g n iz a b le  by th e  sp e a k er . If th e  
c ircu m sta n ces  adum brated  e lu d e  th e  sp e a k e r ’s a b ility  to te ll  w h eth er  
th e y  ob ta in  or n ot th en  it  w ould n e v e r  be p o ss ib le  to  su b sta n tia te  an  
a ccu sa tio n  of ig n o ra n ce  s in c e  fa ilu r e  to re sp o n d  a p p ro p r ia te ly  w ill 
alw ays be ex p lica b le  a s  an in a b ility  to  r e co g n iz e  th a t c ircu m sta n ces  are, 
in  fa c t , th u s  and so . It  w ould n ot be p o ss ib le  to  make a d is tin c tio n  
b etw een  h a v in g  and n ot h a v in g  th e  im plicit k n ow led ge  and so  th e re  
w ould be no s e n s e  in  m aking a sc r ip t io n s  o f su c h  k n ow led ge. T h is p o in t  
is  n ot v e r if ic a t io n is t , it  is  a m eta p h y sica l or c o n s t itu t iv e  fe a tu r e  o f  our  
co n cep t o f k n ow led ge . The p o in t cou ld  be p u t a s  a ch a llen g e  to  a r e a lis t  
who claim s th a t th e r e  is  c o n ten t to  a sc r ip t io n s  o f k n ow led ge  w h ere no
m an ifesta tion  o f p o s s e s s io n  o f th e  k n ow led ge is  p o ss ib le . I t  is  th en
sim ply u tte r ly  o b sc u r e  w hat ex p la n a to ry  v a lu e  th is  notion  o f k n ow led ge  
m ight h a v e , g iv e n  th a t it  d is c e r n s  no d iffe r en ce  b etw een  th o se  who  
p o s s e s s  and th o se  w ho lack  su c h  k n ow led ge . Or, a lte r n a tiv e ly , it  m ight 
be a g reed  th a t realism  w as a s ta b le  p o sitio n , so  th a t b e in g  r e a lis t  about 
k n ow led ge a sc r ip t io n s  w ould su p p o rt a realism  ab ou t th e  tru th  of  
sta tem en ts  more g e n e r a lly , but th e  q u estio n  w ould s t il l  rem ain a s  to
w h eth er  th e r e  is  a n o n -c ir c u la r  ju s tif ic a tio n  o f realism .
Note th a t th e  p o sitio n  d e sc r ib e d  is ,  in  on e s e n s e , n o n -r e  v isio n a ry : we 
do not q u estio n  w h eth er  or not w e u n d ersta n d  n o n -e ffe c t iv e ly  d ecid ab le  
se n te n c e s . Our g r a sp  o f s e n te n c e s  o f th e  f ir s t  ord er  p ra ctice  is  tak en  
as a datum . What w e th e n  q u e s t io n  is  w hat th is  g r a sp  c o n s is t s  in . A 
sem antic th e o ry  w h ich  o f fe r s  an a cco u n t o f th e  m eaning o f th e se
s e n te n c e s  is  th en  a p p r a ised  a cc o rd in g  to i t s  a b ility  to is s u e  in  an  
accou n t o f our k n ow led ge  o f th a t m eaning w h ich  s a t is f ie s  th e  
m an ifestation  and a cq u is it io n  c h a lle n g e s . (T his p o in t w ill be im portant in  
th e  d isc u ss io n  in  c h a p ter  4 o f th e  n a tu re  of a s tr ic t  f in it is t  p o sitio n  
w h ich  is , su p p o se d ly , m otivated  by  g en e r a l a n t i-r e a lis t  a rgu m en ts. It is
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e v id e n t  th a t su c h  a p o sitio n  w ill not q u estio n  w h eth er  or not we g r a sp  
certa in  se n te n c e s  o f th e  f ir s t  o rd er  p ra c tice .)
In  sum m ary, we h a v e  th e  fo llow in g  broad p e r s p e c t iv e . The attem pt to  
a p p ra ise  a p r a c tice  p h ilo so p h ica lly  is  tak en  to c o n s is t  in  an in q u ir y  in to  
th e  form w h ich  an  ap p ro p r ia te  th e o r y  o f m eaning for  th a t p ra c tice  w ould  
tak e . The th e o r y  o f m eaning m ust allow  i t s  p o s s e s s o r  n o n -c ir c u la r  a c c e s s  
to th e  m eaning o f e v e r y  e x p r e ss io n  in  th e  r e le v a n t  fragm en t o f la n g u a g e  
and , in  d o in g  so , m ust not assu m e g r a sp  o f a s e t  o f p rim itive  
e x p r e ss io n s . The th e o r y  o f m eaning g iv e s  a th e o r y  o f u n d er sta n d in g , 
th a t Is, it  c h a r a c te r iz e s  w hat i s  know n b y  a sp ea k er  w h en  he  
u n d e r s ta n d s  th e  la n g u a g e . T hus th e  th e o ry  is  led  to make cer ta in  
a sc r ip t io n s  o f k n o w led g e  to  sp e a k e r s . In  m aking su c h  a sc r ip t io n s  of 
k n ow led ge th e  th e o r y  m ust g iv e  an  a ccou n t o f w hat p o s s e s s io n  o f th at  
k n ow led ge c o n s is t s  in; it  m ust show  how p o s s e ss io n  o f th a t k n ow led ge is  
both m anifestab le  and a cq u irab le .
§6 The J u stif ic a tio n  o f D eduction:
Our attem pt to ju s t i fy  a p r a c t ic e  (as o p p o sed  to  s ta tem en ts  made w ith in  
th e  practice; a c tu a l t r u th -v a lu e s  o f and e v id e n c e  for  in d iv id u a l  
sta tem en ts  are n ot im portant h ere) c o n s is t s  in  tr y in g  to  g iv e  a 
n o n -c ir c u la r  a ccou n t o f th e  m eaning of each  e x p r e ss io n  in  th e  p ra c tice . 
It is  not o b v io u s th a t th is  n eed  a lw ays be p o ss ib le  nor th at its  
im p o ss ib ility  sh ou ld  im pugn th e  m ea n in g fu ln ess  o f th e  p ra c tice . 
In fer e n tia l p r a c tic e , p rim a  fa c ie , o f fe r s  a good exam ple o f th is . D eduction  
is  h e a v ily  enm eshed  in  our u s e  o f la n g u a g e  as a  w hole. We u se  
in fe r e n c e s  to make ap p ro p r ia te  p a s s a g e s  betw een  s e n te n c e s , to work ou t 
a n exu s o f comm itm ent a sso c ia te d  w ith  a g iv e n  se n te n c e . T h ese  
com m itm ents seem  on th e  on e hand to be c o n s t itu t iv e  o f and , on the  
o th e r , to be c o n se q u e n c e s  o f m eaning. C learly , in fe r e n tia l re la tio n s  
betw een  se n te n c e s  are in tim ately  re la ted  to a n y  p la u sib le  notion  th at we 
may h ave o f th e  c o n ten t o f  s e n te n c e s . We o fte n  make d ed u ctio n s  to
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g lea n  inform ation  or to  c a r ry  ou t a d ec is io n  p ro ced u re . To d e n y  the  
m ea n in g fu ln ess  o f in fe r e n c e  (i.e ., to a ccep t in fe r e n tia l r u le s  sim ply as  
op eration a l p r o c e d u r e s  w ith  no sem antic  co n trib u tio n ) is  tantam ount to  
d e n y in g  th e  m ea n in g fu ln ess  o f la n g u a g e  as a w hole. So it  seem s we m ust 
in c lu d e  in fe r e n tia l p r a c tic e  in  ou r sem antic  d esc r ip tio n  o f la n g u a g e .
N otw ith stan d in g  th e  fo rc e  o f th a t  r e flec tio n  th e r e  seem s to  be a 
p ow erfu l argu m en t fo r  d e n y in g  th e  p o ss ib il ity  of g iv in g  a  ju s tif ic a tio n  
o f d ed u ction . A ny ju s tif ic a tio n  w e are  ab le to  g iv e  w ill d o u b tle ss  i t s e lf  
u se  in fe r e n c e . T h ose in fe r e n tia l p r a c t ic e s  th em se lv e s  stan d  in  n eed  of 
ju stif ic a tio n  so  e ith e r  th e  a c c o u n t i s  c ircu lar  or it  g o e s  in to  a r e g r e s s .  
Or, p u t a n o th er  w ay, i f  we are ab le  to  d ed u ce  a ru le  o f in fe r e n c e  from  
c e r ta in  o th e r s  th en  we tak e th is  to  be i t s  ju s tif ic a tio n  but lea v e  o ff  
r e g a rd in g  it  a s  fu n dam enta l. T h ere m ust be a n o n -em p ty  s e t  o f
fu n dam enta l r u le s  w h ich  can n ot be ju s tif ie d  in  th is  w ay. So e ith e r  we
ju s t i fy  them  in  term s o f a n o th er  sy ste m  w hich  la u n ch es a  r e g r e s s  or  
e lse  th e y  are  ta k en  to  be s e l f - j u s t i f y in g  w hich  is  c ircu la r .
Dummett tr ie s  to  show  (in  The J u s tif ic a tio n  o f  D edu ction  (1975a) ) th a t  
th is  argu m en t a p p e a r s  com p elling  o n ly  u n til w e h ave  d is t in g u ish e d  tw o  
s o r ts  o f exp lan ation  and n o ticed  th e  p r e c ise  ch a ra cter  o f th e  a ccu sa tio n  
o f c ir c u la r ity . T u rn in g  to  th e  la tte r  f ir s t ,  th e  p u ta tiv e  ju s tif ic a tio n  is  
a ccu sed  o f b ein g  c ircu la r  n ot b eca u se  it  a ssu m es c e r ta in  in fe r e n tia l
r u le s  a s  p r e m is s e s  but b eca u se  th e  exp lanation  u s e s  th o se  r u le s  o f  
in fe r e n c e . T h is can  be v ic io u s ly  c ircu la r  or not d ep en d in g  on th e
p u rp o se  o f th e  exp lan ation . Were it  ou r in te n tio n  to c o n v in c e  som eone to 
u se  our in fe r e n tia l r u le s , i .e .,  to  g iv e  a  su a s iv e  ju s tif ic a tio n , th e n  the  
exp lanation  w ould o b v io u s ly  be u s e le s s  - r e c e ip t  o f th e  fo rc e  o f th e  
exp lanation  w ould p r e su p p o se  a c c ep ta n c e  of th e  r u le s  o f in fe r e n c e . T his  
h ow ever is  c le a r ly  n ot our in te n tio n . We w ant an  acco u n t o f th e  ro le  o f  
th e  p r e s e n tly  a c c ep te d  in fe r e n tia l p r a c tic e  in  our la n g u a g e , i .e ., w e w ant 
an exp lan atory  ju stif ic a tio n . So we can  p r e su p p o se  an a ccep ta n ce  o f our  
in fe r e n tia l r u le s  and o ffe r  a ju s tif ic a tio n  of them in  term s, sa y , o f a
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so u n d n e ss  proof.
C onsider th e  fo llow in g  (a ttem pted) ju stif ic a tio n  of c la s s ic a l log ic . 
Realism ta k e s  tru th  to  be a p r o p e r ty  w h ich  a sta tem en t e ith e r  has or 
does not h a v e  in d e p e n d e n tly  o f ou r a b ility  to  determ ine th e  m atter. 
A d h eren ce  to  su c h  a notion  o f tr u th  is  m an ifested  by h o ld in g  th a t  
b iva len ce  is  a p p lica b le  to  all s e n te n c e s  o f th e  la n g u a g e . T h us, a ssu m in g  
th e  leg itim acy  o f r e a lis t  tr u th , we allow  a ju s tif ic a tio n  o f th e  c la s s ic a l  
lo g ic ia n ’s  u se  o f th e  Law o f E xcluded  Middle (LEM) or , e q u iv a le n tly , o f  
Double N egation  E lim ination (DNE) s in c e  a ffirm ing  b iv a len ce  in  th is  
co n tex t i s  tan tam ount to  a ffirm in g  th e  La^v of E xcluded M iddle (s in c e  
a s s e r t in g  P  is  e q u iv a le n t  to  a s s e r t in g  th at "P" is  tr u e ) . So c la s s ic a l  
log ic  is  g iv e n  a sem antic  ju s tif ic a tio n  in  term s o f tr a n sfe r r in g  tr u th  (as  
r e a lis tic a lly  c o n c e iv e d ) from  p r e m isse s  to co n c lu sio n . T his o n ly  su c c e e d s  
as a ju s tif ic a tio n  if  an  a cco u n t can  be g iv e n  o f w hat an u n d e r s ta n d in g  
of (ra th er  th an  a com m itm ent to) r e a lis t  tru th  c o n s is t s  in.
To tack le  th is  q u e stio n , c o n s id e r  a base c la s s  o f s e n te n c e s  (w hich  are  
both d ec id ab le  and n o n -e f f e c t iv e ly  d ec id ab le  - s in c e  we may be 
in te r e s te d  in  s ta te m e n ts  ab ou t, sa y , th e  p a st  w h ich  may, p r e s e n t ly  be 
u n d ec id ab le  y e t  are  a p p a r e n tly  lo g ic a lly  sim ple) w h ich  co n ta in s  no 
log ica l m ach inery . U n d e rsta n d in g , as ch a ra c ter ized  h ere , w ill be 
ex h a u sted  by an a b ility  to  u se  th e  s e n te n c e s  c o r r e c tly , i .e ., to know  for  
each  se n te n c e  w hat i t s  c o n d itio n s  o f c o r re c t  a s s e r t ib lity  are . T h ese  
co n d itio n s , s in ce  n e c e s s a r i ly  c ircu m scr ib ed  by u s e s  we are cap ab le  of  
m aking, m ust be co n d itio n s  we can  e f fe c t iv e ly  r e co g n iz e . (Note th a t  
th e re  is  no in fe r e n c e  from  th is  o b se r v a tio n  to th e  den ia l  th a t w e g r a sp  
n o n -e ffe c t iv e ly  d ec id ab le  s e n te n c e s  in  th e  base c la ss .)
The in tro d u ctio n  of c la s s ic a l  log ic  a llow s u s  to  a s s e r t  for  an y  
se n te n c e , P, P  or n o t-P , w h ere , g iv e n  th e  c la ss ic a l tru th  fu n ctio n a l  
d efin itio n  o f th e  c o n n e c t iv e s , th is  a s se r t io n  is  th e  same as  th e  a sse r t io n  
th at P  is  e ith e r  tru e  or fa lse  (aga in , in d e p e n d e n tly  o f w^hether we can  
determ in e th e  m atter), C learly , m astery  o f th is  n otion  of tru th  need  not
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c la s s  ju s t  b eca u se  th a t m astery  can  o n ly  make u se  o f our a b ility  to
r e co g n iz e  c e r ta in  c o n d itio n s  a s  o b ta in in g  or not. So com p reh en d in g  th is  
notion  o f tru th  seem s to be e x h a u sted  ju s t  in  an  a c cep ta n ce  of
c la s s ic a lly  v a lid  r u le s  o f in fe r e n c e . In o th er  w ords we are fo rced  to
a sc r ib e  to  o u r s e lv e s  k n o w led g e  o f r e a lis t  tru th  p u r e ly  to v a lid a te  
c la ss ica l r u le s  o f in fe r e n c e . T h ere  is  a s tra igh tforw ard  im p lau sib ility  (if  
not an in c o h eren ce ) h ere . It  seem s u tte r ly  m y ster io u s to  v iew  th is  
k n ow led ge a s  c o n s t itu te d  b y  a c c ep ta n c e  o f th e se  r u le s  o f in fe r e n c e .  
M oreover it  a p p ea rs  c ircu la r  to  se e k  to  j u s t i fy  th e  lo g ic  by  ap p ea l to  a 
co n cep t w h ich  is  m an ifested  o n ly  in  th e  a ccep ta n ce  o f th a t log ic .
In  th e  J u s tif ic a tio n  o f  D ed u c tio n  (1975a) Dummett h as two main 
c o n c e rn s . F ir st, he w a n ts  to  show  how a ju s tif ic a tio n  of d ed u ctio n  is  
p o ss ib le . He f in d s  th a t i t  is  o n ly  from  a  cer ta in  co n cep tio n  o f th e  n a tu re  
of m eaning, th a t is ,  from  a  m olecular con cep tion  of m eaning (in  w h ich  
g r a sp  each  e x p r e ss io n  can  be g iv e n  a n o n -c ircu la r  exp lan ation  
in d e p e n d e n tly  a g r a sp  o f th e  e n t ir e  lan gu age) th a t a ju stif ic a tio n  is  
p o ss ib le . Holism, it  em erg es , r a th er  th an  o ffe r in g  an a lte r n a tiv e  form  of  
ju s tif ic a tio n  is  th e  d en ia l th a t a ju stif ic a tio n  is  p o ss ib le  a t all. So a  
ju s tif ic a tio n  of d ed u ctio n  is  a p p ra ised  not by th e  log ica l th e o r y  but b y  
th e  th e o r y  o f m ean ing for  th e  la n g u a g e , th at is ,  we t e s t  th e  a d eq u a cy  o f  
a ju stif ic a tio n  o f d ed u ctio n  by a sk in g  w h eth er  th e  ce n tr a l c o n cep t u sed  
in  g iv in g  a  so u n d n e ss  p roof for  th e  log ica l sy stem  c o h e r es  w ith  a  
m olecular acco u n t o f la n g u a g e . The secon d  o f Dummett’s c o n c e rn s  now  
a r ise s  for  it  is  a  t e s t  o f th e  a d e q u a cy  of a th e o ry  o f m eaning th a t it  
exp la in  how in fe r e n c e  is  p o ss ib le . T h is, Dummett p o in ts  o u t is  no e a sy  
ta sk  b ecau se  th e re  seem s to be a te n s io n  betw een  how we a cco u n t for  
th e  leg itim acy  o f d ed u ctio n  and how we accou n t for it s  u s e fu ln e s s .  
C lassica lly , a d ed u ctio n  is  leg itim ate  w h en ev er  it  is  im p ossib le  for  th e  
p r em isses  to  be tr u e  and th e  c o n c lu s io n  fa lse . It is  tem ptin g  to th in k  
th at th is  m eans th a t in  a ck n o w led g in g  th e  tru th  o f th e  p r em isses  we
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h ave, in  som e s e n s e , im p licitly  ack n ow led ged  th e  tru th  o f th e  co n c lu sio n .
T his th o u g h t m ust be tru e  to a t le a s t  th is  ex te n t, a s id e  from
ack n o w led g in g  th e  s o u n d n e ss  o f th e  in d iv id u a l s te p s  o f th e  d ed u ctio n  no 
ex tra  ep istem ic  s te p  is  n e c e s s a r y  so  th at, in  th e  p articu lar  ca se  o f an  
im m ediate (one s te p ) c o n se q u e n c e  th e  o n ly  ep istem ic  a d v a n ce  we make is  
in  a c k n o w led g in g  th e  tru th  o f th e  c o n se q u e n c e  w h ich  is  ju s t  to  a c c ep t  
th e  so u n d n e ss  o f th e  in fe r e n c e . The p o in t now is  th a t in  ord er  to  
a ccou n t for  th e  la tte r  we w ant to  sa y  th a t th e  form er is , in  som e s e n s e ,  
no s ig n if ic a n t  a ch ievem en t. But w e a lso  w ant to sa y  th a t d ed u ctio n  is  
u se fu l ju s t  b e c a u se  it  r e p r e s e n ts  some ep istem ic  a d van ce  so  th a t th e  
ach ievem en t we h ave  ju s t  tr ie d  to  d ow ngrade in  a c c o u n tin g  for  th e  
so u n d n e ss  o f in fe r e n c e  m ust be o f some s ig n if ic a n c e . The ce n tr a l
problem  w ith  th e  f ir s t  co n c e rn  is  in  a cco u n tin g  for  th e  u se  o f th e
p u ta tiv e  ju s tif ic a tio n  a s  a ju s t i f ic a t io n  d e sp ite  i t s  c ir c u la r ity . To r e so lv e  
th e  te n sio n  of th e  seco n d  co n c e rn  we m ust make some c o n c e ss io n  to  
realism , adm it som e gap  betw een  tru th  and its  reco g n itio n  (at le a s t , by  
d ir ec t or can on ica l m eans) but we co n tin u e  to o b je c t  to r e a lis t  u se  o f an  
ep istem ica lly  u n c o n str a in e d  n otion  of tru th  for  m aking im p ossib le  an  
a ccou n t o f w hat it  i s  to u n d er sta n d  and learn  a la n g u a g e . An 
in tu it io n is t ic  sem an tics th u s  r e c e iv e s  te n ta t iv e , program m atic su p p o rt.
S u san  Haack (Haack 1982) c o n te s t s  Dummett’s claim th a t c ir c u la r ity  is  
fa ta l o n ly  if  ou r exp lan ation  is  in te n d ed  to be su a s iv e . H aack’s argum en t  
h as tw o s tr a n d s . S he d is a g r e e s  w ith  Dummett th at th e re  is  a d isa n a lo g y  
b etw een  an  in d u c t iv e  ju s tif ic a tio n  of in d u ctio n  and a d e d u c tiv e  
ju s tif ic a tio n  o f d ed u ctio n . A lso sh e  a r g u e s  th at a llow ing c ircu lar  
ju s tif ic a tio n s  e n a b le s  u s  to ju s t i fy  too much and so  th e  ju s tif ic a tio n  
becom es w o r th le ss . The f ir s t  s tr a n d  of th e  argum en t can  be n e g le c te d  
here; th e  d isa n a lo g y  b etw een  th e  two so r ts  of ju s tif ic a tio n  is  not ce n tr a l  
to Dummett’s claim th a t in  th e  c a se  o f d ed u ction  su ch  a ju s tif ic a tio n  
s e r v e s  our in te r e s ts .  The v a lu e  o f an in d u c tiv e  ju s tif ic a tio n  o f in d u ctio n  
can  be le f t  op en  to q u e stio n . The secon d  argum en t is  o b v io u s ly  more
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p ow erfu l s in ce  it  d ir e c t ly  a t ta c k s  th e  v a lu e  o f th e  c ircu la r , exp lan a tory  
ju s tif ic a tio n .
Haack p o in ts  o u t th a t a c ircu la r  ju s tif ic a tio n  is  a va ilab le  e v e n  for  
su ch  p a te n tly  in va lid  r u le s  a s  M odus M orons (MM), i .e .,  from  P^Q and Q 
in fe r  P. If  we r e g a r d  MM a s  v a lid  th e n  w e can  show  th a t MM is  va lid . 
S u p p ose  P->Q and  Q a re  tr u e . B y th e  tr u th  tab le  d efin itio n  o f P^Q, i f  P  
is  tru e  th en  Q is  tr u e . A lso , Q is  tru e . So, by  MM, P  is  tru e . To o b je c t  
th a t th is  " ju stifica tion "  fa ils  b eca u se  MM is  in va lid  is  to b eg  th e  
q u estio n . H ow ever it  i s  too sw ift  to  co n c lu d e  from  th is  th a t th e  c ircu la r  
ju stif ic a tio n  is  v a lu e le s s  s in c e  if  we h a v e  in d e p e n d e n t rea so n  for
b e liev in g  th a t MM is  in v a lid  th e n  th e  ju stif ic a tio n  m ust s u r e ly  fa il s in ce  
th e n  we p u t o u r s e lv e s  in  th e  p o sitio n  o f r e q u ir in g  a su a s iv e  
ju s tif ic a tio n . We do h a v e  ju s t  su c h  a r ea so n  b eca u se  i t  is  e a s y  to  show  
th at u s in g  MM le a d s  to  a  co n tra d ic tio n . Haack h ow ever  o b je c ts  th a t th is  
dem on stration  a ssu m e s  th a t th e  sy s te m  in  w hich  we em bed MM o th erw ise  
fu n c tio n s  a s  "normal". The th o u g h t h ere  is  p resu m ab ly  n ot th e  sim ple  
one th a t c h a n g in g  th e  o th er  r u le s  o f th e  sy stem  w ill r e tu r n  c o n s is te n c y .  
In th a t c a se  w e no lo n g er  h a v e  an  o b v io u s  in te r p r e ta tio n  fo r  MM and so  
our m otive for  r e g a r d in g  it  a s  in va lid  is  u n d er c u t. In d eed  if  we
in te r p r e t  "P^Q" a s  P  if  Q th e n  MM w ill be va lid . R ather it  seem s Haack 
is  s u g g e s t in g  th a t c o n s is te n c y  (and c o n v e r se ly , co n trad ic tion ) is  a  
p r o p e r ty  o f th e  sy s te m  it s e lf ,  o f th e  e n tire  s e t  of r u le s  n ot o f an y
in d iv id u a l ru le . C learly  co n tra d ic tio n  a r is e s  a s  a r e s u lt  o f w hat we fe e l
jo in t ly  com m itted to. T h ere is  h ow ever , a s  y e t, no m otivation  for  ta k in g  
it  to be a p r o p e r ty  o f th e  sy s te m  a s  a w hole. We cou ld  d is t in g u ish  
c e rta in  r u le s  as g iv in g  th e  m ean ing of th e  lo g ica l c o n sta n ts  and th en  
demand th a t o th er  r u le s  be fa ith fu l to  th at m eaning. In  th a t w ay we 
cou ld  re q u ire  c o n s is te n c y  v ia  th is  p r o c e ss  o f h arm onising  o f r u le s . So in  
th e  p r e se n t  c a se  we cou ld  dem and th a t MM as an elim ination  ru le  be 
fa ith fu l to th e  m eaning of a s  s e t  up  by CP (ie. con d ition a l proof;
from A,PtQ in fer  AlP^Q). We cou ld  th en  e a s ily  show  it to r e su lt  in a
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c o n tra d ic tio n  (take PhP th e n  CP g iv e s  1P>P and so  a lso  P&'PIP^P, th u s , 
by CP a ga in , h(P&'P)^(P^P) and , f in a lly , MM g iv e s  u s  tP& -P). T h ese  
q u e stio n s  h ow ever  d ep en d  for  th e ir  r e so lu tio n  on more g en e r a l notion s  
ab ou t m eaning w h ich  w e sh a ll r e tu r n  to below. No d ir ec t  a tta ck  is  
m ounted on  th e  s p e c if ic  c ir c u la r ity  o f th e  a ccou n t or, r a th er , th e  a tta c k  
on c ir c u la r ity  o n ly  s u c c e e d s  w h en  it  c o n sp ir e s  w ith  a rep u d ia tio n  of th e  
id ea  th a t we can  e s ta b lish  a m eaning for  a log ica l c o n sta n t by  
s t ip u la t in g  an  in tr o d u ctio n  or an  elim ination  ru le  and in s is t in g  on  
harm ony.
B efore c o n s id e r in g  th e  v a lid ity  o f th e  s u a s iv e /e x p ia n a to r y  d is tin c tio n  
I w ant to rem ark on  H aack’s  argu m en t on th e  lack  o f d iscrim ination  of 
c ircu lar  ju s t if ic a t io n s . F ir st , i f  th e  su a s iv e /e x p ia n a to r y  d is tin c tio n  is  
v ia b le  th en  we can n ot, in  on e s e n s e , land up ju s t ify in g  too m uch. We 
can n ot j u s t i fy  MM in  th is  w ay b eca u se  it  is  n e v e r  a can d id a te  to  be so  
ju s t if ie d . We can  o n ly  j u s t i fy  d e d u c tiv e  in fe r e n c e s  th a t w e, in  fa ct, 
a ccep t. T here may be a leg itim ate  q u e stio n  w h y  we d on ’t a c c ep t MM but 
th a t is  a d is t in c t  q u estio n . So co n c e iv e d  th en , th e  ju s t if ic a to r y  p r o jec t  
can j u s t i fy  a t m ost ou r p r e s e n t  p r a c tic e . It can n ot fo rce  u s  to adopt 
new  form s o f in fe r e n c e  but can  lead  u s  o n ly  to ren o u n ce  c e r ta in  form s  
o f in fe r e n c e . Q uite how th e  p r o jec t  g a in s th is  r e v is io n a r y  a u th o r ity  
d e sp ite  i t s  a c c ep ta n c e  o f c ir c u la r ity  is  a m atter we sh a ll r e tu r n  to 
below. The fa c t , th o u g h , th a t Dummett ta k es  th e  p r o jec t  to  h ave th is  
fo rce  sh ou ld  s e r v e  to  w arn u s th a t Haack’s o b je c tio n s  to th e  lack  of 
discrim in ation  o f th is  form  o f ju s tif ic a tio n  betok en  a n e g le c t  o f fu r th e r  
c o n str a in ts  th a t Dummett p la c es  on th e  a c c ep ta b ility  o f a ju stif ic a tio n . 
H aack’s  argu m en t th u s  o n ly  sh ow s th a t we need  to c o n s id er  Dummett’s 
p o sitio n  a s  a w hole. It th e n  becom es ap p aren t th at Haack h as not th u s  
far r ev ea led  an in c o h e r e n c y  in  th e  p osition , ra th er  sh e  o b je c ts  to the  
p osition  from  an  ex te r n a l p e r s p e c t iv e  sym p ath etic  to holism . I ’m not 
s u g g e s t in g  h ere  th a t th e  o b je c tio n  is  not w orth  fa c in g  but sim ply  tr y in g  
to p lace  th e  im pact o f th e  o b jec tio n .
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§7 The D istin ction  b etw een  S u a s iv e  and E xp lanatory J u stif ica tio n s:  
R etu rn in g  now to th e  s u a s iv e /e x p ia n a to r y  d istin c tio n : a su a s iv e
argu m en t s e e k s  to co n v in c e  so  it  m ust w ork from a ccep ted  p re m isses  to  
th e  d e s ir e d  c o n c lu sio n . The lo g ica l and ep istem ic  d ir ec tio n s  m ust 
co in cid e . In an ex p la n a to ry  argu m en t we se e k  to exp la in  som eth in g  we 
a lrea d y  a c c ep t so  th e  p r e m isses  th e m se lv e s  need  not e n jo y  th e  same 
d eg r e e  o f a c c e p ta b ility  in  a d v a n ce . In d eed , Dummett h o ld s th a t we may 
on ly  a c c ep t th e  p r e m isses  b eca u se  th e y  p ro v id e  an exp lan ation  of an  
a lrea d y  a c c ep te d  co n c lu sio n . So h ere  th e  ep istem olo g ica l d irec tio n  ru n s  
co u n ter  to th e  lo g ica l d irec tio n .
Haack o b je c ts  to th e  d is tin c tio n  in  th e  a c c ep ta b ility  o f an exp lan atory  
ra th er  than  a su a s iv e  ju s tif ic a tio n  b ecau se  it  is  draw n on th e  b asis  of 
w hat we b e liev e . T h us th e  asym m etry  in  u s in g , sa y , MPP to j u s t i fy  MPP 
ra th er  than  u s in g  MM to j u s t i fy  MM is  not th e  r e su lt  o f th e  form er  
b e in g  va lid  but o n ly  in  our b e lie f  th a t it  is  v a lid . But th e  in te r e s t  of 
th e  program m e is  in  d eterm in in g  w h eth er  our b e lie fs  are ju s t if ie d . That 
goal i t s e lf  m otiva tes th e  b asis  for  th e  d is tin c tio n .
In so fa r  a s  w e r eg a rd  an a c c ep te d  sta tem en t a s  in  need  o f and so  
capable o f ju s tif ic a tio n  we w ill r e g a rd  a s e t  o f p rem isses  a s  su p p o rted  
by th e  fa c t th a t th e y  p r o v id e  an exp lan ation  o f our a c cep ta n ce  of th at  
sta tem en t. Where th e  p r e m isses  p r o v id e  the o n ly  p o ss ib le  exp lanation  
th en  th a t su p p o rt w ill be as s tr o n g  a s  our comm itm ent to th e  o r ig in a l 
sta tem en t. (As lo n g  as we hold th a t all a s p e c ts  o f our p ra c tice  m ust 
y ield  to some form  o f exp lan ation .) Where we are faced  w ith  a ch o ice  in 
exp lan ation s th en  the m atter w ill be d ecid ed  by w hat in d ep en d en t  
r e a so n s  we h ave  for a c c e p tin g  each  s e t  o f p r e m isses . In th e  p r e se n t  
ca se  Dummett a r g u e s  th a t in d e p e n d e n t  co n s id er a tio n s  about th e  natu re  
of m eaning d eterm in e w h ich  exp la n a to ry  ju s tif ic a tio n  we m ay’ leg itim ate ly  
en d o r se . My p u r p o se  in  b r in g in g  th is  p o in t up here is  not to em bark on  
an a n a ly s is  o f the n a tu re  o f exp lanation  but sim ply to m otivate
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Dummett’s th o u g h t th a t in  n o n -s u a s iv e  ju s t if ic a t io n s  ep istem ic  and  
lo g ica l d ir ec tio n s  n eed  n ot co in c id e . Of c o u r se  th a t o b se r v a tio n  is  far  
from co n d o n in g  b latan t c ir c u la r ity  in  an  argum en t. We can  s e e , th o u g h , 
th a t e v e n  on  th is  sim ple p ic tu r e  o v e r t ly  c ircu la r  a rgu m en ts  (argu m en ts  
in  w h ich  th e  c o n c lu sio n  is  one o f th e  p r e m isses  o f th e  argum en t) w ill 
o n ly  be tre a te d  a s  d e g e n e r a te  arg u m en ts  in  th e  s e n s e  th a t th e y  w ill 
h ave  th e  form  of a cc ep ta b le  a rg u m en ts  but w ill n e v e r  be p r e fe r r e d  o v er  
a lte r n a tiv e  exp la n a tio n s. The r e a so n  fo r  th is  is  ju s t  th a t w h en  fa ced  
w ith a ch o ice  we s e e k  in d e p e n d e n t r e a so n  to a c c ep t th e  p r e m isses . Su ch  
in d e p e n d e n t re a so n  in  th e  c a se  o f a c ircu lar  argu m en t w ill c o n s t itu te  an  
a lte r n a tiv e  exp lan ation  o f th e  o r ig in a l co n c lu sio n  and , i f  p e r s u a s iv e  a s  a 
r ea so n  fo r  a c c e p tin g  th e  c ir c u la r  exp lan ation , w ill s im u ltan eou sly  
u n d er c u t th a t su p p o rt b y  p r o v id in g  a s tr o n g e r  exp lanation .
What d iffe r e n c e  d o es  th e  fa c t  make th at in  a  d e d u c tiv e  ju s tif ic a tio n  
of d ed u ctio n  th e  c ir c u la r ity  is  n ot b latant? What d o es som eone learn  
from a ju s tif ic a tio n  o f, sa y , MPP th a t u s e s  ra th er  th an  a ssu m es MPP? 
C onsider th e  fo llow in g  argu m en ts:
A%: S u p p o se  MPP is  n e c e s s a r i ly  tr u th  p r e s e r v in g . So MPP is
n e c e ss a r ily  tr u th  p r e s e r v in g .
A^: S u p p o se  th a t  P-^Q is  tru e  and th a t P  is  tru e . B y th e  tr u th -ta b le  
d efin itio n  o f if  P^Q is  tr u e  and P  is  tr u e  th e n  <5 is  tr u e . So (b y
MPP or i t s  m eta lin g u istic  e q u iv a le n t)  Q i s  tru e .
A% is  o b v io u s ly  a va lid  argu m en t th a t could  be a c c ep te d  e v e n  by  
som eone who e ith e r  r e je c ts  MPP or who fa ils  to u n d er sta n d  it. A^ on th e  
o th er  hand is  o n ly  a c c ep ta b le  i f  MPP is  i t s e lf  a ccep ta b le . The d iffe r en ce  
is  p r e c is e ly  an a lo g o u s to  th e  one betw een  know in g a p ro p o sitio n  to be 
tru e  and know in g w hat th e  p ro p o sitio n  e x p r e s s e s  w h ich  Dummett 
(Dummett 1975c, p. 107) draw s a tte n tio n  to. A]^  is  e n t ir e ly  u n in form ative  
b eca u se  to p r o g r e ss  from  k n ow in g  it  to be sou n d  to know in g w hat it  
e x p r e ss e s  one n e e d s  to  u n d er sta n d  th e  v e r y  ru le  b ein g  ju s t if ie d . One 
can n ot, th o u g h , e v e n  g e t  a s  far  a s  a c c e p tin g  A^ to be sou n d  u n le s s  one
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a lrea d y  a c c e p ts  MPP. R ecall th a t Dummett u s e s  the d is tin c tio n  to  show  
w h y th e  M -se n te n c es  o f a D avid son ian  tru th  th e o r y  are  u n in form ative . 
The D avidson ian  program m e is  th u s  fa ced  w ith  th e  d iff ic u lty  o f e ith e r  
h a v in g  to a c c ep t th a t i t s  axiom s make th e  r e su lt in g  th e o ry  m odest (i.e ., 
no acco u n t o f w hat it  is  to  know  w hat th e y  e x p r e ss  is  e s sa y e d )  or  
h o lis tic . I s  com patib le w ith  th e  aims of a fu ll-b lo o d ed  th e o r y  o f  
m eaning or d oes fu ll-b lo o d e d n e ss  re q u ire  th e  u se  o n ly  o f su a s iv e  
argu m en ts?
T h ere is  a s tr o n g  r ea so n  w h y  we sh ou ld  reg a rd  A^ a s  com patible  
w ith  th e  dem ands o f fu ll-b lo o d e d n e ss  and th a t i s  th a t a th e o r y  u s in g  A2 
w ill o n ly  be a c c ep te d  if  MPP it s e lf  i s  a ccep ted  so  th a t, a lth o u g h  A^ u s e s  
MPP, we can  a c c ep t it  a s  g iv in g  an exp lan ation  of MPP (on th e  p r o v iso  
th at th e  lo g ic  o f th e  m eta lan gu age in c lu d e s  MPP). A n a logou sly , p ro v id ed  
th e  m eta -la n g u a g e  in c lu d e s  th e  w ord "square" , w e can  g iv e  an a cco u n t  
of th e  co n cep t s q u a r e  by  u s in g  "square". But cou ld  th e  th e o r y  be u se d  
to  j u s t i fy  and , in  th is  s e n s e  exp la in , MPP? Dummett (1987), in  h is  r e p ly  
to John McDowell’s  (1987), r a is e s  a sim ilar problem  for  th e  c la s s ic a l  
log ic ian  in  h is  com m unication o f th e  law o f ex c lu d ed  m iddle (LEM) to a 
d ou b tin g  in tu it io n is t . D esp ite  th e  in tu it io n is t ’s a c c ep ta n c e  th a t th e  
lo g ica l c o n sta n ts  are s u b je c t  to  th e ir  u su a l tr u th -ta b le  d e fin it io n s  he  
c o n te s ts  th e  c la s s ic a l lo g ic ia n ’s  u s e  o f LEM by a sk in g  w ith  w hat r ig h t  
th e  c la s s ic is t  a ssu m es th a t th e  tw o lin e s  o f th e  tr u th -ta b le  e x h a u st  all 
th e  p o s s ib il it ie s  or , b e tte r , th a t one or o th er  line m ust re la te  
d eterm in ate ly  to  th e  a c tu a l s ta te  o f a ffa ir s . That assu m p tion , th e  
assu m p tion  th a t on e or o th er  com bination  of tru th  v a lu e s  d eterm in ate ly  
o b ta in s, is  e q u iv a le n t  to a ssu m in g  LEM so  c a n ’t  be u sed  in  
ju stify in g /c o m m u n ic a tin g  th e  la tte r  to  th e  in tu it io n is t . Of c o u r se  th e r e  is  
no co n tra d ic tio n  h ere  w ith  Dummett’s  d e fen ce  o f a d e d u c tiv e  ju stif ic a tio n  
of d ed u ctio n  s in ce  th e  p o sitio n  ju s t  o u tlin ed  w as one th a t ca lled  for a  
su a s iv e  argum en t. The q u e s t io n  is  w h eth er  Dummett’s in te r e s ts  in  th e  
th e o ry  o f m eaning are  o n ly  to be se r v e d  by su a s iv e  argu m en ts . I w ant
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fu ll-b lo o d e d n e ss .
Later in  th e  sam e p ap er  Dummett s a y s ,
...a  sem antic th e o r y  th a t is  maximally s ta b le  u n d er  c h a n g e s  o f th e  
u n d e r ly in g  lo g ic  o f th e  m eta lan gu age im parts an u n d e r s ta n d in g  of 
th e  log ica l c o n s ta n ts , a s  u se d  in  th e  g iv e n  lo g ic , to  w h oever  a c c e p ts  
th o se  law s u n d er  w h ose  rep lacem en t it is  n ot s ta b le . (1987, p .267)
The v ir tu e  o f th is  p o s itio n  Dummett claim s is  th a t we g e t  a s  fu ll an  
exp lan ation  of th e  lo g ica l c o n s ta n ts  as is  p o ss ib le . T his sta tem en t, 
h ow ever, w an ts a g lo s s . The so r t  o f ju s tif ic a tio n  ju s t  o ffe r e d  of LEM by  
th e  c la s s ic is t  is  m axim ally u n sta b le  s in ce  it su c c e e d s  in  ju s t ify in g  ju s t  
th o se  law s w h ich  are  a ccep ted  in  th e  m eta lan gu age. H ence the  
in tu it io n is t ’s  ob jection : i f  he in s is t s  th a t th e  sem antic th e o r y  be g iv e n  
o n ly  in  a m eta lan gu age u s in g  in tu it io n is t ic  lo g ic  th en  he u n d e r c u ts  th e  
c la s s ic is t ’s  ju s tif ic a tio n  of LEM. In  c o n tr a s t  an in tu it io n is t ic  sem an tics  
u se d  in  a m eta lan gu age o b e y in g  c la s s ic a l log ic  w ill su c c ee d  in  exp la in in g  
to  th e  c la s s ic is t  th e  in tu it io n is t ic  dem on stration  of th e  in v a lid ity  o f LEM 
in  th e  o b je c t  la n g u a g e . A p r e r e q u is ite  to r e so lv in g  a d isp u te  betw een  
p a r tie s  d isa g r e e in g  ab ou t th e  v a lid ity  o f ce r ta in  lo g ica l law s is  th a t  
m utual u n d e r s ta n d in g  is  rea ch ed . B ut, in  v ir tu e  o f th e  fa c t  th a t th e  
d isp u te  is  ab ou t th e  v a lid ity  o f cer ta in  r u le s  o f in fe r e n c e , m utual 
com p reh en sion  is  d iff ic u lt  to a c h ie v e  b ecau se  in  exp la in in g  th e  m eaning  
he a tta c h e s  to th e  lo g ic a l c o n s ta n ts  each  lo g ic ia n  w ill be u s in g  r u le s  the  
o th er  fa ils  to  a c c ep t. We can  o n ly  a c h iev e  m utual u n d er sta n d in g  if  a 
sem an tics is  g iv e n  w h ich  is  a p p ro p r ia te ly  in s e n s it iv e  to c h a n g e s  in  th e  
u n d er ly in g  lo g ic  o f th e  m eta lan gu age so  th at both lo g ic ia n s  can take  
th e ir  log ic  to be o p e r a tiv e  in  th e  m eta language. T his is  o n ly  a 
p r e r e q u is ite  to r e so lv in g  th e  d isp u te  b ecau se  th e  m atter is  not p u re ly  
tech n ica l but a lso  r e lie s  on p h ilo so p h ica l c o n s id er a tio n s, g e n era l id eas
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about m eaning, by w h ich  w e t e s t  th e  n o tio n s u sed  in  th e  sem an tics.
T his d e sc r ip tio n  s u g g e s t s  th e  fo llow in g  p ic tu re . S ta r tin g  from  a  
maximally u n sta b le  sem an tics w e can  p r o g r e s s iv e ly  show  th e  in v a lid ity  o f  
c e rta in  law s. T h us we em bark on  a re v is io n a r y  program m e of red u c in g  
th e  pow er o f th e  lo g ic . At each  s ta g e  th e  sem an tics g iv e n  is  more sta b le  
ju s t  b eca u se  it  is  s ta b le  r e la t iv e  to  su b st itu t io n  of th e  more p ow erfu l 
lo g ic s  in  th e  m eta lan gu age. In  th is  w ay we fin a lly  a c h iev e  a log ic  
ju s t if ie d  b y  a m aximally s ta b le  sem antic  th eo ry . But if  th is  is  th e  o n ly  
c o n str a in t  o p e r a tin g  on  th e  p r o je c t  w h y  don't we su c c ee d  in  a b o lish in g  
in fe r e n c e  by  a d o p tin g  an extrem e c o n s tr u c t iv is t  p osition  (one w h ich  o n ly  
adm its a n otion  o f tru th  in  w h ich  tru th  is  id e n tified  w ith  i t s  actu a l 
re co g n it io n  by d ir e c t  m eans so  th a t  we o n ly  a ccep t a s s e r t io n  o f lo g ica lly  
com plex s e n te n c e s  w h en  can on ica l c o n d itio n s  for  u se  o f th e  in tro d u ctio n  
r u le s  are s a tis f ie d )?  The th o u g h t h ere  is  th a t sta tem en ts  a s s e r te d  a s  a  
r e su lt  o f u s in g  an  elim ination  r u le  (e .g . a s se r t io n  o f th e  lo g ica lly  sim ple 
P  v ia  MPP on th e  a lre a d y  a s s e r t ib le  Q and Q^P ) are n ot a lw ays know n  
b y d ir ec t  or can on ica l m eans to  be tru e . T hus e ith e r  a n y  rem otely  
u se fu l in fe r e n c e  becom es in va lid  or we h a v e  to show  th a t d e sp ite  lack  of 
re co g n it io n  a can on ica l w arran t a lw ays e x is t s  w h en ev er  we h ave  an  
in fe r e n tia l w arrant. The problem  h ow ever  is  to dem on stra te  th a t th e  
la tte r  is  so , g iv e n  o n ly  th e  in fe r e n tia l tec h n iq u es  p rov id ed  by the  
extrem e c o n s tr u c t iv is t . S in ce  th e  in fe r e n tia l te c h n iq u e s  ava ilab le  on th is  
rad ica l c o n s tr u c t iv is t  p o s itio n  are  so  m eagre th is  am ounts to  h a v in g  to  
g iv e  a su a s iv e  ju s tif ic a tio n  o f d ed u ctio n , i .e ., ju s t ify in g  th e  in fe r e n tia l  
p ra c tice  by sh o w in g , w ith ou t u s e  o f in fe r e n tia l te c h n iq u e s , th a t th e  u se  
o f in fe r e n c e  p r e s e r v e s  a s s e r t ib il ity  w ith  r e sp e c t  to  can on ica l w arran ts .
Dummett u s e s  th e  c o n tr a s t  b etw een  an id e a lis t  or c o n s tr u c t iv is t  and a 
r e a lis t  th e o r y  o f m eaning in  fo c u s in g  on th e  ten sio n  in  tr y in g  to  
a cco u n t for both th e  leg itim a cy  and th e  u s e fu ln e s s  o f d ed u ction . The 
ten sio n  a r is e s  b eca u se  we w ant to  sa y  th at an in fe r e n c e  is  va lid  ju s t  
b ecau se  in  r e c o g n iz in g  th e  tru th  o f th e  p r em isses  we h ave , in  a s e n se ,
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accom plish ed  all we n eed  to  do to r e co g n iz e  th e  tru th  o f th e  co n c lu sio n , 
th at th a t s te p  o f a s s e n t  in v o lv e s  no fu r th e r  c o g n it iv e  ach ievem en t. 
A ltern a tiv e ly , th e  s ta te  o f in form ation  req u ired  to  re co g n iz e  th e  
p r e m isses  a s  tru e  s u f f ic e s  fo r  r e co g n it io n  th a t th e  co n c lu sio n  is  tru e . 
On th e  o th e r  hand in fe r e n c e  i s  u s e fu l  ju s t  b ecau se  it  is  in form ative , th e  
p ra c tice  o f in fe r e n c e  r e v e a ls  th a t c e r ta in  p r o p o sitio n s  h ith er to  
u n r e c o g n ize d  a s  tr u e  are , in  fa c t , so . Haack com plains th a t th is  is  o n ly  
a p seu d o -p ro b lem  a r is in g  from  an eq u iv o ca tio n  in  Dummett’s  u se  o f  
d e d u c tiv e  in fe r e n c e  to mean both d e d u c tiv e  im plication  (th e  log ica l 
re la tio n  th a t o b ta in s  b etw een  p r o p o s itio n s)  and d e d u c tiv e  in fe r e n c e  (th e  
actu a l in fe r e n c e s  draw n by  a s u b je c t ) . The co n n ectio n  b etw een  th e se  
tw o n o tio n s is  th a t  x  c o r r e c t ly  in fe r s  Q from P  i f f  P  d e d u c tiv e ly  im plies  
Q. (The "only if" p a r t o f th is  b icon d ition a l sh ou ld  be clear . The "if" 
p art is  d o u b tfu l s in c e  we do n ot w ant th e  q u estio n  o f w h eth er  P  
d e d u c tiv e ly  im plies Q to  d ep en d  on  w h eth er  an yon e  a c tu a lly  draw s th e  
in fe r e n c e  c o r r e c tly . We can , h o w ev er , in s is t  th a t th e  d e d u c tiv e  
im plication  h o ld s ju s t  w h en  th e r e  is  a p o ss ib ility , h ow ever c h a ra c ter ized , 
of draw ing  th e  in fe r e n c e . That p o s s ib il ity  can  th en  be se en  a s  r e la tin g  
to  a notion  o f a (p o ss ib le )  s u b je c t  in  a p p ro p r ia te ly  id ea l ep istem ic  
c o n d itio n s , w ith  id ea l c o g n it iv e  c a p a c it ie s  and th e  d e s ir e  to  draw th e  
in fe r e n c e  c o r r e c t ly . I n s is t in g  on th e  "if" p a rt o f th e  b icon d ition al is  
th en  a w ay o f q u e s t io n in g  how th is  notion  of p o ss ib il ity  sh ou ld  be 
ch a ra c ter ized  in  term s o f an id ea l s u b je c t .)  The reso lu tio n  o f th e  ten sio n  
ex p lo its  th e  d is t in c tio n  a s  fo llow s. P  d e d u c tiv e ly  im plies Q ju s t  w hen  if  
P  is  re co g n iz a b le  a s  tru e  so  i s  Q. Note th at th is  o n ly  s a y s  th at b ein g  in  
a p o sitio n  to  r e c o g n iz e  P  a s  tr u e  is  to be in  a p o sitio n  in  w h ich  Q is  
reco g n iza b le  (not r e co g n iz e d ) a s  tru e . So th e  p ra c tice  o f in fe r e n c e  is  
u se fu l b eca u se  it  sh o w s th e  c o g n it iv e ly  lim ited log ic ian  th at he is  in  fa c t  
in  a p o sitio n  to r e c o g n iz e  a g iv e n  p ro p o sitio n  a s  tru e. Haack in s is t s  th at  
in  ord er  to r e c r e a te  th e  te n s io n  we w ould h ave  to in corp ora te  e ith e r  a 
log ica l e lem en t in  th e  p sy c h o lo g ic a l a ccou n t (a w eak s tr a te g y )  or a
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p sy c h o lo g ic a l e lem en t in  th e  lo g ic a l accou n t.
For a  p ro p o sitio n  to be r e co g n iz a b le  (as op p osed  to reco g n ized ) a s  
tru e  is  for  u s  to  h a v e  an  e f fe c t iv e  m eans w h ich  allow s u s , at le a s t  in  
p rin c ip le , to  r e c o g n iz e  th a t th e  p ro p o sitio n  is  tru e . T his g iv e s  r is e  to  
th e  d is tin c tio n  b etw een  com ing to  re co g n iz e  a p rop osition  a s  tru e  by  
d irec t and b y  in d ir e c t  m eans s in c e  i f  we are capab le o f r e c o g n iz in g  th at  
we h ave  su c h  an e f fe c t iv e  p r o c e d u r e  th en  we are o b lig ed  to a s s e n t  to  
th e  p rop osition . I t  i s  ju s t  th is  d is tin c tio n  w h ich , Dummett a r g u e s , is  
n e c e ss a r y  to  re co n c ile  th e  te n s io n  and w hich  b eto k en s a c o n c e ss io n  to  
realism  s in ce  it  a llow s th a t th e  tr u th  o f a p ro p o sitio n  i s  not to  be 
id e n tif ie d  w ith  r e c o g n it io n  o f i t s  tr u th , a t lea s t , by d ir ec t  or can on ica l 
m eans. So it  is  a rg u a b le  th a t Haack on ly  su c c e e d s  in  d ism issin g  
Dummett’s  problem  by  a ssu m in g  h is  so lu tion . T his argu m en t, h ow ever, 
r e lied  on id e n tify in g  in d ir e c t  v e r if ic a t io n  w ith r e co g n iza b ility . But w hat 
if  n o tion s o f r e c o g n iz a b ility  can  be exp la ined  som ehow e ls e  or a ccep ted  
a n t i-r e a lis t ic a lly  a s  p r im itives?
Haack h o p es to  show  th a t no c o n c e ss io n  to realism  is  r eq u ired  in  
o rd er  to  a cco u n t for  th e  in fo r m a tiv e n e ss  of d e d u c tiv e  in fe r e n c e . Let u s  
re co n sid e r  th e  argu m en t. We h a v e  th e  e q u iv a len t sta tem en ts:
"P d e d u c tiv e ly  im plies Q" (1)
and "x c o r r e c tly  in fe r s  Q from  F '. (2)
Now (1) is  u n p ack ed  as:
"when P  is  r e co g n iz a b le  a s  tru e  so  is  Q" (3).
So, by (3), no fu r th e r  ep istem ic  p r o g r e ss  is  in v o lv ed  in  r e co g n iz in g  Q 
as tru e  on ce  P  h as been  so  reco g n iz e d  s in ce  o th erw ise  h a v in g  
r eco g n iz e d  th e  tr u th  o f P  we w ould n eed  some fu r th e r  a cq u a in tan ce  w ith  
the w orld in  o rd er  to  r e c o g n iz e  th e  tru th  o f Q. I f  th is  fu r th e r  m atter of 
acq u a in tan ce  w ere a n e c e s s a r y  fa c t  th en  we are in  d an ger  o f d ev e lo p in g  
a r e g r e s s  (in o rd er  to  know  th a t P  im plies Q we n eed  f ir s t  to  know  
w h eth er P  im plies R, sa y ) w h ils t  if  i t  w ere a c o n tin g e n t fa c t th en  we 
h ave th e  p o s s ib il ity  o f (3) b e in g  cou n terexem p lified . Haack in tr o d u ce s
108th e p o s s ib il ity  o f in fo r m a tiv e n e ss  o f in fe r e n c e  by n o tic in g  th a t th e  u se  
o f r e c o g n iz a b ility  in  (3) a llow s fa llib ility  on  th e  p art o f th e  s u b je c t  i.e . 
(3) is  c o n s is te n t  w ith:
"x r e c o g n iz e s  P  a s  tru e  but d o es  not r e co g n iz e  Q a s  true"  (4)
T his m akes s e n s e  o f  th e  "correctly"  in  (2), sh ow in g  th e  norm ative role  
o f log ica l p r o p o s itio n s . But now th e  log ica l form  o f (4) is  s l ig h t ly  
am biguous s in ce  w hat it  d o es  i s  p o in t to  a p o s s ib il ity  w h ich  is  
com patib le w ith  (3) and i t  i s  n ot c lear  how we sh ou ld  c h a r a c te r iz e  th is  
p o ss ib ility . I am n ot c e r ta in  w h at in te r p r e ta tio n  Haack fa v o u r s . She  
n o tes  th a t "UJf th e  p r e m isse s  o f a lo g ic a lly  v a lid  argu m en t are  
a s s e r t ib le , so  too is  th e  co n c lu sio n ; but human c o g n it iv e  lim itations are  
su c h  th a t w e may a s s e r t  th e  p r e m isse s  y e t  fa il to a s s e r t  th e  conclu sion"  
{1982, p .233). The s e n te n c e  is  o b sc u r e . If, in  th e  c ircu m sta n ces  
d e sc r ib e d , fa ilu re  to  a s s e r t  th e  co n c lu sio n  is  a c o g n it iv e  fa ilin g  th e n  th e  
in fo r m a tiv e n e ss  o f d ed u c tio n  is  a lre a d y  p r e su p p o se d , fo r  th a t p o sitio n  
w as ju s t  th e  one o f h o ld in g  th a t a  g en u in e  c o g n itiv e  a ch ievem en t w as  
in v o lv e d  in  a c k n o w led g in g  th e  a s s e r t ib il ity  o f th e  co n c lu sio n . Ig n o r in g , 
th e re fo r e , her  u s e  o f th e  a d je c t iv e , d o es  Haack in te n d  u s  to  read: 
"Human lim itations are  su c h  th a t  w e make m istak es so  we may a s s e r t  th e  
p r em isses  ..." (ca ll th is  in te r p r e ta t io n  (4’)) or "Human lim itations are  
su ch  th a t th e  fa c t s  o f th e  m atter are  not ap t for  human r e co g n it io n  so  
we may a s s e r t  th e  p r e m isse s  ..." (ca ll th is  in te r p r e ta tio n  (4"))? Haack 
g iv e s  no m otivation  fo r  th e  la tte r , s tr o n g e r  read in g .
(4 ) is  e n t ir e ly  u n c o n tr o v e r s ia l. It is  o b sc u r e  how su c h  a banal 
o b se r v a tio n  is  to en a b le  u s  to a cco u n t for th e  in fo r m a tiv en ess  o f  
d ed u ction . It is  banal b eca u se  a ll it  allow s is  th a t th e re  may be 
in s ta n c e s  o f fa llib ility  in  in fe r e n c e  so  th a t it  is ,  in  a s e n s e , in form ative  
to each  of u s  to  g e t  h is  in fe r e n c e s  r ig h t, to r e f le c t  c o r r e c tly  on  h is  
s ta te  o f in form ation . But th a t is  n ot th e  q u estio n  at is s u e , we w ant to  
know how in fe r e n c e  can  be u s e fu l to u s  (com m unally). The c o n tr a s t  is  
th at betw een  som eone who know s th a t P  and know s th a t Q and so
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r e c o g n iz e s  from  w ith in  th e  p r a c tic e  o f in fe r e n c e  th at he a lso  know s the  
p rop osition  P -an d -Q  (so , in  a s e n s e , lea rn s som eth in g ), and how th e  
p ra c tice  i t s e lf  can  be in form ative  or u se fu l, that is ,  w hat p u rp o se  
co n ju n ctio n  in tr o d u ctio n  h as in  th e  la n g u a g e .
The a c c e p ta b ility  o f (4") to  a c o n s tr u c t iv is t  i s ,  at b e st, c o n ten tio u s  so  
Haack’s claim th a t th e  a p p a ren t n eed  for  a c o n c e ss io n  to  realism  a r is e s  
ou t o f a m ere eq u iv o c a tio n  g r o s s ly  sim p lifies  th e  s itu a tio n  and , in  do ing  
so , lo se s  th e  p o in t a t is s u e . The c o n s tr u c t iv is t  in tr o d u c e s  h is  sem an tics  
a s a r e sp o n se  to  a r e a lis t  sem an tics w h ere  th a t sem an tics is  
o b jectio n a b le  b eca u se  o f i t s  u s e  o f a notion  o f tr u th  w h ich  d eterm in ate ly  
a p p lies  or fa ils  to  a p p ly  a lth o u g h  w e can  h ave  no g u a ra n tee  o f b ein g  
ab le to r e c o g n iz e  it  a s  o b ta in in g  w h en ev er  it  d oes so . (4”) com bined  
w ith  (3) a s c r ib e s  th e  se lf-sa m e  p r o p e r ty  to r e co g n iz a b ility  s in ce  it  s a y s  
th a t a p ro p o sitio n  may be d eterm in a te ly  (th is  from  (3)) reco g n iza b le  as  
tru e  a lth o u g h  it  is  n e v e r  so  r e co g n iz e d  and w h ere th e  fe a t  o f  
reco g n itio n  may be on e  th a t is  g u a r a n teed  to ev a d e  u s . So if  we a ccep t  
th is  as H aack’8 in te n d e d  in te r p r e ta t io n  of (4) th e n  it  is  e n t ir e ly  
u n su r p r is in g  th a t in  th is  w ay sh e  sh ow s th a t no c o n c e ss io n  to realism  is  
called  for  s in ce  th e  c o n c e ss io n  to realism  h as a lrea d y  been  made in  th e  
s e tt in g  up of th e  sem an tics . The sh ib b o le th  o f a r e a lis t  p o s itio n  ca n  be 
sta te d  in  term s o f w hat is  ta k en  to  c o n s titu te  a p o ss ib le  w orld in  w h ich  
a g iv en  p ro p o sitio n  is  r e co g n iz e d  a s  tr u e , th e  r e a lis t  m aintain ing th a t a 
w orld is  s t i l l  p o ss ib le  e v e n  if  it  in c lu d es  b e in g s  w ith  in fin ita r y  
id ea lisa tio n s  o f our r e co g n it io n a l ca p a c it ie s . H ere, th e r e  is  no need  to  
ex cava te  th e  in tr ic a c ie s  of th a t d eb a te  (th at I sh a ll a ttem pt la ter  in  th e  
ch a p ter  on  s tr ic t  fin itism ); it  is  en o u g h  to o b se r v e  th a t Haack in  fa ilin g  
to d is t in g u ish  (4 ) and (4") and so  n o tic in g  no ob liga tion  to a r g u e  for  
(4") h as c o v e re d  o v e r  an im portant is s u e  w h ich  Dummett’s d isc u ss io n  
n ice ly  h ig h lig h ts .
We can  r e tu r n  now to H aack’s s u g g e s t io n  th at to se e  a ten sio n  in  th e  
p o ss ib ility  o f d ed u ctio n  on e n e e d s  to in corp ora te  a p sy c h o lo g ica l
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com ponent in  th e  lo g ica l a cco u n t. Her r e n d itio n  o f how su c h  an argu m en t  
m ight go  is  a s fo llow s. Take lo g ica l n e c e s s ity  to be tru th  in  v ir tu e  of 
m eaning and m eaning to be g iv e n  in  term s of w a rra n ts  for  a s se r t io n  or  
co n d itio n s  for  re co g n it io n  o f tr u th . Then: "For a p ro p o sitio n  to be
lo g ic a lly  n e c e s s a r y  ju s t  is  fo r  it  to  be a s s e r t ib le , or r e co g n iza b le  a s  
tr u e , come w hat m ay. So if  a n y o n e  r e c o g n iz e s  th e  tru th  o f th e  p r em isses  
o f an  argu m en t b u t d oes n ot r e c o g n iz e  th e  tr u th  o f th e  c o n c lu sio n , th e n  
th e  c o n n ec tio n  b etw een  th e  tr u th  o f th e  p r em isses  and th e  co n c lu sio n  
can n ot be n e c e ssa r y "  (1982, p .228). The argu m en t c le a r ly  ta k e s  th e  
c o n s tr u c t iv is t  to  be d e n y in g  fa llib ility . But it  is  a m istake to tak e  th e  
c o n s tr u c t iv is t  to  be a b o lish in g  th e  d is tin c tio n  b etw een  in fe r r in g  and  
in fe r r in g  c o r r e c tly . The c o n s tr u c t iv is t  sim ply in s is t s  th a t we g iv e  
co n ten t to  th e  la tte r  o n ly  b y  ap p ea l to  a ctu a l c a p a c it ie s  to u s e  th e  
la n g u a g e . That p o sitio n  e n a b le s  th e  c o n s tr u c t iv is t  to make som e lin k  
b etw een  d e d u c tiv e  im plication  and ou r p r a c tice  o f in fe r r in g ; e n o u g h  o f a 
link  to outlaw  a p o sitio n  su ch  a s  th a t d e sc r ib e d  in  (4"), at le a s t  u n d er  
c e rta in  in te r p r e ta t io n s  o f it. It i s  ten d e n tio u s  to d e sc r ib e  th is  p o sitio n  
a s  on e o f b u ild in g  a p sy c h o lo g ic a l com ponent in to  th e  lo g ica l a cco u n t for  
th a t is  to a sc r ib e  to  th e  p r o je c t  a sp u r io u s  p sy ch o lo g ism . The p r o je c t  is  
to  avo id  p sy ch o lo g ism  w h ils t  in s is t in g  th a t in  th e  a cco u n t o f d e d u c tiv e  
im plication  we p ay  due h eed  to g e n e r a l c o n s id er a tio n s  about m eaning, 
and th a t m eans th e  a cco u n t is  c o n stra in ed  by r e fe r e n c e  to human  
reco g n itio n a l c a p a c it ie s .
Haack c o n s is te n t ly  fra g m e n ts  Dummett’s p r o je c t , a tta c k in g  each  
elem en t in  iso la tio n  w ith ou t c o n s id e r in g  th e  w ay o th e r  e lem en ts s e t  up  
c o n s tr a in ts  on so lu tio n s  o f a p a rticu la r  a sp e c t. T hus for  Duramett 
c ircu la r  ju s t if ic a t io n s  are c o n str a in e d  by th e  form o f th e  th e o r y  of 
m eaning and d e d u c tiv e  im plication  is  co n n ec ted  to in fe r e n c e  v ia  th e  
th e o ry  of m eaning. In v iew  o f th e  c e n tr a l ro le  th a t th e  th e o ry  o f  
m eaning has in Dummett’s p h ilo so p h y  it seem s u n fa ir  to com plain th at  
H aack’8 d isa g reem en t w ith  Dummett is  ju s t  a d iffe r e n c e  ab ou t the n atu re
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o f m eaning and th e  ro le  o f th e  th e o r y  o f m eaning in  p h ilo so p h y . But 
Haack’s a rgu m en ts  w ere  su p p o se d  to co u n ter  Dummett’s  v ie w s  on  th e  
m atter and to su p p o rt her  ow n. Far from  d oin g  th a t, h er  arg u m en ts  are  
p rem issed  on th e  a c c e p ta b ility  o f her  own p o sitio n , th e y  r e c e iv e  no 
in d e p e n d e n t m otivation  and , sym m etrica lly , sh e  m otivates no d ep a rtu re  
from  Dummett’s p o sitio n .
The v a lid ity  o f H aack’s c r it ic ism s w as o n ly  an u lter io r  m otive in  th is  
d isc u ss io n . The main in te r e s t  w as in  r e f le c t in g  on w h y  we are not 
d r iv en  in to  th e  extrem e c o n s tr u c t iv s t  p o sitio n  in  ou r se a rc h  fo r  a 
maximally s ta b le  lo g ic . In  su p p o rt o f Dummett w e fou n d  th a t th e r e  w as a 
c o u n te r -w e ig h t  to  th is  program m e in  th e  n eed  to g iv e  an  a cco u n t o f th e  
u s e fu ln e s s  o f d ed u ctio n . (T his co n s id er a tio n  w ill p lay  an  im portant ro le  
in  my d isc u ss io n  o f s tr ic t  fin itism .) T his d oes in d eed  r e ly  on  a 
lib era liza tio n  o f th e  notion  o f tr u th  beyond  th a t w h ich  t ie s  tru th  to 
r e co g n iz e d  tru th . But we sh a ll s e e  th a t tru th  a s  so  c o n c e iv e d  is  not 
a n t i-r e a lis t ic a lly  o b jectio n a b le .
§8 What d oes Dummett tak e to  be th e  r e v is io n a r y  im plication s o f th e se  
r e flec tio n s?
C lassica l log ic  can  o n ly  be ju s t if ie d  b y  ap p ea l to  a notion  o f tr u th  w hich  
d eterm in ate ly  a p p lie s  or fa ils  to  a p p ly  in d e p e n d e n tly  o f our a b ilit ie s  to 
determ ine th e  m atter. S in ce  su c h  a co n c e p t is  r e p u g n a n t to ou r v iew  of  
th e  n a tu re  o f m eaning we ca n n o t j u s t i fy  c la s s ic a lly  a ccep ted  in fe r e n tia l  
p ra c tice . That p r a c tic e , th e r e fo r e , s ta n d s  in  need  o f r e v is io n .
We h ave  had a c o n v in c in g  argu m en t for  th e  secon d  prem ise . What o f  
th e  f ir s t?  The q u e stio n  is  la rg e . Dummett’s v iew  on th e  m atter is  th a t  
local ju s tif ic a tio n  o f c la s s ic a l in fe r e n tia l p r a c tice  is  p o ss ib le  s in c e  m any 
local a n ti-r e a lism s h a v e  ju s t  th is  form . An exam ple o f th is  (se e  Dummett 
1981, p .437) is  n eu tra lism  ab ou t th e  fu tu r e , th a t is , th e  b elief th at th e  
fu tu r e  c o n s is t s  o f a s e t  o f d e fin ite  fu tu r e  c o u r se s  o f e v e n ts . A 
sta tem en t is  tru e  if  tru e  in  e v e r y  su ch  c o u rse  and fa lse  if it  is  not.
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T h u s, on one in te r p r e ta t io n , e v e r y  sta tem en t is  e ith e r  tru e  or fa lse  and  
c la ss ic a l lo g ic  a p p lie s . Yet th e  p o sitio n  is  n ot r e a lis t  s in c e  th e  sem an tics  
is  not a c la s s ic a l tw o -v a lu e d  sem a n tics , th e  notion  o f tr u th  is  g iv e n  a 
r e d u c tiv e  a cco u n t in  term s of t r u e - in -a - f u tu r e - c o u r s e - o f - e v e n t s ,  w e do 
not su p p o se  th a t th e r e  is  a fu tu r e  w h ich  d eterm in ate ly  m akes our  
sta tem en ts  tru e  or fa lse .
The m ost o b v io u s  ta c tic  fo r  ju s t i fy in g  c la ss ic a l lo g ic  is  v ia  th e  n otion  
of a sse r t io n . H ow ever Dummett sh ow s th at u s in g  th e  p r in c ip le  th a t  
a s s e r t io n s  c a n n o t be n e ith e r  c o r r e c t  nor in c o r r e c t  o n ly  r e in s ta te s  th e  
p rin c ip le  th a t a s s e r t io n s  c a n n o t be n e ith e r  tru e  nor fa lse  (i.e ., tertium  
non d atur) and it  ta k e s  c la s s ic a l lo g ic  to  c o n v e r t  th is  to  th e  p r in c ip le  o f  
b iva len ce . (B r ie fly  th e  argu m en t ta k e s  som eth in g  like th is  form . C onsider  
th e  fo llow in g  argu m en t fo r  B iv a len ce . In tu ition ism  claim s th a t we do 
h ave , and so  tr ie s  to  g iv e  an  acco u n t o f, an  u n d er sta n d in g  of  
u n d ec id ab le  p r e d ic a te s . Now tr u th  th a t tr a n sc e n d s  v e r if ic a tio n  is  ju s t  
su ch  à p re d ica te  and p resu m a b ly  th e  in tu it io n is t  w ill g iv e  an acco u n t o f  
th is  u n d e r s ta n d in g  a s  he w ill fo r  o th er  u n d ec id a b le  p r e d ic a te s . If he  
d oes th is  th e n  w e m ust know  o f  a n y  se n te n c e  w hat it  is  for it  to be 
tru e . So w e can  id e n t ify  th e  m ean ing o f each  se n te n c e  w ith  i t s  tru th  
co n d itio n s . I f  w e know  w hat a s e n te n c e ’s  tru th  co n d itio n s  are  th en  we 
may n ot be ab le  to te ll  w h eth e r  or n ot in  an y  p articu lar  c a se  th e y  are  
fu lf illed  but we can  a ck n o w led g e  o n ly  two p o ss ib ilit ie s , s in c e  o th erw ise  
we th r ea te n  th e  id ea  th a t we g r a sp  th e  tru th  co n d itio n s. T his la st  s te p  
fo llow s b y  th e  in tu it io n is t ’s  ow n req u irem en ts  for  th e  in tu it io n is t  h o ld s  
th a t if  we h a v e  an  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f a co n cep t th en  i f  we are n ot ab le , 
in  p r in c ip le , to d eterm in e th a t i t  is  ap p licab le  it  is  not ap p licab le . To be 
more p r e c is e , th e  in tu it io n is t ic  a c c o u n t o f n eg a tio n  m akes th e  n eg a tio n  
o f a s e n te n c e  a s s e r t ib le  ju s t  w h en  we could  draw  a co n tra d ic tio n  from  
th e  a s s e r t ib il ity  o f th e  s e n te n c e  i t s e lf .  T hus if  we can show  th a t, in  a 
su ita b le  s e n s e , a s e n te n c e  is , in  p r in c ip le , n ot a s s e r t ib le  we h ave  a 
co n tra d ic tio n  w ith  th e  su p p o se d  a s s e r t ib il ity  o f th e  se n te n c e . So th e
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n ega tion  of th e  s e n te n c e  becom es a s s e r t ib le . Note, th a t th e  "in princip le"  
q u a lifica tion  is  im portant s in ce  w ith ou t it  we can n ot su p p o se  th a t th e  
su p p o sed  a s s e r t ib il ity  o f  th e  s e n te n c e  d ev e lo p s  a c o n tra d ic tio n  a s  
op p osed  to an im p la u sib ility  or p h y s ic a l im p o ssib ility . So if  it  h a p p en s  
th a t a se n te n c e  is  u n d ec id a b le  w e can n ot sa y  both th at we can n ot  
determ in e w h eth er  i t s  tr u th  c o n d itio n s  hold and th a t th e y  may hold . So 
e ith e r  we h ave  a  m eans o f d eterm in in g  th e  tru th  v a lu e  or th e  s e n te n c e ’s  
tru th  c o n d itio n s  fa il. Both p o s it io n s  allow  u s  to a s s e r t  b iva len ce . The 
la s t  s te p  o f th is  h ow ever  r e lie s  on  th e  in feren ce: Q). T h is is
in tu it io n is t ic a lly  in v a lid  so  we n eed  a r e a lis tic  assu m p tion  to com plete  
th e  argu m en t.) For th e  p r e s e n t  I w an t to  note th a t Dummett’s  v iew s  do 
h ave  re  v is io n a r y  im plication s in  a t le a s t  th is  s e n se . A ccep tin g  Dummett’s 
m ethodologica l s ta n ce  lea d s  in ex o ra b ly  to rep u d ia tin g  an orth od ox  
(rea list)  sem an tics  g iv e n  by  tr u th -c o n d it io n s . So it  dem ands th e  
c o n str u c tio n  o f an  a lte r n a tiv e  sem a n tics . W hether an a n t i-r e a lis t ic a lly  
a ccep ta b le  sem an tics is  p o ss ib le  and  w hat r e v is io n  it  w ould e n ta il are  
q u e stio n s  I sh a ll exam ine in  re la tio n  to m athem atics.
What form  m ight su c h  a sem a n tics  take? The c e n tr a l problem  for  
r e a lis t  tru th  is  th a t it  i s  u n c o n str a in e d  by our reco g n itio n a l ca p a c it ie s . 
The gap b etw een  tr u th  and our r e co g n it io n  o f tr u th  is  f illed  o n ly , if  a t  
all, by th e  notion  th a t an a s s e r t io n  is  tr u e  if  i t  could  be o b se r v e d  to  be 
so  by som e id ea l b ein g  w ith  (p erh a p s) in fin ita r y  reco g n itio n a l ca p a c it ie s . 
The co n c lu sio n  o f th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  argu m en ts is  th a t th in k in g  th a t we 
h ave  th is  n otion  is  a ra d ica l m iscon cep tion  of how we im bue la n g u a g e  
w ith  m eaning. T h u s tr u th  m ust be lin k ed  to our c a p a c itie s  to re co g n iz e , 
in  p r in c ip le , w h eth er  it  o b ta in s  or not.
The p ic tu r e  e n c o u ra g ed  b y  th is  d e sc r ip tio n  is  th a t we id e n tify  tru th  
w ith th e  notion  tak en  a s  c e n tr a l in  th e  sem antic th e o ry  w hich g iv e s  an  
a ccou n t o f th e  c o n ten t o f a s s e r t io n s . (And so , in  some a tten u a ted  se n se ,  
g iv e  a tru th  con d ition a l a cco u n t o f m eaning.) I tak e it  th at th is  is  not 
th e  program m e. We g iv e  th e  m eaning o f a se n te n c e  by sp e c ify in g
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co n d itio n s  w h ich  we can  r e c o g n iz e  e ith e r  a s  o b ta in in g  or not o b ta in in g  
and w h ich  w arran t th e  a s s e r t io n  o f th e  se n te n c e . The co n d itio n s , s in ce  
th e y  w arran t th e  a s s e r t io n  o f th e  se n te n c e , w arrant th e  a s se r t io n  th a t it  
is  tru e . We ca n n o t, h o w ev er , ta k e  tru th  to be e q u iv a le n t to th e se  
co n d itio n s  th e m se lv e s . The r e a so n  fo r  th is  is  th a t tru th  is  an atem poral 
c o n cep t in  th e  s e n s e  th a t  r e v is in g  a tr u th -v a lu e  n e c e s s a r ily  im p u gn s a 
p r e v io u s  ju d gm en t. A nother r e a so n  is  th at tru th  and a s s e r t ib il ity  
co n d itio n s  o f a s e n te n c e  may n eed  to  be d is t in g u ish e d  w h en  c o n s id e r in g  
th e  s e n te n c e  a s  a c o n s t itu e n t  o f m ore com plex se n te n c e s , (See ch a p ter  4 
for  my argu m en t th a t an a c c o u n t o f d is ju n c t iv e  sta tem en ts  sh ow s tru th  
need  not co in c id e  w ith  w a rra n ted  a s s e r t ib il ity .)  H ow ever s in ce  
id e n tify in g  a s s e r t io n  c o n d itio n s  w ith  tru th  co n d itio n s  w ould en ta il th a t  
tr u th  w as a lw ays be a  d é c id a ble p r o p e r ty  we m ust a c c ep t a d is tin c tio n  
b etw een  ou r c o n c e p t o f w a rran ted  a s se r t io n  and tru th . We ack n ow led ge  
th is  by r e c o g n iz in g  th a t an  a s s e r t io n  may be w arran ted  y e t  fa lse  and  
n ot w arran ted  y e t  tr u e . So we may r e v is e  our op in ion  about th e  tru th  
v a lu e  o f a sta tem en t w ith o u t r e v is in g  th e  q u e stio n  of w h eth er  or n ot we 
p o s s e s s e d  a w arran t. W arranted a s s e r t ib il ity  is  a n otion  w hich  
r e c o g n iz e s  th e  p a r ticu la r  ep istem ic  p o stio n  o f a sp ea k er . T ruth , h ow ever , 
ev e n  if  ep istem ica ily  c o n str a in e d  r e la te s  to su ita b ly  id ea l ep istem ic  
co n d itio n s. Our th e o r y  o f m ean ing a lw ays g iv e s  a r e d u c tiv e  acco u n t of 
tr u th  e ith e r  by  c h a r a c te r iz in g  m eaning in  term s o f v e r if ic a tio n  a n d /o r  
fa ls if ic a tio n  c o n d itio n s , or c o n d itio n s  o f ju s tif ic a tio n  or c r iter ia l w arran ts  
and th en  a llow ing an a c co u n t o f tr u th  by u tilis in g  th e  e q u iv a le n c e  
p rin c ip le . In o th er  w o rd s, on e c h a r a c te r iz e s  th e  notion  o f tru th  th ro u g h  
our p ra c tice  o f a s s e r t io n . Or on e  may g iv e  d ir e c t ly  a r e d u c tiv e  a cco u n t  
of tru th  and th e n  c h a r a c te r iz e  m eaning in th e  s ty le  o f D avidson  by  
assu m in g  a notion  o f tr u th  in  a T arsk ian  tru th  d efin ition  to d e liv er  an  
accou n t o f m eaning. But th is  seco n d  s tr a te g y , it  sh ou ld  be n oted , will 
not g iv e  a g lob al a cco u n t o f m eaning s in ce  we a lw ays req u ire  a base  
c la s s  o f s e n te n c e s  in  term s o f w h ich  th e  r e d u c tiv e  a ccou n t of tr u th  is
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to be g iv e n . T h is r e fle c t io n  m ight seem  to h ave  litt le  b ear in g  on th e  
m athem atical c a se  w h ere  c o n d itio n s  o f a s se r t io n  are an yw ay in d e fea ib le  
in  th a t r e v is io n  o f a  tr u th  v a lu e  a ss ig n m en t is  im p ossib le  w ith ou t  
im p u gn in g  th e  p r e v io u s  claim th a t co n d itio n s  w arran tin g  an a s se r t io n  
ob ta in ed . The d ia lec tica l p o s itio n  sh ou ld  h ow ever be made c lear  and may 
be im portant in  th e  w ay w e a cco u n t for  th e  in tro d u ctio n  o f inform al 
p ro o fs  and new  p roof p r o c e d u r e s . An in tu it io n is t ic  sem an tics u su a lly  
c h a r a c te r iz e s  m eaning in  term s o f some (r e c u r s iv e ly  ch a ra c ter ized )  
notion  o f can on ica l p roof. We w ill (alm ost c e r ta in ly ) n ot w ant to id e n tify  
tru th  in  m athem atics w ith  p o s s e s s io n  of a can on ica l p roof but w ill g iv e  a 
r e d u c tiv e  a c c o u n t o f  tr u th  in  term s o f canon ica l p ro o fs. T his w ould allow  
th e  p o s s ib il ity  o f u s  b road en in g  ou r  co n cep t o f p ro o f to  in c lu d e  inform al 
p ro o fs  and to a c c o u n t for  inform al p ro o fs  a s  b e in g  n e c e s s a r ily  tr u th  
p r e s e r v in g . A lso if  th e  notion  o f can on ica l p roof is  firm ly  c ircu m scrib ed  
(b y , sa y , b e in g  tied  to  a g iv e n  form alisation ) it  w ould become d iff icu lt  to  
exp la in  th e  d eve lop m en t o f new  p ro o f p r o c e d u r e s  w h ich  tra n sc e n d  th is  
form alisation  u n le s s  th e  notion  of tru th  tra n sc e n d e d  (ev en  if  exp la ined  
in  term s of) th e  e x is te n c e  o f can on ica l p ro o fs. (But s e e  below -c h a p te r  
6 -  for my d is c u ss io n  o f th is  is s u e .)
Dummett ta k e s  th e  n o tion  o f c o n d itio n s  (or a s u b s e t  o f co n d itio n s)  
w arran tin g  a s s e r t io n  a s  c e n tr a l in  th e  c o n str u c t io n  of a th e o r y  o f  
m eaning for  th e  la n g u a g e . T h ere are  good r e a so n s  for  doing  so. One 
rea so n  is  th a t th is  seem s to p r e s e r v e  im portant in s ig h ts  o f th e  
tru th -c o n d itio n a l a cco u n t. That so r t  o f sem an tics w as a p p ea lin g  b ecau se  
th e  notion  o f tr u th  r e la te s  p r e c is e ly  to th e  c o r r e c tn e s s  and  
in c o r r e c tn e s s  o f an  a s se r t io n . An a sse r t io n  is  c o r r e c t  ju s t  w hen it  is  
tru e. So, ta k in g  tr u th  a s  a sem antic  prim itive, w e can sp e ll ou t both th e  
co n ten t and th e  aim o f an  a s s e r t io n  by r e fe r e n c e  to tr u th -c o n d itio n s . We 
h ave fo rsw o rn  u se  o f r e a lis t  tr u th  as a sem antic p rim itive but s t il l  take  
th e  p ra c tice  o f m aking a s s e r t io n s  a s  fundam ental, g iv in g  the co n ten t o f  
a s s e r t io n s  in  term s o f (d e fea s ib le ) w arran ts  for a sse r tio n . T h ese  in tu rn
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g iv e  an a cco u n t o f our u se  o f th e  tr u th  p re d ica te  in  th e  la n g u a g e . The 
p oin t o f th is  is  th a t, as w ell as u t ilis in g  a s se r t io n  for  i t s  rô le  a s  a 
fundam ental l in g u is t ic  a c t, we d ev e lo p  an  acco u n t o f our co n c e p t o f  
tru th  for  th e  d isc o u r se  and th e  m etap h ysica l is s u e  o f realism  r e la te s  
p r e c is e ly  to  th is  n otion  o f tru th .
A m athem atical a s s e r t io n  is  made in  e ith e r  o f tw o c a s e s , th e  
p o s s e ss io n  of a p roo f for  it  or o f an e f fe c t iv e  m eans g u a r a n te e in g  
c o n str u c tio n  o f a proof. T h us in  th is  ca se  a s s e r t ib il ity  c o n d itio n s  re la te  
d ir e c t ly  to  ou r a b ility  to  p r o v e  th e  s e n te n c e . We u n d er sta n d  th e  
se n te n c e  w h en  w e can  r e co g n iz e  a  p roo f o f it. So we tak e a notion  o f  
p ro v a b ility  as c e n tr a l in  g iv in g  th e  m eaning o f m athem atical s e n te n c e s .
How do we c h a r a c te r iz e  th e  m ean in gs o f th e  lo g ica l c o n s ta n ts  for  
m athem atics? A n a tu ra l f ir s t  th o u g h t is  th a t th e  m ean ings o f th e  lo g ica l  
co n sta n ts  are g iv e n  in  th e  r u le s  o f in fe r e n c e . G iven a s e t  o f  
(w e ll-u n d ersto o d ) lo g ic a lly  sim ple s e n te n c e s  an u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f th e  
c o n n e c tiv e s  seem s to be e x h a u sted  by an a b ility  to  r e c o g n iz e  and  
perform  p a tte r n s  o f in fe r e n c e  sa n c tio n e d  by th e  canon  o f r u le s  and to  
know th a t th e se  p a tte r n s  w arran t th e  a s se r t io n  o f th e  co n c lu d in g  
se n te n c e  (w h eth er  th is  is  sim ple or com plex). The th o u g h t h ere  is  th a t  
th e  r u le s  o f c la s s ic a l  log ic  are  c o n s t itu t iv e  o f th e  m ean in gs o f th e  
lo g ica l c o n n e c t iv e s  th e m se lv e s  so  th a t p ro v id ed  th e y  do n ot lead  u s  in to  
co n tra d ic tio n , i .e . ,  p ro v id ed  th e y  g iv e  r is e  to  a c o n s is te n t  p r a c tic e , we  
sh ou ld  a c c ep t th a t th e  m ean in gs o f th e  c o n sta n ts  are im p licitly  g iv e n  in  
th e  p r a c tice  i t s e lf .  We sim ply  n eed  to  be ab le  to  determ ine w hat co u n ts  
a s  a d h e ren ce  to  and w hat c o u n ts  a s  c o n tra v en tio n  of th e  r u le s  o f  
in fe r e n c e  and w hat rô le  th e  p r a c tic e  o f in fe r e n c e  h as in  p r o v id in g  
w arran ts fo r  a s se r t io n . D escr ib ed  in  th is  w ay th e  canon  o f r u le s  m ust 
be a d eq u ate  so le ly  on th e  p r o v iso  th a t it  can  be m astered  and th a t it  
d o es not lead  to  a b su r d ity . C lassica l log ic  w ould th en  r e c e iv e  a rap id  
re in sta tem en t.
To a c c ep t th e  e x is te n c e  (or p o ss ib ility )  o f a p ra c tice  is  h ow ever  not
117
to con d on e it . The p r a c tic e  m ust be se e n  to  have som e p o in t. Our 
ju stif ic a tio n  sh ou ld  exp la in  th e  p u r p o se  o f th e  p ra c tice . A ny in fe r e n tia l  
p ra c tice  a llow s u s  to  p a s s  from  one s e t  of sta tem en ts  to o th e r s  in
accord  w ith  c e r ta in  r u le s . That p u r e ly  sy n ta c t ic  d e sc r ip tio n  le a v e s  o u t  
an im portant e lem en t in  th e  p r a c tic e  s in c e  it  g iv e s  no c lu e  a s  to w hat 
p e d ig r ee  we tak e  to  be tr a n sfe r r e d  in  in fe r e n c e . As soon  a s  w e tak e  on  
th at o b liga tion  we in cu r  th e  a d d ed  r e sp o n s ib ility  o f sa y in g  j u s t  w h y  
th o se  in fe r e n tia l r u le s  tr a n sfe r  th a t p e d ig r ee . T hat is ,  we m ust g iv e  an  
exp lan atory  ju s tif ic a tio n  of d ed u ctio n .
A sou n d  in fe r e n c e  is  su c h  th a t  b e in g  in  a p o sitio n  to  a s s e r t  th e
p rem ises  o f  th e  in fe r e n c e  i s  ju s t  to  be in  a p o sitio n  to a s s e r t  its
co n c lu sio n . The in fe r e n c e  t r a n s fe r s  th e  p r o p e r ty  o f b e in g  c o r r e c tly  
a sse r t ib le . So fa r  th a t s a y s  v e r y  lit t le . It c e r ta in ly  im p oses no a d eq u a cy  
co n d itio n s  on th e  in fe r e n tia l p r a c tic e  b ecau se  it  ju s t  is  in  th e  n a tu re  of 
our u se  o f in fe r e n c e  th a t it  s u p p lie s  a w arrant for  a sser tio n : if  th e  
in fe r e n c e  i s  c o r r e c t  th en  it  is  c o r r e c t  to  a s s e r t  it s  co n c lu sio n  (if we are  
w arran ted  in  a s s e r t in g  i t s  p r e m isses)  and it  is  c o r r e c t  j u s t  w h en  it
com plies w ith  th e  r u le s  o f in fe r e n c e . No a d eq u a cy  con d ition  is  im posed  
ju s t  b eca u se  o f th is  c ir c u la r ity . The id ea  th a t in fe r e n c e  is  co n stra in ed  
by h a v in g  to com p ly  m erely  w ith  th e  e x is te n c e  o f a w arrant for  
a sse r t io n  is  too c r u d e  to r e s u lt  in  c o n ten tfu l c o n str a in ts . S in ce  
in fe r e n c e  i t s e lf  g iv e s  u s  w a rra n ts  for  a s se r t io n  no r e s tr ic t io n s  are  
en co u n tered .
The o n ly  w ay th is  req u irem en t can  lead to a d eq u a cy  c o n s tr a in ts  on  
in fe r e n c e  is  in  th e  p r e se r v a tio n  o f m ean ings o f lo g ic a lly  sim ple  
s e n te n c e s  g iv e n  in d e p e n d e n tly  o f in fe r e n tia l w arran ts . A ltern a tiv e ly , we 
in s is t  th at th e  p o s s e s s io n  o f an  in fe r e n tia l w arrant m ust be co n stra in ed  
by th e  e x is te n c e  o f (or our a b ility , in  p r in c ip le , to fu r n ish )  
n o n -in f  e r en tia l w a rra n ts . L og ica lly  sim ple s e n te n c e s  w hich  become 
a sse r t ib le  v ia  in fe r e n c e  sh o u ld , in d e p e n d e n tly  o f in fe r e n c e , be c o r r e c tly  
a sse r t ib le , i .e ., th e  in se r t io n  o f in fe r e n tia l r u le s  in to  th e  base c la s s
118sh ou ld  be a c o n s e r v a t iv e  e x te n s io n  o f th a t c la s s  r e la t iv e  to c o r r e c t  
a s s e r t ib ilty . T h ese  th o u g h ts  sim ply  u np ack  th e  n a ïv e  v iew  th a t  
in fe r e n tia l r u le s  sh o u ld  be fa ith fu l to th e  m ean ings o f s e n te n c e s . T heir  
im portance is  th a t th e y  en ab le  u s  to th in k  o f la n g u a g e  a s  b e in g  
p a rtia lly  o rd e r ed . The com p eten ce ga in ed  at on e le v e l  is  com p lete  and  
s u r v iv e s  in ta c t  th e  in tro d u ctio n  o f a new le v e l  o f g r e a te r  (log ica l) 
com p lexity . T hus w e can  a cco u n t for  our p r o g r e s s iv e  a cq u is it io n  o f  
la n g u a g e . For a n y  s e n te n c e  o n ly  a  p ro p er  fragm en t o f la n g u a g e  n eed  be 
know n for  an  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f th a t s e n te n c e .
The im plication  fo r  th e  form  o f ju s tif ic a tio n  of log ic  is  th a t we sh a ll 
h ave  to g iv e  a uniform  a cco u n t o f m eaning fo r  both lo g ica l and  
n o n -lo g ica l v o c a b u la ry . A bove I m entioned th a t we n eed  to  j u s t i fy  th e  
in fe r e n tia l r u le s  in  term s of th e ir  a b ility  to e n su r e  th a t a c e r ta in  
p e d ig r e e  is  tr a n sfe r r e d  in  a  sou n d  in fe r e n c e  from  p r e m isses  to  
co n c lu sio n . The p e d ig r e e  we are  in te r e s te d  in , o b v io u s ly , is  tr u th , but 
th e  im portant p o in t i s  to u n c o v e r  w h at notion  o f tr u th  we are e n tit le d  
to  c r e d it  o u r s e lv e s  w ith , g iv e n  th e  n a tu re  o f our u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  
lo g ica lly  sim ple s e n te n c e s . We in s is t  on u n iform ity  in  our a cco u n t o f  
log ica l and n o n -lo g ic a l v o c a b u la r y  by r e fu s in g  to  g r a n t th a t we h a v e  
g ra sp  o f a n otion  o f tr u th  w h ich  tr a n sc e n d s  th a t w h ich  we are  fo rc e d  to  
adm it in  ou r a cco u n t o f lo g ic a lly  sim ple s e n te n c e s . So if  a lo g ic  can  o n ly  
be g iv e n  a p u ta t iv e  ju s tif ic a tio n  b y  appeal to su c h  a n otion  o f tr u th  we 
rep u d ia te  th a t lo g ic  a s  u n ju s t if ia b le . T ech n ica lly , w e en fo rc e  th is  
c o n str a in t by in s is t in g  th a t ou r lo g ic  e s ta b lish  a c o n se r v a t iv e  e x te n s io n  
of th e  b ase  c la s s  o f s e n te n c e s , th a t is ,  we in s is t  th a t no se n te n c e  in  th e  
base c la s s  becom es a s s e r t ib le  on  th e  b a sis  of an in fe r e n tia lly  p ro v id ed  
w arran t if  it  w as n o t, in  som e s e n s e , a s se r t ib le  on th e  b asis  o f a 
n o n -in fe r e n tia l w arran t. T hus it  w ill be in su ff ic ie n t  to a d v e r t, a s  ab ove , 
to  the m ea n in g fu ln ess  o f th e  b ase c la s s  and n o n -c o llu s iv e  agreem en t in  
in fe r e n tia l p r a c tic e . T h ose o b se r v a tio n s  are p r e c o n d itio n s  for t^erp  
jh e in g  som eth in g  to  j u s t i fy  but d on ’t am ount in  th e m se lv e s  a
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ju s tif ic a tio n . T h ey  g iv e  u s  no in s ig h t  in to  th e  n atu re  o f th e  p ra c tice . 
Dummett claim s th a t to a c c ep t th is  p o s itio n  is  to  a c c ep t holism .
§9 Summary:
In th is  c h a p ter  I h ave  a ttem p ted  to  exp ose  Dummett’s  arg u m en ts  for  
ta k in g  th e  th e o r y  o f m eaning a s  a v ita l tool in  our a ttem p ts to  reach  a 
p h ilo so p h ica l u n d e r s ta n d in g  of a p r a c tic e . I e lu c id a ted  c e r ta in  
c o n s tr a in ts  w h ich  an a c cep ta b le  a cco u n t o f m eaning m ust s a t is fy  if  it  is  
not to  c o n tra v e n e  b asic  req u irem en ts  o f a notion  o f m eaning in  sh ow in g  
how we learn  a  la n g u a g e  and how we com m unicate th r o u g h  la n g u a g e . 
The r e su lt  w as th a t a th e o r y  o f m ean ing had to m eet th e  c h a llen g e  o f  
g iv in g  an a cco u n t o f ju s t  w hat ou r u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  a n y  e x p r e ss io n  
c o n s is t s  in , in  term s w h ich  show  how , w hen  a sp ea k er  is  sa id  to p o s s e s s  
k n ow led ge , th a t s ta te  o f co g n itio n  is  m an ifestab le . T his can n ot be done  
i f  th e  th e o r y  m akes u se  o f n o tio n s, su ch  a s  th e  r e a lis t  or b iva len t  
co n cep tio n  o f tr u th , w h ich  are n ot lin k ed  to reco g n itio n a l ca p a c it ie s . The 
th e o ry  o f m eaning can  be s e e n  to  be fu ll-b lo o d ed  p ro v id ed  th at  
req u irem en t is  su ita b ly  in te r p r e te d  a s  not r e q u ir in g  a r e d u ctio n  of 
m eaning to n o rm -free  b eh av iou r a n d /o r  d isp o s it io n s . The p o s s ib il ity  o f  
g iv in g  a ju s tif ic a tio n  o f d ed u ctio n  w as a rg u ed  for  and o b je c t io n s  ra ised  
by Haack to  th e  c ir c u la r ity  o f th a t p r o je c t  w ere d ism issed . A ten sio n  
b etw een  th e  se a rc h  fo r  a "maximally stab le"  log ic  and an a cco u n t of the  
u s e fu ln e s s  o f d ed u ctio n  w as n oted . (That is s u e  is  p u r su e d  in  con n ectio n  
w ith  th e  b u s in e s s  o f c h a p ter  4 below .) L astly , th e  need  to g iv e  an  
a cco u n t o f th e  v a lid ity  o f d ed u ctio n  by sh ow in g  how in fe r e n c e  tr a n s fe r s  
some sem antic  p r o p e r ty  w h ich  is  a p p ro p r ia te ly  co n str a in e d  ep istem ica ily  
sh o w s th a t a c la s s ic a l tw o -v a lu ed  sem antic  th e o r y  can n ot be ad h ered  to  
u n iv e r sa lly . So r e v is io n  o f lo g ic  is  p o ss ib le .
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The Need for  a J u stif ic a tio n  o f D ed u ction
The sco p e  o f th is  c h a p ter  is  lim ited . I a ttem pt to r e b u t cer ta in  
a rgu m en ts  for  th e  c o n c lu s io n  th a t  th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  can  and , p erh a p s , 
sh ou ld  e sch ew  a ju s tif ic a tio n  o f d ed u ctio n . T h ese  a rgu m en ts  (g lean ed  
m ainly from  th e  w r it in g s  o f C risp in  W right) h ave  two main fo c u s s e s .  
F ir st , it  i s  claim ed th a t a sem an tic  ju s tif ic a tio n  is  not m andatory g iv e n  
o n ly  th e  a n t i- r e a lis t ’s  c o n str a in t  o f m olecu larity . S eco n d ly  (and more 
p ow erfu lly ) it  is  a r g u e d  th a t su c h  ju s t if ic a t io n s  p r e su p p o se  a co n cep tio n  
o f m eaning w h ich  is  u n ava ilab le  to  th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  s in ce  in  th e  p r o c e ss  
o f ju s tif ic a tio n  on e a ssu m es th a t th e r e  are d eterm in ate and tr a n sc e n d e n t  
co n d itio n s  o f c o r r e c t  u se . My c o n tr a r y  claim is  th a t a r e fu sa l to co n cern  
o n e s e lf  w ith  a sem antic  ju s tif ic a tio n  o f d ed u ction  in v o lv e s  a d ep a rtu re  
from  a m olecular co n cep tio n  o f m eaning and th a t we h ave  been  g iv e n  no 
r ea so n  for  su p p o s in g  th a t th e  ju s t if ic a to r y  p r o jec t  n e c e s s ita te s  an  
a n t i-r e a lis t ic a lly  r e p u g n a n t notion  of m eaning. T hus th e  (m olecular) 
a n t i-r e a lis t  p o s itio n  i s ,  a t le a s t , p o te n tia lly  re  v is io n a r y  s in ce  it  r e q u ir e s  
a s ig n if ic a n t  ju s tif ic a tio n  o f th e  p r a c tic e . The v a lid ity  o f c la s s ic a l log ic  
w ill th u s  d ep en d  on  an  a p p ro p r ia te  sem an tics being  forth com in g . I do 
n ot claim th a t no a n t i-r e a lis t ic a lly  a ccep ta b le  va lid a tion  of c la ss ic a l log ic  
is  p o ss ib le . I do, h ow ever , a c c e p t  th a t th e  c la ss ic a l two va lu ed  
tr u th -fu n c tio n a l a cco u n t o f c la s s ic a l lo g ic  in v o lv e s  an in ad m issab le  
c o n c e ss io n  to  realism  (or, p e r h a p s , sh ou ld  ra th er  be id e n tif ie d  w ith  w hat 
it  is  to assu m e a r e a lis t  p o s itio n  w ith  r e sp e c t  to a g iv e n  d isc o u r se ) . So 
e v e n  if  we can  be b ro u g h t to  a c c e p t  c la s s ic a l log ic  a s  v a lid , we are , as  
a n t i-r e a lis ts ,  n e c e s s a r i ly  in v o lv e d  in  r e v is io n  of, a t lea st , th e  sem antic  
th e o r y  u n d er p in n in g  c la s s ic a l lo g ic .
I do not a r g u e  (in  th is  c h a p ter  or an yw h ere  e lse )  th a t an a n t i-r e a lis t  
p osition  m u st  co in c id e  w ith  a v e r s io n  of in tu ition ism . I lea v e  op en  the  
q u e stio n  o f w h eth er  an  a n t i-r e a lis t ic a lly  accep ta b le  sem an tics w hich  
su c c e e d s  in  j u s t i fy in g  c la s s ic a l log ic  is  p o ss ib le . That is  a large
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q u estio n . (It w ould , for  a  s ta r t , in v o lv e  a s u r v e y  o f v a r io u s  
su p e r -v a lu a tio n a l sem an tics and o th e r  r e d u c tiv e  sem antic a c c o u n ts .)  The 
su p p o rt I o ffe r  fo r  in tu ition ism  c o n s is t s ,  f ir s t ,  in  ex p la in in g  th e  
in tu it io n is t ic  sem an tics  a s  a p la u s ib le  (b u t by no m eans an in ev ita b le )  
outcom e o f  a n t i-r e a lis t  sem antic  c o n s id er a tio n s  and , se co n d ly , in  
d efen d in g  th a t p o sitio n  from  c e r ta in  a c c u sa tio n s  o f in c o h eren ce . (T his, I 
u n d erta k e  m ainly in  c h a p te r s  4 and 6.) So th e  s tr e n g th  o f my argum en t 
fo r  in tu ition ism  a s  a p h ilo so p h y  o f m athem atics is  lim ited to  sh ow in g  th a t  
it  is  a n t i-r e a lis t ic a lly  a c c ep ta b le , not th at it  is  m andatory to  an  
a n t i-r e a lis t .
The c o u r se  o f my argu m en t h as been  d ic ta ted  by a s e t  of 
c o n s id er a tio n s  ra llied  by  W right. The s tr u c u r e  o f th e  ch a p ter  is  th u s  
som ew hat c o n v o lu ted . I hope th a t by a n tic ip a tin g  my argu m en t h ere  I 
can  make th a t s tr u c tu r e  c le a r e r . I b eg in  (§1) by o u tlin in g  th e  r e le v a n t  
n otion s o f holism  and  m olecularism . In §2 I o ffe r  a d ir ec t  r e b u tta l o f th e  
c o n s is te n c y  o f h o ld in g  both W right’s  im plicit d efin ition a l v iew  o f log ic , 
and a m olecular v iew  o f la n g u a g e .
§3 in v e s t ig a te s  a som ew hat d iffe r e n t  and , p erh a p s, d eep er  ch a llen g e  
to r e v is io n a r y  a n ti-rea lism . The broad ch a llen g e  (w hich  d ep en d s on a 
com plex s e t  o f c o n s id er a tio n s  to  do w ith  th e  p r o c e ss  o f v a lid a tin g  a 
log ic) is  for  th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  to g iv e  c o n ten t to th e  sp e c if ic a lly  sem a n tic  
n otion s he r e g a r d s  h im self a s  e n t it le d  to . The p o in t o f th e  c h a llen g e  is  
th at u n le s s  th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  can  make good an a ccu sa tio n  a g a in s t  a 
sem antic th e o r y  o f u s in g  a n t i-r e a lis t ic a lly  r ep u g n a n t n otion s th e  
ch a ra cter iza tio n  o f th e  m eta p h y sica l is s u e  o f realism  in sem antic term s  
th r e a te n s  to co lla p se . My d e fe n c e  o f a n ti-rea lism  h in g e s  on , i) 
r e se r v a t io n s  ab ou t th e  d eta il o f th e  argum en t and , ii) a reco g n itio n  th a t  
a lth ou gh  th e  p o s s ib il ity  o f r a is in g  the m etap h ysica l is s u e  o f realism  
r e q u ir e s  th a t th e re  be som e m easure o f agreem en t b etw een  p a r tie s  to  
th e  d isp u te , th is  n eed  not be a so u rce  o f co n cern  p rov id ed  no 
m etap h ysica l q u e stio n  is  b e g g ed .
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th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  is  u n ab le  to c o n c e rn  h im self w ith  q u e stio n s  o f so u n d n e ss  
b ecau se  an in s ta n c e  o f e r ro r  can  o n ly  be r e co g n iz e d  from  w ith in  an  
in fe r e n tia l sy stem . T h ere is  th u s  no reco g n iza b le  o b je c t iv e  fa c t  w hich  
d eterm in es w h eth er  or n ot a g iv e n  sy ste m  (sh o r t o f in c o n s is te n c y )  is  
sou n d . I a ttem pt to in c r e a se  th e  te n s io n  by a r g u in g  th a t d e sp ite  th e  
r e la t iv ity  W right claim s to  h a v e  r e v e a le d  in  q u e s t io n s  o f so u n d n e ss  a n y  
p ra c titio n er  o f in fe r e n c e  ca n n o t a c c e p t  th a t m ore than  one sy stem  is  
sou n d .
§5 a ttem p ts to r e sp o n d  to  th is  te n s io n . F ir st , I claim  th a t W right has  
on ly  su c c e e d e d  in  d em o n stra tin g  th e  u n d ec id a b ility  o f q u e stio n s  o f  
u n so u n d n e ss . So from  th e  in tu it io n is t ic  p o in t o f v iew  it  h as been  show n  
th a t a n y  sy ste m  is  n ot u n so u n d  (w hich  is  not, by in tu it io n is t ic  l ig h ts , to  
sa y  th a t it  i s  so u n d ). S ec o n d ly , I n o tice  that th e  a ccu sa tio n  made by th e  
in tu it io n is t ic  a n t i-r e a lis t  a g a in s t  c la s s ic a l  log ic  is  not th a t it  is  u n so u n d , 
it  is  th a t it  is  n o t d em o n stra b ly  sou n d . It is  q u ite  p o ss ib le  for  an  
a n t i-r e a lis t  a c c e p tin g  th e  f ir s t  p o s itio n  to  r a ise  q u e s t io n s  ab ou t  
so u n d n e ss  (ra th er  th a n  u n so u n d n e ss )  and th u s  to make th e  a ccu sa tio n  
lev e lled  in  th e  seco n d  p o sitio n .
In th is  la s t  se c t io n  (§6) I a r g u e  th a t W right's r e se r v a t io n s  about  
r e v is io n a r y  a n ti-rea lism  stem  w h o lly  from h is  in te r p r e ta tio n  of 
W ittg en ste in ’s  Rule F ollow in g C on sid era tion s. I o ffer  an a lte r n a tiv e  
in te r p r e ta tio n  o f th o se  c o n s id e r a tio n s  (draw n from  th e  w r itin g s  o f John  
McDowell) w h ich  I claim  is  c o n s is te n t  w ith  a n ti-rea lism . So no in tern a l  
in c o h e re n c y  in  th a t p o sitio n  h as b een  rev ea led .
§1 Holism and M olecularism :
We are c o n cern ed  w ith  th e  e f fe c t  o f  holism  on th e  form of th e  th eo ry  of 
m eaning. T h us we can  th in k  o f holism  a s  th e  den ia l of th e  p o ss ib ility  of 
a m olecular th e o r y  o f m ean ing. A m olecular th e o r y  ho ld s th at  
u n d er sta n d in g  a n y  e x p r e ss io n  r e q u ir e s  com p eten ce in  a t m ost a fragm ent
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o f la n g u a g e  and th a t we can  g iv e  an  acco u n t for  e v e r y  e x p r e ss io n  o f
w hat th a t com p eten ce  c o n s is t s  in . T h ere  are th r e e  w ays o f d e n y in g  th is ,
so  th ree  form s o f holism .
Holism) some s e n te n c e s  do not h a v e  a determ in ate m eaning.
Holism^:- a ll s e n te n c e s  h a v e  determ in ate  m ean ings but u n d e r s ta n d in g  
some s e n te n c e s  r e q u ir e s  com p eten ce  in  th e  e n tir e  la n g u a g e .
Holism^:- a ll s e n te n c e s  h a v e  determ in ate  m ean ings n ot d ep e n d e n t on  
an u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f th e  e n tir e  la n g u a g e  but some e x p r e ss io n s  are  
su c h  th a t we ca n n o t g iv e  an exp lan ation  (in  th e  s e n s e  o f a sem antic  
ju s tif ic a tio n  a s  g lo ss e d  in  th e  la st ch a p ter) o f w hat an
u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f them  c o n s is t s  in .
I sh ou ld  h ere  add a w ord to my u se  o f th e  n otion  o f determ in ate
m eaning. The m anner in  w h ich  I w ould  ch o o se  to e lu c id a te  th is  n otion
would be th a t an  e x p r e ss io n  h as determ in ate  m eaning if  i t s  m eaning is  
cap ab le o f b e in g  exp la in ed  w ith in  an ap p rop ria te  th e o r y  o f m eaning for  
th e  la n g u a g e .
Holism y tr ie s  to  m eet m any o f th e  m olecular c o n str a in ts  th a t em erge  
from c o n s id e r in g  th e  n a tu re  o f u n d e r s ta n d in g  but is  s h y  o f th e  
s tr e n g th  o f th e  m olecular m eth od olog ica l s ta n ce  (w hich in s is t s  th a t it  be 
p o ss ib le  to g iv e  a n o n -c ir c u la r  a c c o u n t o f th e  m eaning o f each  s e n te n c e  
in  term s w h ich  p r e su p p o se  com p eten ce  in  at m ost a fragm en t of th e  
lan gu age) b eca u se  o f i t s  a c c ep ta n c e  o f th e  p o ss ib il ity  o f im posing  a
r e v is io n  in  a f ir s t  ord er  p r a c tic e . It allow s th e  p o ss ib ility  o f a p ra c tice  
e v a d in g  exp lan ation  w ith in  a  th e o r y  o f m eaning w ith ou t s e e in g  th is , in  
m olecular fa sh io n , a s  a condem nation  o f th e  m ea n in g fu ln ess  of th e  
p ra c tice . We cou ld  th u s  tak e it  th a t it  d iffe r s  o n ly  term in o log ica lly  from  
th e  th orou gh  m olecular p o s itio n  s in c e  both m ight a g ree  on th e  so r t  o f  
d escr ip tio n  we can  g iv e  o f th e  p r a c tic e , i .e ., th e y  need  not d iffe r  on th e  
q u e stio n  of w h eth er  and w hat so r t  o f ju stif ic a tio n  we can  g iv e  but o n ly
124
ov er  th e  n eed  or rô le  o f th e  ju s tif ic a tio n . H owever th a t w ould be to  
loose  a, p o s s ib ly  im portant, d is tin c tio n . The ad op tion  o f a m ethodology  
r e v e a ls  w h at on e ta k e s  to  be th e  n a tu re  o f m eaning. Holismy 
e n c a p su la te s  a c e r ta in  c o n c e p t o f m eaning. It is  im portant b eca u se  it  is  
o f cru c ia l in te r e s t  to  our p r o je c t  to  d isc o v e r  w h eth er  or n ot a
d ep a rtu re  from  m olecularism  n eed  c o lla p se  in to  a holism  o f th e  f ir s t  two  
so r ts  s in ce , a s  I h ave  ju s t  n o ted , Holismy allow s u s  to  a c c ep t m any of 
th e  sem antic c o n s tr a in ts  g o v e r n in g  ou r acco u n t o f th e  p r a c tice  y e t  
p r o v id e s  a p o ss ib le  m eans o f d e fu s in g  a n y  re v is io n a r y  im plication s th a t  
m ight fo llow  th erefrom .
In th is  ch a p te r  I sh a ll be in te r e s te d  in  a s s e s s in g  th e  fe a s ib ility  o f a  
p osition  w h ich  is  a v e r s io n  o f Holismy. I w ant to a r g u e  th a t th is  v e r s io n  
o f Holism^ c o lla p se s  in to  a holism  o f th e  o th er  two s o r ts . (Holism^
o b v io u s ly  c o lla p se s  in to  Holism ) if  th e  e x p r e ss io n s  it  e x c e p ts  from  
h av in g  a m eaning th e o r e t ic  exp lan a tion  in c lu d e  s e n te n c e s .  So, in  p a rt  
w hat I sh a ll be a r g u in g  is  th a t h a v in g  th is  a ttitu d e  to su b se n te n tia l  
e x p r e ss io n s  h as d isce r n a b le  e f f e c t s  a t th e  se n te n tia l lev e l.)
§2 The R elation B etw een  Holism and th e  J u stif ic a tio n  of D eduction:
I t w ould be d iff ic u lt  to  u n d er ta k e  th is  ta sk  w ith ou t c o n s id e r in g  
p r e c is e ly  w h ich  e x p r e ss io n s  th is  v e r s io n  of Holism^ e x c e p ts  from h a v in g  
a  m eaning th e o r e t ic  exp lan ation . W right (1981) m oots a  v iew  of lo g ic  
w h ich  is  of a form  of Holismy s in c e , a cco rd in g  to  th is  v iew , we do not 
g iv e  a com plete a c c o u n t o f all lo g ica l v o ca b u la ry  in  m eaning th e o re tic  
term s. Dummett a r g u e s  th a t th e  o n ly  ju s tif ic a tio n  we h ave  o f th e  g lob a l 
u se  of c la s s ic a l lo g ic  d e p e n d s  on an o b jectio n a b le  n otion  o f tru th . So we 
are led in ex o ra b ly  to r e v is io n  o f lo g ic  w ith  holism  (1 and 2) th e  o n ly  
sa v in g  p o sitio n . W right q u e s t io n s  w h eth er  th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  m ight not  
d isavow  th e  need  fo r  a sem an tica l ju s tif ic a tio n  o f log ic  (so  a v o id in g  th e  
trap  of realism ) y e t  m aintain a m olecular v iew  o f la n g u a g e . The p ic tu r e  
e n v isa g e d  is  j u s t  th a t u n d e r s ta n d in g  th e  lo g ica l c o n s ta n ts  a c c ru es
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th u s  im p lic itly  d e fin ed . The p ic tu r e  d oes not, a t le a s t  a t f ir s t  s ig h t,  
d e sc r ib e  a holism  (of th e  f ir s t  tw o so r ts )  s in ce  th e  e s s e n c e  o f th e  
m olecular p o s itio n  is  th a t com p lete  u n d er sta n d in g  can  be ga in ed  in  ju s t  
a fragm en t o f la n g u a g e  (th at com p eten ce b ein g  u n d is tu r b e d  in  th e  
p a ssa g e  to in c r e a se d  lin g u is t ic  sk ill) . T his segm en ta tion , W right claim s, 
m ight s t i l l  be p o ss ib le  a lth o u g h  each  s ta g e  r e q u ir e s  com plete lo g ica l  
com p eten ce.
The so r t  o f ju s tif ic a tio n  we r e q u ire d  w as one th a t show ed  th e  ro le  o f  
in fe r e n tia l p r a c tic e  in  la n g u a g e  a s  a w hole. T h is, i f  we follow  W right, we 
are now r e n e g in g  on . The req u irem en t w as a m ethodologica l on e so  th e r e  
need  be, a s  n o ted  b efore , no su b s ta n t iv e  d isa g reem en t, both  p a r tie s  
a g r e e in g  th a t th e  o r ig in a l m eth od o logy  dem ands some k ind  o f r e v is io n . 
W right h ow ever  u r g e s  th a t n o th in g  su b sta n tia l is  fo r fe ite d  in  sh ift in g  
th e  m ethodologica l s ta n c e  draw n from  th e  dem ands o f m olecularism  (i.e ., 
th a t th at p o sitio n  w as not w ell m otivated ) and fu r th e r  (for r e a so n s  we 
sh a ll e n c o u n ter  below) th a t som e s h if t  is  forced  on u s s in c e  th e  o r ig in a l 
s ta n ce  is  in te r n a lly  in c o h e re n t.
The m olecular v iew  h o ld s, f ir s t ,  th a t we can g iv e  a r e p r e se n ta tio n  of  
th e  c o n te n ts  o f in d iv id u a l s e n te n c e s  and , se co n d ly , th a t w e can  do th is  
in d e p e n d e n tly  o f a d e sc r ip tio n  o f th e  e n tir e  la n g u a g e . A ssum ing th a t we 
h ave  iso la ted  a lo g ic a lly  com p lete  s ta g e  th en  we h ave  c e r ta in ly  sa tis f ie d  
the la tter  c o n str a in t , i .e ., i f  w e can g iv e  a r e p r e se n ta tio n  o f th e  
c o n ten t o f in d iv id u a l s e n te n c e s  th en  th at r e p r e se n ta tio n  w ill be 
in d e p e n d e n t o f a d e sc r ip t io n  o f th e  e n tir e  la n g u a g e . Can w e s a t is fy  th e  
a n te ce d e n t o f th e  con d ition al?  What r e p r ese n ta tio n  o f th e  c o n te n ts  of  
in d iv id u a l s e n te n c e s  m ight we t r y  to g iv e?  If we can n ot g iv e  su c h  
r e p r e se n ta tio n s  th e n  our p o s itio n  w ill co lla p se  in to  Holism).
We m ight t r y  to g iv e  th e  m eaning o f a s e n te n c e  in  term s o f i t s  
p osition  w ith in  th e  in fe r e n t ia lly  co n n e c te d  web of s e n te n c e s  or e ls e  we 
m ight tr y  to  iso la te  some fe a tu r e  o f u se  r e la tiv e  to a s p e c if ic  s u b s e t  of
126
o th er  se n te n c e s . The f ir s t  p o s itio n  is  a s  bad as r e q u ir in g  com p eten ce in  
th e  e n tir e  la n g u a g e  b eca u se  it  im p lau sib ly  m akes u n d e r s ta n d in g  a 
se n te n c e  re lia n t on  g r a sp  of all th e  in fe r e n tia l c o n n e c tio n s  in  th e  
la n g u a g e . T his is  a bad p o s itio n  p a r tly  b eca u se  com p eten ce in  a 
la n g u a g e  n e v e r  r e q u ir e s  th is  so r t  o f log ica l om n isc ien ce  (in  fa c t  th is  
om n isc ien ce  w ould make in fe r e n tia l p r a c tice  red u n d a n t) but a lso  b ecau se  
it  is  u n c lea r  w h at s e n s e  th e r e  i s  in  a sc r ib in g  su c h  a c a p a c ity . What 
ra n g e  o f s k ills  cou ld  a sp e a k e r  e x e r c ise  to d em on stra te  g r a sp  o f th e se  
in fe r e n tia l co n n ec tio n s?  It w ould seem  th a t all we can  re q u ire  o f log ica l  
com p eten ce is  an a b ility  to r e c o g n iz e  and perform  c o r r e c t  in fe r e n c e s .  
But c h a r a c te r iz in g  th a t a b ility  w ill lead  u s to  our seco n d  a lte r n a tiv e  
b eca u se  th e  m ost o b v io u s  w ay o f  d o in g  th is  is  to  iso la te  a r a n g e  o f  
canon ica l in fe r e n tia l s te p s  w h ich  w ould determ ine th e  u se  o f th e  g iv e n  
se n te n c e  r e la t iv e  to  a sp e c if ic  s u b s e t  o f o th er  se n te n c e s .
Let u s  tu r n , th e n , to  th e  seco n d  a lte r n a tiv e . U n d ersta n d in g  a  
se n te n c e  m ight be a m atter o f know in g  i t s  im m ediate (in  a s e n s e  s t il l  
aw aitin g  fu ll  exp lica tion ) lo g ica l c o n se q u e n c e s  a n d /o r  g ro u n d s . But th is  
p o sitio n  i s  h a rd ly  a n y  more p la u s ib le  th an  th e  la s t  if  i t  su p p o se s  th a t  
u n d e r s ta n d in g  a se n te n c e  w ould in v o lv e  k n ow led ge  o f e v e r y  lo g ica lly  
e q u iv a le n t s e n te n c e , s in ce  w h at th is  m eans is  th a t u n d e r s ta n d in g  a 
theorem  w ould r e q u ire  u n d e r s ta n d in g  e v e r y  theorem  in  lo g ic . If th a t  
m eans th a t we need  a k n ow led ge  o f e v e r y  theorem  th e n  w e’v e  
r e g e n e r a te d  th e  n eed  for  lo g ica l om n isc ien ce . If, th o u g h , it m eans th a t  
we sh ou ld  be cap ab le  o f r e c o g n iz in g  a theorem  if  p r e se n te d  w ith  one or 
o f c h e c k in g  w h eth er  a g iv e n  c o n str u c t io n  is  a p roof or d isp ro o f o f a 
p u ta tiv e  theorem  th en , a s  we d isc o v e r e d  in  the la s t  p a ragrap h , we w ant 
some a cco u n t o f how we s e t  ab ou t re co g n iz in g  th eorem s. We can  do th at  
by s y n ta c t ic a lly  c h a r a c te r iz in g  can on ica l g ro u n d s a n d /o r  c o n se q u e n c e s . 
C anonical g r o u n d s  and c o n se q u e n c e s  th u s  becom e a com bination of 
g ro u n d s  and c o n se q u e n c e s  g iv e n  by  th e  c o n te n ts  of th e  lo g ic a lly  sim ple  
se n te n c e s  and th e  s y n ta c t ic a lly  d efin ed  r u le s  o f in fe r e n c e .
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g iv e n  by  its  can on ica l g r o u n d s  and c o n se q u e n c e s  w h ere  th e se  are  
determ in ed  s y n ta c t ic a lly  by th e  s tr u c tu r e  o f th e  s e n te n c e  it s e lf .  The 
can on ica l g r o u n d s  and c o n se q u e n c e s  w ill th u s , in  th e  c o n tex t o f lo g ic a lly  
com plex s e n te n c e s , d eterm in e w h en  c e r ta in  log ica l c o n s ta n ts  may be 
in tro d u ced  and w h en  elim inated . But th is  c h a ra c ter iza tio n  o f th e  u se  o f  
th e  lo g ica l c o n s ta n ts  is  not to be r e g a rd ed  a s  a c h a r a c ter iza tio n  of th e ir  
m eaning. So w h at th e n  w ould d is t in g u ish  a sem an tics w h ich  ta k e s  th e  
log ica l c o n s ta n ts  a s  im p licitly  d e fin ed  p r im itiv es  in  th e  m anner ju s t  
in d ica ted  and a p r o o f-th e o r e t ic  sem an tics w h ich  ta k e s  th e  m ea n in g s  o f  
th e  lo g ica l c o n s ta n ts  a s  g iv e n  by th e  in tro d u ctio n  a n d /o r  elim ination  
r u le s?  O vertly  it  w ould seem  v e r y  lit t le . The d iffe r e n c e  w ould em erge in  
th e  s p ir it  in  w h ich  th e  can on ica l r u le s  o f in fe r e n c e  w ere  o ffe r e d . In  th e  
seco n d  c a se  we hold th e se  to  be r e sp o n s ib le  to  a n te ce d e n t sem antica l 
p r in c ip le s  so  we en jo in  a req u irem en t o f harm ony {how ever th is  is  to  be 
ch a ra c te r iz e d ) b etw een  in tr o d u ctio n  and elim ination r u le s . The f ir s t  
p o sitio n  d iscla im s th is  r e p o n s ib ility , r a th er , th e  r u le s  o f in fe r e n c e  are  
sim ply e x p lic it  s tip u la t io n s . In  d o in g  so , I sh a ll a r g u e , th a t it  th e r e b y  
e x p o se s  i t s e lf  to  th e  a c c u sa tio n  th a t th e  exp lan ation  o ffe r e d  o f a g iv e n  
s e n te n c e  fa ils  to  co n fer  on  it  a determ in ate  se n se .
C anonical g r o u n d s  and c o n se q u e n c e s  h ave , a cco rd in g  to th e  f ir s t  
p o sitio n , i .e .,  th e  im plicit d e fin itio n a l v iew , th u s  far  been  d efin ed  p u r e ly  
as g r o u n d s  and c o n se q u e n c e s  w h ich  are d eterm in ed  by  an ex p lic it  
ap p lica tion  o f on e o f th e  in tr o d u ctio n  or elim ination  r u le s . T hus it  w ould  
seem  th a t we m ust m ention bo th  in tro d u ctio n  and elim ination r u le s  in  
ch a r a c te r iz in g  can on ica l g r o u n d s  and a lso  in  c h a r a c te r z in g  canon ica l 
c o n se q u e n c e s . But th e n  our exp lan ation s o f, for in s ta n c e  canon ica l 
g r o u n d s , w ill in e v ita b ly  be c ircu la r  s in ce  th e  s e n te n c e  w ill be a s se r t ib le  
as a r e su lt  o f u s in g  th e  elim ination  ru le  on s e n te n c e s  o f w h ich  it  is  a  
c o n s titu e n t. T hus th e  exp lan ation  w ill p r e su p p o se  u n d er sta n d in g  o f the  
se n te n c e  it  is  ex p la in in g , (e .g . P  m ight be a s se r t ib le  as a r e su lt  o f u s in g
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MPP on Q^P so , in  c h a r a c te r iz in g  th e  m eaning o f P, we w ould n eed  to  
g iv e  an  a cco u n t o f th is  g r o u n d . But i t  is  a grou n d  for a s s e r t in g  P  
re co g n itio n  o f w h ich  p r e s u p p o s e s  an  u n d er s ta n d in g  of P  s in ce  we h ave  
to ch a ra c te r iz e  th e  a s s e r t ib il ity  o f Q^P in  term s o f th e  a s s e r t ib il ity  o f P  
its e lf .)
The a lte r n a tiv e  to  th is  is  to  s p e c ify  g r o u n d s  in  term s o n ly  o f  
in tro d u ctio n  r u le s . T hus th e  s e n te n c e  becom es ca n o n ica lly  a s s e r t ib le  a s  a  
r e su lt  o f u s in g  th e  in tr o d u ctio n  ru le  o f i t s  dom inant log ica l o p era tor  (so  
th a t in  th e  exam ple ju s t  g iv e n  we do not n eed  to r e fe r  to th e  
a s s e r t ib il ity  o f P  a s  a r e s u lt  o f MPP ap p lied  to  Q^P). We n eed , th o u g h , 
to  fin d  room for  th e  elim ination  r u le s  and th is  we can  do by  r e fe r e n c e  
to  can on ica l com m itm ents a r is in g  from  th e  elim ination  of th e  dom inant 
lo g ica l op era tor . So ca n on ica l g r o u n d s  and com m itm ents co r re sp o n d , 
r e s p e c t iv e ly , to  g r o u n d s  g iv e n  by in tro d u ctio n  r u le s  and c o n se q u e n c e s  
g iv e n  by elim ination  r u le s . C anonical g ro u n d s  and com m itm ents w ould  
seem  to m atch up but th is  is  n o t  a  req u irem en t on th e  a d eq u a cy  o f th e  
s tip u la tio n s  and i s  p r e c is e ly  w h y  both  g r o u n d s  and comm itm ent n eed  to  
be e x p lic it ly  m entioned.
That th e y  m ight n ot m atch up is  show n by  a co n sid era tio n  o f th e  
n eg a tio n  r u le s  for  c la s s ic a l lo g ic . C on sider a s e n te n c e  o f th e  form -  - P  
w h ere P  is  a lo g ic a lly  sim ple s e n te n c e  o f determ in ate  m eaning (g iv e n , 
sa y , by  a s s e r t ib il ity  co n d itio n s) . T hen to u n d ersta n d  -  - P  in v o lv e s  
k now in g th a t i t  can  be d er iv ed  from  P by d oub le n eg a tio n  in tro d u ctio n  
(DNI) or by  a red u c tio  ad absurdu m  (RAA) w ith  - P  a s  th e  so le  
assu m p tion . But u n d e r s ta n d in g  a lso  r e q u ir e s  know in g  how th e  lo g ica l  
o p era to rs  can  be elim inated  a c co rd in g  to our canon ica l r u le s  o f  
in fe r e n c e . Here we h ave  d oub le n eg a tio n  elim ination  (DNE) to g iv e  P. 
T hus P is  a s s e r t ib le  e ith e r  w h en  th e  o r ig in a l a s s e r t ib il ity  co n d itio n s  
hold or w h en  we h a v e  a d ed u ctio n  of it  from — P. T h ese  c o n d itio n s  are  
d is t in c t . T his is  im portant s in c e  an  attem pt to g u a r a n tee  a match w ould  
be to attem pt to j u s t i fy  d ed u ctio n . A lso, the n atu re  o f in fe r e n c e  m eans
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th a t th e  d e d u c tiv e  ro u te  p r o v id e s  c o n c lu s iv e  g ro u n d s  for P. So the  
d e d u c tiv e  g r o u n d s  ca n n o t be r e g a rd ed  a s  g ro u n d s  w h ich  m erely  p ro v id e  
good e v id e n c e  th a t th e  s e n te n c e 's  p r e v io u s ly  g iv e n  a s s e r t ib il ity  
co n d itio n s  o b ta in . T heir fu n c tio n  is  e n t ir e ly  d iffe r en t from  e v id en tia l  
g ro u n d s . But if  th is  is  th e  c a se  th e n  our p r e v io u s  ch a ra c ter iza tio n  of  
th e  m eaning o f P  w as in com p lete  j u s t  b eca u se  it  fa iled  to g iv e  an  
ex h a u stiv e  sp e c if ic a t io n  o f w h en  it  i s  c o r r e c t  to  a s s e r t  P. If w e now  
attem pt to  in c lu d e  th is  g ro u n d  in  o u r  a cco u n t o f th e  u se  c o n d itio n s  o f P  
th en  o n ce  aga in  ou r ex p la n a tio n s becom e c ircu la r . An u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f P  
p r e s u p p o s e s  an  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f •—P  and th a t in  tu r n  p r e s u p p o s e s  an  
u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f P.
One m ight w on d er w h eth er  th is  lim ited holism  is  n ot a ccep ta b le  s in ce  
m any c o n c e p ts  p la u s ib ly  can  o n ly  be u n d ersto o d  in  a co n tex t su p p lied  
by a g ro u p  o f s im ilarly  in te r d e p e n d e n t  co n cep ts; co lou r c o n c e p ts  m ight 
p ro v id e  an exam ple o f th is . But th e  p r e s e n t  th r ea t o f holism  is  far  more 
p e r v a s iv e . The exam ple w as m erely  illu s tr a t iv e ;  n o th in g  p articu lar  ab ou t  
n ega tion  w as assu m ed . The r e a so n  th e  exam ple w as c h o se n  w as th at  
in tu it io n is t ic  a rg u m en ts  o ffe r  som e p rim a  fa c ie  rea so n  for  d o u b tin g  
w h eth er  th e  tw o s o r ts  o f g r o u n d s  and c o n se q u e n c e s  m atch up. H owever  
th e  same s itu a tio n  o c c u r s  w h en ev e r  a lo g ic a lly  sim ple se n te n c e  is  
a s s e r t ib le  a s  a r e s u lt  o f u se  o f an elim ination  ru le , {e .g ., C onsider th e  
m eaning o f P  a s  c h a r a c te r iz e d  b y  its  a s s e r t ib il ity  co n d itio n s . Now a sk  
w h eth er  a s s e r t io n  o f P  by u s e  o f  & -elim ination w ith  P&Q a s  prem ise is  
in c lu d ed  in  th a t c h a r a c te r iz a tio n . If it  is  th en  we d eve lop  a c ir c u la r ity  
s in ce  g r a sp  o f P&.Q w ill in v o lv e  g r a sp  of th e  a s se r t io n  co n d itio n s  o f P. 
If  not, th e n  it  seem s th a t we h a v e  an in a d eq u a te  c h a ra c ter iza tio n  o f th e  
m eaning o f P. The la tte r  horn  o f th e  dilemma may be hard to tak e  
e n t ir e ly  s e r io u s ly  b eca u se  o f th e  o b v io u s  harm ony betw een  in tro d u ctio n  
and elim ination  r u le s . But th is  notion  o f harm ony can  h a v e  no ro le  in  
th e  im plicit d e fin itio n a l v iew .) I f  th is  is  th e  ca se  m ean ings become 
irred eem ab ly  in d eterm in ate . Holism^ c o lla p se s  in to  H olism )_
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What if  th e  s itu a t io n  is  w eak en ed  to one in  w h ich  we a ssu m e  th a t a 
ju stif ic a tio n  o f th e  p r a c tic e  conform ing  to m olecular req u irem en ts  is
g iv e n  in  an  in tu it io n is t ic  sem a n tics , but th a t we in tro d u ce  DNE by  
stip u la tio n  to r e c o v e r  c la s s ic a l log ic?  In  o th er  w ord s we a c c ep t o n ly  a 
p artia l sem antic  ju s tif ic a tio n  o f th e  log ic  and avo id  th e  m ism atch  
betw een  w hat w e are  ab le  to  ju s t i fy  and th e  a c tu a l p r a c tice  by
in tr o d u c in g  e x p lic it  s t ip u la t io n s . So, a lth o u g h  some in te r e s t  is  in v e s te d  
in  th e  ju s t if ic a to r y  program m e, i t s  r e v is io n a r y  pow er is  sap p ed  from  th e  
o u tse t . W right (1981, p p .19-21) fo c u s e s  on j u s t  su c h  an exam ple and  
w on d ers w h y  ou r o r ig in a l m olecular v iew  is  p r e ju d iced  by th e
stip u la tio n  th a t tw o ty p e s  o f s e n te n c e  w ith  h ith er to  d is t in c t  a s s e r t ib il ity
co n d itio n s  sh a ll h e n c e fo r th  c o in c id e ,
... c o n s id er  a n y  la n g u a g e  fo r  w h ich  an  a s s e r t ib il ity -c o n d it io n s  
sem an tics is  c o r r e c t  w h ose  e f f e c t  is  to op en  up, for ce r ta in  
sta te m e n ts , a p o ss ib le  h ia tu s  b etw een  co n d itio n s w a rran tin g  th e  
a sse r t io n  o f th e ir  doub le n e g a tio n s  and c o n d itio n s  w arran tin g  th e  
a sse r t io n  o f th o se  s ta tm en ts  th e m se lv e s . The q u estio n  is: if  a
m olecular v iew  o f su c h  a la n g u a g e  is  p o ss ib le  at a ll, how w ould it  be 
com prom ised if  th e  la n g u a g e  w ere  m erely  a lte r ed  so  a s  to o b litera te  
th is  h ith er to  r e c o g n ise d  d istin c tio n ?  (1981, p .20 -1 )
The problem  w ith  th is  p ic tu r e  is  th at in tro d u ctio n  o f th e  stip u la tio n  
m eans th a t we h ave  no g u a r a n te e  th a t we sh a ll be ab le  to m aintain our  
g r a sp  of th e  m ean in gs a s  g iv e n  in tu it io n is t ic a lly . Here th e  th r ea t is  not 
of small loca l holism s bu t th a t th e  s tip u la tio n  w ill a lter  th e  m ean ings o f  
th e  in tu it io n is t ic a lly  g iv e n  lo g ica l v o c a b u la ry  r e su lt in g  in  w h olesa le  
c h a n g e s  o f m eaning in  th e  fragm en t o f la n g u a g e . E ither we lo se  s ig h t  of 
the m ean ings a s  g iv e n  in tu it io n is t ic a lly  - in  w hich  c a se  th e  o r ig in a l  
problem s r e c u r -  or e ls e  we re ta in  th e  in tu it io n is t ic  la n g u a g e  in  some 
form and u se  it  to  exp la in  the m eaning of th e  stip u la tion . The secon d
131scen a rio  a s  w ell a s  b e in g  h ig h ly  a r tif ic ia l d oes not prom ise a g lobal 
r e in sta tem en t o f c la s s ic a l lo g ic  nor does it  fo re g o  a co n cern  w ith  
sem antic ju s t if ic a t io n s , (R ecall it  is  th e  q u estio n  about th e  g lob al 
a p p lica b ility  o f c la s s ic a l  lo g ic  th a t h as been lin k ed  to th e  a c c ep ta b ility  
o f realism .) It  a c h ie v e s  a t m ost a loca l reh ab ilita tion  o f c la s s ic a l log ic  
su b sta n tia ted  by  som e so r t  o f r e d u c tiv e  th e s is .  So we are not in  th e  
p o sitio n  o f re ta in in g  a m olecular v iew  to g e th e r  w ith  a  r e fu sa l to  accou n t  
sem an tica lly  for  th e  log ic; r a th er  w e a ccep t th e  ob lg a tio n  to a ccou n t for  
lo g ic , re ta in  a  m olecular v iew  and  j u s t i fy  c la ss ic a l log ic  lo ca lly . That is  a  
p e r fe c t ly  a ccep ta b le  form  o f a n ti-r e a lism  about a re g io n  o f d isco u rse .
T his p o in t ab ou t th e  n eed  to e n v isa g e  a  la n g u a g e  g iv e n  a prior  
in tu it io n is t ic  sem an tics a lso  sh o w s th a t th e  ap p earan ce  o f a fin a l p o s itio n  
w hich  is  n o n -r e  v is io n a r y  i s  e n t ir e ly  illu so r y . The la n g u a g e  for  w h ich  we 
a ccep t th e  v a lid ity  o f c la s s ic a l  lo g ic  h as m arked ly  le s s  e x p r e ss iv e  pow er  
th an  th e  o r ig in a l la n g u a g e  s in c e  th e  co n ten t o f P  in  th e  o r ig in a l  
la n g u a g e  has been  w eak en ed  to  th a t o f — P (in th e  o r ig in a l la n g u a g e). 
T here is  no lo n g er  a m eans o f e x p r e ss in g  th e  c o n ten t o r ig n a lly  c o n v e y e d  
by P.
§3 The Form o f Dummett’s  Program m e and th e  Im portance o f th e  Notion  
o f Truth:
W right’s a d v o c a c y  o f w hat h e  term s th e  im plicit d efin ition a l v iew  of th e  
m ean ings o f th e  lo g ica l c o n n e c t iv e s  is  su p p o sed  to be c o n s is te n t  w ith  
Dummett’s  sem antic c o n s tr a in ts . T h ose  c o n str a in ts  u sh e r e d  in  a g en era l 
argum ent a g a in s t  a n otion  o f tr u th  p o s s e s s in g  determ in ate tru th  v a lu e s  
ir r e s p e c t iv e  of our a b ility  to  determ in e th o se  v a lu e s . So W right w an ts  to  
show  th a t we can  a c c e p t  th e  in c o h e re n c e  o f r e a lis t  tru th  but d iv o r ce s  
th e  im plication s o f th a t from  p o ss ib le  r e v is io n s  o f log ic . He a ttem p ts to  
a c h iev e  th is  by r e fu s in g  to s e e k  for  a sem antic va lid a tion  o f log ic  y e t  
sh ow in g  th a t th a t r e fu sa l d oes not in v ite  the ch a rg e  o f holism . I have  
tr ied  to show  th at W right d o es  n ot s u c c e s s fu lly  d is t in g u ish  h is  p osition
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from a h o lis t ic  on e. Now I w ant to  c o n s id er  a s e t  o f a rgu m en ts  draw n  
from s u g g e s t io n s  o f W right w h ich  c h a lle n g e s  th e  u se  Dummett m akes o f  
th e  notion  of tr u th  in  c h a r a c te r iz in g  th e  m etap h ysica l is s u e  o f realism . 
T h ese  arg u m en ts  p o se  a p o te n tia lly  d eep er  ch a lle n g e  to Dummett’s  
program m e s in c e  th e y  q u e s t io n  th e  sem antic fram ew ork w ith in  w h ich  
Dummett th in k s  th e  m etap h ysica l i s s u e s  m ust be tack led .
"The re la tio n  of tr u th  to  re co g n it io n  o f tr u th  is," a s  Dummett n o te s  
in  The J u s tif ic a tio n  o f  D ed u c tio n  (1975a, p .314), "the fu n d am en ta l 
problem  o f  th e  th e o r y  o f m ean ing, or , w hat is  th e  same th in g , o f  
m etap h ysics: fo r  th e  q u e s t io n  a s  to  th e  n a tu re  o f r e a lity  is  a lso  th e  
q u estio n  w hat is  th e  a p p ro p r ia te  notion  o f tru th  fo r  th e  s e n te n c e s  of 
our la n g u a g e , or , a g a in , how w e r e p r e se n t  r e a lity  by  m eans of 
se n te n c e s ."  A d isc o u r se  e n a b le s  r e p r e se n ta tio n  o f an a sp e c t  o f r e a lity . 
To determ in e th e  m anner o f th a t r e p r e se n ta tio n  we n eed  to fo c u s  on th e  
notion  o f tr u th  r e le v a n t  to th a t d isc o u r se . How do we a rr iv e  a t th e  
c o r r e c t  notion  o f tru th ?  Dum m ett’s  an sw er  is  b y  a ttem p tin g  to c o n s tr u c t  
a th e o r y  o f m eaning w h ich  is  a  th e o r y  o f u n d er sta n d in g  for  the  
d isco u rse . The im portance o f th is  s te p  is  tw ofold . F ir st, a tte n d in g  to  
q u e stio n s  ab ou t m eaning a llow s u s , w ith ou t b e g g in g  a n y  m etap h ysica l 
q u e stio n s , to  im pose g e n e r a lly  ap p licab le  c o n s tr a in ts  on  an ad eq u ate  
a ccou n t o f our p r a c tic e . T h is c o r r e sp o n d s  to  the g lobal a s p e c t  of 
a n ti-rea lism  in th a t th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  sem antic argu m en ts p ro v id e  u s  w ith  
a g e n e r a lly  a p p lica b le  c h a lle n g e  to a ttem p ts to ju s t i fy  a p ra ctice . 
S econ d ly , th e  attem pt to c o n s tr u c t  a th e o r y  o f m eaning for  a p articu lar  
reg io n  of d isc o u r se  is  co n str a in e d  by  h a v in g  to g iv e  an ad eq u ate  
a ccou n t o f th a t p r a c tic e . What c o u n ts  as an ad eq u ate  a ccou n t is  su b je c t  
to deb ate . C erta in ly  we can n ot re q u ire  th a t th e  a cco u n t j u s t i fy  e v e r y  
a sp e c t  o f th e  p r a c tic e  w ith ou t som e argum en t to th e  e f fe c t  th at su c h  an  
accou n t sh ou ld  be p o ss ib le . The a cco u n t m ust how ever e n g a g e  w ith  th e  
p ra ctice  i t s e lf  in  th a t we m ust show  how sem antic n o tion s u sed  in  the  
th eo ry  re la te  to  th e  p r a c tic e .
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W right (1986) a r g u e s  th at a c c e p tin g  th e  p r in c ip le  o f B iva len ce  for  
sta tem en ts  n ot know n to  be e f f e c t iv e ly  d ec id ab le  is  n ot d is t in c t iv e  o f a
r e a lis t  a ttitu d e  tow ard s th o se  sta tem en ts . He claim s a lso  th a t th e
a n t i-r e a lis t  is  n ot com m itted to  a p articu lar  a ttitu d e  tow ard s th e
p r in c ip le  o f B iva len ce  a s  ap p lied  to  su c h  sta tem en ts . B efore exam ining  
some o f th e  d eta il o f  W right’s  a rg u m en ts  I w an t, b r ie f ly , to in v e s t ig a te  
th e ir  im port.
My im m ediate c o n c e r n  h ere  is  w ith  th e  q u e stio n  o f w h eth er  or  n ot  
th e  sea rch  for  a sem antic  ju s t if ic a t io n  of lo g ic  i s  a  p r o je c t  w h ich  is  
both  a ccep ta b le  and  n e c e s s a r y  fo r  an a n t i-r e a lis t . The a b ility  o f an  
a n t i-r e a lis t  to  a c c ep t th e  p r in c ip le  o f B iva len ce  h a s no im m ediate b earin g  
on th a t q u e stio n . B efore we can  a p p ra ise  th e  r e le v a n c e  o f th e
a n t i-r e a lis t ’s  a ttitu d e  tow ard s th e  p r in c ip le  o f B iva len ce  we n eed  to  be 
g iv en  some a cco u n t o f how he m aintains th a t a ttitu d e . H ow ever, e v e n  if  
we b rack et th a t q u e stio n  for  th e  moment th e r e  is ,  a t le a s t  p rim a  fa c ie , a  
problem  fo r  th e  a n t i-r e a lis t . Realism  in v o lv e s  a commitment to  a n otion  o f  
tru th  w h ich  d e term in a te ly  e ith e r  o b ta in s  or fa ils  to ob ta in  in d e p e n d e n tly  
o f our a b ility  to  d eterm in e th e  m atter. It m ight seem  n a tu ra l th a t  
a c c ep tin g  su c h  a n otion  o f tr u th  sh ou ld  be exp la in ed  in  term s o f an  
en d orsem en t o f B iva len ce  fo r  a ll s ta tem en ts  (and, in  p a rticu la r , for  
sta tem en ts  n o t know n to  be e f fe c t iv e ly  d ec id a b le ). Now, i f  it  is  
q u estio n a b le  w h eth er  or not an  a n t i-r e a lis t  can  en d o r se  B iva len ce , th e  
n atu re  o f th e  m etap h ysica l is s u e  o f realism  becom es u n clear . That is , th e  
a n t i-r e a lis t  fa c e s  a su b s ta n tia l ta sk  in  m erely  d is t in g u is h in g  h im self  
from th e r e a lis t .
In some o f h is  la ter  w ork Dummett (1982, 1981, 1991) has r e tr a c te d  
h is  o v e r -s im p le  c h a r a c te r iz a tio n  o f realism  w ith  r e s p e c t  to a g iv e n  c la s s  
o f sta tem en ts  p u r e ly  in  term s o f th e  a p p lica b ility  o f b iv a len ce  to th o se  
sta tem en ts . The n a tu re  o f th e  sem antic th e o ry  ad op ted  for  th o se  
sta tem en ts  is  i t s e lf  an  in te g r a l p a rt of w hat c o n s t itu te s  a r e a lis tic  
a ttitu d e  tow ard s th o se  s ta te m e n ts . One is  a r e a lis t  ab ou t s ta tem en ts  o f a
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g iv e n  c la s s  if  on e a c c e p ts  a c la s s ic a l tw o -v a lu ed  tru th  con d ition a l 
sem an tics for  th o se  s ta tem en ts  w h ich  m akes e s se n t ia l  u se  o f th e  n otion  
of r e fe r e n c e  (1982, p p .5 6 -7 ). Or, b e tte r , su c h  a p o sitio n  e v in c e s  an  
a ttitu d e  o f n a iv e  realism  w ith  r e s p e c t  to  th o se  sta tem en ts . Dummett d oes  
not p r e te n d  th a t n a ive  realism  is  in  th e  le a s t  p la u s ib le  a s  a g lobal 
p osition . In  m any in s ta n c e s  a r e a lis t  may o ffe r  a r e d u c tiv e  a cco u n t o f  
the tr u th  co n d itio n s  o f on e c la s s  o f sta tem en ts  (th e  prob lem atic c la s s )  in  
term s o f th o se  o f a n o th er  (th e  r e d u c tiv e  c la s s ) . T h us a tru th  con d ition a l 
m eaning th e o r y  is  g iv e n  fo r  th e  form er c la s s  w h ich  may leg itim ate  th e  
ap p lica tion  o f th e  p r in c ip le  o f B iva len ce . H ow ever a n a iv e ly  r e a lis tic  
p osition  is  n ot assu m ed  s in c e  an in ev ita b le  ap p ea l to  th e  notion  of 
r e fe r e n c e  fo r  s in g u la r  term s of th e  prob lem atic c la s s  is  n ot made in  th e  
sem antic th e o ry . It  w ou ld , h o w ev er , be in c o r r e c t  to  id e n tify  su c h  a 
p o sitio n  w ith  a re lin q u ish m en t o f a r e a lis t  v iew  of th e  prob lem atic c la s s .  
Dummett d u b s su c h  p o s itio n s  v e r s io n s  o f so p h is tic a te d  realism . (It is  an  
im portant q u e stio n  w h eth er  so p h is t ic a te d  realism  m ust a lw ays assu m e a 
n aive  realism  w ith  r e s p e c t  to som e c la s s  o f s ta tem en ts .) The m etap h ysica l 
q u estio n  now c e n tr e s  on r e a so n s  for  d e p a r tu r es  from  n a ive  realism : no  
d ep a rtu re  is  m eta p h y sica lly  n eu tr a l. A n ti-rea lism  o f Dummett’s  so r t  
o ffe r s  a g lo b a lly  ap p licab le  c h a lle n g e  to a n y  sem antic th e o ry . Some 
p o s itio n s , a lth o u g h  not o f th e  n a iv e ly  r e a lis t  so r t, w ill s t il l  fa il to m eet 
th at c h a llen g e . An exam ple o f th is  m ight be c e r ta in  m any va lu ed  log ica l 
sy ste m s w h ose  v a lu e s  d e term in a te ly  ob ta in  or fa il to ob ta in . I f  a  n a iv e ly  
r e a lis t  v iew  is  a t a ll p la u s ib le  w ith  r e sp e c t  to th e  c la s s  o f sta tem en ts  
co n cern ed  th e n  su c h  p o s itio n s  w ill be se e n  a s  d e p a r tu r es  from  realism . 
(T hus w ill n ot be m eta p h y sica lly  n e u tr a l) . But th e  r e a so n s  for d ep a r tin g  
from realism  may be draw n from , sa y , a p articu lar  o n to lo g ica l v iew  and  
th u s  th e  r e su lt in g  p o s itio n  may fa il to sq u a re  w ith  Dummett’s c o n s tr a in ts  
on an a c cep ta b le  sem antic  th e o ry . So B iva len ce  is  o n ly  a n e c e s s a r y  
con d ition  fo r  a n a iv e ly  r e a lis t ic  a tt itu d e  and a p o sitio n  may fa il to be 
fu lly  ( i.e ., n a iv e ly )  r e a lis tic  y e t  s t i l l  fa il to m eet th e  a n t i-r e a lis t ’s
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ch a llen g e .
We sh ou ld  n ote  th e  fo llow in g . F ir st, it  is  not c lear  th a t an  
en d orsem en t o f c la s s ic a l lo g ic  w ill in v o lv e  a commitment to B iva len ce  and  
se co n d ly  it  is  n ot c lea r  th a t an  a n t i-r e a lis t  may not su b s c r ib e  to (a 
sta tem en t of) B iva len ce . So it  may be th a t our f ir s t  o rd er  lin g u is t ic  
p ra c tic e  may be p r e s e r v e d  w ith ou t e v in c in g  a r e a lis tic  a ttitu d e . The 
re la tio n  b etw een  our c o n s tr a in ts  on  a sem antic a cco u n t o f th e  p ra c tice  
and th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  p r a c tic e  i t s e l f  m ust be m ediated b y  th e  com plex  
b u s in e ss  o f c o n s tr u c t in g  th e  sem antic th eo ry .
So W right is  c o r r e c t  in  h o ld in g  th a t th e r e  can n ot be a n y  
id e n tif ic a tio n  o f  a n ti-r e a lism  w ith  a s p e c if ic  a ttitu d e  tow ard s th e  
p rin c ip le  o f B iv a len ce . H ow ever th a t p o sitio n  g o e s  no w ay tow ard s  
sh ow in g  th a t th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  is  u n ab le  to co n c e rn  h im self w ith  sem antic  
v a lid a tio n s o f lo g ic . B ut, p erh a p s  we can  u n co v e r  a  more p ro fo u n d ly  
u n se tt lin g  problem  fo r  th e  a n t i-r e a lis t .  G ranted th a t th e  is s u e  o f realism  
d oes n ot h in g e  p u r e ly  on  th e  n a tu re  o f th e  f ir s t  o rd er  p r a c tic e  but 
e s se n t ia lly  in v o lv e s  th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  sem antic a cco u n t o f th a t p r a c tic e , 
it  may be a moot and s ig n if ic a n t  p o in t a s  to  w h eth er  or not th e  sem antic  
acco u n t is  i t s e lf  a n t i-r e a lis t ic a lly  accep ta b le . In  o th er  w ord s, if  w e are  
not su r e  w h eth er  or not u se  o f B iva len ce  in  th e  f ir s t  ord er  p r a c tic e  is  
leg itim ate , i s  it  s t i l l  c lea r  w h eth er  or not th e  sem a n tic  th e o r y  m akes u se  
of an a n t i-r e a lis t ic a lly  r e p u g n a n t notion? I f  we ca n n ot be c e r ta in  o f th e  
c r e d e n tia ls  o f  th e  sem antic th e o r y  th e  d isp u te  th r e a te n s  to  become  
u n ap p roach ab le .
So m uch th e n  for  th e  form  o f an  a tta ck  on  th e  c o h e r en ce  of 
(Dummettian) a n ti-rea lism . To tak e th e  q u estio n  fu r th e r  I sh a ll n eed  to  
co n s id er  th e  s p e c if ic  arg u m en ts  c a n v a sse d  by  W right in  h is  in v e s t ig a tio n  
o f th e  ro le  o f B iva len ce .
W right a r g u e s  th a t th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  who a d h e r e s  to in tu it io n is t ic  log ic  
can  c o h e r e n tly  e ith e r  d e n y  or a c c ep t B iva len ce . So (sem antic)  
a n ti-rea lism  sh ou ld  n ot be r e g a rd ed  as e n ta ilin g  an a g n o stic ism  about
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B iva len ce , O b viou sly , if  our c o n c e rn  is  w ith  d is t in g u ish in g  a n ti-rea lism  
from  realism  and B iv a len ce  is  ta k en  to be n e c e s s a r y  to  realism , we need  
o n ly  co n c e rn  o u r s e lv e s  w ith  th e  p o ss ib il ity  o f an a n t i-r e a lis t  
en d orsem en t o f B iva len ce . W right n o te s  th a t th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  m ight 
r e in te r p r e t  th e  sta tem en t o f B iva len ce  a s  sa y in g  th a t a ll sta tm en ts  are  
(hum anly) re so lu b le . He can  th u s  a c c ep t B iva len ce  on fa ith  w ith ou t
in c u r r in g  a comm itm ent to realism , th at is , w ith ou t in c u r r in g  a
comm itm ent to  th e  p o s s ib il ity  o f unk now ab le tr u th s .
The ta r g e t  o f  th e se  a tta c k s  is  th e  v iew  th a t an  a n t i-r e a lis t  is  
com m itted to  an a g n o stic ism  ab ou t B iva len ce . T here is  no o b v io u s
e x ten sio n  o f th e  argu m en t to  m otivate th e  so r t  o f d oub t ab ou t th e  
c o h e r en ce  o f th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  p o s itio n  I sk e tc h e d  ab ove , The scen ario
d e p ic ts  th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  a s  an a d h e r e n t o f in tu it io n is t ic  log ic  and th u s  
p r e su p p o se s  th a t a d ep a r tu re  from  c la ss ic a l lo g ic  h as a lrea d y  been  
accom p lish ed . That d ep a r tu re  is  p resu m ab ly  to be ta k en  a s  a r e sp o n se  
to  an a n t i-r e a lis t ic  va lid a tio n  o f lo g ica l p ra ctice . T hus th e  leg itim acy  of 
th a t p r o je c t  m ust be g r a n ted  at le a s t  a s  an assu m p tion  for  th e  p u r p o se s  
o f a red u c tio  proof. But th en  it  is  c lear  th at th e  p r in c ip le  o f B iva len ce  
is  b ein g  a c c ep te d  on  fa ith  and not a s  p art o f th e  a n t i-r e a lis t ’s sem antic  
th e o ry . The a b ility  to  make th is  d is tin c tio n  is  all th a t is  req u ired  to 
d is t in g u ish  th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  from  th e  re a lis t. S e co n d ly  th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  
in te r p r e ta tio n  o f th e  p r in c ip le  o f  B iva len ce  (as e v in c in g  th e  b e lie f  th at  
all sta tem en ts  are hum anly r e so lu b le , i .e ., th a t a ll s ta tem en ts  are  
a n t i-r e a lis t ic a lly  tru e) m ust be re g a rd ed  a s  in te llig ib le . It can  o n ly  be 
tak en  a s  in te llig ib le  if  we r e g a rd  th e  a n t i-r e a lis t ’s n otion  of tru th  (i.e ., 
a c o n cep t o f tru th  firm ly  tied  to  our reco g n itio n a l a b ilit ie s)  a s  co h eren t. 
T his, aga in  allow s th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  to  d is t in g u ish  h im self from  th e r e a lis t  
s in ce  th e  r e a lis t  w ill not o ffe r  su ch  an a ccou n t o f h is b iva len t  
co n cep tio n  o f tru th .
It m ight ap p ear th a t a more p ow erfu l argu m en t is  to be g lean ed  from  
c o n s id e r in g  th e  re la tio n  of c la s s ic a l  log ic  to th e  p r in c ip le  o f B iva len ce .
137W right (1986, p p . 351-2) a r g u e s  th a t i f  c la ss ic a l log ic  is  a n t i-r e a lis t ic a lly  
a ccep ta b le  th en  it  is  n ot c lea r  th at e sp o u sa l o f th e  p r in c ip le  o f  
B iva len ce  is  not to  be in te r p r e te d  a s  an inform al sta tem en t o f th e  Law 
o f E xcluded M iddle (LEM) -w h ic h , by assu m p tion , is  a n t i-r e a lis t ic a lly  
a ccep ta b le . One w an ts  im m ediately to  resp o n d  to th is  on b eh a lf o f the  
a n t i-r e a lis t  th a t o n ly  fo r  th e  r e a lis t  is  th e  p r in c ip le  o f B iva len ce  a 
sem a n tic  p r in c ip le  u se d  a s  a ju s ti f ic a tio n  o f th e  la tte r  sy n ta c t ic  
p rin c ip le . But th is  d is tin c tio n , W right cla im s, is  p r e c is e ly  w hat is  
req u ired  to  be made o u t an d , w h ils t  it  is  c lear  e n o u g h  for  form al 
la n g u a g e s , r e q u ir e s  ex p lica tio n  b efo re  it  can be ap p lied  to  th e  c a se  o f  
n atu ra l la n g u a g e s .
The p e r tin e n c e  o f th is  o b se r v a tio n  e s c a p e s  me, W right is  claim ing  
th a t in  n a tu ra l la n g u a g e  th e  d is t in c tio n  b etw een  sem antic an d  sy n ta c t ic  
p r in c ip le s  is  n ot s u f f ic ie n t ly  w ell e s ta b lish e d  to en ab le  a sep a ra tio n  o f  
th e  u se  o f th e  sta tem en t th at a ll s e n te n c e s  are  tru e  or are n ot tru e  as  
a sta tem en t o f ex c lu d ed  m iddle from  a sta tem en t of B iva len ce . P erh ap s  
so , but th e  r o le  o f  th e  sta tem en t is , in  e ith e r  c a se  d iffe r e n t. In  both  
c a s e s  th e  sta tem en t w ill be ap p ea led  to in  o rd er  to j u s t i fy  p a r tic u la r  
in fe r e n c e s  by ex c lu d ed  m iddle but o n ly  th e  r e a lis t  w ill ap p ea l to th e  
p rin c ip le  o f B iv len ce  in  ord er  to  j u s t i fy  LEM its e lf  (w hich  p resu m ab ly , 
in  i t s  more orth od ox  form , is  in te llig ib le  to both d isp u ta n ts ) . For th e  
a n t i-r e a lis t  su c h  an  ap p ea l w ould be b la tan tly  c ircu la r . A lso th e  
a n t i-r e a lis t  is  su p p o se d  to be in  p o s s e s s io n  o f an a n t i-r e a lis t ic a lly  
a ccep ta b le  sem antic v a lid a tio n  o f c la s s ic a l logic: it  is  to th is  th a t he w ill 
ap p eal in  o rd er  to  Justify-j r a th er  th a n  s ta te , LEM.
A nother w ay o f  p u tt in g  th e  p o in t w ould be in  term s o f s p e a k e r s ’ 
k n ow led ge o f th e  r e le v a n t  p r in c ip le s . K now ledge o f th e  sy n ta c t ic  
p r in c ip le  w ould be ex h a u sted  by an  a b ility  to a p p ly  th e  p r in c ip le  
c o r r e c tly . K now ledge o f th e  sem antic  p r in c ip le  m ust be exp la in ed  in  
term s o f a g r a sp  o f th e  r e le v a n t  sem antica l co n cep t. T his can n ot, on  
pain o f c ir c u la r ity , be tak en  to c o n s is t  sim ply in  th e  a b ility  to perform
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and r e co g n iz e  a p p ro p r ia te  in fe r e n c e s ,
W right s t r e s s e s  th a t th e  sc en a r io  d e sc r ib e d  is  p rem issed  on th e  
a b ility  o f th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  to fu r n ish  a sem antic ju s tif ic a tio n  of c la ss ic a l  
lo g ic . That p o s s ib il ity  m ight be th o u g h t to be im p lau sib ly  fa r - fe tc h e d  
but both W right and Dummett h a v e  p ro v id ed  su p e r -v a lu a tio n a l sem an tics  
w hich  prom ise an  a n t i-r e a lis t ic a lly  a c cep ta b le  ju s tif ic a tio n  of c la ss ic a l  
lo g ic , a t le a s t  in  r e s tr ic te d  c o n te x ts . The argu m en t m ight be read  a s  
o ffe r in g  a r e d u c tio  a d  a b su rd u m  o f  a n o n -r e v is io n a r y  a n t i-r e a lis t  s ta n ce . 
The argu m en t w ould th e n  be th a t if  su c h  a s ta n c e  i s  assum ed  th e re  can  
be no d is t in g u is h in g  th e  u se  in  th e  sem a n tic  th e o r y  o f a n t i-r e a lis t ic a lly  
r e p u g n a n t n o tio n s. That r e su lt  w ould be s ig n if ic a n t  (p a rtly  b ecau se  the  
ap p aren t s u c c e s s  o f su p e r -v a lu a tio n a l a p p ro a ch es  w ould th en  be prim a  
fa c ie  e v id e n c e  for  th e  in c o h e re n c e  o f th e  a n t i-r e a lis t ’s  p o s itio n ).
An argu m en t o f th is  form  is  n o t, d e sp ite  a p p ea ra n ces , in  th e  o ffin g . 
U se of th e  sta tem en t th a t a ll s e n te n c e s  are  tru e  or not tru e  a s  an  
inform al sta tem en t o f LEM is  p rem issed  n ot o n ly  on  th e  v a lid ity  o f  
c la ss ic a l lo g ic  b y  a n t i-r e a lis t  l ig h ts  but a lso  on  th e  a c c ep ta b ility  o f th e  
e q u iv a le n c e  th e s is .  What we h a v e , for  a n y  sta tem en t P  is ,
" F' is  tr u e  or is  n ot tr u e , 
i .e ., ”P" is  tr u e  or "P" is  n ot tru e , 
i .e ., "P" is  tru e  or not-("P "  is  tru e)  
i .e ., P  or n o t-P , p ro v id ed  "P" is  tru e  if f  P.
The argu m en t I sk e tc h e d  a b ove  can  now be s e e n  to fa il b eca u se  in  th e  
su p e r -v a lu a tio n a l a p p ro a ch es  th e  e q u iv a le n c e  th e s is  is  in va lid  b ecau se  
tr u th  d oes n ot d is tr ib u te  o v e r  d is ju n ctio n . The po in t is  a s  fo llow s. If 
th e  e q u iv a len ce  th e s is  h o ld s for  "P or Q" th en  we have,
"P or Q" is  tru e  i f f  P  or Q,
But th en , if  the e q u iv a le n c e  th e s is  h o ld s for a rb itr a r y  P and Q (i.e ., we
h a v e , " F' is  tru e  if f  P) th en  w e h a v e ,
"P or Q" is  tru e  i f f  "P" is  tru e  or "Q" is  tru e .
So tru th  w ill d is tr ib u te  o v er  d is ju n c tio n  c o n tra r y  to th e  o r ig in a l claim.
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a n t i-r e a lis t ic a lly  a c c ep ta b le  v a lid a tio n  o f c la ss ic a l log ic  w h ich  a lso  
e n d o r se s  th e  e q u iv a le n c e  t h e s is  ( i.e ., a c c e p ts  th e  tw o v a lu ed  tru th  
ta b le s  a s  c o r r e c t) . B ut th a t, s in c e  i t  is  a v e r s io n  of realism , sh ou ld  not 
be te r r ib ly  su r p r isn g .
It is  co n c e iv a b le  th a t th is  argu m en t m ight be o b je c te d  to  by  in s is t in g  
th a t we a d h ere  to  som e n o n -s ta n d a r d  in te r p r e ta tio n  of d is ju n ctio n  in  th e  
sem a n tic  th e o ry .  B u t, u n le s s  w e assu m e th a t th e  c o n n e c tiv e s  are g iv en  
th e  sta n d a rd  tr u th  fu n c tio n a l in te r p r e ta t io n  (th is  i s  n o t  to  sa y  th a t  
th e ir  m ea n in g s  are ca p tu r ed  in  th is  m anner) it  is  im p ossib le  to  s e e  how, 
in d eed , we cou ld  c h a r a c te r iz e  th e  n otion  o f tru th  w hich  th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  
f in d s  u n a ccep ta b le . It w ould , o th e r w ise , be p o ss ib le  to c o n tin u a lly  bring  
in to  q u e stio n  th e  term s in  w h ich  w e ch a r a c te r iz e  su c h  a notion  and we 
w ould th u s  n e v e r  h a v e  a m eans o f ch a r a c te r iz in g  a n otion  w hich  
e n g a g e s  w ith  th e  p r a c tic e .
The p o s s ib il ity  o f th e  d isp u te  w ould  th e n  th r ea te n  to v a n ish . But th is  
o n ly  sh ow s th a t th e  d isp u te  r e q u ir e s  th at th ere  be a m easure of 
agreem en t b etw een  th e  d isp u ta n ts . We n eed  o n ly  in s is t  th a t th e  n atu re  
of th e  agreem en t b e g s  no m eta p h y sica l q u e stio n s . It is  hard to  s e e  how  
in s is t in g  on  th e  sta n d a rd  in te r p r e ta t io n  o f th e  c o n n e c tiv e s  in  th e  
sem antic th e o r y  p r e ju d g e s  th e  m eta p h y sica l is s u e .
It sh o u ld , f in a lly , a lso  be n o ted  th a t th e  p o sitio n  th e  argum en t  
p rom ises to d e liv e r  is  th a t th e r e  is  an in co h eren ce  in  th e  a n t i-r e a lis t ’s 
p osition  b ecau se  he is  u n ab le  to  ch a r a c te r iz e  th o se  sem antic n otion s  
w hich  c o n tra v e n e  h is  g e n e r a l c o n s id e r a tio n s  ab ou t m eaning. T his is  not 
th e  p osition  w h ich  W right a t som e p o in ts  seem s to be a d v e r tis in g . W right 
seem s to be sa y in g  th a t we can  a c c ep t th e  a n t i-r e a lis t 's  sem antic  
c o n str a in ts  y e t  q u e stio n  th e  n eed  for  a p o ten tia lly  r e v is io n a r y  p osition  
to flow  therefrom . The p o sitio n  r a th er  q u e stio n s  the a n t i-r e a lis t ’s a b ility  
to form ulate c o h e r e n tly  th o se  c o n s tr a in ts . (We sh a ll se e  below th a t  
W right o f fe r s  w hat p u r p o r t to be more profound  r e a so n s  for h o ld in g
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The p o in t o f my arg u m en ts  th u s  far h as been  f ir s t ly  to r e fu te  
W right’s claim th a t ab a n d o n in g  th e  p r o jec t  o f ju s t ify in g  log ic  is  not to  
abandon an im portant co n cep tio n  o f m eaning, nam ely, th a t w h ich  in s is t s  
on m olecu larity  o f m eaning. S e c o n d ly  I h ave  tr ied  to show  th a t a c c ep tin g  
th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  fram ew ork d o es lead , c o n tra  W right’s  co n ten tio n s , to , at 
lea st , a p o te n tia lly  re  v is io n a r y  p o sitio n . I h ave , h o w ev er , im p licitly  
assum ed  th a t one is  ab le  to  s u b s ta n tia te  a notion  o f m eaning w h ich  
allow s th a t a c e r ta in  p a tte r n  o f u se  may or may not be fa ith fu l to  or in  
harm ony w ith  e s ta b lish e d  m ean in gs. I h ave th u s  fram ed th e  argu m en t 
w ith in  th e  param en ters o f Dum m ett’s  a n t i-r e a lis t  d isc u ss io n . W right 
c o n te s ts  w h eth er  th e se  n o tio n s  are  th em se lv e s  a n t i-r e a lis t ic a lly  
a ccep ta b le . T his c h a lle n g e s  th e  a n t i-r e a lis t ’s  a b ility  to  s ta te  h is  own  
c a se  and th u s  th e  v e r y  c o h e r en ce  o f Dummett’s  p osition .
§4 The P o ss ib ility  o f an A n ti-R ea list J u stif ic a tio n  o f D eduction:
If W right is  o b je c t in g  to th e  a n t i- r e a l is t ’s u se  o f n o tion s to do w ith  
f id e lity  to  p r e -e s ta b lis h e d  m ean in gs th e n  th e  o r ig in a l p o r tra y a l w h ich  I 
g a v e  o f h is  p o s itio n  n e e d s  a lte r in g  to th e  more fo r c e fu l on e o f h o ld in g  
not sim ply th a t w e can  s h ift  ou r m ethodologica l s ta n ce  but th a t we m ust 
sh ift  th a t s ta n c e  and th a t th a t s h ift  c o r re sp o n d s  to  an im portant 
rea lign m en t in  our c o n cep tio n  o f m eaning. The sh ift  is  not m erely  to a 
p o sitio n  w h ich  p rom ises more, a v o id s  th e  need  for  r e v is io n , at l it t le  or
no co st. R ather w e m ust s h ift  b eca u se  th e  o r ig in a l p osition  is  s e e n  to be
in co h eren t.
W right o b je c ts  to  th e  a n t i- r e a l is t ’s a b ility  to s ta te  c o h e r en tly  h is  
claim th at in fe r e n tia l r u le s  are  a d eq u a te  o n ly  if  th e y  is s u e  in  w arran ts  
for  the a s se r t io n  o f s e n te n c e s  in  the base c la s s  th a t w ould  
p r e -in fe r e n t ia lly  h ave  been  c o r r e c t ly  a s se r t ib le . The q u estio n  W right 
p o se s  is  w h eth er  we cou ld  e v e r  r e co g n iz e  th a t a g iv e n  p ra c tice  of 
in fe r e n c e  m ight fa il th is  a d e q u a c y  con d ition . If not th en  by h is  own
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p rop osed  is  v a c u o u s . We m ight d ou b t our a b ility  to r e co g n iz e  an
in ad eq u ate  in fe r e n tia l p r a c tic e  j u s t  b ecau se  on ce  a ccep ted  th a t p r a c tice  
s e r v e s  a norm ative fu n c tio n . The r u le s  th em se lv e s  are in v o lv e d  in  how  
we draw th e  lin e  b etw een  ap p ea ra n ce  and r e a lity .
An a lte r n a tiv e  arith m etic?  To illu s tr a te  th is  le t  u s  c o n s id er  an exam ple  
w h ich  W right d is c u s s e s  (1981, p p .2 1 -7 ), C onsider a com m unity w ith  
e x a c tly  sim ilar c o u n tin g  p r a c t ic e s  to ou r own sa v e  th at th e y  fa il to  go  
on to d eve lop  ar ith m etic . The com m unity som ehow f in d s  i t s e lf  in  
p o sse ss io n  of a s e t  o f, w h at it  ta k e s  to  be, arith m etic  tr u th s  and u s e s  
th e se  a s  norm ative o v e r  i t s  c o u n tin g  p ra c tice , Among th e  s e t  o f tr u th s
it a c c e p ts  is  th e  s ta tem en t ''17+29=45" (w hich we tak e to  be fa ls e ) . We
tak e th e  sta tem en t to  be fa ls e  b eca u se  it  w ill c o n v ic t  a  c o r re c t  co u n t o f, 
sa y , 17 th en  29 and a  to ta l o f 46 o f erro r  and w ill san ction  an in c o rr e c t  
cou n t o f 17 th en  29 th e n  a to ta l o f 45.
The q u estio n  W right p o s e s  (1981, p .22) is  how on ce  th e  sta tem en t is  
a ccep ted  by  th e  com m unity a s  an arithm etic  tru th  w e cou ld  co n v in ce  
them  th a t, in  fa c t , it  is  n ot. I f  we can n ot a c h iev e  th is  th en  our  
co n v ictio n  about th e  c o r r e c tn e s s  o f c e r ta in  c o u n tin g  o p era tio n s  w ill 
sim ply t e s t if y  to th e  w ay we draw  th e  a p p e a r a n c e /r e a lity  d is tin c tio n  and  
not to th e  a c tu a l p r e s e n c e  or a b se n c e  o f su ita b le  p r e - in f  ere  n tia l 
w arran ts. On th e  b a s is  o f our arith m etic  we s a y  th at a lth o u g h  a  co u n t  
seem ed c o r r e c t  th e r e  r e a lly  w as an erro r . But th a t same claim is  
availab le  to th e  com m unity in  c a s e s  w h ere  th e ir  arithm etic  c a lls  on them  
to  d isa g re e  w ith  th e  r e s u lt  o f a seem in g ly  c o r re c t  cou n t. B ecau se  each  
claim is  an op en  e x is te n tia l claim (th a t is ,  we do n ot g iv e  a p r e c ise  
sp ec if ic a tio n  of th e  s e t  of p o ss ib le  er ro r s)  each  is  s tr ic t ly  in d e fe a s ib le . 
So in  no c a se  of d iv e r g e n c e  can  we co n v in c e  them (or v ic e -v e r s a )  th at  
th e ir  arithm etic  is  a t fa u lt . T h us th e  a d eq u a cy  con d ition  on th e  
in fe r e n tia l p ra c tic e  is  em pty  (or, a t le a s t  th e  o n ly  w ay to g iv e  su b sta n c e
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to it  is  to sa y  th a t d e sp ite  ou r in a b ility  to  fin d  an o b je c t iv e  fa c t  
determ in in g  th e  c o r r e c t  ar ith m etic  th e r e  n e v e r th e le s s  is  some su c h  fa c t  
-a n d  th a t is  a n t i-r e a lis t ic a lly  u n a ccep ta b le ). So th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  
c o n str a in t o f c o n s e r v a t iv e n e s s  is  v a c u o u s .
The c o n c lu sio n  th a t a n t i-r e a lis t  u se  o f th e  n otion  of c o n se r v a t iv e  n e s s  
is  illic it  d oes n ot h ow ever  im m ediately  follow  from  th is  illu s tr a tio n  w h ich  
r e v e a ls  m erely  th a t in  a n y  g iv e n  c a se  we are in cap ab le  o f d eterm in in g  
w h eth er  th e  r u le  a p p lie s  c o n s e r v a t iv e ly  or not. An o v e r a ll c o n str a in t  on  
an a p p e a r a n c e /r e a lity  d is t in c tio n  is  th a t m ost o f th e  tim e w hat seem s to  
be the c a se  is  th e  c a se . If  w e a c c e p t  th is  p r in c ip le  th en  o b se r v a tio n s  o f
m any c o u n ts  o f sa y  17 th e n  29 th e n  th e  to ta l w ill r e s u lt  e ith e r  in  u s
sa y in g  th a t w hat seem ed to  be th e  c a se  m ostly  w as not th e  c a se  or e lse  
th e y  m ust s a y  th is  (or e ls e  th e r e  m ight be a "tie" in  w h ich  ca se  we had  
b etter  g iv e  up  do ing  ar ith m etic  a lto g e th e r ) . So th e  n o n -c o n s e r v a t iv e n e s s  
o f th e  ru le  w ill em erge  in  i t s  b e in g  a bad a rb iter  o f r e a lity . Two flaw s  
in  th is  v iew  seem  to be that: it  m akes arithm etic  seem  em pirical; and, 
th e  o r ig in a l p r in c ip le  la ck s  m otivation .
To take th e  seco n d  o b je c tio n  f ir s t ,  le t  u s  assu m e (as 1 fe e l  c o n fid e n t  
of th is  b ein g  th e  u p sh o t o f th e  "experim ent") th a t it  is  th e  com m unity  
ra th er  th an  u s  who g e t  th in g s  w ron g  m ost of th e  tim e. The q u estio n  is; 
w hat exp lan ation  can  th e y  o ffe r  th e m se lv e s  o f th is  situ a tion ?  If  th e y  fe e l  
no exp lan ation  is  ca lled  fo r  th e n  we w ould s u r e ly  tak e them  to be do ing
som eth ing  ap p ro a ch in g  a r itu a l o f no in tr in s ic  s ig n if ic a n c e  to them .
A rithm etic o c c u p ies  th e  p lace  it  d o es  in  our l iv e s  p a r t ly  th r o u g h  its  
a b ility  to g e n e r a te  p r e c ise  ex p e c ta tio n s  o f w h ich  we are th o r o u g h ly  
c o n v in ced . O therw ise w e w ould not be ta k in g  it  a s  an a rb iter  o f w hat 
rea lly  is  th e  c a se . I f  no exp lan a tion  in  th e  fa ce  o f m assive  fa ilu re  is  
called  for th en  th e  in fe r e n tia l p r a c tic e  m ust o c c u p y  a v e r y  d iffe r e n t  
rôle in  th e ir  l iv e s  to th a t in  ou i's. So we w ould not be com paring sim ilar  
p r a c tic es . A dm ission on th e ir  p a r t th a t th e ir  arithm etic  is  at fa u lt  is  
ju s t  the r e su lt  w e're  a fte r  so  sh o r t o f th a t an sw er w hat exp lan ation  can
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th e y  g iv e  th em se lv es?
G iven an in s ta n c e  o f m iscou n tin g  th ree  so u r c e s  o f erro r  s u g g e s t  
th em selves: a la p se  in  c o g n it iv e  fa cu lt ie s ;  a m iscon cep tion  in  th e  n a tu re  
of the o b je c ts  c o u n ted  (w e're m istak en  in  b e liev in g  th e y  p e r s is t  th r o u g h  
time or th a t th e y 'r e  d is t in c t  e tc .);  or, a m isu n d ersta n d in g  o f c o u n tin g  
p r o c e d u r e s. G lobalised in  th e  w ay th e y  need  to  be, none o f th e se  
exp lan ation s is  in  th e  le a s t  p la u sib le . The h y p o th e s is  o f a g lob a l la p se  in  
c o g n itiv e  fa c u lt ie s  i s  j u s t  to  sa y  th a t w e are c o g n it iv e ly  lim ited. So th a t  
in  th e  c a se  in  q u e s t io n  w e ca n n o t im plem ent th e  co u n tin g  p ro ced u re . 
Now, u n le s s  we are  to  allow  th is  p o sitio n  to  in fla te  in to  a  b lanket  
scep tic ism  ab ou t w h eth er  w e e v e r  can  h ave  k n ow led ge o f  h a v in g  
sa tis f ie d  o p era tion a l c r ite r ia  th e r e  m ust be a ran g e  o f c a s e s  w h ere  su ch  
k n ow led ge  is  (d e fe a s ib ly )  a va ilab le . In  th e se  c a s e s  th e  g lobal h y p o th e s is  
of a c o g n it iv e  la p se  is  u n ava ilab le . The p osition  th at em erges from  th is  
c o n sid era tio n  is  a s tr ic t  f in it is t ic  one, i .e ., we a c c ep t th a t we n eed  to  
ju s t i fy  in fe r e n tia l c r ite r ia  o n ly  r e la t iv e  to  our a ctu a l a b ility  to  im plem ent 
op eration a l cr iter ia . I am not e n d o r s in g  th a t p o sitio n . What I am sa y in g  
is  th at th e  p o s s ib il ity  o f su c h  a p o sitio n  sh ow s th a t g r a sp  o f op eration a l  
cr iter ia  a llow s th e re  to  be som e q u e stio n  of w h eth er  arithm etic  c r ite r ia  
are a ccep ta b le . In  p a r ticu la r , it  is  p o ss ib le  to n o tice  a c la sh  b etw een  th e  
two s e ts  o f c r iter ia . H ow ever, h a v in g  th u s  dem onstrated  th e  p o ss ib il ity  
o f ju stif ic a tio n , I sh a ll go  on to  a r g u e  th a t th e  program m e r e s u lt s  n o t in  
s tr ic t  fin itism  but in  in tu ition ism .
G lobalising th e  th ird  a lte r n a tiv e  v e r y  q u ick ly  lead s to a b su r d ity  
s in ce  it  is  ju s t  to  su p p o se  th a t we m isu n d erstan d  our ow n la n g u a g e .
What o f th e  seco n d  a lte rn a tiv e?  T h is am ounts to  sa y in g  th at ou r u se  
of o b ser v a tio n a l c r ite r ia  for  c o u n tin g , w hich  h ith er to  had seem ed to be 
ap p licab le , are show n by th e  in fe r e n tia l c r iter ia  not to be so  in  r ea lity . 
So co n d itio n s w h ich  we had tak en  to w arrant th e  a sse r t io n  of num erical 
p re d ica te s  no lo n g er  do so . S in ce  th e se  co n d itio n s  determ ined  th e  
m eaning of th e se  p r e d ic a te s  th o se  m ean ings m ust have a ltered . T hus the
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com m unity w ill, in  th is  c a se , f in d  th a t th e  in fe r e n tia l c r ite r ia  ex ten d  th e  
o b ser v a tio n a l c r ite r ia  n o n -c o n s e r v a t iv e ly . So th e  com m unity can n ot  
s a t is fy  i t s e lf  th a t w h ere  in fe r e n tia l c r iter ia  r e su lt  in  m a ssiv e  a c c u sa tio n s  
of erro r  th o se  c r ite r ia  are , n e v e r th e le s s , a d eq u ate . I co n c lu d e , th e re fo r e , 
th a t we m ust a c c e p t  a s  a c o n str a in t  on an a ccep ta b le  m eans o f  
d is t in g u ish in g  a p p ea ra n ce  from  r e a lity  th a t we are n ot fo rc e d  by  th e  
d is tin c tio n  to  a c c u se  o u r s e lv e s  o f e rro r  too o ften .
R etu rn in g  now to th e  f ir s t  o b jec tio n  to my a d eq u a cy  co n d itio n  on  an  
a p p e a r a n c e /r e a lity  d istin c tio n : d o e s  th e  d e sc r ip tio n  g iv e n  make
m athem atics seem  em pirical? C erta in ly  it  sh ow s th a t th e  a p p lica b ility  o f  
m athem atics d e p e n d s  on em pirical r e g u la r it ie s . But th a t is  d iffe r e n t  from  
sa y in g  th a t we a c c ep t m athem atical sta tem en ts  b e c a u se  th e y  co in c id e  
w ith  o b se r v e d  r e g u la r it ie s . The m anner in  w h ich  we come to a ccep t  
m athem atical s ta te m e n ts , i .e .,  v ia  proof, is  cru cia l. In th e  exam ple we 
su p p o sed  th e  com m unity not to  h ave  p ro o fs  for th e  arith m etic  sta tem en ts  
it  a c c ep te d . T h ere are  tw o d iff ic u lt ie s  w ith  c h a n g in g  th e  exam ple so  th at  
th e  com m unity p o s s e s s e s  w hat p u rp o rt to be p roo fs. The f ir s t  is  th at  
th e  n a tu re  o f c o u n te r -a r ith m e tic  p ro o fs  is  u t te r ly  m y ster io u s  to  u s . 
S eco n d ly  if  th e y  did p o s s e s s  su c h  "proofs" th en  we could  d is c u s s  th e se  
and d isc o v e r  p r e c ise  d isa g re e m en ts  traceab le  to d iffe r e n c e s  in  m eaning  
or in  our a cco u n t o f m eaning. That is , e ith er  we w ill a g r e e  th a t th e y  
h ave  a d iv e r g e n t  but m ean in gfu l p r a c tice  (w hich we m ight ch o o se  to 
ad op t, h a v in g  lea r n t it) or e ls e  we sh a ll d isa g re e  ab ou t how we im bue  
ou r term s w ith  m eaning.
"Laying dow n a m easure" (to  u se  W ittgen ste in 's  p h ra se) may d ep en d  
upon d e f in ite ly  e x p e c tin g  c e r ta in  outcom es. D isappointm ent in  th o se  
e x p ec ta tio n s  can lead  to  u s  not u s in g  th e  m easure. To th is  e x te n t  a  
m athem atical th e o r y  is  em pirical: but for  th e  su re  ex p ecta tio n  (w hich is  
a c o n tin g e n c y ) it  w ould not be a m easure. But ju s t  b eca u se  the  
m athem atical p ro p o sitio n  is  u sed  a s  a m easure, te l ls  u s  w hat we can  
ex p ec t w ith  c e r ta in ty , it  i s  not em pirical. T hus th e  m athem atical
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p ro p o sitio n  d o es n ot i t s e l f  e x p r e ss  th e  su r e  ex p ec ta tio n  a lth o u g h
ad op tion  o f it d e p e n d s  u p on  th e re  b e in g  su ff ic ie n t  r e g u la r ity  in  r e s u lt s  
w hich  lead  to  som e c e r ta in tie s . (W ittgen ste in , 1978, IV §§ 52,3)
The argu m en t sh ow s th a t a co n d itio n  of a d eq u a cy  on  in fe r e n tia l
c r ite r ia  is  th a t fo r  s ta tem en ts  d ec id a b le  by op eration a l c r ite r ia  we are  
not fo rc e d  to  a c c u se  o u r s e lv e s  o f  erro r  too o fte n . T his co n d itio n  is  
w eak. I t, in  e f f e c t ,  am ounts to  sa y in g  litt le  more th an  th a t n o -o n e  w ould  
ad op t a d u ff ar ith m etic . W right ca n n o t be tak en  to be s u g g e s t in g  th a t  
th e y  w ould . What th is  banal c o n s id er a tio n , if  th a t it  be, d o es  a c h iev e  is  
a m otivation  o f ou r , a s  it  w ere , r e a lis t  in tu itio n  th a t th e re  can  be a t  
m ost one a c c ep ta b le  arith m etic . The th o u g h t experim en t m ust be a ccep ted  
by a n y o n e  e n g a g in g  in  in fe r e n c e  so  no d isco rd  in  in fe r e n tia l p ra c tic e  
can  be a c c ep te d  w ith  eq u an im ity . M oreover our rea so n  for  in s is t in g  on  
agreem en t in  in fe r e n tia l p r a c tic e  d o es not d ep en d  on  th e  th o u g h t th a t  
one p r a c tic e  is  bound to  h ave  a p ra ctica l su p e r io r ity  o v e r  th e  o th er . It  
is  not th a t in  th e  p r o c e ss  o f u se  we d isco v e r  on e p ra c tice  to be b etter  
than  th e  o th e r  (it may be th a t we n e v e r  make en o u g h  u s e  o f th e  
d iv e r g e n t  r e s u lt s  for  th is  to  em erge) but th a t th e  th o u g h t exp erim en t
g iv e s  u s  a p r io r i  r ea so n  for r e fu s in g  to  a ccep t th e  c o r r e c tn e s s  o f both
sy s te m s  or , in  o th e r  w o rd s, for  a ffirm in g  th at, a t le a s t , on e sy stem  m ust 
be a b so lu te ly  in c o rr e c t. The th o u g h t experim en t sh ow s an in c o h e re n c e  in  
c o n c e iv in g  th a t more th an  on e  arith m etic  m ight be c o r re c t  or th a t  
ju d g em en ts  o f c o r r e c tn e s s  or in c o r r e c tn e s s  are a lw ays made from  th e  
p e r s p e c t iv e  o f a c c e p tin g  on e or o th er  in fe r e n tia l p ra c tice  so  th at, 
s tr ic t ly , th e y  are  incom parable.
§5 A n ti-rea lism  and S ou n d n ess:
W right sh ow s th a t a n y  (c o n s is te n t)  in fe r e n tia l p ra c tice  is  bound to seem  
sound  to th o se  e n g a g e d  in  it . Combine th is  w ith the v iew  th at a t m ost 
one in fe r e n tia l p r a c tic e  is , in  fa c t , sou n d  and we land o u r s e lv e s  in  th e  
p red icam ent o f h o ld in g  th at th e re  is  a su b sta n tia l q u e stio n  about
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w h eth er  or not ou r in fe r e n tia l p r a c tic e  is  a c tu a lly  sou n d  and no m eans 
o f s a t is fy in g  o u r s e lv e s  one w ay or th e  o th er .
W right a r g u e s  th a t s in ce , in  a n y  g iv e n  c a se , a d isp a r ity  in  the
v e r d ic ts  ob ta in ed  by u se  o f o p era tion a l cr iter ia  and in fe r e n tia l c r iter ia
can  be exp la in ed  in  term s o f th e r e  h a v in g  been  a m istake in  th e
im plem entation o f th e  form er th e r e  can  be no q u e stio n  o f our op eration a l 
p ra c tic e  "forcing" a g iv e n  in fe r e n tia l p ra c tice  on u s  th r o u g h  a g e n era l  
c o n str a in t o f so u n d n e ss . Or, b e tte r  p u t th e  argu m en t ru n s  a s  fo llow s. 
The a n t i-r e a lis t  w a n ts  to  c o n cern  h im self w ith  th e  q u estio n  o f so u n d n e ss  
of a g iv e n  in fe r e n tia l p r a c tic e . Now, in  an y  g iv e n  im plem entation of  
in fe r e n tia l c r ite r ia  we can n ot f in d  o u r s e lv e s  in  th e  p osition  o f h a v in g  to  
se e  th a t im plem entation a s  u n sou n d  s in ce  th e  a p p e a ra n c e  o f u n so u n d n e ss  
is  all we e v e r  a r r iv e  a t and th a t ap p earan ce is  a lw ays exp licab le  in  
term s o f th e  s tr ic t ly  in d e fe a s ib le  h y p o th e s is  th at th e re  w as some 
m istake. T h us th e  u n so u n d n e ss  o f th e  sy stem  (if it  be so) m ust be a  
fea tu r e  o f th e  sy ste m  w h ich  e v a d e s  reco g n itio n . So, in  claim ing th e  r ig h t  
to be co n cern ed  w ith  is s u e s  o f so u n d n e ss  one is  com m itted to th ere  
bein g  a "determ inate o b je c t iv e  c la s s  o f cases"  in  w h ich  a m istake e ith e r  
did or did not o ccu r , in d e p e n d e n tly  o f our a b ility  to  determ ine th e  
m atter. T his is  a p o s itio n  o f d o u b tfu l co h e r en ce  for an a n t i-r e a lis t  to  
adopt g iv e n  h is  ow n arg u m en ts  a g a in s t  th e  p o ss ib ility  of our g r a sp in g  
tr a n sc e n d e n t  s ta te s  o f a ffa ir s  w h ich  d eterm in ate ly  e ith e r  do or do not  
obtain .
The argu m en t n e e d s  som eth in g  o f a g lo s s . I t  sh ow s th a t th e  
u n so u n d n e ss  o f a g iv e n  in fe r e n tia l sy s te m  is  u n reco g n iza b le . Or, ra th er , 
th at it  o n ly  can  ap p ear to be u n so u n d  from th e p e r sp e c t iv e  o f an
op p o sin g  sy stem . B ut, s in ce  th e  argu m en t is  sym m etrical, th e re  is  no
r e a ssu r a n c e  to be had th a t th a t sy stem  is  a c tu a lly  c o r re c t  and so no
a b so lu te  a ccu sa tio n  o f u n so u n d n e ss . T his, g iv en  a loose  in te rp re ta tio n  o f  
th e  in tu it io n is t ic  p o s itio n , m ight be held  to be tantam ount to h o ld in g
th at th e  sy ste m  is  not u n sou n d . So a n y  sy stem  has been  show n by
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in tu it io n is t ic  l ig h ts  to  be n ot u n so u n d  (con trad iction  a s id e ) . W right 
prom ises u s  an argu m en t th a t th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  can n ot c o h e r e n tly  co n cern  
him self w ith  q u e s t io n s  o f so u n d n e ss . That argu m en t p resu m ab ly  em erges  
in  th e  fo llow in g  m anner. A ssum e th a t A i and a re  c o n flic tin g
in fe r e n tia l sy s te m s  in  th e  s e n s e  th a t th e y  is s u e  in  co n tra d ic to ry  
p r o p o sitio n s . So if  A \ is  sou n d  A^ i s  u n sou n d  and c o n v e r se ly . We have  
ju s t  show n th a t, by  in tu it io n is t ic  l ig h ts , both  sy s te m s  are  not u n so u n d . 
But th en , w ere  we to  h a v e  a  p roo f o f th e  so u n d n e ss  o f A%, w e w ould  
h ave a d em on stra tion  o f th e  u n so u n d n e ss  o f A^, w h ich  w ould co n tra d ic t  
th e  fa c t  th a t i s  n o t u n so u n d . So w e can  h ave  no p roof o f th e  
so u n d n e ss  o f A}. T h is, p ro v id e d  we allow  th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  to  be 
co n cern ed  w ith  q u e s t io n s  o f s o u n d n e ss , aga in  lea d s to co n tra d ic tio n  
s in ce  th en  we h a v e , in tu it io n ls t ic a lly , th a t A  ^ is  u n so u n d . So we 
co n c lu d e  th a t th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  can  h a v e  no leg itim ate  c o n c e rn  w ith  th e  
notion  o f so u n d n e ss .
Note, f ir s t ,  th a t th e  argu m en t r e lie s  on a loose  in te r p r e ta t io n  of th e  
in tu it io n is t ic  lo g ica l c o n s ta n ts  s in c e , s tr ic t ly , to co n c lu d e  th a t an y  
sy stem  is  not u n so u n d  we sh ou ld  h ave  to d er iv e  a c o n tra d ic tio n  from  
th e  assu m p tion  th a t it  can  be r e c o g n iz e d  a s  u n sou n d . We h ave  o n ly  been  
g iv e n  a dem on stra tion  o f a c e r ta in  in co h eren ce  a tta c h in g  to th is  
su p p o sitio n . S eco n d ly , th e  argu m en t r e q u ir e s  th e  ab ove g lo ss  s in c e , in  
i t s  a b se n c e , a ll we h a v e  is  a g e n e r a l argu m en t to th e  e f fe c t  th a t we 
h ave  no e f fe c t iv e  m eans o f r e c o g n iz in g  th e  u n so u n d n e ss  of a g iv en  
sy stem . But th e  lack  o f a n e g a t iv e  d ec is io n  p r o c ed u re  is  n ot en o u g h  to  
p rec lu d e  leg itim ate  a n t i-r e a lis t  c o n c e r n s  w ith  q u e stio n s  o f so u n d n e ss . 
That is , th e  argu m en t fa lls  sh o r t  o f fo rc in g  on u s  th e  co n c lu sio n  th at  
we are u n ab le  to d em on stra te  th a t a ce r ta in  sy stem  is  sou n d . The la tter  
m ight s t il l  be a c h iev a b le  d e sp ite  our not b e in g  ab le to show  th at a 
g iv e n , c o n s is te n t  sy ste m  is  u n so u n d .
An im portant s te p  in  th e  argu m en t a s  I h ave  r e c o n str u c te d  it  r e lie s  
on  an assu m p tion  ab ou t th e  n a tu re  o f th e  c la sh  e n v isa g e d . We are  ask ed
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to im agine a lte r n a tiv e  sy s te m s  w h ere th e  so u n d n e ss  o f th e  one e n ta ils  
th e  u n so u n d n e ss  o f th e  o th e r  (s in c e  we are su p p o sed  to be ab le  to  
p ro v e  in  on e  th e  c o n tr a d ic to r y  o f a p rop osition  p rovab le  in  th e  o th e r ) . 
We need  n ot h o w ev er  o n ly  be c o n cern ed  w ith  c la sh e s  o f th is  form . The 
i s s u e  w h ich  c o n c e r n s  u s  m ost, th a t c o n cern in g  th e  so u n d n e ss  o f  
c la ss ic a l and in tu it io n is t ic  lo g ic , d o es  not take th is  form . The in tu it io n is t  
d oes not a c c u se  th e  c la s s ic a l lo g ic ia n  o f a d h er in g  to an u n sou n d  sy stem  
o f in fe r e n c e , r a th er , he q u e s t io n s  th e  sco p e  o f c e r ta in  r u le s  of  
in fe r e n c e . That is ,  a c c ep ta n c e  o f in tu it io n is t ic  log ic  d oes not en ta il th a t  
one s e e  th e  c la s s ic a l  sy stem  a s  b e in g  u n sou n d  (re la tiv e  to th e  e x is te n c e  
of n o n -in fe r e n tia l w a rra n ts), in d eed  th e  in tu it io n is t  m ight a g ree  th a t  
c la ss ic a l log ic  is  n ot u n so u n d , but (in  v iew  o f h is  a d h eren ce  to  
in tu it io n is t ic  p r in c ip le s )  can  s t i l l  a sk  for  an a ssu r a n c e  th a t c la ss ic a l  
log ic  is  in d eed  sou n d .
B ut, b efore  in v e s t ig a t in g  th a t d ia lec tic , I sh ou ld  c la r ify  th e  p r e se n t  
p osition . It  w ould seem  th a t r a is in g  th e  q u estio n  of th e  leg itim acy  of an  
u n d er ly in g  lo g ic  is  prem ature s in c e , a s  th e  argum en t s ta n d s , the  
a n t i-r e a lis t  can n ot co n c e rn  h im self w ith  q u e stio n s  o f so u n d n e ss  o f  
c o n flic tin g  in fe r e n tia l sy s te m s. And, if  he can n ot m otivate a c o h eren t  
in te r e s t  in  s o u n d n e ss  in  c a s e s  o f th a t so r t, how can  th ere  be for  him 
an y  su b sta n c e  to th e  notion  o f s o u n d n e ss  w h ich  r e q u ir e s  f id e lity  to  
e s ta b lish e d  m ean ings or n o n -in fe r e n tia l p r a c tic e s  o f a sser tio n ?
The exam ple we are p r e se n te d  w ith  w orks by a sk in g  u s w h eth er  or  
not we cou ld  r e c o g n iz e  th e  u n s o u n d n e s s  o f a sy stem  w hich  is s u e s  in  a 
co u n ter-a r ith m etic  r e su lt . A p rem iss  is  th a t we a g ree  w ith  the d ev ia n t  
arith m etician s in  ou r p r a c tic e  o f co u n tin g  so  th at th e re  can be no 
s u g g e s t io n  th a t th e  d isc r e p a n c y  is  exp licab le  a s  a r is in g  ou t of 
d iv e r g e n c e s  in  th e  m ean ings o f our r e sp e c t iv e  num erical term s. In  a 
se n se  we have a s in g le  com m unity of c o u n te rs  who d iv e r g e  am ongst 
th em se lv es  as to w h ich  arith m etic  tr u th s  th e y  shou ld  en d o rse . Or, p u t  
an oth er  w ay, th e  com m unity h as a c o n tra d ic to ry  arithm etic. A dm ittedly,
149no s in g le  sp e a k er  w ill f in d  h im self (g iv e n  th e  term s o f th e  exam ple) 
w an tin g  to  e n d o r se  both  o f tw o c o n tra d ic to ry  p ro p o sitio n s . But th is  is  
b ecau se  we im agine a c e r ta in  asym m etry: a d v o c a tes  o f th e  tr u th  o f  
29+17=46 are  th o u g h t o f a s  p o s s e s s in g  a  p roof o f th a t r e s u lt  w h erea s  
a d v o ca tes  o f th e  tr u th  o f  29+17=45 are  n ot. It is  su p p o se d  th a t an yon e  
w ith  s u ff ic ie n t  n o u s  to  fo llow  a p ro o f o f th e  form er w ill s e e  h is  r a s h n e s s  
in  a c c ep tin g  th e  la tte r . But i f  th is  su p p o sit io n  is  held  u n iv e r sa lly  tru e  
th e n  it  s u p p lie s  a r ea so n  for  h o ld in g  our arithm etic  to  be co rrec t:  th e  
d isagreem en t seem s tr iv ia l (th is  p o s itio n  is  c o n s is te n t  w ith  h o ld in g  th a t  
th e r e  are p eo p le  in  th e  com m unity w ho are sim ply too dim to  g r a sp  th e  
p roof and so  co n tin u e  in  th e ir  d ev ia n t w a y s). I f  it  is  n ot held  to  be 
u n iv e r sa lly  tru e  th en  we are  a sk e d  to im agine sp e a k e r s  who g r a sp  th e  
proof y e t  do not r e lin q u ish  th e ir  b e lie f  in  th e  form er (fa lse) p ro p o sitio n . 
But in  th is  c a se  th e ir  p r a c tic e  is  c le a r ly  c o n tra d ic to ry . T h us the  
g r o u n d s for  h o ld in g  th a t th e  d e v ia n t arithm etic  is  u n so u n d  stem  from  
the fa c t  th a t it  is  in c o n s is te n t . N eg lect o f th is  a s p e c t  w ill, 
u n s u r p r is in g ly , r e n d e r  u s  in ca p a b le  o f r e co g n iz in g  th e  sy ste m  to be 
u n sou n d .
The exam ple is  i t s e lf  d e c e p tiv e  in  th a t it  ca lls  on u s to  im agine a 
fo re ig n  com m unity w ith  a c o n flic t in g  p r a c tice . When p h ra sed  in  th is  w ay  
it  seem s th a t th e ir  p r a c tic e  is  c o n s is te n t  and a lte r n a tiv e . We th e n  seem  
to h ave  a sep a ra b le  ta sk  (w hich  a c c o rd in g  to th e  argu m en t we can n ot  
perform ) o f sh ow in g  th a t th e  sy s te m  is  u n sou n d . But th is  is  m islead ing . 
We sh ou ld  ra th er  v iew  th e  p o sitio n  a s  one in fe c t in g  a s in g le  com m unity  
w h ich  com es to s e e  i t s  p r a c tic e  a s  in c o n s is te n t  and th u s  in  n eed  o f  
reform . Of c o u r se , th e  p r e c is e  n a tu re  o f the reform  may be a d e lica te  
m atter, but th e  re co g n it io n  o f u n so u n d n e ss  was all we w ere a sk ed  to  
d em on stra te  and th is  I u r g e  is  p o ss ib le  th ro u g h  th e  reco g n itio n  o f an  
in c o n s is te n c y .
It is  ap t to  seem  th a t in  in v o k in g  th e  q u estio n  o f a l in g u is t ic  
com m unity in  th is  w ay I h ave  sim ply  and fa ir ly  b la tan tly  gerrym an d ered
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th e  exam ple to  s u it  my e n d s . N atu ra lly , I do n ot th in k  th a t th is  is  so. 
L et me b r ie fly  exp la in  th e  u n d e r ly in g  th o u g h t. If w e are to  im agine a 
g e n u in e ly  fo r e ig n  com m unity th e n  we m ust make s e n s e  o f an  
in te r p r e ta t iv e  e x e r c ise . We can n ot sim ply  assu m e th a t our u n d er s ta n d in g  
of num erical term s a g r e e s  w ith  th e ir s  w ith ou t u n p a ck in g  th a t  
a ssu m p tion . I f  th e  a ssu m p tion  is  b ased  on a co in c id e n c e  o f c o u n tin g  
p r a c tic e s  th en  th e  exam ple a s k s  u s  to  im agine a s in g le  com m unity w h ere  
c o u n tin g  p r a c tic e  lea d s  to  a c o n tr a d ic to r y  in fe r e n tia l p ra c tice . I f  not, 
th e n  we m ust in te r p r e t  th e ir  c o u n tin g  p r a c tice . We w ould th en  w ant 
some exp lan ation  o f th a t p r a c tic e  (th is  is  e sp e c ia lly  tru e  i f  th e  
com m unity held  a b su r d  ar ith m etica l b e lie fs  su c h  a s  29+17=45). That is , 
we w ould e x p e c t  them  to  o ffe r  or to  r e c o g n iz e  som eth in g  lik e  th e  Peano  
axioms a s  ex p la n a tio n s o f th e ir  p r a c tic e . Once th e y  did th is  our g r o u n d s  
for  r e je c t in g  th e ir  p r a c tic e  w ould  be th a t it  is  d em on strab ly  
in c o n s is te n t . T h is may w ell r a ise  fu r th e r  q u e s t io n s  ab ou t m ethods o f  
dem on stra tion  bu t su c h  q u e s t io n s  o f th e  so u n d n e ss  o f th e  u n d e r ly in g  
lo g ic  are  j u s t  w h at c o n c e rn  u s . My co n ten tio n  is  th a t su c h  q u e s t io n s  
can  be leg itim a te ly  r a ise d  by  th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  p ro v id ed  th e  s o u n d n e ss  of 
th e  one sy ste m  d o es  n o t im ply th e  u n so u n d n e ss  o f th e  o th er . The p o in t  
seem s to be th a t th e  p o s s ib il ity  o f  r a is in g  th e  d isp u te  r e q u ir e s  a  
m easure o f ag reem en t, n ot th a t th e  d isp u te  can n ot be ra ised .
I f  th is  argu m en t h o ld s  th en  w e h a v e  no argu m en t for  th e  v iew  th a t  
th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  ca n n o t co n c e rn  h im self w ith  q u e s t io n s  o f so u n d n e ss . So 
it  is  op en  to  th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  to  q u e stio n  w h eth er  c la ss ic a l log ic  can  be 
show n to be sou n d  (e v e n  th o u g h  he adm its th a t it  is  not u n so u n d ). The  
p oin t is  th a t c la s s ic a l  lo g ic  can  be sh ow n  to be sou n d  r e la tiv e  to tru th  
a s  r e a lis t ic a lly  c o n c e iv e d , and can n ot be show n to  be u n sou n d  r e la tiv e  
to th e  m ere e x is te n c e  o f n o n -in fe r e n tia l w arran ts. (The la tter  fo llow s  
from th e  form er and  from  th e  sp e c if ic a lly  a n t i-r e a lis t  c o n s id er a tio n s  
ad v a n ced  by W right.) The q u e stio n  th o u g h  is  w h eth er  we are ju s tif ie d  
in  a sc r ib in g  g r a sp  o f r e a lis t  tr u th  to  o u r s e lv e s . The a n t i-r e a lis t  g iv e s  a
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g en e r a l argu m en t draw n from  c o n s id er a tio n s  about m eaning to show  th at  
we can n ot be ju s t if ie d  in  su c h  a claim. In c o n tr a s t  to th e  r e a lis t , th e  
a n t i-r e a lis t  o f fe r s  an  acco u n t o f an  ep istem ica lly  co n stra in ed  notion  of  
tr u th  and a sk s  w h eth er  c la s s ic a l  lo g ic  is  sou n d  r e la tiv e  to th at notion . 
But th a t q u e stio n  o n ly  a s k s  u s  to  r e f le c t  on our ep istem ic  p o sitio n  a t  
th e  c o n c lu sio n  o f c e r ta in  c la s s ic a lly  va lid  in fe r e n c e s . If  we c la s s ic a lly  
in fe r  a p ro p o sitio n  by u s in g  d ou b le  n eg a tio n  elim ination  on  a v e r if ic a tio n  
tr a n sc e n d e n t  p ro p o sitio n  or by u s in g  an  argum en t by dilemma on th e  
same th e n  th e  in tu it io n is t  a s k s , "Does th e  p o s s e s s io n  o f an  in fe r e n tia l  
w arrant for  th a t p ro p o sitio n  g u a ra n tee  th e  o b ta in a b ility  o f a 
n o n -in fe r e n tia l w arrant?" , i .e ., in  su c h  c a s e s  do we h ave  a m ethod for  
o b ta in in g  th e  ap p ro p r ia te  n o n -in fe r e n tia l w arrant?  The an sw er  th e  
in tu it io n is t  u r g e s  in  r e sp o n se  to  th a t q u e stio n  is  sim ply  "no". T his  
fa ilu re  is  c le a r ly  r e co g n iz a b le . The leg itim acy  of th e  a n t i-r e a lis t ’s 
q u e stio n  r e q u ir e s  o n ly  th a t we be ab le  to  r e fle c t  on  our ep istem ic  
p o sitio n . G iven a c la s s ic a l in fe r e n tia l w arran t w e do not n eed  to s e t t le  
i t s  v a lid ity  by d eterm in in g  w h eth e r  or not a n o n -in fe r e n tia l w arrant  
r e a l ly  e x is t s , we sim ply  need  to q u e stio n  w h eth er  or not we are in  a 
p o sitio n  to  ob ta in  su c h  a w arrant.
The program m e p r e c is e ly  a v o id s  th e  q u e stio n  w h ich  in v ite s  W right’s  
attack . That is ,  w e do n ot p u t  o u r s e lv e s  in  th e  p o sitio n  o f a sk in g  
w h eth er  or not in fe r e n tia l c r ite r ia  a c tu a lly  co in cid e  w ith  n o n -in fe r e n tia l  
c r ite r ia  (and th u s  c lo se  a c ir c le  o f d ep en d en ce , s in ce  ou r v e r d ic t  on th e  
a ctu a l sa tis fa c t io n  o f th e  la tter  is  norm atively  co n str a in e d  by in fe r e n tia l  
c r ite r ia  th e m se lv e s ) . We sim ply  a sk  w h eth er  or not, w h en  we p o s s e s s  
in fe r e n tia l w arran ts for  th e  a s s e r t io n  of a p rop osition , we have a m eans 
o f o b ta in in g  n o n -in fe r e n tia l w a rra n ts .
§6 The O b jec tiv ity  o f M eaning:
In th e  la s t  se c tio n  I a rg u ed  th a t c o n sid era tio n s  draw n from the  
norm ative ro le  o f in fe r e n tia l c r ite r ia  do not s u ff ic e  to p rec lu d e  leg itim ate
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p ractice; th o se  arg u m en ts  s u f f ic e  to  show , a t m ost, th a t q u e s t io n s  o f  
u n so u n d n ess  o f an o s te n s ib ly  c o n s is te n t  sy stem  can n ot be ra ise d , I tak e  
th is  c o n c lu sio n  to in d ica te  a d ee p e r  p o in t o f d iv e r g e n c e  betw een  th e  
Dumm ettian a n t i-r e a lis t  an d  h is  W rightian co u sin . W right’s  in te r p r e ta tio n  
o f th e  Rule F ollow in g C on sid era tion s o f W ittgen ste in  lie s  a t th e  h ea rt o f  
th e  m atter and  ex p la in s  W right’s  c o n v ic tio n  th a t th e  notion  of so u n d n e ss  
i s  u n in te llig ib le .
Let u s  r e tu r n  to  ou r arith m etic  exam ple. No c o n flic t  b etw een  
arith m etic  c r ite r ia  an d  op era tio n a l c r iter ia , it  w as show n, cou ld  come to  
lig h t  s in ce  th e  arith m etic  c r ite r ia  are  u se d  to  determ in e in s ta n c e s  o f  
m isapp lication  o f th e  o p era tion a l c r ite r ia  and th e  h y p o th e s is  o f  an erro r  
in  su c h  an  a p p lica tion  is  s tr ic t ly  in d e fe a s ib le . W right claim s th a t it  
m akes no s e n s e  to  q u e s t io n  w h eth er  in  su c h  a c a se  th e r e  r e a l iy  w as a
m isapp lication  o f  th e  o p era tion a l c r iter ia  w h ich  cou ld  h ave  been
r e co g n iz e d  by  p r e -a r ith m e tic  c r ite r ia  a lone. So it  m akes no s e n s e  to  
q u estio n  w h eth er  th e  arith m etic  c r ite r ia  are r e a l ly  sou n d  w ith  r e sp e c t  to  
co u n tin g  p r o c e d u r e s . T h us it  is  n ot sim ply th a t th e  q u estio n  of
V
u n so u n d n e ss  is  u n d ec id a b le  but th a t th e  notion  of so u n d n e ss  to  w h ich  
w e ap p eal h e r e  i s  u n in te llig ib le .
The a p p a ren t n eed  to  a sk  q u e s t io n s  o f th is  form  stem s from  a  
m isrep resen ta tio n  o f th e  ch a r a c te r  o f our own u n d er sta n d in g , We assum e  
th a t, in  g iv in g  m ean ing to  ou r term s, we are ab le  to  co n fer  on  them  a  
d eterm in ate p a tte r n  o f u s e  su c h  th a t con form ity  to th is  p a ttern  o f u se  
w ould h a v e  r e q u ire d  or w ould  r e q u ire  a d e fin ite  r e sp o n se  in
c ircu m sta n ces  w h ere  w e h a v e  n ot y e t  u sed  th e  e x p r e ss io n  or can n ot, in  
p r a c tic e , so  u se  it . T h us a c o n c e rn  w ith  so u n d n e ss  b e tr a y s  a b e lie f th a t  
our u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f c o u n tin g  p r o c e d u r e s  e n jo in s  a c o r re c t  p a ttern  o f  
im plem ention o f  them  in d e p e n d e n t o f our, actu a l or p o ss ib le , u se  o f  
th o se  p r o c e d u r e s . So th a t w h en  we u se  an arithm etic  cr iter io n  to  
determ in e an e r ro r  it  is  p e r fe c t ly  d eterm in ate w h eth er  or not th ere  is
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a c tu a lly  an e r ro r  by c r ite r ia  g o v e r n in g  co u n tin g  o p era tio n s . In stea d  
W right claim s a ll we ca n  do is  s a y  th a t th e re  w as su c h  an  erro r  but 
s in c e , ir r e s p e c t iv e  o f th e  ar ith m etic  ad op ted , it  is  a lw ays p o ss ib le  to  
r e so r t  to  th is  sa v in g  h y p o th e s is  th is  is  n ot to  e n te r  in to  a n y  su b sta n tia l  
commitment.
1 can n ot o ffe r  a  r e sp o n s e  to  W right’s  trea tm en t o f th e  Rule Follow ing  
C on sid era tion s w h ich  h is  th o r o u g h  p r e se n ta t io n  d e s e r v e s . What I w ant to  
do h ere  i s  to  o u tlin e  my r e a so n s  fo r  th in k in g  th a t W right’s  ap p lica tion  
o f r u le  fo llow in g  is  a t fa u lt  h e r e  an d  th u s  th a t th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  d o es  not 
in v o lv e  h im self w ith  a n otion  o f s o u n d n e ss  e lu c id a ted  a s  ab ove .
I am in  com p lete  a g reem en t w ith  W right’s  em in en tly  lucid  
in te r p r e ta t io n  o f th e  Rule F ollow in g C on sid era tion s a s  p r o v id in g  a 
fu n dam enta l c r it iq u e  o f a ttem p ts  to  a cco u n t fo r  our u se  o f la n g u a g e  in  
term s w h ich  "platonize" m ean ing, th a t is ,  w h ich  make ou r u se  
a cco u n ta b le  (in  a norm ative s e n s e )  to  some item  (a ru le , or a re la tio n  of 
r e fe r e n c e  or tr u th  e tc .)  w h ich  w e come to  know . If  m an ifesta tion  is  a 
g e n e r a l c o n str a in t  on  a sc r ip t io n s  o f  k n ow led ge  th en  th e  Rule Follow ing  
C on sid era tion s sh ow  th a t k n o w led g e  o f th e  re q u ire d  so r t  can n ot be 
p u b lic ly  m an ifested . So, i f  th is  k n o w led g e  is  to  p ro v id e  our sem antic  
b a sis  we m ust make s e n s e  o f th e  id ea  o f p r iv a te  s e lf -a s c r ip t io n  o f  
k n ow led ge . The q u e s tio n  th e n  is  w h eth er  each  o f u s  can  m an ifest th is  
k n ow led ge  to h im self. The p r iv a te  la n g u a g e  argu m en t th en  sh ow s the  
im p o ss ib ility  o f th e  p r iv a te  l in g u is t  s a t is fy in g  h im self on th is  p o in t s in ce  
he can n ot make a d is t in c tio n  b etw een  c ircu m sta n ces  w h ere  h is  u se  
a p p ea rs  to co in c id e  w ith  h is  p u ta t iv e  k n ow led ge  and c ircu m sta n ces  
w h ere it  a c tu a lly  d o es so . So no s e lf -a s c r ip t io n  o f k n ow led ge o f the  
sem antic p r im itive  is  p o ss ib le . In  p a rticu la r , i f  we th in k  o f la n g u a g e  u se  
as exp la in ed  th r o u g h  g r a sp  o f tr u th  c o n d itio n s  w h ere  tru th  is  tak en  a s  
prim itive  w e can  g iv e  no s a t is fa c to r y  acco u n t o f our k n ow led ge  o f th e se  
co n d itio n s.
Our se a rc h  fo r  a th e o r y  o f m eaning now ta k e s  th e  fo llow in g  tu rn .
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F ir st , we r e co g n iz e  th a t k n ow led ge  o f  a n y  p r o p e r ty  c h o se n  a s  c e n tr a l in  
th e  sem antic th e o r y  m ust, n e c e s s a r ily , be p u b i ic iy  m an ifestab le . 
S eco n d ly , th e  Rule Follow ing C on sid era tion s show  th a t th is  k n ow led ge  
can n ot be th e  u ltim ate g ro u n d  o f  c o r r e c t  u s e . A c e r ta in  b ase c la s s  o f  
e x p r e ss io n s  are  g iv e n  ex p la n a tio n s w h ich  s itu a te  th e  u se  o f  th e  
e x p r e ss io n  w ith in  a n orm ative ly  co n stra in ed  p r a c tic e . The p o sitio n  now  
allow s fo r  Dum m ettian c o n c e r n s  a b o u t th e  n a tu re  o f tru th . We m ust g iv e  
a r e d u c tiv e  a c c o u n t o f  tr u th , th e  q u e stio n  is  w h eth er  w e can  r e in s ta te  a 
notion  o f tr u th  w h ich  g lo b a lly  a p p lie s  b iv a len tly . Dummett sh ow s tr u th  
co n c e iv e d  in  th is  w ay is  o f th e  e s s e n c e  o f realism  and th a t su c h  a 
n otion  o f tr u th  i s  bound to  c o n tr a v e n e  th e  m an ifesta tion  req u irem en t. (A 
r e d u c tiv e  a cco u n t b ased  on  com p osition a lity  w ould fa il to  r e in s ta te  
c la ss ic a l tr u th  b eca u se  o f, a s  T en n an t (1987, p .112) o b s e r v e s , Gddeiian  
r e a so n s  r e la tin g  to in co m p leten ess: a n y  c ircu m scr ip tio n  of th e  r a n g e  of 
c a p a c itie s  w e m an ifest r e la t iv e  to  o u r  g r a sp  o f a ce r ta in  c la s s  o f  
sta tem en ts  form ed from  a lim ited v o ca b u la ry  w ill a lw ays fa il to w arrant 
g r a sp  o f a  d e c is io n  p r o c e d u r e  w h ich  is ,  th e o re tic a lly , u n r e s tr ic te d ly  
ap p licab le .) T ak ing a s s e r t io n  a s  c e n tr a l in  th e  sem antic th e o ry  en a b le s  
u s to  c h a r a c te r iz e  ou r u s e  o f  th e  tr u th  p r e d ica te  an d  so  to  r e v e a l our  
notion  o f tru th .
For W right we m ust, a s  a r e s u lt  o f th e  Rule Follow ing C on sid eration s, 
ta lk  o f m eaning in  term s, n ot sim p ly  o f u s e , but a s  u se  a g a in s t  a 
" secu rab le  b ack grou n d  of com m unal a ssen t" . Only in  th e  p r e se n c e  o f  
th is  b ack grou n d  can  w e g u a r a n te e  th a t our u se  is  su b je c t  to  norm ative  
c o n str a in ts . So we can  do no more th a n  p o in t s u g g e s t iv e ly  to  an  a sp e c t  
of th e  p r a c tic e  and sa y  "This is  w hat w e do." The ta sk  o f th e  
p h ilo so p h y  o f la n g u a g e  is  th e n  to  w eed  o u t c o n fu s io n s  w h ich  r e su lt  from  
th e o re tic a l "overloading" o f th e  n o tion  o f m eaning. An exam ple w ould be 
th e  s e t  o f c r itic ism s W right le v e ls  a t th e  Dummettian a n t i-r e a lis t . N otice  
th at " first  order" u s e  o f la n g u a g e , e .g .,  our claim th a t in  th e  e v e n t  o f a 
co u n ter  arith m etic  c o u n tin g  r e s u lt  we m ust h ave m isapplied  th e  c o u n tin g
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p ro ced u re , is  exem pt from  cr itic ism .
T here is  a te n s io n  in  W right’s  p o s itio n  s in c e , g iv e n  an a c cep ta n ce  o f  
h is d esc r ip tio n  o f m ean in gfu l u s e , it  is  p o ss ib le  u n c o n tr o v e rs ia lly  to  ta lk  
about th e  a s se r t io n  co n d itio n s  a s  g iv in g  th e  m eaning o f s e n te n c e s
p rov id ed  we do n ot u s e  a s s e r t io n  c o n d itio n s  a s  o b je c ts  o f k n ow led ge
w h ich  a lw a y s  g u id e  our u s e . I t  i s  n ot c lea r  w hat W right ta k e s  an
a sse r t io n  co n d itio n  to  be; th e  tw o o p tio n s  a v a ilab le  to  him co rresp o n d  to  
th e  h orn s o f  a dilemma. E ither a s e n te n c e  is  a s s e r t ib le  ju s t  w h en  we can  
se c u r e  th e  n e c e s s a r y  comm unal a s s e n t , so  th a t th e  a s se r t io n  con d ition  
c o r re sp o n d s  p r e c is e ly  to  th e  co n d itio n  o f h a v in g  communal a s s e n t , or  
a sse r t io n  co n d itio n s  a re  c o n d itio n s  in  th e  w orld , th a t is  th e y  are
co n d itio n s  w h ich  th e  w orld  fu lf i ls  and a  re co g n it io n  o f w h ich  is  ta k en  a s  
an  en titlem en t to  make th e  a p p ro p r ia te  a s se r t io n . The f ir s t  in te r p r e ta tio n  
adm its th a t w e can  command no v iew  o f th e  s p e c if ic  n a tu re  o f m ean ings  
in  our la n g u a g e  s in c e , g iv e n  a n y  sy ste m a tic  acco u n t o f ou r  u se  o f  
la n g u a g e  w e sh a ll h ave  no g r o u n d s  to  d is t in g u ish  it  a s  a norm ative  
d esc r ip tio n  r a th er  th an  d e sc r ip t io n  o f a r e g u la r ity . T his is  sim ply  
b ecau se  it  w ill o n ly  sy s te m a tise  w h at th e  com m unity h a s done and , s in ce  
Rule Follow ing C on sid era tion s a p p ly  to  th e  com m unity a s  a w hole, th is  
can  h ave no norm ative in flu e n c e  on  w h at it  g o e s  on to do. W hilst, on  th e  
secon d  in te r p r e ta tio n , i f  we sa y  th a t  a  c o u n ter  arithm etic  r e s u lt  b e tra y s  
an u n n oticed  e rro r  in  a p p ly in g  c o u n tin g  p r o c e d u r e s  th en  th e re  is  no  
o p p o r tu n ity  o f d ism iss in g  th is  a s  ju s t  w hat we sa y . If we are  e n tit le d  to  
sa y  th is  th e n  th e r e  m ust r e a l ly  h a v e  been  a m istake. We do not have a 
s tr o n g e r  stan d ard  o f  o b je c t iv ity  to  w h ich  th e  r e a lity  o f th e  m istake is  
accou n tab le .
But th e n  w hat o f W right’s  d em on stra tion  o f  th e  r e la t iv ity  o f su c h  a 
ju dgem ent?  The lin e  I tr ie d  to  u r g e  a few  p a ra g ra p h s ago  w as th a t th e  
r e la t iv ity  i s  a c o n se q u e n c e  o f a llow in g  th e  v a lid ity  o f ju s tif ic a tio n le ss  
ju d g em en ts  based  on  in fe r e n c e . We em erge from  the ten sio n  if  we allow  
th at th e re  is  a b ase  c la s s  o f lo g ic a lly  sim ple s e n te n c e s  for  w hich
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W right’s  d e sc r ip t io n  o f u n d e r s ta n d in g  is  in e v ita b le . T hat is ,  th e r e  is  a 
c la s s  o f e x p r e ss io n s  w h ich  can  o n ly  be exp la in ed  by d em on stra tin g  our  
u se  o f them  in  th e  w orld . Rule Follow ing C on sid era tion s are  n ot in ten d ed  
to  be re  v is io n a r y  ab ou t c o n te n ts  (n o n -m e a n in g -th e o r e tic  c o n te n ts , at 
lea st)  w h ich  we ta k e  o u r s e lv e s  to  g r a sp  nor do th e y  r e d u c e  to  
a b su r d ity  th e  id ea  th a t w e su c c e e d  in  n orm atively  c o n str a in in g  u se . The 
im pact o f  th e  Rule F ollow ing C on sid era tion s l ie s  in  th e  cr itic ism  th e y  
o ffe r  o f c e r ta in  ex p la n a tio n s o f how  c o r r e c t  u se  is  determ in ed . Now w ith  
r e sp e c t  to  som e b ase c la s s  o f e x p r e ss io n s , we can  tak e it  th a t we sim ply  
h ave  an  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f th o s e  e x p r e ss io n s  and th e n , g iv e n  th a t  
u n d er s ta n d in g , a ttem p t to c h a r a c te r iz e  our notion  o f tr u th  by  look in g  at  
our ju s tif ic a tio n  o f  in fe r e n tia l p r a c tic e  w hen in se r te d  in to  th is  base  
c la s s . The problem  w ith  th is  (m odest) ap p roach  is  th a t we n eed  to  g iv e  
some a cco u n t o f w hat th e  u n d e r s ta n d in g  of th e se  s e n te n c e s  c o n s is t s  in  
in  o rd er  to d eterm in e th e  c e n tr a l n o tion  o f th e  sem antic th e o r y  w h ich  
in fe r e n c e  h as to  p r e s e r v e . B ut th e  d e sc r ip tio n  o f ou r g r a sp  o f th e se  
basic e x p r e ss io n s  ca n  be g iv e n  w ith ou t p r e su p p o s in g  a n y  co n cep tu a l  
e x p e r tise  s in c e  th e  u s e  is  g ro u n d ed  in  a  n o n - lin g u is t ic  p r a c tic e  w h ich  is  
i t s e lf  s u b je c t  to  norm ative c o n s tr a in ts . (Recall th e  d isc u ss io n  o f m od esty  
and fu ll-b lo o d e d n e ss  in  th e  la s t  c h a p te r .)  The th e o r y  o f m eaning does  
n ot i t s e lf  a ttem pt an  ex p lica tio n  o f th e  o r ig in  o f th e  s ta n d a r d s  o f  
c o r r e c tn e s s  g o v e r n in g  th is  p r a c tic e , r a th er  it  sim ply d e s c r ib e s  them . So 
Rule F ollow ing C on sid era tion s are  n ot ap p licab le  to th e  a ccou n t we g iv e  
of our g r a sp  o f th e s e  e x p r e ss io n s  ju s t  b eca u se  th a t d e sc r ip tio n  
p r e su p p o se s , and fa ils  to  exp la in , s ta n d a r d s  o f c o r r e c tn e ss .
To p u t th e  p o in t d if fe r e n tly . Rule Follow ing C on sid eration s show  th a t  
u n d er sta n d in g  can n ot a lw ays be d e sc r ib e d  in  term s o f an in tern a lisa tio n  
o f a ru le  or in te r p r e ta tio n . So, if  ou r acco u n t g ro u n d s  th e  u se  of 
c e rta in  e x p r e ss io n s  in  a c tio n s  perform ed  w ith in  a p r a c tice  or custom , 
th en  th e  r e q u is ite  notion  of g r a sp in g  a p a tte r n  of u se  w ill n ot p r e se n t  
i t s e lf  for  an  a tta ck  b ased  on Rule Follow ing C on sid eration s. The p ra ctice
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or custom  and i t s  norm ative r e q u irem en ts  are not g iv e n  a  n o rm -free  
d esc r ip tio n . T his is  n ot in  o rd er  sim p ly  to  d od ge  th e  Rule Follow ing  
C on sid era tion s, r a th e r  it  a c c e p ts  a s  a  c o n se q u e n c e  o f  th e  Rule F ollow ing  
C on sid eration s th a t no com p lete  exp lan a tion  is  p o ss ib le .
G iven th is  a c c o u n t w e th e n  in s is t  th a t in tro d u ctio n  o f an in fe r e n tia l  
p ra c tice  be ju s t if ie d  o n ly  if  i t  i s  so u n d  r e la t iv e  to  a sem antic  n otion  
w h ich  can  be ta k en  to  d e sc r ib e  ou r  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f th e  base c la s s  o f  
e x p r e ss io n s . The p r o je c t  th u s  c o n s is t s  of; f ir s t ,  a c c e p tin g  th e  n a tu re  o f  
th e  p r a c tic e  a s  g iv e n  by  th e  c o n te n ts  e x p r e ss ib le  in  th e  base c la s s  o f  
ex p r e ss io n s;  an d , se c o n d ly , q u e s t io n in g  w h eth er  m an ifesta tion  o f g r a sp  
o f a  g iv e n  c o n te n t  ju s t i f ie s  th e  b e lie f  th a t it  h as a determ in ate  tru th  
v a lu e .
W right p o in ted  to  a  r e la t iv ity  in  ju d g em en ts  o f e r ro r  and so  
c r it ic ise d  ou r c o n v ic tio n  th a t it  is  o b je c t iv e ly  tru e  th a t a c o u n ter  
in fe r e n tia l r e s u lt  cou ld  h a v e  b een  r e co g n iz e d  p r e - in fe r e n t ia lly  a s  in  
error . T his r e la t iv ity  v a n is h e s  s in c e  e ith e r  th e re  is  a d iv e r g e n c e  in  
ju d gem en t ab ou t th e  c o r r e c tn e s s  o f a u s e  o f (log ica l or o f n o n -lo g ica l)  
e x p r e ss io n s  an d  on e  or o th e r  d isp u ta n t la ck s a ju s tif ic a tio n  or both  
p o s s e s s  p u ta t iv e  ju s t if ic a t io n s . I f  th e  d iv e r g e n c e  r e la te s  to  
ju s t if ic a t io n le s s  u s e  o f e x p r e ss io n s  in  th e  base c la s s  th e n  th e re  i s  a 
d isagreem en t ab ou t th e  m eaning o f th o se  term s, i .e ., we a re  c o n s id er in g  
d iffe r e n t, not a l te r n a t iv e ,  d is c u r s iv e  p r a c tic e s . I f  th e  d iv e r g e n c e  r e la te s  
to  an a s p e c t  o f th e ir  lo g ica l p r a c tic e  th e n , s in c e  we are a llow ing p lay  
w ith  th e  notion  o f h a v in g  a  ju s tif ic a tio n , lack  of ju s tif ic a tio n  is  to  be 
im pu gned . L astly , th e  d iv e r g e n c e  in  ju s t if ic a t io n s  o f log ica l e x p r e ss io n s  
can  o n ly  r e la te  to  th e  m anner o f r e p r e s e n t in g  th e  c o n ten t o f e x p r e ss io n s  
in  th e  b ase c la s s  to  o u r s e lv e s . B ut th is  r e g e n e r a te s  our co n cern  w ith  a 
sem antic ju s tif ic a tio n  of lo g ic  b ased  on  a su ita b le  ce n tr a l notion: we 
r e su r r e c t  th e  sem antic  d eb a te ,
§7 Summary:
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W right is  a r g u in g  fo r  tw o co n c lu sio n s:  th e  f ir s t  is  cond itional; th e  
seco n d  is  not. He w an ts  to  sh ow , f ir s t ,  th a t, g iv e n  h is  ow n argu m en ts , 
th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  can n ot m otivate an  in te r e s t  in  sem antic ju s t if ic a t io n s  o f  
lo g ic  and , s e c o n d ly , th a t th e  Rule F ollow ing C on sid eration s show  th a t  
th e re  can  be no leg itim ate  c o n c e rn  w ith  sem antic ju s tif ic a tio n s  o f lo g ic . I 
q u estio n ed  th e  f ir s t  claim  sim p ly  b y  sh ow in g  th a t W right’s argu m en t  
d ep en d s on  im p ortin g  h is  ow n in te r p r e ta tio n  o f th e  Rule Follow ing  
C on sid era tion s and th a t th e r e  i s  an  a lte r n a tiv e  in te r p r e ta t io n  c o n s is te n t  
w ith  a n ti-rea lism  a s  I s e e  it . W right ta k e s  th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  co n c e rn  w ith  
p u b lic  m a n ife sta b ility  to  be e q u iv a le n t  to  h is  notion  th a t m ean in gfu l u se  
m ust a lw ays be d e sc r ib e d  a s  u s e  a g a in s t  "a secu ra b le  b ack grou n d  o f  
communal a ssen t"  (s in c e  a c h ie v in g  th is  c o n se n t i s  to  be c o r r e c t) . I th in k  
th a t th is  is  w rong: th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  n e e d s  to g iv e  som e acco u n t o f  th e  
p r e -c o n d it io n s  fo r  h a v in g  a  p r a c tic e  w h ich  in v o lv e s  norm s but n eed  not  
g iv e  a n y  r e d u c tiv e  a cco u n t o f w h at th a t c o r r e c tn e s s  c o n s is t s  in . So 
th e r e  is  a  c o h e r e n t a n t i-r e a lis t  p e r s p e c t iv e  w h ich  allow s th e  
m etap h ysica l is s u e  o f rea lism  to  be ra ise d  in  an  orth od ox  Dumm ettian  
m anner. To make a  ju d g em en t on  th e  secon d  o f W right’s  claim s I w ould  
need  to s e t t le  th e  is s u e  o f  how th e  Rule Follow ing C on sid eration s m u st  
be in te r p r e te d . But th a t i s s u e  ta k e s  me too far  from  p r e s e n t  
p reo ccu p a tio n s .
I b egan  th e  c h a p te r  by q u e stio n in g  W right’s  claim  th a t th e  
req u irem en ts  o f m olecu larity  do n ot dem and th a t a sem antic ju stif ic a tio n  
o f lo g ic  be g iv en . I g a v e  r e a so n s  for  th in k in g  th a t  a n y  p o sitio n  r e fu s in g  
th e  p r o jec t  o f g iv in g  a  ju s t if ic a t io n  o f  log ic  w ill co lla p se  in to  holism . I 
w en t on  to  d e fen d  th e  program m e o f  g iv in g  a ju s tif ic a tio n  from  a tta c k s  
w h ich  q u e stio n e d  th e  a n t i- r e a l is t ’s  a b ility  to  g iv e  su b sta n c e  to th e  
sem antica l n o tio n s he in te n d s  to  u se  (and w h ich  th u s  q u e stio n  h is  
a b ility  to  d is t in g u is h  h im self from  th e  r e a lis t) . My p o in t h ere  w as th a t  
th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  can  in s is t  on  s u f f ic ie n t  agreem en t b etw een  th e  d isp u tin g  
p a r tie s  to  e n su r e  th a t h is  sem an tica l n o tion s en g a g e  w ith  f ir s t  ord er
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p r a c tice  w ith ou t b e g g in g  a n y  m etap h ysica l q u e stio n s .
So my co n c lu sio n  is  th a t th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  has a leg itim ate  c o n cern  
w ith  sem antic  v a lid a tio n s  o f lo g ic  and th a t th e  req u irem en ts  o f  
m olecu larity  n e c e s s ita te  su c h  a  co n cern . C lassica l log ic  is  th u s  o n ly  
a ccep ta b le  if  it  ca n  be g iv e n  an  a n t i-r e a lis t ic a lly  a ccep ta b le  va lid a tion .
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S tr ic t  F in itism
I sh a ll be c o n s id e r in g  th e  re la tio n  o f th r e e  p o s itio n s  w h ich  can  each  be 
sum m arized a s  fo llo w s,
S tr ic t  fin itism : T ru th  v a lu e s  o f s e n te n c e s  a r e  d eterm in ate  w hen  th e y  
can , in  p r a c tic e , be d eterm in ed .
In tu ition ism ; T ru th  v a lu e s  o f s e n te n c e s  are determ in ate  w h en  t h e y  can , 
in  p r in c ip le , be d eterm in ed .
Realism : T ruth  v a lu e s  o f  s e n te n c e s  are  d eterm in ate ( ir r e s p e c t iv e  o f our  
a b ility  to  d eterm in e them  e v e n  in  p r in c ip le ).
In  th is  c h a p te r  I w an t to  d e fen d  th e  in tu it io n is t ic  p o s itio n  from  s tr ic t  
f in it is t ic  a tta c k s  w h ich  claim  th a t th e  in tu it io n is t ic  p o s itio n , in  i t s  u se  o f  
n otion s su c h  a s  v e r if ia b le  in  p r in c ip le ,  is  s u sc e p tib le  to  cr it ic ism s w h ich  
are p r e c is e ly  a n a lo g o u s in  form  to  th o se  b ro u g h t b y  th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  
a g a in s t  th e  r e a lis t . A c c o rd in g ly , a n t i-r e a lis t ic a lly  in sp ir e d  in tu ition ism  
th u s  in c o h e r e n tly  dem ands a r e v is io n  in  c la s s ic a l m athem atics w h ich  is  
le s s  extrem e th an  th a t dem anded by  i t s  own m otivatin g  l ig h ts .
§1 The A n alogy  B etw een  th e  In tu it io n is t ic  A ttack  on  Realism  and th e  
S tr ic t  F in itis t  A ttack  on  In tu ition ism :
L et u s  c o n s id e r  th e n  w h y  th e  in tu it io n is t ’s  notion  o f tr u th  is  th o u g h t to  
s u ffe r  from  th e  sam e in c o h e re n c e  a s  th a t o f th e  r e a lis t . The r e a lis t  
b e lie v e s  we co n fer  a m eaning on  th e  term s o f  our la n g u a g e  in  su c h  a 
w ay th a t a n y  e x p r e ss io n  f it  fo r  m aking an  a s se r to r ic  sta tem en t is  
g u a ra n teed  a d eterm in ate  tr u th  v a lu e  w h eth er  or n ot we h a v e  a n y  
m ethod fo r  d eterm in in g  th a t v a lu e . The a n t i-r e a lis t  c h a lle n g e s  th is  b e lie f  
by a sk in g  w hat in  th e  n a tu re  o f our u n d er sta n d in g  o f lo g ic - fr e e
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lan g u a g e  ju s t i f ie s  u s  in  a ssu m in g  th a t  w e g r a sp  th is  b iv a len t co n cep tio n  
of tr u th  and by  q u e s t io n in g  how  p r a c tic e  w ith  c e r ta in  r u le s  o f in fe r e n c e  
cou ld  p o s s ib ly  c o n s t i tu te  g r a sp  o f  th is  n otion  o f  tr u th . The p o in t ab ou t  
th e  f ir s t  c h a lle n g e  i s  th a t n o th in g  in  th e  c o n d itio n s  in  w h ich  we learn  
to  u s e  and in  w h ich; w e c o r r e c t ly  u s e  an  e x p r e ss io n  ca n  j u s t i fy  
assu m in g  th a t c o n d itio n s  w h ich  lie  so  r a d ica lly  o u t w ith  ou r r e co g n it io n a l  
ca p a c itie s  d e term in a te ly  e ith e r  ob ta in  or fa il to  ob ta in . K now ing how to  
u se  an e x p r e ss io n  c o r r e c t ly  is  to  know  i t s  m eaning so  n o th in g  in  th e  
u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  an  e x p r e ss io n  ca n  r e la te  to  th e  d eterm in acy  o f su c h  
r e co g n it io n  tr a n sc e n d e n t  s ta te s  o f a ffa ir s . The p o in t i s  n o t th a t w e fa il  
to  form  th e  c o n c e p tio n  o f d e f in ite  tr u th  co n d itio n s  w h ich  lie  b eyon d  
w hat we can  g u a r a n te e  to  be ab le  to  r e c o g n iz e  but th a t w h ere  w e do  
form  su c h  a  c o n c e p tio n  w e c a n n o t ju s t i fy  th e  a ssu m p tion  th a t su ch  
co n d itio n s  d e term in a te ly  e ith e r  do or do n o t ob ta in . That i s ,  th e  
ch a llen g e  i s  d ir e c te d  a t th e  a ssu m p tio n  o f  determ in ate  tr u th  v a lu e s  not  
at th e  c o n c e p tio n  o f tr u th  c o n d itio n s  w h ich  o u tr u n  w h at w e can  
(p r e se n tly )  r e c o g n iz e  to  be tr u e . In so fa r  a s  w e c h a r a c te r iz e  th e  m eaning  
o f a se n te n c e  b y  i t s  a s s e r t io n  co n d itio n s  we g iv e  an  aco u n t o f w h en  it  
can  ju s t if ia b ly  be h eld  to  be tr u e . So we g iv e  an a cco u n t o f  i t s  tru th  
co n d itio n s . T h is a p p lie s  e q u a lly  to  both e f fe c t iv e ly  and n o n -e ffe c t iv e ly  
d ecid ab le  s e n te n c e s . So th a t in  th e  la tte r  ca se  we can  s a y  th a t w e know  
w hat it  w ould be fo r  th e  s e n te n c e  to  be tr u e  a lth o u g h  w e can n ot  
gu a ra n tee  e ith e r  to  p u t o u r s e lv e s  in  a p o sitio n  o f r e c o g n iz in g  it  a s  tru e  
or to  show  th a t it  i s  im p o ssib le  to  do so . So, in  th is  s e n s e , w e g r a sp  
tru th  co n d itio n s  w h ich  are  r e c o g n it io n  tr a n sc e n d e n t  a lth o u g h , s in c e  our  
notion  o f tr u th  i s  e p istem ica lly  c o n str a in e d , i .e ., th e  tr u th  o f a s e n te n c e  
will a lw ays be lin k ed  to  w a y s  in  w h ich  we r e co g n iz e  i t  to  be tr u e , tru th  
c o n d itio n s  are  n o t r a d ica lly  r e c o g n it io n  tr a n sc e n d e n t . T h us th e  n otion  o f  
unk now ab le tr u th s  i s  r e p u d ia te d . The e f f e c t  o f r e je c t in g  th is  co n cep tio n  
of ra d ica lly  r e c o g n it io n  tr a n sc e n d e n t  tru th  c o n d itio n s  is ,  th o u g h , to  
r e je c t  th e  d eterm in acy  o f tr u th  v a lu e s  for  n o n -e ffe c t iv e ly  d ec id ab le
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s e n te n c e s  (and th u s  to  r e je c t  b iv a len ce  a s  ap p lied  to  them ). One m ight 
sa y  th a t w e do n ot q u e s tio n  w h ich  tru th  c o n d itio n s  w e g r a sp  but 
w h eth er  th e  n a tu re  o f  th a t  u n d e r s ta n d in g  ju s t i f ie s  h o ld in g  th a t th e  
tr u th  co n d itio n  i s  d e term in a te ly  fu lf ille d  or not.
T h is p o in t h as b een  w ell m ade b y  McDowell in  T ru th  C o n d itio n s  
B iv a le n c e  a n d  V erifica tion ism  (1976) w h ere  he a r g u e s  th a t on e  can  a c c ep t  
th e  v e r if ic a t io n is t  argu m en t sim p ly  b y  a c c e p tin g  an in tu it io n is t ic  p roof  
th e o r y  in  a  T arsk ian  tr u th  d e fin it io n  so  w ith h o ld in g  a s s e n t  from  th e  
p r in c ip le  o f b iv a len ce  bu t u s in g  a v e r if ic a t io n  tr a n sc e n d e n t  n o tion  o f  
tr u th . It is  tr u e  th a t  McDowell ta k e s  th is  a s  an  argu m en t fo r  realism  
w h ere he id e n tif ie s  th a t p o s itio n  w ith  m ainta in ing  th a t tr u th  may 
tr a n sc e n d  v e r if ic a t io n . B ut realism  is  in  fa c t  a p o s itio n  r e la tin g  w h olly  
to  th e  q u e stio n  o f  d e term in acy  o f tr u th  v a lu e  (se e  fo r  in s ta n c e , T enn ant 
1987 Ch. 11 and L u n tley  1988 p .3 ff) . The p o in t, a s  I h ave  ju s t  rem arked , 
i s  not w h eth e r  or  n ot we g r a sp  tru th  c o n d itio n s  w h ich  (p r e se n tly )  
tr a n sc e n d  v e r if ic a to r y  p r o c e d u r e s  but, w h en  w e do so , w h eth er  
m an ifesta tion  o f th a t g r a sp  ju s t i f ie s  a b e lie f in  d eterm in ate  tr u th  v a lu e s .
What th e n  i s  th e  p a ra lle l argu m en t a g a in s t  th e  in tu it io n is t ic  b e lie f  
th a t tr u th  v a lu e  i s  determ in ate  w h en ev er  w e h a v e  an e f fe c t iv e  d ec is io n  
p ro ced u re?  P resu m ab ly  th is ,  th a t  w e can  o n ly  j u s t i fy  ou r n otion  of  
tru th  r e la t iv e  to u se  th a t we are  a c tu a lly  cap ab le  o f m aking so  we can  
o n ly  assu m e th a t tr u th  v a lu e s  a re  determ in ate  w h ere  we can  a c tu a lly  
determ in e th o se  v a lu e s . N oth ing  in  th e  n a tu re  o f th is  u s e  sh o w s th a t we 
g r a sp  a  n o tion  of tr u th  w h ich  is  determ in ate  in  c a s e s  w h ere  we are not 
a c tu a lly  cap ab le  o f in s t itu t in g  th e  d e c is io n  p r o ced u re . So th e  in tu it io n is t  
m akes p r e c is e ly  th e  sam e assu m p tion  a s  th e  r e a lis t , nam ely, th a t  
d eterm in acy  o f tru th  v a lu e  o u tr u n s  ou r a b ility  to  determ in e tr u th  v a lu e . 
In  th e  r e a lis t  c a se  th is  is  e x te n d ed  beyond  all p o ss ib il ity  o f d eterm in in g  
tr u th  v a lu e  w h erea s  in  th e  in tu it io n is t ’s  c a se  it  i s  o n ly  ex ten d ed  to  some 
p o s s ib il ity  o f d eterm in in g  tr u th  v a lu e  in  p r in c ip le . In  e ith e r  c a se , th e  
s tr ic t  f in it is t  h o ld s, th e  e x te n s io n  is  u n ju s t if ie d  b y  our g r a sp  o f th e  u se
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A num ber o f com m entators (e .g . W right, 1982; G eorge, 1988) a ttem p t to  
b rin g  o u t th is  p a ra lle l b y  a s k in g  how th e  in tu it io n is t  can  com m unicate  
h is  n otion  o f tr u th , i .e . ,  v e r if ia b il ity  in  p r in c ip le , to  th e  s tr ic t  f in it is t .  
J u st  a s  th e  r e a lis t  in  h is  a ttem p t to  exp la in  h is  n otion  o f tr u th  to  th e  
in tu it io n is t  is  fr u s tr a te d  b y  th e  c ir c u la r ity  o f h is  a ttem p ted  ex p la n a tio n s  
so  th e  in tu it io n is t  i s  f r u s tr a te d  by c ir c u la r ity  in  h is  e x p la n a to ry  
program m e. It  sh o u ld  be n o ted  th a t  w h ere  we ta lk  ab ou t com m unicating  
a n otion  o f  tr u th  w e cou ld  (sh ou ld ) be ta lk in g  ab ou t g iv in g  a
n o n -c ir c u la r  ju s t if ic a t io n  o f th e  n otion  o f tr u th . Take th e  r e a lis t ’s  
ju s tif ic a tio n  fo r  a ssu m in g  th a t  q u a n tifica tio n  o v e r  an  in fin ite  dom ain (of 
a d ec id a b le  p re d ica te )  a lw a y s i s s u e s  in  a se n te n c e  w ith  determ in ate
tr u th  v a lu e . Each in s ta n c e  o f  th e  q u a n tified  se n te n c e , th e  r e a lis t  w ill 
u n c o n tr o v e r s ia lly  (r e la tiv e  to  th e  in tu it io n is t)  m aintain, h a s a  
determ in ate  tr u th  v a lu e  so  th e  in f in ita r y  p r o d u ct or sum  o f th e s e  tr u th  
v a lu e s  w ill i t s e lf  be d eterm in ate . But in  th is  la s t  s te p  th e  r e a lis t
a ssu m es ju s t  w h at h e  s e t  o u t to  sh ow , nam ely, th a t tr u th  v a lu e s  are
d eterm in ate  ir r e s p e c t iv e  o f  our a b ilit ie s  to  d eterm in e them .
How can  th e  in tu it io n is t  s e t  ab ou t ex p la in in g  h is  notion  o f tru th ?  The 
in tu it io n is t  w a n ts  to  ju s t i fy  h o ld in g  th a t tru th  v a lu e s  are determ in ate  
w h en  determ in ab le  in  p r in c ip le . S ay  h e  p u ts  forw ard  an  argu m en t sim ilar  
to  th e  fo llow ing; w e h a v e  a p r o c e d u r e  w h ich  is  g u a ra n teed , a fte r  a  f in ite  
num ber o f s te p s , to com e to a h a lt  i s s u in g  in  a v e r d ic t  on  tr u th  v a lu e . 
So w h eth er  or n ot we im plem ent or can  im plem ent th e  p ro ced u re  it  m ust 
be determ in ate  in  a d v a n c e  o f in s t itu t in g  it  w h ich  tr u th  v a lu e  i t  w ill, if  
c o r r e c t ly  ca rr ied  o u t, is s u e  in . T h us th e  tr u th  v a lu e  o f  th e  se n te n c e  is  
determ in ate . The s tr ic t  f in it is t  can  a tta ck  th is  exp lan ation  a t tw o p o in ts . 
F ir st , he m ight a g r e e  th a t if  th e  p ro ced u re  is  su r v e y a b ly  im plem ented it  
i s s u e s  in  a d eterm in ate  v e r d ic t  on  tru th  v a lu e  but q u e stio n  w h eth er  we 
are e n tit le d  to assu m e th a t  it  is  determ in ate  w h ich  v e r d ic t  
im plem entation o f  th e  p r o c e d u r e  w ill i s s u e  in . O nly in  th e  la tte r  c a se  can
164we ta k e  it  th a t th e  tr u th  v a lu e  i s  determ in ate  but to  m ove from  th e  
form er to  th e  la tte r  i s  j u s t  to  assu m e th a t in  p r in c ip le  d eterm in ab le  
tr u th  v a lu e s  are  d eterm in ate . S e c o n d ly , th e  s tr ic t  f in it is t  can  q u e stio n  
th e  in tu it io n is t ’s  n o tion  o f  f in ite  num ber. I f  th e  n otion  o f f in itu d e  
c o in c id e s  w ith  som eth in g  th e  s tr ic t  f in it is t  i s  p re p a r e d  to  e n d o r se  th e n  
i t  m ight be th a t a  f in ite  p r o c e d u r e  a s  u se d  in  th e  exp lan a tion  o f "in 
p rin c ip le  d ec id ab ility"  c o in c id e s  w ith  a c tu a lly  im plem entable p r o c e d u r e s . 
In  th is  c a se  th e  in tu it io n is t  p o s it io n  c o lla p se s  in to  th e  s tr ic t  f in it is t  
p o sitio n  b eca u se  he i s  sim p ly  u n ab le  to  c o n v e y  th e  p e c u lia r ly  
in tu it io n is t ic  n o tion  o f  "in p r in c ip le  d ecid ab ility"  to  th e  s tr ic t  f in it is t .
We can  a g a in  look a t th e  a n a lo g y  b etw een  th e  r e a lis t  and in tu it io n is t  
b y n o tic in g  th a t  both  in s is t  th a t th e y  h a v e  a p ro ce d u r e  for  d eterm in in g  
tru th  v a lu e . The r e a lis t ’s  m ethod c o n s is t s  in  s u r v e y in g  an  in fin ite  
domain o f  tr u th  v a lu e s  w h ile  th e  in tu it io n is t ’s  m ethod c o n s is t s  in  
im plem enting  a f in ite ly  bou n d ed  p r o c e ss . Ig n o r in g  fo r  th e  moment 
q u e st io n s  ab ou t w h at th e  in tu it io n is t  m eans by f in ite , it  s t i l l  a p p ea rs  
th a t both d e sc r ip t io n s  are  s im ilarly  q u e stio n  b e g g in g . We w ant th e  
r e a lis t  to  exp la in  w h y  an  u n d ec id a b le  s e n te n c e , i .e . ,  th e  r e s u lt  o f  
s u r v e y in g  an  in fin ite  dom ain, adm its o f  h a v in g  a determ in ate  tr u th  v a lu e  
and th e  in tu it io n is t  to  exp la in  w h y  th e  outcom e o f a  f in ite  p ro ced u re  
sh ou ld  be d eterm in ate . What, on e  m ight a sk  th e  in tu it io n is t , i s  th e  
r e le v a n t  d iffe r e n c e  b etw een  th e  in fin ite  and f in ite  but u n su r v e y a b le  
case?  A fter a ll s u r e ly  th e  e s s e n t ia l  problem  w ith  th e  in fin ite  c a se  is  j u s t  
th a t in fin ite  dom ains are , in  p r a c tic e , u n su r v e y a b le ,
§2 S tr a in s  in  th e  A nalogy:
In th is  se c t io n  I w ant to  q u e s t io n  how d eep  th e  a n a lo g y  b etw een  th e  
in tu it io n is t  a tta ck  on realism  and th e  s tr ic t  f in it is t  a tta c k  on in tu ition isra  
r u n s . My th o u g h t i s  th a t by  fo c u s s in g  on  th e  e x te n t  o f agreem en t  
betw een  d isp u t in g  p a r t ie s  w e can  r e v ea l a c ru c ia l d isa n a n o lg y  betw een
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th e  tw o c a s e s . Of c o u r se , m erely  sh ow in g  th a t th e re  is  a  d isa n a lo g y  
b etw een  th e  tw o c a s e s  w ill n ot c o n s t itu te  a d e fen ce  o f in tu ition ism , A 
fu ll d e fen ce  w ould h ave  to  show  how  th e  d isa n a lo g y  u n d e r c u ts  th e  s tr ic t  
f in it is t  a tta c k s  on  in tu ition ism  w h ils t  lea v in g  u n to u ch ed  th e  in tu it io n is t ’s 
a tta ck  on  realism . My argu m en t is  c o n s id er a b ly  w eaker and le s s  d ir ec t  
th an  th is . H aving d em on stra ted  a d isa n a lo g y  I th e n  go  on to  a r g u e  th a t  
th e  s tr ic t  f in it is t  p o s itio n  i s  sim p ly  n ot v ia b le  and m ust be r e je c te d :  we 
can n ot a c c ep t th e  s tr ic t  f in i t i s t ’s  n o tion  o f tr u th  if  w e a re  to  allow  fo r  
th e  p r a c tic e  o f in fe r e n c e . I t  m ight be th o u g h t th a t one ta k in g  th is  
a ttitu d e  w ould be a c c e p tin g  a r e d u c tio  a d  a b su rd u m  o f a n ti-rea lism  v iz .,  
th a t a n t i-r e a lis t  a rg u m en ts  m ust be w ron g  s in c e  fu ll  im plem entation  of  
th o se  arg u m en ts  lea d s  to  ad op tion  o f  an in c o h e re n t p o sitio n . The p o in t I 
w ant to  m ake, h o w ev er , i s  th a t im p ortin g  th e  g e n e r a l  c o n str a in t th a t our  
a cco u n t m ust allow  fo r  th e  p r a c tic e  o f in fe r e n c e , d em on stra tes  a n eed  to  
a c c ep t a  notion  o f  tr u th  w h ich  d eterm in ate ly  o b ta in s  e v e n  w h en  we 
can n ot, in  p r a c tic e , determ in e i t s  v a lu e  (in  Dummett’s  w ord s w e are  
fo rc e d  by  th e  p r a c tic e  o f in fe r e n c e  to  make som e " co n cess io n  to  
realism ") but th a t, b eca u se  o f th e  d isa n a lo g y  I claim to h ave  
dem on stra ted  and th e  e v id e n t  w eak er  a ssu m p tion  in v o lv e d  in  in tu ition ism  
no d ir ec t  argu m en t fo r  th e  r é in tr o d u c tio n  o f  fu ll-b lo w n  realism  is  
forth com in g . In tu ition ism  is  th u s  (w eak ly) v in d ica te d  a s  th e  minimal 
v ia b le  p o sitio n . That is ,  th e  a rgu m en t I o ffe r  s u f f ic e s , i f  i t  is  s u c c e s fu l,  
to  r e b u t  th e  c h a lle n g e  o ffe r e d  to in tu ition ism  -  in tu ition ism  is  a  sta b le  
p o sitio n  -  w ith ou t su p p ly in g  a s u a s iv e  argu m en t w h ich  w ould s a t is fy  a  
s tr ic t  f in it is t  w ho is  p rep a red  to  ad op t a scep tic ism  ab ou t in fe r e n tia l  
p ra c tice . One m ight p u t th e  p o in t by  sa y in g  th a t b o th  in tu ition ism  and  
realism  in v o lv e  m aking som e m eta p h y sica l a ssu m p tion  but th a t th e ir  
r e s p e c t iv e  a ssu m p tio n s  are  d is t in c t ,  a c c ep tin g  th e  in tu it io n is t ’s  
assu m p tion  h as o n ly  b een  ju s t if ie d  by an ap p ea l to  a g en e r a l a d eq u a cy  
c o n str a in t  on  an a c co u n t o f a p r a c tic e  (v iz ., th a t th e  acco u n t allow  for  
th e  p r a c tice  o f in fe r e n c e ) . B ut, b eca u se  th e  r e a lis t  a ssu m p tion  is  a t le a s t
166a s  s tr o n g  a s  th e  in tu it io n is t 's  (s in c e  realism  im plies in tu ition ism , in  
term s o f th e  g lo s s  g iv e n  on  th e s e  claim s at th e  o u ts e t  o f th e  c h a p ter ,
i .e .,  th a t a ll s e n t e n c e s . h a v e  d eterm in ate  tr u th  v a lu e s  e n ta ils  th a t th e  
tr u th  v a lu e s  o f a ll e f f e c t iv e ly  d ec id a b le  s e n te n c e s  are  determ inate^) I 
claim  th a t th e r e  i s  an  im p era tive  to a c c e p t  th e  in tu it io n is t 's  a ssu m p tion  
w h ich  th e  r e a lis t 's  m eta p h y sica l a ssu m p tion  la ck s .
L et me s k e tc h  th e  form  o f my argu m en t. My f ir s t  claim is  th a t  
a n t i-r e a lis t  a rg u m en ts  lead  to  a c c e p tin g  a sem antic  th e o r y  w h ich  d iffe r s  
in  fo rm  from  a tr u th  c o n d itio n a l accou n t: tr u th  co n d itio n s  are  no lo n g er  
ta k en  a s  fu n d am en ta l b u t a re  exp la in ed  in  term s of v e r if ic a to r y  or  
ju s t if ic a to r y  p r o c e d u r e s . So n a iv e  realism  m ust be r e je c te d . T his  
a p p ea rs  to  lea v e  th r e e  p o s s ib le  p o sitio n s:  id ea l ver ifica tio n ism  (exp la ined  
below); in tu ition ism ; an d , s tr ic t  f in itism . I th e n  a r g u e  th a t th e r e  i s  no  
s lid e  from  in tu itio n ism  to  id ea l v e r ifica tio n ism , i .e .,  I a r g u e  th a t i f  we 
can  be b ro u g h t to  a c c e p t  an  in tu it io n is t ic  p o s itio n  w e do n ot th e r e b y  
commit o u r s e lv e s  to  an  id ea l v e r if ic a t io n is t  p o s itio n . F in a lly  I claim th at  
th e  s tr ic t  f in it is t  p o s itio n  m ust be r e je c te d  s in c e  it  fa ils  to  allow  fo r  an  
a cco u n t o f in fe r e n t ia l p r a c tic e . So th is  g e n e r a l c o n str a in t  (of r e q u ir in g  
an a cco u n t o f in fe r e n t ia l p ra c tic e )  p r o v id e s  a m otive for  a c c ep tin g  an  
a ssu m p tion  o f d eterm in a cy  o f tr u th  v a lu e  w h ich  g o e s  b eyond  th a t w h ich  
th e  s tr ic t  f in it is t  i s  p rep a red  to allow . S in ce  th e  in tu it io n is t 's  
assu m p tion  is  d is t in c t  and is  w eak er th an  th a t o f th e  id ea l 
v e r if ic a t io n is t  we can  o n ly  claim  th a t th e  g e n e r a l c o n str a in t  p r o v id e s  
su p p o rt fo r  th e  in tu it io n is t ic  p o s itio n .
It  is  w orth  d is t in g u is h in g  tw o s o r ts  o f rea list; th e  f ir s t  h o ld s th a t we 
sim ply  h a v e  a g r a s p  o f d e term in a te ly  o b ta in in g , v e r if ic a tio n  tr a n sc e n d e n t  
tru th  co n d itio n s  fo r  n o n -e f fe c t iv e ly  d ec id ab le  s e n te n c e s . The secon d
I. T his is  n ot to  s a y  th a t th e  p r a c tic e  o f in tu it io n is t ic  m athem atics m ust 
be in c lu d e d  in  th e  p r a c tic e  o f r e a lis t  m athem atics.
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tr ie s  to  a c co u n t fo r  th a t g r a sp  in  term s o f a  g r a sp  o f in fin ita r y  
v e r if ic a tio n  p r o c e d u r e s . Call th e  seco n d  form  o f r e a lis t  an id ea l 
v e r if ic a t io n is t . The p a ra lle l b etw een  th e  tw o a rg u m en ts  a p p lie s  w h en  we  
c o n s id er  th e  id ea l v e r if ic a t io n is t  p o s itio n  s in c e  th e n  th e  r e a lis t , a lth o u g h  
adm itting  th a t we h a v e  no e f f e c t iv e  d e c is io n  p ro ce d u r e , in s is t s  th a t we  
h ave  an in fin ita r y  d e c is io n  p r o c e d u r e  w h ich  ju s t i f ie s  h is  b e lie f  in  
determ in ate  tr u th  v a lu e s . That i s  h is  m etap h ysica l a ssu m p tion . W hereas 
th e  in tu it io n is t  a ssu m e s  th a t  p o s s e s s io n  o f an e f fe c t iv e  d ec is io n  
p ro ced u re  j u s t i f ie s  b e lie f  in  d eterm in ate  tr u th  v a lu e s . T hat is  h is  
m etap h ysica l a ssu m p tion . So fa r  th e  p a ra lle l seem s tru e .
T here is  a n o th er  a s p e c t  o f  th e  p ara lle l. The in tu it io n is t , in  so  fa r  a s  
he d o es n ot q u e s t io n  ou r  g r a s p  o f (p r e se n tly )  n o n -e ffe c t iv e ly  d ec id ab le  
s e n te n c e s , w ill n ot q u e s t io n  th e  id e a l v e r if ic a t io n is t ’s  d e sc r ip tio n  o f th e  
in fin ita r y  p ro ce d u r e . What h e  q u e s t io n s  is  w h eth er  a p ro ced u re  so  
d e sc r ib e d  is  g e n u in e ly  a  d e c is io n  p o ced u re , th a t is ,  he q u e s t io n s  
w h eth er  p o s s e s s io n  o f  a d e sc r ip t io n  o f su ch  a p r o c e d u r e  ju s t i f ie s  b e lie f  
in  d eterm in ate  tr u th  v a lu e s . S im ilarly  th e  s tr ic t  f in it is t  (or, a t le a s t , th e  
s tr ic t  f in it is t  w h ose  p o s itio n  s u p p o se d ly  r e s u lt s  from  an a n t i-r e a lis t  
atta ck  on in tu ition ism ) w ill n o t q u e stio n  ou r  g r a sp  o f an  e f fe c t iv e  
d ec is io n  p r o c e d u r e  fo r  s e n te n c e s  in v o lv in g , s a y , exp on en tia tion . What he  
q u e st io n s  is  w h eth er  th a t g r a sp  ju s t i f ie s  b e lie f  in  determ in ate  tr u th  
v a lu e s  fo r  su c h  s e n te n c e s .
The p a ra lle l d is in te g r a te s  o n ce  w e tu rn  to  look at th e  a c c o u n ts  
o ffe r e d  o f ou r u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  th e  r e le v a n t s e n te n c e s . A c la s s ic a l tru th  
con d ition a l m ean ing th e o r y  i s  a tta c k e d  by th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  fo r  i t s  
in a b ility  to  g iv e  an in form ative  a cco u n t o f w hat our u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  
v e r if ic a tio n  tr a n sc e n d e n t  tr u th  co n d itio n s  c o n s is t s  in  (and th u s  can n ot  
ju s t i fy  a sc r ip t io n s  o f k n o w led g e  o f su ch  co n d itio n s) . The a n t i-r e a lis t  
o ffe r s  an a lte r n a tiv e  m odel o f o u r  u n d e r s ta n d in g  in  term s o f w hat 
c o u n ts  a s  a ju s tif ic a tio n  for  h o ld in g  th e  s e n te n c e  to be tru e . So our  
u n d er sta n d in g  of, sa y , u n iv e r sa lly  q u a n tified  s e n te n c e s  c o n s is t s  in  an
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a b ility  to r e c o g n iz e  o f  a n y  c o n s tr u c t io n  w h eth er  it  is  an  op era tion  
ta k in g  an a r b itr a r y  member o f th e  domain onto  a  p roof th a t th e  
a p p rop ria te  p r e d ica te  a p p lie s  to  it . I tak e it  th a t th is  a s p e c t  o f th e  
a n t i-r e a lis t 's  argu m en t i s  e n d o r se d  by  th e  s tr ic t  f in it is t ,  in tu it io n is t  and  
id ea l v e r if ic a t io n is t . Each p o s itio n  i s  d is t in c t iv e ly  ch a r a c te r iz e d  by  w hat 
c o n s tr u c t io n s  it  i s  p r ep a red  to  r e c o g n iz e  a s  e n c a p su la tin g  a p roo f or  
d ec is io n  p r o c e d u r e . What th is  m eans i s  th a t each  p o sitio n  a c c e p ts  a  
p roof th e o r e t ic  ex p la n a tio n  o f th e  m ean in gs o f  th e  lo g ica l c o n s ta n ts . 
H ow ever b eca u se  o f th e  im p r e d ic a tiv ity  o f th o se  ex p la n a tio n s th e y  
e s ta b lish , a t m ost, a fram ew ork w ith in  w h ich  th e  m ean in gs o f th e  
c o n s ta n ts  m ust be g iv e n . So th e r e  i s  s t i l l  an  is s u e  a s  to  w h eth er  th e  
n otion  o f  p roo f u se d  in  th o se  ex p la n a tio n s  is  to  be th a t  o f a c la s s ic a lly  
va lid  p roof (as th e  id ea l v e r if ic a t io n is t  c o n ten d s)  or in tu it io n is t ic .
A fu r th e r  p o in t sh o u ld  be n o ted  and th a t is  th a t a p roof th e o re tic  
exp lan ation  can  o n ly  be a n t i-r e a lis t ic a lly  a ccep ta b le  i f  it  rem ains a  
d ecid ab le  m atter a s  to  w h eth er  a  c o n str u c t io n  is  to  be a ccord ed  th e  
s ta tu s  o f a p roof (of a  g iv e n  s e n te n c e ) . (S h o r tly , I sh a ll c o n s id e r  an  
argu m en t w h ich  im plies th a t th is  v iew  is  fa lla c io u s .)  O therw ise g r a sp  o f  
a g iv e n  se n te n c e  c a n n o t be ta k en  to  be m an ifested  in  an e x e r c ise  o f a 
r e co g n itio n a l sk ill. T h is r u le s  o u t a n y  d ir e c t  ap p ea l th e  id ea l 
v e r if ic a t io n is t  may m ake to  in fin ita i*y  v e r if ic a t io n  p r o c e d u r e s  a s  proofs^  
At m ost th e  id ea l v e r if ic a t io n is t  can  ap p ea l to  in fin ita r y  v e r if ic a tio n  
p r o c e d u r e s  in  o r d e r  to  j u s t i fy  c e r ta in  p roof p r o c e d u r e s .
S uch  an ap p ea l is ,  h o w ev er , i ll ic it  b eca u se  it  tr a n sc e n d s  a n y th in g  
th a t can  be ju s t if ie d  b y  ap p ea l to  th e  m odel o f m eaning w h ich , 
a cco rd in g  to  th e  a b o v e , th e  id e a l v e r if ic a t io n is t  e n d o r se s , th a t is ,  a  
m odel o f m eaning w h ich  ta k e s  p r o v a b ility  a s  ce n tr a l in  th e  sem antic  
th eo ry . T h is, I claim , is  a c o n se q u e n c e  o f th e  in co m p le ten ess  r e su lt s . 
What th e se  show  is  th a t g r a sp  o f th e  p roof p r o c e d u r e s  r e la tin g  to an y  
se n te n c e  o f th e  la n g u a g e  ca n n o t be tak en  to is s u e  in  a g u a ra n teed  
m eans o f d ec is io n  e v e n  i f  th e  p ro o f p r o c ed u re  is  c la s s ic a l (ju s t if ie d  by
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ap p ea l to  in fin ite  v e r if ic a t io n  p r o c e d u r e s ) . The p o in t h ere  is  th a t ta k in g  
p roof a s  c e n tr a l in  th e  sem an tic  th e o r y  m eans th a t  we a c c e p t  th e  
orth od ox  in tu it io n is t ic  exp lan a tion  o f th e  lo g ica l c o n s ta n ts  in  term s o f  
proof. T here i s  a q u e s t io n  a s  to  w h at n otion  o f p roo f is  to be u se d  in  
th e se  ex p la n a tio n s. The id ea l v e r if ic a t io n is t  ta k e s  h im self to  be e n tit le d  
to  assu m e a c la s s ic a l n o tion  o f  p roof. But th e n  th e  in c o m p le ten ess  
r e s u lt s  show  th a t e v e n  c la s s ic a l ly  w e can n ot g u a r a n tee  th a t th e r e  is  a  
p roof or d isp r o o f o f e v e r y  s e n te n c e . T h us on e can n ot ap p ea l to  c la s s ic a l  
p r o v a b ility  in  o r d e r  to  j u s t i fy  b e lie v in g  in  determ in ate  tr u th  v a lu e s  fo r  
all s e n te n c e s . So th e  ap p ea l to  in fin ite  v e r if ic a tio n  p r o c e d u r e s  in  o rd er  
to  j u s t i fy  c la s s ic a l  lo g ic  fa ils  to  j u s t i fy  b e lie f in  d eterm in ate  tr u th  
v a lu e s  on ce  th e  sem antic  th e o r y  i s  a ccep ted  to  be o f p roo f th e o r e t ic  
form . The en d  r e s u lt  i s  th a t th e r e  i s  an  aw kw ard m ism atch b etw een  th e  
ju s tif ic a tio n  p ro v id e d  b y  th e  sem an tic  th e o r y  and th e  p r a c tic e  o f  
in fe r e n c e ,
§2.1 S e n te n c e  S ize  B ounds:
T here i s ,  th o u g h , an  a p p a r e n tly  s tr o n g  id ea l v e r if ic a t io n is t  ch a lle n g e  to  
th is  p o s itio n . The f ir s t  s ta g e  o f th a t c h a lle n g e  n o te s  th a t th e  
in co m p le ten ess  r e s u lt s  are  a c c e p te d  b y  in tu it io n is ts  a s  sh ow in g  th a t ou r  
notion  o f p r o v a b ility  ca n n o t be c ircu m scr ib ed  w ith in  a s in g le  form al 
sy stem . The id ea l v e r if ic a t io n is t  is  ab le  to  make p r e c is e ly  th e  same m ove, 
th a t i s ,  he can  a c c e p t  th e  in c o m p le te n e ss  r e s u lt s  a s  sh ow in g  th a t h is  
notion  o f p roo f tr a n sc e n d s  th e  lim its o f a  g iv e n  form al sy stem .
The n ex t and  m ost c r u c ia l s ta g e  o f th e  ch a lle n g e  q u e s t io n s  th e  
s u g g e s t io n  th a t p r o o fs  m ust be o f f in ite  le n g th . That i s ,  th e  id ea l 
v e r if ic a t io n is t  q u e s t io n s  w h eth e r  th e  s ta tu s  o f a c o n str u c tio n  a s  a p roo f  
m ust be a d ec id a b le  m atter in  th e  m anner s u g g e s te d  b y  th e  in tu it io n is t . 
T his p a r t o f th e  argu m en t ca n  be draw n fa ir ly  d ir e c t ly  from  L an gen d oen  
and P o sta l’s  The V a s tn e ss  o f  N a tu ra l L a n g u a g e s  (1984). I f  both a s p e c ts  
o f th e  c h a lle n g e  can  be made good  th e n  th e  id ea l v e r if ic a t io n is t  can  hold
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th e  we h ave  a notion  o f  (tr a n sf in ite )  p ro o fs  w h ich  is ,  i) not ca p tu ra b le  
w ith in  th e  r e so u r c e s  o f a s in g le  form al sy stem , ii) su f f ic ie n t  to
g u a ra n tee  a  d eterm in ate  tr u th  v a lu e  fo r  e v e r y  se n te n c e .
L an gen d oen  and  P osta l a tta ck  w hat th e y  s e e  a s  an u n fo u n d ed
assu m p tion  common to  a  w hole v a r ie ty  o f l in g u is t ic  th e o r ie s , nam ely, th a t  
se n te n c e  s iz e  h a s no f in ite  bound bu t th a t a ll s e n te n c e s  are  o f f in ite  
le n g th  (so  s e n te n c e  s iz e  is  in f in ite ly  b ou n d ed ). T h ey  c o n s id e r  arg u m en ts  
in  fa v o u r  o f su c h  v ie w s  w h ich  attem pt to  show  th a t a n y  f in ite  
r e str ic t io n  on  s e n te n c e  s iz e  w ould  be b ased  up on  "arbitrary" or  not
e s se n t ia lly  l in g u is t ic  fa c to r s  (su ch  a s  c o n tin g e n t  p erform ance lim itations  
o f hum an s p e a k e r s ) . S u ch  fa c to r s , it  i s  claim ed are n ot e s s e n t ia l  to  th e  
g ra m m a tic a lity  o f  s e n te n c e s . What L an gen d oen  and P osta l a ttem p t to  
show  is  th a t su c h  a rg u m en ts  are  e ith e r  q u e s t io n -b e g g in g  or te ll in  
fa v o u r  o f a r e je c tio n  o f a ll ( in c lu d in g  tr a n sf in ite )  b ou n d s on  s e n te n c e  
size; th a t gram m aticality  is  in  no w ay lin k ed  to  s iz e  but is  a  p u r e ly  
form al p r o p e r ty . T h u s, th e y  co n c lu d e , no r e s tr ic t io n  on th e  s iz e  o f a
gram m atical s e n te n c e  sh o u ld  be a c c e p te d .
T ran sp osed  to  th e  s e t t in g  o f th e  c o n tr o v e r s y  b etw een  th e  in tu it io n is t
and th e  id ea l v e r if ic a t io n is t  th e  argu m en t w ould be th a t th e  in tu it io n is t
a d h e r e s  to  an ill-m o tiv a ted  f in ite  s iz e  bound on  th e  le n g th  of 
p r o o fs /d e c is io n  p r o c e d u r e s . A ny argu m en t, it  w ould be claim ed, to  show  
th a t we g r a sp  a r b itr a r ily  lo n g  (b u t f in ite )  d ec is io n  p r o c e d u r e s  is  e ith e r  
fa lla c io u s or sh ow s th a t  a n y  bound on  th e  le n g th  o f p ro o fs  is  a r b itr a r y . 
In fa c t , L an gen d oen  and P o sta l make j u s t  th is  p o in t w h en  c o n s id e r in g
an o b jec tio n  to th e ir  v iew  w h ich  claim s th a t in  a  c o n s tr u c t iv e  grammar a
s iz e  law n eed  n ot be e x p lic it ly  form ulated  s in c e  a s iz e  bound w ill em erge  
as a c o n se q u e n c e  o f th e  f in ite  n e s s  o f  d e r iv a tio n s  o f s e n te n c e s .
Let u s  look now a t som e o f th e  d e ta il o f  L an gen d oen  and P o sta l’s  
argum en t. F ir s t  L an gen d oen  and P osta l a ttem p t to  p o in t ou t th e  fa u lts  in  
c e r ta in  common a rg u m en ts  a g a in s t  a f in ite  s iz e  bound on se n te n c e s . Any  
argu m en t, th e y  claim , th a t is  b ased  on  e v id e n c e  o f a c tu a l l in g u is t ic
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fa il to  d isc r e d it  a f in ite  b u t s u f f ic ie n t ly  la rg e  s iz e  bound. Also
arg u m en ts  b ased  on  th e  p r e se r v a t io n  of se n ten ceh o o d  u p on  r e p ea ted  
a p p lica tion  o f a g iv e n  s u b - s e n te n t ia l  u n it  ( e .g ., "I know th a t  ...") w ill 
fa il for  e ith e r  o f tw o rea so n s: i) su c h  a rgu m en ts  b eg  th e  q u e stio n  o v e r  
w h eth er  se n te n c e h o o d  i s  p r e s e r v e d  w h en  th e  ap p lica tion  i s  r e p e a te d  a n y  
(fin ite ) num ber o f tim es, i .e . ,  su c h  a rgu m en ts  assu m e th a t th e re  is  no
f in ite  s iz e  bound t r a n s g r e s s io n  o f  w h ich  in v a lid a te s  a s tr in g  a s  a
se n te n c e ;  ii) i f  th e  argu m en t is  c o n s tr u e d  a s  a d e m o n stra tio n  th a t su c h  
s tr in g s  a re  p a r t o f a n a tu ra l la n g u a g e , th e n  th e  d em on stra tion  w ill 
in c lu d e  an  in d u c t iv e  s te p  and  so  can n ot be c o n s tr u c te d  w ith in  an  
axiom atic th e o r y  w h ich  d o es  n o t in c lu d e  a q u e s t io n -b e g g in g  axiom o f  
in fin ity .
H ow ever L an gen d oen  and P o sta l do th in k  th a t  a c o g e n t  argu m en t can  
be made a g a in s t  a n y  f in ite  s iz e  bound on se n te n c e s . A ny su c h  bound  
th e y  a r g u e  can  be s e e n  to la ck  a s e c u r e  l in g u is t ic  m otivation . T hat is ,  
a n y  le n g th  p r o p e r ty  u se d  to  d eterm in e  sen ten ceh o o d  w ill n ot be based  
on  "the s tr u c tu r a l p r o p e r ty  o f s y n ta c t ic  w ell-form ed n ess"  (1984, p .35 
Note: H ere L an gen d oen  and P o sta l a re  q u o tin g  Katz, w ith  ap p rova l) but
w ill e ith e r  be w h o lly  a r b itr a r y  or  m otivated  by c o n tin g e n t  p erform ance
c a p a c it ie s  e x h ib ited  b y  s p e a k e r s , L an gen d oen  and P osta l attem pt to  show  
th is  b y  c o n s id e r in g  how on e  w ould  c o n s tr u c t  r u le s  g o v e r n in g  
gram m aticality  from  an in d u c t iv e  b ase of actu a l a t te s te d  s e n te n c e s  
(w hich  th u s  are  n e c e ssa in ly  f in ite ) .  The argum en t is  th en  a s  fo llow s. 
C learly  w e ca n n o t tak e  th e  maximum s iz e  o f s e n te n c e s  in  th e  in d u c tiv e
b a sis  a s  a  s iz e  bound fo r  th e  la n g u a g e  as a w hole b eca u se  w e could
e a s ily  im agine h a v in g  an  in d u c t iv e  b ase  w hich  in c lu d ed  s e n te n c e s  o f 
(far) g r e a te r  le n g th . In  o r d er  to  make th is  p o ss ib ility  v iv id  L an gen d oen  
and P o sta l d e sc r ib e  th e  s itu a tio n  th u s .
To se e  fu r th e r  th a t th e  p r in c ip le  (th a t s e n te n c e  s iz e  is  boun ded  by
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th e  maximum s iz e  o f  s e n te n c e s  in  th e  in d u c tiv e  b asej is  a p r o p e r ty  
o f som eth in g  d is t in c t  from  L (th e  g iv e n  n atu ra l la n g u a g e ] , im agine  
c r e a tu r e s , ca ll them  W oocoos, w ith  life  sp a n s  one m illion tim es  
g r e a te r  th an  o u r s , w ith  on e b illion  tim es more memory and w ith  
com parable e x tra  r e a so n in g  p ow er. C learly , th e  IB (L )s ( in d u c tiv e  
b a ses! o f  Woocoo l in g u is t s  s tu d y in g  (n a tu ra l la n g u a g e s !  sp o k en  by  
W oocoos w ou ld  be s u b je c t  to  an  e n t ir e ly  d iffe r e n t  and m uch w eak er  
s iz e  p r in c ip le  th an  (th e  a b o v e j. S u ch  p r in c ip le s  th u s  p r o v id e  no  
in form ation  ab ou t L bu t o n ly  ab ou t th e  p r o c e ss  o f l in g u is t ic
r e se a r c h  on  L c a rr ied  o u t by  c r e a tu r e s  w ith  fixed  lim itations. (1984,
p.37)
A lter n a tiv e ly  i f  w e ch o o se  som e o th er  la rg e r  f in ite  s e n te n c e  s iz e  
bound th e n  p r e c is e ly  th e  sam e im ag in a tive  exam ple w ill aga in  sh ow  th a t  
su c h  a  ch o ice  is  a r b itr a r y  or is  b ased  on  p e r c e iv e d  lim itations on  
perform an ce. The p o in t, th e y  claim  m ight be p u t a s  fo llow s.
T here i s  no c a se  w h ere  an  in tu it io n  o f ill-fo r m e d n e ss  is  a ttr ib u ta b le  
to  m ere le n g th . All th a t  i s  e v e r  o b se r v e d  i s  th a t a s  s e n te n c e s
become lo n g e r , th e y  becom e h a rd er  to u n d er sta n d , perform , e tc , 
(1984, p .37)
T h ey go on  to  d ev e lo p  w h at th e y  claim is  a seco n d  argu m en t based  
on  sim ilar c o n s id e r a tio n s  for  th e  sam e co n c lu sio n . The p o in t o f th e
seco n d  argu m en t is  th a t th e  law fu l p r o p e r tie s  o f th e  la n g u a g e , i .e . ,  th e  
p r o p e r tie s  w h ich  d is t in g u is h  th e  p a rticu la r  la n g u a g e , w ill be u n re la ted  
to  s e n te n c e  s iz e . T h us im portation  o f a se n te n c e  s iz e  bound w ill h ave  
th e  c o n se q u e n c e  o f e x c lu d in g  in f in ite ly  m any s tr in g s  w h ich  s a t is fy  th e  
d is t in g u is h in g  p r o p e r t ie s  fo r  b e in g  a se n te n c e  o f th e  la n g u a g e  
co n cern ed  and w h ich  th u s  a r e  s e n te n c e s  o f th e  la n g u a g e .
T his se co n d  argu m en t is  im portant b ecau se  L an gen doen  and P osta l
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exp lo it th e  g e n e r a lity  o f  th e  a rg u m en t in  o rd er  to  show  th a t no  s e n te n c e  
s iz e  bound is  leg itim a te . T h ey  n o te  th a t s in ce  th e  law fu l p r o p e r tie s  o f  
th e  la n g u a g e  are in s e n s it iv e  to  s e n te n c e  s iz e  a n y  s iz e  bound w ill 
m isca teg o r ize  c e r ta in  p e r fe c t ly  w ell-form ed  s tr in g s  a s  n o n -s e n te n c e s .
T h is m anner o f p r o c e e d in g  is  h o w ev er  m uddled. The m uddle em erg es  
b ecau se  L an gen d oen  and  P o sta l im pu te an u n w arran ted  g e n e r a lity  in to  
th e  sco p e  o f  th e  c o n c lu s io n  o f  th e  se co n d  argum en t. T h is in  p a r t a r is e s  
b eca u se  L an gen d oen  an d  P o sta l a re  a p t to  tr e a t  th e  seco n d  argu m en t a s  
d is t in c t  from  th e  f ir s t .  I t  i s  n o t. R ather it  is  b ased  w h o lly  on  th e  f ir s t  
argum en t. L an gen d oen  an d  P o sta l n o te  th a t th e ir  co n c lu sio n  "follow s 
from  th e  a ssu m p tio n  th a t P ( th e  law fu l p r o p e r tie s  o f th e  la n g u a g e! are  
s iz e - in d e p e n d e n t . But," th e y  go  on  to  n o te , " sin ce th e  p r e v io u s  
argu m en t sh ow s th a t  th e r e  i s  no n o n -a r b itr a r y  lin g u is t ic  b a s is  fo r  a  
f in ite  le n g th  bound, th is  a lr e a d y  follow s."  (1984, p .38) So w ith o u t th e  
su p p o rt o f th e  f ir s t  argu m en t th e  seco n d  argu m en t o n ly  h o ld s  g iv e n  an  
assu m p tion  w h ich  i s  both  la rg e  an d , in  v iew  o f L an gen d oen  and P o sta l’s  
own e a r lier  cr it ic ism s o f o th e r  a rg u m en ts , q u e s t io n -b e g g in g .
The argu m en t a g a in s t  a n y  s iz e  bound on s e n te n c e s  th u s  o n ly  g o e s  
th r o u g h  if  an  a p p ro p r ia te  g e n e r a liza tio n  of th e  f ir s t  argu m en t can  be 
g iv en . But th is  L an gen d oen  an d  P o sta l do not a ttem pt to  g iv e . M oreover  
it  is  hard  to  se e  how  th is  s te p  o f  th e  argu m en t cou ld  be c o n s tr u c te d .  
Recall th a t th e  f ir s t  argu m en t m ade u se  o f th e  d e v ice  o f  im agin ing  
c r e a tu r e s  w ith  f in ite ly  e x te n d ed  perform an ce lim itations. T h is d e v ic e  is  
not m erely  rh e to r ica l. What in  th e  tr a n sf in ite  c a se  cou ld  p o s s ib ly  su p p ly  
th is  s te p  o f th e  argu m en t?  Can w e im agine b e in g s  w ith  n o  f in ite  
lim itations on  p erform an ce?
The r e sp o n se  th e n  to  L an gen d oen  and P o sta l’s  argu m en t i s  to  sa y  
th a t in  th e  tr a n sf in ite  c a s e  th e r e  is  an ap p rop ria te  s iz e  law (r e s tr ic t in g  
s e n te n c e s  to f in ite  le n g th )  and th a t  th is  s iz e  law is  not a r b itr a r y  and is  
not, a t le a s t  in  a r e s tr ic te d , p u r e ly  form al s e n s e  o f th e  term , l in g u is t ic . 
It  i s  p erform an ce r e la ted  bu t is  n o t re la ted  to c o n tin g e n t  lim itations
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w hich  hum ans a c tu a lly  p o s s e s s .  R ather it  is  re la ted  to  w hat we can  
c o h e r e n tly  im agine a s  e x e r c ise  o f s k ills  c o n s t itu t iv e  o f g r a sp  o f th e  
ap p ro p r ia te  l in g u is t ic  r u le s .
A nother w ay  o f  p u tt in g  th e  p o in t is  to  sa y  th a t i f  we can  im agine  
b ein g s w h ich  h a v e  a p p r o p r ia te ly  in f in ite  p erform ance c a p a c itie s  th e n  th e  
f ir s t  s ta g e  o f L an gen d oen  and  P o sta l’s  argu m en t in  th e  tr a n sf in ite  c a se  
g o e s  th r o u g h . (Note th a t th e  argu m en t m ust be r ep ea ted  a t each  s ta g e  
for  each  p o ss ib le  tr a n s f in ite  s iz e  law: no g e n e r a l  argu m en t a g a in s t  a ll 
s iz e  law s is  im m ediately  in  th e  o f f in g .)  B ut to  make th is  a ssu m p tion  is  
ju s t  to  a ssu m e  th a t o u r  l in g u is t ic  com p eten ce sh ow s th a t we m an ifest a  
g r a sp  of tr u th  c o n d itio n s , g iv e n  by in fin ita r y  d e c is io n  p r o c e d u r e s ,  
w h ich  d eterm in a te ly  ob ta in  ir r e s p e c t iv e  o f  our a b ility  to  d eterm in e th e  
r e le v a n t  tr u th  v a lu e . T hat h o w ev er  Is p i 'e c is e ly  th e  c o n c lu sio n  fo r  w h ich  
th e  argu m en t w as in te n d e d  to o f fe r  su p p o rt, So L an gen d oen  and  P osta l 
o ffe r  no n o n -c ir c u la r  v in d ica tio n  o f  th e  id ea l v e r if ic a t io n is t ’s p o sitio n .
§2.2 In fin ite  D ecision  P ro ced u res;
W hether or n o t on e  a g r e e s  w ith  L an gen d oen  and P o sta l’s argu m en t for  
th e  lack  o f s iz e  b ou n d s for  s e n te n c e s  on e  m ight, p la u s ib ly , s e e  f i t  to  
r e je c t  th e  e x te n s io n  o f  th e  argu m en t to  d e c is io n  p r o c e d u r e s . In  th is  
se c tio n  I w ant to  in v e s t ig a te  r e a so n s , draw n from  c o n s id er a tio n s  to  do 
w ith  th e  n a tu re  o f d e c is io n  p r o c e d u r e s , for  d e n y in g  th e  c o h e r en ce  o f  
in fin ite  d ec is io n  p r o c e d u r e s .
I claim  th a t a  d is t in c t iv e  fe a tu r e  o f a d e c is io n  p r o c ed u re  is  th a t one  
sh ou ld  be ab le  to  g iv e  a d e sc r ip t io n  o f it  su c h  th a t a t a n y  p o in t i t  is  
c lear  w hat th e  n ex t c o r r e c t  s te p  w ill be. F u rth er , th e  d e sc r ip tio n  sh ou ld  
in c lu d e  d e f in ite  c o n d itio n s  fo r  h a v in g  com p leted  th e  d ec is io n  p ro ced u re . 
An in fin ite  d e c is io n  p r o c e d u r e  fa ils  to  s a t is fy  th e  seco n d  con d ition  s in ce  
e ith e r  th e  com p letion  co n d itio n  i s  la ck in g  or it  i s  b ased  on an a b su r d ity  
(and th u s  is  e q u iv a le n t  to  a  d e sc r ip t io n  la ck in g  a com pletion  co n d itio n ). 
For exam ple c o n s id e r  th e  fo llo w in g  a lgorithm  for  a d e c is io n  p ro ced u re
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for  th e  s e n te n c e  (Vx)Fx w h ere  F  i s  d ec id ab le  for  ea ch  o f i t s  a rg u m en ts .
1. S e t n~0
2. C heck Fn
3. If n o t-F n  th e n  sto p
4. I f  Fn th en  s e t  n=n+l
5. Go to  (2)
T his a lgorithm  la c k s  a fu ll  com p letion  con d ition  s in ce  th e  m achine is  
in s tr u c te d  to  s to p  o n ly  if  n o t-F n  h o ld s  for  som e n. T h is p a te n tly  c a n n o t  
be g u a ra n teed  in  a d v a n c e . T h is, i t  m ight be th o u g h t cou ld  be rem edied  
by u s in g  tr a n sf in ite  o r d in a ls , i .e .,
1. S e t n -0
2. Check Fn
3. If n o i-F n  th e n  sto p
4. I f  Fn th e n  s e t  n=n+l
5. I f  n~(ù th e n  sto p
6. Go to  (2)
T h is a lgorithm  p u ta t iv e ly  h a s a s to p p in g  in s tr u c t io n  in  a n y  e v e n tu a lity . 
But s in ce  we know  th a t «pîn-fl fo r  a ll v a lu e s  o f n  th is  h a ltin g  con d ition  
is  v a c u o u s . T h is m achine i s  th u s  (u n su r p r is in g ly )  e q u iv a le n t to  th e  
form er.
P erh a p s d ue to  m otives draw n from  th e se  s o r ts  o f c o n s id er a tio n  one  
o fte n  e n c o u n te r s  a d e c is io n  d e sc r ib e d  a s  fo llow s: C heck FO in  th e  f ir s t
m inute; c h e c k  FL in  th e  n ex t h a lf m inute; c h eck  F2 in  th e  n ex t q u a rter
o f a m inute; e tc .. Now, p ro v id e d  we can  c o n c e iv e  th e  p o s s ib il ity  o f  
im plem enting a p r o c e d u r e  w ith  an  a r b itr a r y  but f in ite  d e g r e e  of 
r a p id ity , it  w ould seem  th a t we h a v e  d e sc r ib e d  a d ec is io n  p ro ced u re . 
M oreover it  is  a d e c is io n  p r o c e d u r e  w h ich  is  g u a ra n teed  on  th e  e la p sin g
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o f tw o m in u tes to  is s u e  in  a d e c is io n , so  h a s a g u a r a n te ed  com pletion  
con d ition .
We sh ou ld  h o w ev er  be a ler ted  to  th e  fa c t  th e  som eth in g  is  aw ry  by  
th e  n eed  to  t ie  com p letion  o f th e  p ro ce d u r e  to th is  ex tr a n e o u s  con d ition . 
In d eed  i f  tim e fa iled  to  form  an  o rd in a ily  in fin ite  u n iform ly  d e n se  s e t  
but w as q u a n tised  th e n  we w ould h ave  fa iled  to d e sc r ib e  a d ec is io n  
p ro ce d u r e  fo r  th e  s e n te n c e  (Vx)Fx. W hether or n ot tim e i s  q u a n tised  may 
(for a ll I know ) be a c o n t in g e n t  m atter or may be d ec id a b le  a  p r io r i .  
The m athem atical s ta te  o f  a f fa ir s  w ou ld , in  th e  form er c a se , be a 
c o n tin g e n t  m atter. W hilst, i f  th e  la tte r  w ere tr u e , th e  r e so lu tio n  o f a 
m athem atical is s u e  w ould  d ep en d  u p on  (w hat I ta k e  to  be) a d eep  r e s u lt  
in  th e  p h ilo so p h y  o f  tim e. T his c o n c lu s io n  seem s r a d ica lly  im plausib le .
So p r o v id ed  on e  g r a n ts  my in it ia l claim  ab ou t th e  d e sc r ib a b ility  o f a 
d ec is io n  p r o c e d u r e  no s e n s e  can  be made o f an  in fin ite  d e c is io n  
p ro ced u re .
Let me reca p  th e  c o u r se  o f my argu m en t in  th is  se c tio n . I claim to  
h ave  r e v ea le d  a d isa n o lo g y  b etw een  th e  s tr ic t  f in it is t  a tta ck  on  
in tu ition ism  and  th e  in tu it io n is t  a tta c k  on realism . Two s ta g e s  w ere  
in v o lv e d  in  th is  d em on stra tion . In  th e  f ir s t  I tr ie d  to show  th a t  
a c c e p tin g  th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  a rg u m en ts  m ust lead  to  ad op tion  o f  a sem antic  
th e o r y  w h ich  h a s a d iffe r e n t  form  to th a t o f th e  r e a lis t . That is ,  on e is  
fo rc e d  to  ad op t a  n o tion  o th er  th a n  tr u th  a s  c e n tr a l in  th e  sem antic  
th e o ry . A n ti-r e a lis t  sem antic  th e o r ie s  (a ccep ted  by both  s tr ic t  f in it is t s  
and in tu it io n is ts )  tak e  a notion  o f p r o v a b ility  (or d ec id a b ility ) a s  
cen tra l. T hat p o s itio n , i t  w as n o ted , s u f f ic e s  to  h a lt th e  s lid e  from  an  
in tu it io n is t ic  r e b u tta l o f s tr ic t  f in itism  to c la s s ic a l tru th  con d ition a l 
realism . But th is  sim ply  o p e n s  up  th e  p o ss ib ility  o f a p o sitio n , h ere  
ca lled  id ea l v er ifica tio n ism , w h ich  a c c e p ts  th e  form  o f  an a n t i-r e a lis t  
sem antic th e o r y  but q u e s t io n s  th e  n otion  o f p roo f or d e c id a b ility  w hich  
th a t th e o r y  ta k e s  i t s e l f  to be e n tit le d  to. The th o u g h t h ere  w as th a t the  
id ea l v e r if ic a t io n is t  m ight a r g u e  th a t in  ju s t  th e  same w ay a s  th e
177'
in tu it io n is t  r e je c t s  ty in g  ou r  g r a sp  o f d ec is io n  p r o c e d u r e s  to  a c tu a l  
perform ance lim ita tion s, on e  sh ou ld  r e je c t  a sim ilar c o n str a in t  b ased  on  
im plem entab ility  in  p r in c ip le ,  or  to  f in i te  perform ance lim ita tion s. I th e n  
w en t on  to  a r g u e  a g a in s t  th e  n o tion  o f in fin ite  d e c is io n  p r o c e d u r e s . The 
u p sh o t o f th is  d is c u ss io n  w as th a t th e  (m etap h ysica l) a ssu m p tion  
m otivatin g  id ea l v er if ic a tio n ism  i s  d is t in c t  from  th a t m otiva tin g  
in tu ition ism . So no s lid e  from  th e  la tte r  p o sitio n  to  th e  form er h as been  
d em on stra ted . What I w ant to do now  is  to look more c lo s e ly  a t th e  
d eb ate  b etw een  th e  s tr ic t  f in it is t  and in tu it io n is t  in  o rd er  both  to  
c la r ify  and to  a ssem b le  som e m otivation  fo r  th e  la tte r  p o sitio n . To do 
th is  we m ust look  to  th e  c h a r a c te r  o f  our u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f th e  r e le v a n t  
lo g ica l and n o n -lo g ic a l v o ca b u la r y . S in ce  we are c o n cern ed  w ith  w h en  we 
are ju s t if ie d  in  h o ld in g  s e n te n c e s  o f th e  form F (n )v -F (n )  to  be tr u e , I 
sh a ll be in te r e s te d  in  ou r a c c o u n t o f n eg a tio n  and d is ju n ctio n  and  in  
our g r a sp  o f  p red ica tio n .
§3 Im p lications o f th e  C om positionality  o f M eaning:
In  th is  se c t io n  I am a ssu m in g  a s  a  r e s u lt  from  th e  p r e v io u s  se c tio n  th a t  
th e  a n t i-r e a lis t ’s  n o tion  o f  d e c id a b ility  is  not to  be exp la in ed  in  term s o f  
in fin ita r y  d e c is io n  p r o c e d u r e s . G iven th a t, it  i s  th e n  tr u e  to s a y  th a t, 
s in c e  th e r e  is  no w ay  o f u n iform ly  e x te n d in g  ou r g r a sp  o f q u a n tifica tio n  
o v er  a r b itr a r y  f in ite  dom ains to  th a t  o v e r  in fin ite  dom ains, q u a n tify in g  
o v e r  in fin ite  dom ains is  prob lem atic  b ecau se  h e r e  we h ave  a s p e c if ic  
op era tion  w h ich  in tr o d u c e s  u n d ec id a b ility . U n d e rsta n d in g  o f th e  
q u a n tif ic a tio n -fr e e  r e g io n  o f  la n g u a g e  c o n s is t s  in  a s e n s it iv i ty  to th e  
p o s s e s s io n  and c o r r e c tn e s s  o f p r o o fs . The in co m p le ten ess  r e s u lt s  show  
th a t on ce  we in tr o d u c e  q u a n tifica tio n  in to  th e  sy stem  of  
q u a n tif ic a tio n -fr e e  ar ith m etic  to  c r e a te  f ir s t  o rd er  arith m etic  th en  th e re  
w ill be s e n te n c e s  w h ich  are p e r fe c t ly  u n d ersta n d a b le  but for  w h ich  
th o se  p roof m eth od s, s e n s it iv i ty  to  w h ich  is  c o n s t itu t iv e  o f th e  a b ility  to
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a m eans o f d ec is io n . T h us w e ca n n o t p resum e th a t th e se  s e n te n c e s  h ave  
d eterm in ate  tr u th  v a lu e s , i .e .,  th e re  can  be n o th in g  in  th e  
u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  th e  q u a n tif ic a tio n -fr e e  la n g u a g e  w h ich  sh o w s th a t in  
g r a sp in g  q u a n tified  s e n te n c e s  w e g r a sp  tru th  co n d itio n s  w h ich , a lth o u g h  
tr a n sc e n d in g  d eterm in ation , d e term in a te ly  e ith e r  do or do n ot ob ta in .
In c o n tr a s t , in  th e  c a se  o f u n s u r v e y a b ly  la rg e  f in ite  p r o c e d u r e s  no  
s p e c if ic  o p era tio n  i s  in tr o d u ce d  w h ich  a cco u n ts  for th e  in d e term in a b ility  
in  p r a c tic e  o f  tr u th  v a lu e s . T y p ica lly , w e c o n s tr u c t  s e n te n c e s  w h ich  are  
n ot, in  p r a c tic e , d ec id a b le  b y  com b in ing  e x p r e ss io n s  d en o tin g  o p era tio n s  
w h ich , in  th e  r ig h t  c o n tex t, h a v e  su r v e y a b le  a p p lica tio n s . T h us it  is  
o n ly  w h en  w e a p p ly  th e  p r e d ica te  "is prime" to  la rg e  en o u g h , th o u g h  
s u r v e y a b ly  e x p r e ss ib le , nu m b ers th a t  we d ev e lo p  p r a c tic a lly  u n d ec id a b le  
s e n te n c e s . Now it  w ould  seem  th a t  th is  p o s itio n  sh ou ld  be prob lem atic  
o n ly  to  a s tr ic t  f in i t is t  who in s is te d  th a t we did n ot u n d er sta n d  su ch  
s e n te n c e s  and th e  s tr ic t  f in it is t  n eed  n ot d isp u te  th is . What he d isp u te s  
is  sim ply  th e  a ssu m p tion  th a t su c h  s e n te n c e s  h ave  determ in ate  tr u th  
v a lu e s .
H ow ever th is  ig n o r e s  th e  rô le  o f  th e  d e c is io n  p ro ced u re . The r e a lis t  
m ight a ttem p t to  b u t tr e s s  h is  p o s itio n  by ap p ea l to  c o n s id e r a tio n s  to do 
w ith  th e  co m p o sitio n a lity  o f m ean ing. That is ,  he m ight t r y  to  claim th a t  
our u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f th e  com p on en ts o f an  u n d ec id a b le  se n te n c e  
e n s u r e s  th a t we g r a sp  a tr u th  co n d itio n  w h ich  d eterm in ate ly  o b ta in s . 
The in tu it io n is t  o b je c ts  to  th is  p r e c is e ly  b ecau se  he ta k e s  q u an tifica tion  
o v e r  in fin ite  dom ains to be an  op era tion  w h ich  g iv e s  r is e  to  c e r ta in  
se n te n c e s  w h ich  r e s i s t  d eterm in ation  by  p r e s e n tly  u n d ersto o d  d ec is io n  
p r o c e d u r e s  an d , u n til w e can  g u a r a n te e  a m eans o f d is so lv in g  th is  
r e s is ta n c e , w e ca n n o t assu m e d eterm in acy  of tru th  v a lu e s . B ut, in  th e  
c a s e s  th a t th e  s tr ic t  f in it is t  o b je c t s  to , a s  a m atter o f  ou r c o n tin g e n t  
perform an ce lim ita tion s, it  com es ab ou t th a t an attem pt to  in s t itu te  th e  
sam e  p r o c ed u re  w h ich  w e s u c c e s s fu lly  im plem ent in  sm all f in ite  c a se s
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becom es im p ossib le  in  la rg e  f in ite  c a s e s . G rasp o f th e  p ro ced u re  in  th e  
form er s e t  o f c a s e s  m a n ife sts  g r a sp  o f a p ro ced u re  w h ich  is s u e s  in  
determ in ate  tr u th  v a lu e s . S in ce  th is  i s  th e  same p ro ced u re  in  th e  la tte r  
s e t  o f c a s e s  it  m ust, e v e n  w h en  im plem entation  is  fr u s tr a te d  (b y  our  
ow n fe e b le n e s s ) ,  is s u e  in  d eterm in ate  tr u th  v a lu e s .
N otice th e  w ay  th is  argu m en t is  in te n d ed  to  w ork. I am n ot sim ply  
sa y in g  th a t in  a ll c a s e s  we h a v e  g r a sp  o f a p ro ced u re  su c h  th a t th e  
fo llow in g , on  o c c a sio n  c o u n te r fa c tu a l, claim  a lw ays h o ld s good; if  th e  
p ro ced u re  is  im plem ented  it  d e term in es a tr u th  v a lu e . R ather I am 
sa y in g  th a t  w h ere  it  i s  fe a s ib le  to  im plem ent th e  p r o c e d u r e  th e  
in tu it io n is t  and th e  s tr ic t  f in it is t  ta k e  th e  m ere p o s s e s s io n  (ra th er  th a n  
im plem entation) o f su c h  a p r o c e d u r e  a s  a ju s tif ic a tio n  o f ou r b e lie f  in  
d eterm in ate tr u th  v a lu e s . Now s in c e  i t  is  th e  sam e  p ro ced u re  in v o k ed  in  
th e  u n su r v e y a b le  s e t  o f  c a s e s  we are aga in  ab le , a cco rd in g  to  th e  
in tu it io n is t , to  u s e  it  to  j u s t i fy  ou r  b e lie f in  d eterm in ate  tr u th  v a lu e s  
ir r e s p e c t iv e  o f th e  a c tu a l im plem entation  o f th e  p ro ced u re . The p o in t is  
th at a ssu m in g  a  r e le v a n t  sa m e n e ss  in  our g r a sp  o f th e  d ec is io n  
p ro ced u re  a c r o ss  th e  s u r v e y a b le /u n s u r v e y a b le  bou n d ary  ju s t i f ie s  th e  
m ove from  ta k in g  it , u n c o n tr o v e r s ia lly , th a t (i) im plem enting  th e  
p ro ced u re  is s u e s  in  a d eterm in ation  o f tru th  v a lu e s  to  ta k in g  it  th a t, 
(ii) i t  is  determ in ate  w h ich  tr u th  v a lu e s  th e  p ro ced u re  w ill, in  a n y  ca se , 
is s u e  in . We n eed  now to  look m ore c lo se ly  at w hat th is  "sam eness" in
g r a sp  of th e  a p p lica tion  o f a  p r o c e d u r e  c o n s is t s  in .
§4 U n d e rsta n d in g  th e  A p p lication  o f a P red icate:
A ssum e th a t we h a v e  a p r e d ica te , F, for  w h ich  we h ave  a w ell d e fin ed
c r iter io n  o f  ap p lica tio n , s a tis fa c t io n  o f  w h ich  for  a n y  argu m en t is  an  
( in tu itio n is tic a ily )  d ec id a b le  m atter. P o sse ss io n  o f su ch  a p ro ced u re  
a sso c ia ted  w ith  a g iv e n  p r e d ica te  is  tak en  by th e  s tr ic t  f in it is t  to  
ju s t i fy  a s s e r t io n  o f F (n )v -F (n )  o n ly  w h en  we can  a c tu a lly  im plem ent th e  
p ro ced u re  for  th e  g iv e n  argu m en t. The in tu it io n is t ic  ch a lle n g e  b ased  on
i
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th e  com p o sitio n a lity  o f m eaning a s k s  w hat in  ou r u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  a n y  
o f th e  com p on en ts o f th is  d is ju n c tio n  d is t in g u is h e s  th o se  in s ta n c e s  w hen  
i t  is  ( s tr ic t  f in it is t ic a lly )  a s s e r t ib le  from  th o se  w h en  it  is  not.
Let u s  f ir s t  fo c u s  on  th e  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f th e  p r e d ica te . G rasp of  
th e  p r e d ica te  is  (at le a s t  p a r tly ) c o n s t itu te d  by  m astery  o f th e  c r iter io n  
o f ap p lica tion  fo r  th e  p r e d ica te . T h ere are tw o w ays in  w h ich  a s tr ic t  
f in it is t  m ight r e je c t  th e  a s  s e r t i  b ilit y  o f  F{n)'V"'F{n) w h en  w e c a n n o t, in  
p r a c tic e , determ in e s a tis fa c t io n  or  fa ilu r e  to s a t is fy  th e  c r iter io n . One 
so r t  o f s tr ic t  f in i t is t  m ight r e je c t  th e  in te l l ig ib i i i t y  o f  th e  d is ju n ctio n , 
claim ing th a t for  s u f f ic ie n t ly  la r g e  n  we h a v e  no g r a sp  o f F{n) ,  T h is  
s tr ic t  f in it is t  q u e s t io n s  ou r g r a sp  o f  c e r ta in  c o n te n ts  .
The se co n d  s o r t  o f s tr ic t  f in i t is t  w ould a c c ep t th a t  w e g r a sp  th e  
d is ju n ctio n  but w ou ld  go  on  to  claim  th a t, s in c e  w e can n ot in  p r a c tic e  
im plem ent th e  r e le v a n t  p r o c e d u r e , w e are  n ot ju s t if ie d  in  b e lie v in g  th a t  
th e  se n te n c e  h a s a  d eterm in ate  tr u th  v a lu e  and  th u s  are  n ot ju s t if ie d  in  
a s s e r t in g  th a t LEM h o ld s  fo r  it.
I h a v e  r e p e a te d ly  rem arked  th a t  th e  f ir s t  so r t  o f s tr ic t  f in it is t  i s  n ot  
a p o s itio n  w h ich  r e s u lt s  from  a c c e p tin g  d is t in c t iv e ly  a n t i - r e a l i s t  
argu m en ts . T h ose  a rg u m en ts  are  n o t re  v is io n a r y  ab ou t c o n te n t, th a t is ,  
th o se  a rgu m en ts  do n ot is s u e  in  a ch a lle n g e  to  ou r g r a sp  o f g iv e n  
se n te n c e s . We c e r ta in ly  u n d er sta n d  th e  e x p r e ss io n  " F{n)" s in c e  we 
u n d er sta n d  th e  com p onent e x p r e ss io n s  and th e ir  m ode o f com position .
The a n t i-r e a lis t  th e n  a s k s  w hat th a t  u n d e r s ta n d in g  c o n s is t s  in . His p o in t  
is  th a t i t  can n ot be ta k en  to  c o n s is t  in  g r a sp  o f b iv a len t tr u th  
c o n d itio n s  fo r  s e n te n c e s  w h ose  tr u th  v a lu e s  we ca n n o t g u a r a n tee  a 
m eans o f d ec is io n . We can n ot m an ifest su ch  a g r a sp . R ather, w hat we  
m an ifest, in  g r a p s in g  th e  com p on en ts o f th e  e x p r e ss io n  (and th e ir  mode 
of com p osition ), is  a s e n s it iv i t y  to  th e  s ta tu s  o f c o n s tr u c t io n s  a s  p ro o fs  
or r e fu tu a tio n s  o f  th e  s e n te n c e  co n cern ed . T his g r a sp  w ill not j u s t i fy  
b e liev in g  th a t th e  tr u th  v a lu e  o f th e  se n te n c e  is  d eterm in ate. So fo r  th e  
a n t i-r e a lis t  th e r e  is  no q u e s tio n  o f w h eth er  or n ot we g r a sp  ”F{ n) ”,
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th e re  is  o n ly  th e  q u e stio n  o f  w h eth e r  th a t g r a sp  ju s t i f ie s  b e lie v in g  in  
d eterm in ate  tr u th  v a lu e s .
T h u s, if  s tr ic t  f in itism  is  to  be a  c o n se q u e n c e  o f a n t i-r e a lis t  
argu m en ts  i t  m ust be a  s tr ic t  fin itism  o f th e  seco n d  so r t. B ut in  th is  
c a se  th e  s tr ic t  f in i t is t  and  th e  in tu it io n is t  a g r e e  in  th e  a c c o u n t o f our  
u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  th e  r e le v a n t  (e lem en tary) p r e d ic a te s . The s tr ic t  f in it is t  
sim ply  q u e s t io n s  w h eth er  th a t u n d e r s ta n d in g  ju s t i f ie s  b e lie f  in  
determ in ate  tr u th  v a lu e s  w h en  th e  p ro ced u re  i s  o n ly  im plem entable in  
p r in c ip le . T h is , h o w ev er , m eans th a t  th e  s tr ic t  f in it is t  and  th e  
in tu it io n is t  d iffe r  in  th e ir  a c c o u n t o f th e  m eaning o f v e l.
§5 The M eaning o f Vel:
So le t  u s  c o n c e n tr a te  on  th e  s tr ic t  f in it is t  who a g r e e s  th a t w e m an ifest  
g r a sp  o f  th e  a p p lica tio n  o f  a  p r o c e d u r e  to  a n y  num ber, i .e .,  th a t w e  
u n d er sta n d  th e  s e n te n c e  ”F{ n) ”, fo r  a n y  n.  In  th is  c a se  th e  s tr ic t  
f in it is t  w ould n ot o b je c t  to th e  in tu it io n is t  u se  o f th e  com p osition a lity  o f  
m eaning b u t w ill claim  th a t th e  m ean ing o f "v" w ill n o t w arran t th e  
a s s e r t io n  o f  F(n)V"F(n). I w an t, th o u g h , to  a r g u e  th a t in  th is  c a se  th e  
s tr ic t  f in it is t  a llow s j u s t  th e  a p p ea l to  m eaning w h ich , com bined w ith  th e  
need  to  a c c e p t  th e  p o s s ib lity  o f  in fe r e n c e , e n a b le s  u s  to  co n c lu d e  th a t  
th e  tr u th  v a lu e  o f  each  in s ta n c e  is  determ inate; th a t ou r  u n d e r s ta n d in g  
o f, sa y , th e  s ie v e  o f E r a to s th e n e s  ju s t if ie s  u s  in  h o ld in g  th a t each  
num ber e ith e r  i s  or  i s  n ot prim e. Now p resu m ab ly  e v e n  if  th e  s tr ic t  
f in it is t  i s  to  fo llow  u s  th is  fa r  in  th e  d e sc r ip tio n  o f h is  p o s itio n  he w ill 
sim ply  p o in t o u t th a t, a lth o u g h  th e  d e sc r ip tio n  o f  w hat we g r a sp  may be 
co r re c t, th e  n otion  o f u n d e r s ta n d in g  is  in s u ff ic ie n t ly  r o b u s t  to  su p p o rt  
th e  ap p ea l th e  in tu it io n is t  n e e d s  to  m ake to it .
The o n ly  r e sp o n s e  I ca n  recom m end to  th e  in tu it io n is t  h ere  is  to  
r e f le c t  th e  c h a lle n g e  back on  th e  s tr ic t  f in it is t .  G iven th a t th e  la tter  
a c c e p ts  th a t ou r u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f th e  p ro ced u re  is ,  in  a p p ro p r ia te  
r e s p e c ts , th e  sam e in  th e  tr a n s it io n  from th e  su r v e y a b le  to th e
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McDowell ta k e s  from  Dummett’s  (1978b). T h ere Dummett n o te s  th a t to  
h a v e  th e  c o n c e p t sq u a r e  is  to  be ab le  to  d iscr im in ate  betw een  sq u a re  
th in g s  and th in g s  o f o th e r  s o r ts . One o f th e  w ays o f d o in g  th is  is  to  
a p p ly  th e  w ord "square" to  r e c o g n iz a b ly  sq u a r e  th in g s . Two p o in ts  
sh ou ld  be n o ted . F ir st , on e co u ld , p r e lin g u is t ic a lly , h ave  th e  co n c e p t  
sq u a re  bu t h a v in g  th e  c o n c e p t i s  n o t a  p r e c o n d it io n  for  lea r n in g  th e  
m eaning o f  "square" . R ather lea r n in g  th e  c o r r e c t  u s e  o f th e  w ord  
"square" is  on e w ay  o f g r a sp in g  th e  c o n c e p t sq u a re . The p o in t h e r e  is  
th a t we do n ot u s e  th e  id ea  o f  a  p r e lin g u is t ic  g r a sp  o f th e  co n c e p t to  
exp la in  how m eaning is  im bued in  la n g u a g e , i .e .,  how sym b ols come to  
h ave  a r e p r e se n ta tio n a l rô le , r a th e r , th e  p o s s ib il ity  o f a  p r e lin g u is t ic  
g r a sp  o f th e  c o n c e p t  e n t it le s  u s  to  claim  th a t th e  a b ility  w e are  
a sc r ib in g  d o es n ot d ep en d  u p on  a n y  sp e c if ic a lly  lin g u is t ic  ach ievem en t. 
One cou ld  s a y  th a t la n g u a g e  is  m ean in gfu l o n ly  b eca u se  b eh av iou r is . 
The th e o r y  o f m eaning g iv e s  an  a c co u n t o n ly  o f l in g u is t ic  m eaning. 
S eco n d ly , w hat on e  m a n ifests  in  g r a sp in g  th e  c o n c e p t s q u a r e  i s  n o t a 
r e g u la r ity  in  b eh a v in g  d if fe r e n t ly  r e la t iv e  to  sq u a re  th in g s  but a  
d is c r im in a to r y  a b ility , th a t  i s ,  a s e n s it iv i ty  to  s u c c e s s  or fa ilu r e  in  th is  
p r a c tice . T h is s e n s it iv t y  to  c o r r e c tn e s s  ( i.e ., th is  e lem en t o f ra tio n a lity )  
i s  not e s se n t ia lly  lin g u is t ic  so , a lth o u g h  fu n d am en ta l to m ean ingfu l u se  
o f la n g u a g e  n eed  n ot be p a rt o f  a com plete d e sc r ip tio n  o f w hat it  i s  to  
u se  a la n g u a g e . T h us we can  g iv e  an  a cco u n t o f la n g u a g e  w hich  
g r o u n d s p o s s e s s io n  o f l in g u is t ic a lly  e x p r e ss ib le  c o n c e p ts  in  
n o n -lin g u is t ic  but ra tion a l p r a c tic e s . M oreover, in  d o in g  so , we do not 
exp la in  m ean in gfu l u se  in  term s of a n te c e d e n t ly  g r a sp e d  c o n c e p ts .
T h is c o n cern  w ith  th e  d is t in c tio n  b etw een  a r e g u la r ity  in  b eh aviou r  
and b eh av iou r or u se  w h ich  is  s u b je c t  to  s ta n d a r d s  o f c o r r e c tn e s s  
r ea d ily  ca lls  to mind W ittg en ste in ’s p reo ccu p a tio n  w ith  w hat it  is  to  
fo llow  a ru le  in  P h ilo so p h ica l I n v e s t ig a t io n s  and R em a rk s on th e  
F o u n d a tio n s  o f  M ath em atics, M cDowell’s  r e se r v a t io n s  about  
fu ll-b lo o d e d n e ss  seem  to stem  from  h is  r ea d in g  o f W ittgen ste in , In
150
th e  exam ple to s u it  my e n d s . N atu ra lly , I do not th in k  th a t th is  i s  so . 
L et me b r ie fly  exp la in  th e  u n d e r ly in g  th o u g h t. If w e are to im agine a  
g e n u in e ly  fo r e ig n  com m unity th e n  we m ust make s e n s e  o f an  
in te r p r e ta t iv e  e x e r c ise . We c a n n o t sim p ly  assu m e th a t ou r  u n d e r s ta n d in g  
o f num erical term s a g r e e s  w ith  th e ir s  w ith o u t u n p a ck in g  th a t  
assu m p tion . I f  th e  a ssu m p tion  is  b ased  on a  c o in c id e n c e  o f c o u n tin g  
p r a c tic e s  th e n  th e  exam ple a s k s  u s  to  im agine a s in g le  com m unity w h ere  
c o u n tin g  p r a c tic e  lea d s  to  a c o n tr a d ic to r y  in fe r e n tia l p ra c tice . If  n ot, 
th e n  we m ust in te r p r e t  th e ir  c o u n tin g  p r a c tic e . We w ould th e n  w ant 
som e exp lan ation  o f th a t p r a c tic e  (th is  is  e sp e c ia lly  tru e  i f  th e  
com m unity h eld  a b su r d  a r ith m etica l b e lie fs  su c h  a s  29+17=45). That is ,  
w e w ould e x p e c t  them  to  o f fe r  or to  r e c o g n iz e  som eth in g  lik e  th e  Peano  
axioms a s  ex p la n a tio n s o f th e ir  p r a c tic e . Once th e y  d id  th is  our g r o u n d s  
for  r e je c t in g  th e ir  p r a c tic e  w ou ld  be th a t it  is  d em on strab ly  
in c o n s is te n t . T h is may w ell r a is e  fu r th e r  q u e s t io n s  ab ou t m ethods o f 
d em on stra tion  b u t su c h  q u e s t io n s  o f th e  s o u n d n e ss  o f th e  u n d e r ly in g  
log ic  are  j u s t  w h at c o n c e r n  u s . My c o n ten tio n  i s  th a t  su c h  q u e s t io n s  
ca n  be leg itim a te ly  r a ise d  by th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  p r o v id ed  th e  s o u n d n e ss  o f 
th e  one sy ste m  d o es  n o t im ply th e  u n s o u n d n e s s  o f th e  o th e r . The p o in t  
seem s to  be th a t th e  p o s s ib il ity  o f  r a is in g  th e  d isp u te  r e q u ir e s  a 
m easure o f  ag reem en t, n ot th a t th e  d isp u te  c a n n o t be ra ise d .
If  th is  argu m en t h o ld s  th e n  w e h a v e  no argu m en t for  th e  v iew  th a t  
th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  c a n n o t co n c e rn  h im self w ith  q u e s t io n s  o f so u n d n e ss . So 
it  is  o p en  to  th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  to  q u e s tio n  w h eth er  c la s s ic a l lo g ic  can  be 
show n to  be sou n d  (ev e n  th o u g h  h e  adm its th a t it  is  n ot u n so u n d ). The 
p o in t is  th a t c la s s ic a l lo g ic  can  be sh ow n  to be sou n d  r e la t iv e  to tru th  
a s  r e a lis t ic a lly  c o n c e iv e d , and c a n n o t be sh ow n  to  be u n sou n d  r e la t iv e  
to  th e  m ere e x is te n c e  o f n o n - in fe r e n t ia l  w arran ts , (The la tte r  fo llow s  
from th e  form er an d  from  th e  sp e c if ic a lly  a n t i-r e a lis t  c o n s id er a tio n s  
a d v a n ced  b y  W right.) The q u e s t io n  th o u g h  is  w h eth er  we are  ju s t if ie d  
in  a sc r ib in g  g r a sp  of r e a lis t  tr u th  to  o u r s e lv e s . The a n t i-r e a lis t  g iv e s  a
182u n su r v e y a b le  it  is  u p  to  him to  d e lin e a te  a r e le v a n t  d iffe r e n c e  in  th e se  
tw o c o n te x ts  of ap p lica tio n . T he "relevant"  d iffe r e n c e  m ust be a sem a n tic  
d iffe r e n c e , i .e .,  i t  sh o u ld  n ot m erely  be a c o n se q u e n c e  o f ou r c o n tin g e n t  
p erform ance lim itation s. To p u t th e  m atter s l ig h t ly  d iffe r e n tly , th e  
in tu it io n is t  claim s th a t  w e g r a s p  th e  p ro ce d u r e  in  su c h  a w ay a s  to  
h ave  a q u ite  g e n e r a l u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f i t s  c o r r e c t  ap p lica tion . In  each  
in s ta n c e , in  w h ich  th e  p r o c e d u r e  i s  r e le v a n t , w e ta k e  th is  u n d e r s ta n d in g  
to  j u s t i fy  a b e lie f  in  th e  d e term in a cy  o f tr u th  v a lu e s  1. The s tr ic t  f in it is t  
a c c e p ts  th e  f ir s t  but r e je c t s  th e  se c o n d  a s se r t io n . He can  do so  e ith e r  
by d e n y in g  th a t th e  u n d e r s ta n d in g  d e sc r ib e d  in  th e  f ir s t  a s se r t io n  
e v e r , on  i t s  ow n, ju s t i f ie s  a  b e lie f  in  d eterm in acy  o f  tru th  v a lu e s  or by  
sh ow in g  how  th e  ju s t if ic a t io n  fa ils  in  p a s s in g  from  th e  s u r v e y a b le  to  th e  
u n su r v e y a b le . B ut a c c o rd in g  to  th e  f ir s t  a lte r n a tiv e  p o s s e s s io n  o f an  
a c tu a lly  im plem entab le p r o c e d u r e  w ill n ot j u s t i fy  b e lie f  in  determ in ate  
tr u th  v a lu e s , o n ly  a c tu a l im plem entation  o f th e  p ro ced u re  w ill su ff ic e .  
But th en  it  is  u t te r ly  m y ste r io u s  a s  to  w hat p o ss ib le  u s e  th e  s tr ic t  
f in it is t  m ight h a v e  fo r  r e a so n in g  b y  dilemma. T h us i t  w ould seem  a ll but 
th e  m ost extrem e f in it is t  m ust r e je c t  th e  f ir s t  a lte r n a tiv e . What p o ss ib le  
rea so n  can  th e r e  be fo r  a c c e p tin g  th e  seco n d  g iv e n  th a t th e  tra n sit io n  
m arks no m athem atically  s ig n if ic a n t  b ou n d ary , th a t i s  no b ou n d ary  w h ich  
can  be c r o ss e d  o n ly  by  a c q u is it io n  o f an  e s se n t ia lly  new  re co g n itio n a l  
sk ill?  T h is n otion  o f "an e s s e n t ia lly  new  re co g n it io n a l skill" is  u n clear . 
We could  m otivate th e  notion  b y  sh ow in g  th a t a n y  b ou n d ary  b etw een  
a c tu a lly  im plem entable and  in  p r in c ip le  im plem entable p r o c e d u r e s  w ould  
be a lte r ed  w ere ou r p erform an ce lim ita tion s to be f in ite ly  ex ten d ed .
The problem  h e r e  i s  th a t, g iv e n  agreem en t on  w hat an  u n d e r s ta n d in g
1. T his s itu a tio n , it  sh o u ld  be n o ted , i s  a p p r o p r ia te ly  d isa n a lo g o u s to  
th a t in  w h ich  th e  r e a lis t  f in d s  h im self s in c e  th e  r e a lis t  is  in  p o s s e s s io n  
o f a s e n te n c e , w h ich  th e  in tu it io n is t  w ill g r a n t is  o f d e fin ite  s e n s e , but 
w h ich  h as no m utu ally  u n d er sto o d  d e c is io n  p ro ced u re  to  j u s t i fy  h is  
b elie f in  d eterm in ate  tr u th  v a lu e s , h o w ev er  th e  in tu it io n is t ’s  d ec is io n  
p r o c ed u re  is  u n d er sto o d  by  th e  s tr ic t  f in it is t .  (S ee  §2 o f th is  c h a p ter .)
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o f th e  p r e d ica te  c o n s is t s  in , th e  in tu it io n is t  i s  sim ply b affled  a s  to  
w h atth e  s tr ic t  f in i t is t  ta k e s  th e  m ean ing o f "v" to  be. Now, i f  th e  s tr ic t  
f in it is t  claim s th a t b e in g  in  a p o s itio n  to  a s s e r t  A vB  is  to p o s s e s s  a 
p roof o f  e ith e r  A or  o f  B  th e n  th e  in tu it io n is t  can  u n d er sta n d  h is  u se  o f  
"v" but w ould w o n d er  w h y  th e  p o s s e s s io n  o f an  a c tu a lly  im plem entable  
d e c is io n  p r o c e d u r e  e v e r  w a rra n ts  a s se r t io n  o f a d is ju n ctio n . If th e  
f in it is t  i s  hard  n o se d  e n o u g h  to  d e n y  th a t th e n  it  is  d iff ic u lt , from  
e ith e r  p e r s p e c t iv e , to  s e e  w h at p o ss ib le  u se  a  f in it is t  m ight h a v e  fo r  
"v" (u n le s s  he k n ew  h e had p ro v ed  on e o f  th e  d is ju n c ts  bu t had  
fo r g o tte n  w h ich ). (T his c o r r e sp o n d s  to  th e  f ir s t  a lte r n a tiv e  o f th e  
p r e v io u s  p a ra g ra p h , i .e . ,  r e je c t io n  o f th e  id ea  th a t m ere p o s s e s s io n  a s  
o p p o sed  to  im p lem e n ta tio n  o f an a c tu a lly  im plem entable p ro ced u re
ju s t i f ie s  b e lie f  in  d eterm in ate  tr u th  v a lu e s .)
Let u s  assu m e th e n  th a t  th e  s tr ic t  f in it is t  notion  o f  "v" is  g iv e n  by  
th e  fo llow in g  stip u la tio n ; A vB  i s  a s s e r t ib le  w h en  w e h a v e  a p r o c e d u r e  
w h ich  w e ca n  a c tu a lly  im plem ent to  g iv e  a p roof e ith e r  o f A or o f B. One 
w ay o f p u tt in g  th e  in tu it io n is t ’s  p o in t w ould th en  be to  make u s e  o f th e  
s tr ic t  f in i t is t ’8 a d m issio n  th a t th e  e x te n t  o f ou r a c tu a l r eco g n itio n a l  
c a p a c it ie s  c o n s t itu te s  a c o n t in g e n t  fa c t  ab ou t u s . The in tu it io n is t  cou ld  
th en  show  th a t e ith e r  th e  f in i t i s t ’s  s tip u la tio n  fa ils  to  co n fer  a  
determ in ate  s e n s e  on  "v" b e c a u se  th e  notion  o f a c tu a l im plem entab ility  
d ep e n d s  on  em p irica l d eterm in ation  or  th a t a n y  p r e c is if ica tio n , in
m athem atical term s, o f th a t n o tion  e n a b les  th e  in tu it io n is t  to  g iv e  a
f in it is t ic a lly  a c c ep ta b le  a c c o u n t o f  "v" w h ich  b road en s th e  co n d itio n s  
u n d er  w h ich  a d is ju n c t io n  i s  a s s e r t ib le . The f in i t is t ’s  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  
"v" becom es u n sta b le  s in c e  p e r p e tu a lly  s u b je c t  to e x ten sio n . (The 
e x te n s ib ility  o f  th e  n o tion  i s  not, in  my v iew , prob lem atic in  i t s e l f  s in ce  
I th in k  th a t som e o f o u r  c o n c e p ts  are s u b je c t  to  co n tin u a l e x ten sio n . 
But I do th in k  th a t th e  p o s s ib il ity  o f e x te n s io n  m ilita tes a g a in s t  f in it is t ic  
r e s tr ic t io n s  o f th e  n o tio n  and th a t if  th e  id ea  o f e x te n d in g  a s  op p osed  
to  c h a n g in g  th e  c o n c e p t  is  to make s e n s e  th e n  w e h a ve  to h ave  a
184stip u la tio n  w h o se  form  en co m p a sse s  th e  p r o c e ss  o f e x te n s io n . An 
in tu it io n is t ic  s tip u la tio n  a llow s th is  p o s s ib il ity . S ee  ch a p te r  6 fo r  more 
d isc u ss io n  o f th is .)  So, g iv e n  an  a cco u n t o f  a c tu a l im p lem en tsb ility , 
th e re  w ould be b o rd er lin e  c a s e s  o f s u r v e y s  b ilit y  fo r  w h ich  th e  
in tu it io n is t  can  exp la in  to  th e  s tr ic t  f in it is t  how  a  sm all f in ite  e x te n s io n  
(sm all e n o u g h  to g u a r a n te e  th a t both  can  h ave  a c c e s s  to  n o tio n s o f th is  
size ) o f ou r a c tu a l c a p a c it ie s  w ould  en ab le  u s  s u r v e y a b ly  to  im plem ent 
th e  p r o ced u re . So if  "v" w as ex p la in ed  in  term s o f th is  sm all e x te n s io n  
o f ou r a c tu a l c a p a c it ie s  th e  s tr ic t  f in it is t  w ould h ave  to  a c c e p t  th e  
a s s e r t ib il ity  o f th e  d is ju n c tio n . T h u s in  a n y  attem p t to  draw  a b ou n d ary  
by m athem atical c r ite r ia  a lon e th e  in tu it io n is t  can  fo rc e  th e  s tr ic t  
f in it is t , by  c o n s id e r in g  o n ly  th e  c o n t in g e n c y  o f our re co g n itio n a l  
c a p a c it ie s , e ith e r  to  exp an d  th e  b ou n d ary  or to  a c c ep t th a t  th e  
b ou n d ary  is  not s e m a n tic a lly  r e le v a n t ..
B ut th e  d isp u te  i s  d if f ic u lt  to  a p p reh en d  in  th e s e  term s. L et u s  aga in  
co n sid er  th e  tr a n s it io n  from  A^{BvC) to  (A-»B)v(A-»C), i .e ., th e  p a ssa g e  
from  my (i) to  my (ii) a b ove  (th e  en d  o f §3), w h ich  W right (W right 1980, 
p p .208-9) p o in ts  o u t is ,  in  g e n e r a l, n o t in tu it io n is t ic a lly  a ccep ta b le . 
W right, in  S tr ic t  F in itism  (W right 1982) g iv e s  u s  th e  d eta il o f  an  
argu m en t w h ich  p u r p o r ts  to  j u s t i f y  th e  tr a n sit io n  in  th e  p r e s e n t  
(m athem atical) c o n te x t w ith o u t c o n tr a v e n in g  a n y  in tu it io n is t ic  s c r u p le s .  
But he g o e s  on  to  c r it ic iz e  th e  argu m en t for  r e ly in g  on  a ssu m p tio n s  
about th e  o b je c t iv ity  o f m ean ing. W right n o te s  th a t a lth o u g h , in  g en era l, 
th e  p a ssa g e  from  s e n te n c e s  o f  th e  form  o f (i), i .e ., A->{BvC), to  s e n te n c e s  
o f th e  form  (ii), i .e . ,  (A>JB)v(A-»C), i s  in tu it io n is t ic a lly  in v a lid , h e  l is t s
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fou r  c o n d itio n s  sa tis fa c t io n  o f w h ich  ju s t i f ie s  th e  in fe r e n c e  1. So w ith  
th e se  fo u r  c o n d itio n s  in  p la ce  w e are ju s t if ie d  in  a c c e p tin g  th e  
tra n sit io n . But W right n o te s  th a t th e  tra n sit io n  a ssu m es th a t we can  so  
co n fer  m eaning on  ou r la n g u a g e  th a t it  is  determ in ate  w hat r e s u lt  
c o r r e c t  im plem entation  o f  a p r o c e d u r e  sh ou ld  i s s u e  in  and th a t th is  m ust
hold both in  a d v a n c e  o f im plem enting  it  and ir r e s p e c t iv e  o f w h eth er  or
n ot we a c tu a lly  can  im plem ent it . P u t sim ply , W right a r g u e s  th a t w h ere  
A h y p o th e s iz e s  th e  im plem entation  o f a  d e c is io n  p ro ced u re  and D is  
p rovab le  from  th e  d is ju n c tio n  o f B and C w e can , sim ply  e n o u g h , p r o v e  
and th e  p o s s ib il ity  o f im plem enting  th e  p r o c e d u r e  h y p o th e s iz e d  by  
A th e n  a llow s u s  u n c o n d itio n a lly  to  a s s e r t  D, (S in ce  (BvC)*^L(A->B)v(A->C)J 
we can  th e n  a s s e r t  th e  d is ju n c tio n  o f co n d itio n a ls , i .e . ,  we j u s t i fy  th e  
tr a n s it io n  ju s t  m en tion ed .) In  h is  argu m en t W right c o n c e n tr a te s  on  th e  
c a se  w h ere  C i s  -B , th a t is ,  w h ere  A  h y p o th e s is e s  th e  im plem entation  o f  
a d ec is io n  p r o c e d u r e  fo r  th e  s e n te n c e  B. The problem  W right d is c e r n s  in
th e  c a se  he g iv e s  fo r  th e  u n co n d itio n a l a s s e r t io n  of D is  th a t in
a c c e p tin g  it  we im p lic itly  a c c e p t  th e  in v e s t ig a tio n  in d e p e n d e n c e  o f B. 
O nly if  w e r e g a r d  D a s  s ta n d in g  fo r  a s ta te  o f a ffa ir s  w h ich  e x is t s  
in d e p e n d e n tly  o f o u r  a c tu a lly  com ing to  know  it  can  we ta k e  i t  th a t  
a ctu a l im plem entation  o f th e  p r o c e d u r e . A, is  ir r e le v a n t  to w h eth er  or 
n ot B, in  fa c t , o b ta in s . B ut, W right c o n tin u e s , th e  con d ition a l A-^D s im ply  
m eans th a t we can  e x te n d  our s ta te  o f in form ation  from  on e o f h a v in g  
im plem ented A to  r e c o g n iz in g  th e  tr u th  o f B. K nowing th a t  we can
1. The f ir s t  co n d itio n  i s  th a t th e  h y p o th e s is  ho ld s; th a t sa tis fa c t io n  o f A 
b r in g s  ab ou t th e  tr u th  o f th e  d is ju n ctio n . The seco n d  is  th a t th e r e  is  
no in d eterm in a cy  a s  to  w h ich  d is ju n c t  is  tr u e  w h en  th e  a n te c e d e n t  is  
sa tis f ie d . The th ir d  is  th a t th e re  is  no ex tra  co n d itio n  su c h  th a t i t s  
sa tis fa c t io n  in  c o n ju n c tio n  w ith  th a t o f th e  a n te c e d e n t  b r in g s  ab ou t th e  
tr u th  o f one d is ju n c t  w h ile  i t s  fa ilu r e  in  th e  sam e c ircu m sta n ces  b r in g s  
ab ou t th e  tr u th  o f th e  o th e r  d is ju n c t . F in a lly  th a t th e  tr u th  o f th e  
d is ju n ctio n  is  in  fa c t  lin k ed  to  th e  tr u th  o f th e  a n te ce d e n t. So it  m ust 
not be th e  c a se  th a t, w h eth er  or n ot A h o ld s, th e r e  are g r o u n d s  for  
e x p e c tin g  th e  tr u th  o f BvC.
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im plem ent A d o es  n ot th e n  j u s t i f y  u s  in  u n co n d itio n a lly  a s s e r t in g  D 
s in ce  it  may be th a t im plem entation  o f th e  p r o c ed u re  b r in g s  a b o u t  th e  
tr u th  o f B. The o b v e r s e  o f th is  p o s itio n  is  th a t i f  w e a c c e p t  th e  
argu m en t a s  e s ta b lish in g  th e  u n co n d itio n a l a s s e r t ib il ity  o f B in  th e se  
c ircu m sta n ces  th e n  w e assu m e th a t, in  a d v a n ce  o f  a p p ly in g  and  
ir r e s p e c t iv e  o f w h eth e r  we e v e r  a c tu a lly  a p p ly  th e  d e c is io n  p r o c e d u r e , B 
h a s a d eterm in ate  tr u th  v a lu e . B u t th is  b e tr a y s  a b e lie f  th a t  we h ave  
su c c e e d e d  in  c o n fe r r in g  a m ean ing on  ou r term s su c h  th a t f id e l ity  to  
th a t m ean ing e s ta b l is h e s  s ta n d a r d s  o f c o r r e c t  u s e  w h ich  tr a n sc e n d  our  
a ctu a l u se . Note th a t th e r e  is  a  s e n s e  in  w h ich  th is  o b je c tio n  is  
ir r e le v a n t  to  th e  is s u e  o f th e  in t u it io n is f s  u s e  o f  p r o c e d u r e s  
im plem entsb le  o n ly  in  p r in c ip le  s in c e  th e  o b je c tio n  w ould hold  e q u a lly  
a g a in s t  a s tr ic t  f in i t is t  w ho h e ld  th a t m ere p o s s e s s io n  o f  an  a c tu a lly  
im plem entable p r o c e d u r e  ju s t if ie d  b e lie f  in  determ in ate  tr u th  v a lu e s . It  
i s  s t i l l  n ot c lea r  in  th a t c a s e  w h eth er  th e  im plem entation  o f th e  
p ro ced u re  b r in g s  ab o u t th e  tr u th  o f  B or d isc o v e r s  B to be tru e ,
W right*s form ulation  o f th e  c e n tr a l n o tio n s  i s  u n h e lp fu l. T hat it  i s  so  
can  be s e e n  from  th e  w ay he r e s u r r e c ts  th e  m eta p h y sica l mode o f  
d eb a te . The q u e s t io n  th a t so  fa s c in a te s  W right c o n c e r n s  w h at he term s  
th e  in v e s t ig a t io n  in d e p e n d e n c e  o f c e r ta in  s ta te s  o f a f fa ir s . T h is f in a lly  
com es to r e s t  on  q u e s t io n s  a b o u t w h eth er  or n ot, in  e x te n d in g  ou r  s ta te  
o f in form ation , w e b r in g  ab ou t (th e  tru th  of) th o se  s ta te s  o f a ffa ir s . But 
th is  w hole s e t  o f c o n c e r n s  r e la te s  p u r e ly  to th e  n otion  o f  tr u th  we tak e  
o u r s e lv e s  to  be ju s t if ie d  in  u s in g , th a t is ,  w h eth er  or n ot w e reg a rd  
tru th  v a lu e s  a s  d eterm in ate  w h en  th e y  tr a n sc e n d  r e co g n itio n .
O b v iou sly  w e ca n  r e p la ce  B b y  BvC. The in tu it io n is t  r e g a r d s  h im self  
a s  ju s t if ie d  in  u n c o n d itio n a lly  a s s e r t in g  th is  d is ju n ctio n  so  th e  p la y  
W right m akes w ith  th e  tr a n s it io n  b etw een  th e  co n d itio n a l w ith  d isjo in ed  
c o n se q u e n t  and  th e  d is ju n c tio n  o f  c o n d itio n a ls  i s  ir r e le v a n t  p ro v id e d  we 
can  sim ply  j u s t i f y  th e  a s s e r t io n  o f B vC  u n co n d itio n a lly . M oreover s in ce  
it  is  a q u e s tio n  o f  p r e c is e ly  th is  form  w h ich  W right ta k e s  to determ in e
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th e  v a lid ity  o f th e  tr a n s it io n  th e  q u e stio n  o f  th e  v a lid ity  o f th e  
tra n sit io n  m ust be, a t m ost, se c o n d a r y . W right*s form al m anœuvres c lou d  
th e  c e n tr a l is s u e  w h ich  is  th e  m eaning o f in tu it io n is t ic  d is ju n ctio n .
W right in d e e d  r a is e s  th is  is s u e  in  c r it ic iz in g  Hey ting* s  inform al 
exp lica tion  o f d is ju n ctio n ; th a t  a  p ro o f o f BvC is  a p roo f e ith e r  o f B or  
o f  C. I f  w e are  to  ta k e  th is  a s  s e t t in g  th e  m eaning o f "v" th e n  th e  
in tu it io n is t  ca n  h a v e  no u s e  fo r  i t  in  h is  d e d u c tiv e  p r a c tic e  s in c e  a n y  
p roo f p r o c e e d in g  th r o u g h  th e  d is ju n c tio n  cou ld , in  p r a c tic e , p roceed  
th r o u g h  th e  p ro o f o f on e  o f th e  d is ju n c ts . So th e  m eaning o f  ”v" n e e d s  
som e lib era liza tio n , W right ta k e s  it  th a t th e  co n d itio n s  w a rra n tin g  th e  
a s s e r t io n  o f  a  d is ju n c tio n  sh ou ld  be exp an d ed  so  a s  to  in c lu d e  th o se  
c o n d itio n s  in  w h ich  th e  a s s e r to r  can  r e c o g n iz e  th a t h e  is  in  a p o sitio n  
in  w h ich  h e  can  fin d  o u t, exp an d  h is  s ta te  o f in form ation  to  in c lu d e , th e  
tru th  o f o n e  o f th e  d is ju n c ts  e v e n  if , a t p r e s e n t , he ca n n o t sa y  w h ich . 
But th is  w ay  o f s ta t in g  th e  p ro p o se d  em end ation  o f Hey ting* s  exp lan ation  
ca lls  in to  q u e s t io n  w h at e x p a n s io n s  o f o n e ’s  s ta te  o f in form ation  are  
p o ss ib le  and  w h eth er  th e  tr u th  so  d isc o v e r e d  had a s ta tu s  in d e p e n d e n t  
o f th e  a c tu a l p r o c e ss  o f ex p a n d in g  o n e ’s s ta te  o f in form ation .
In ste a d  c o n s id e r  th is  a lte r n a tiv e  exp lanation; a p roo f o f JBvC is  a n y  
c o n s tr u c t io n  (to g e th e r  w ith  a m ethod o f a p p ly in g  it) o f w h ich  it  can  be 
re co g n iz e d  th a t, if  a p p r o p r ia te ly  a p p lied , it  y ie ld s  a p roo f o f  B or o f C. 
Now th e  c o n d itio n s  u n d er  w h ich  th e  d is ju n ctio n  is  u n co n d itio n a lly  
w a rra n ted ly  a s s e r t ib ie  r e su lt  ju s t  from  th e  r e co g n it io n  th a t we h ave a 
d ec is io n  p r o c e d u r e  h y p o th e s iz e d  by  A  su ch  th a t A-^{BvC) (w hich  is  
sim ply th e  co n d itio n a l a ll s id e s  a g r e e d  we w ere  cap ab le  o f  r e co g n iz in g  
a s  tr u e  p u r e ly  a s  a r e s u lt  o f u n d e r s ta n d in g  th e  d e c is io n  p r o c e d u r e ). We 
s tip u la te  th e  m ean ing so  th a t  it  d o es  n ot d ep en d  on r e co g n iz in g  
co n d itio n s  in to  w h ich  we can , in  som e s e n s e , g e t  o u r s e lv e s , ra th er  it  
d e p e n d s  so le ly  on  c o n d itio n s  w h ich  we can  r e co g n iz e  o u r s e lv e s  to  be in  
a t p r e se n t . We can  now j u s t i fy  th e  a s s e r t io n  of th e  d is ju n ctio n  a s  a 
c o n se q u e n c e  o f th e  m eaning o f "v". The one p o in t a t w h ich  a s tr ic t
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f in it is t  m ight d iffe r  from  th e  in tu it io n is t  cou ld  o n ly  now r e la te  to  w hen  
th e  form er took  h im self to be in  p o s s e s s io n  o f su c h  a  g e n e r a l d e c is io n  
p r o ced u re . B ut, a s  j u s t  rem ark ed , th e  p o s s e s s io n  o f su c h  a g en e r a l  
p ro ce d u r e  w as a g r e e d  u pon  a s  a  p rem ise  to  th e  argu m en t.
One q u e s t io n  rem ains. D oes n ot th is  new  d e fin it io n  j u s t i fy  th e , 
g e n e r a lly  in tu it io n is t ic a lly  in v a lid , tr a n s it io n  from  A^{JBvC} to  
Quite o b v io u s ly  i t  d o e s  no su c h  th in g  s in c e  A m u st be 
som eth in g  w h ose  tr u th  we can  g u a r a n te e  to  b r in g  ab ou t. But e v e n  th a t  
w ay o f s ta t in g  th e  p o s itio n  i s  c o n fu se d . The m eaning stip u la tio n  te lls  u s  
w h en  we ca n  r e g a r d  a  c e r ta in  c o n s tr u c t io n  a s  a p roof. The c o n str u c tio n  
g iv e n  in  th e  s tip u la tio n  i s  an  o p era tio n  from  c o n s tr u c t io n s  (we can n ot  
be m ore s p e c if ic  th a n  th is ,  i t  may a c t on  p ro o fs  or p e r h a p s  e lem en ts  o f  
a dom ain) to  p r o o fs  so  th e  so r t  o f p r o p o s itio n  w h ich  can  tak e th e  p lace  
o f A w ill be s e v e r e ly  lim ited .
We sh o u ld  bear in  mind th a t th is  argu m en t, e v e n  i f  s u c c e s fu l, seem s  
o n ly  to  a c h ie v e  a  loca l ju s tif ic a tio n  o f in tu it io n is t ic  lo g ic  for  
m athem atical d isc o u r se . A lth ou gh  I th in k  th e re  are  im portant d iff ic u lt ie s  
in  e x te n d in g  th is  p o s itio n  to  em p irica l d isc o u r se  I do n o t th in k  th a t  
th e s e  p rob lem s are  to  do w ith  th e  in te r n a l c o h e r en ce  o f an  
a n t i-r e a lis t ic a lly  m otivated  in tu itio n ism . R ather th e  problem  is  one o f  
m aking good  th e  n o tion  o f a d e c is io n  p ro ced u re  w h en  tr a n sfe r r e d  from  
th e  n arrow ly  m athem atical s e t t in g  to  th e  more g e n e r a l em pirica l on e. We 
h a v e  f ir s t ly  to  g iv e  som e a c c o u n t o f c o n c lu s iv e  but d e fea s ib le  ( i.e ., 
c r iter ia l)  w a rra n ts  and th en  g iv e  an  a ccou n t o f a llow able or can on ica l 
w ays o f a c h ie v in g  th e s e , i .e . ,  w a y s  w h ich  c o u n t sim ply  a s  o b s e r v in g  or  
m easu rin g  th a t th e  w arran t is  a va ilab le  and th o se  w h ich  a lter  th e  
c o n d itio n s  o f a s s e r t io n  th e m se lv e s . B ut, h e r e , I ca n n o t e v e n  sp e c u la te  on  
th e  fe a s ib ility  o f th is  la rg e  program m e,
56 The C o n serv a tiv e  n e s s  o f In tu it io n is t ic  Logic:
The s tip u la tio n , h o w ev er , d o es  n ot, o f i t s e lf ,  so lv e  th e  problem . We need
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to  ju s t i fy  it . The r e a lis t , w e know , claim s to  be ab le  to  c h a r a c te r iz e  
c o n d itio n s  (nam ely, a n y  at a ll) u n d er  w h ich  th e  a s s e r t io n  o f a  
d is ju n c tio n  o f a  s e n te n c e  and i t s  n e g a tio n  is  a s s e r t ib ie . But th is  com m its 
him to  h o ld in g  th a t on e or o th e r  i s  tr u e  ir r e s p e c t iv e ly  o f w h eth er  we 
can  d eterm in e th e  m atter. S im ilarly , th e  in tu it io n is t  h as ch a ra c te r iz e d  
co n d itio n s  u n d er  w h ich  h e  h o ld s  a d is ju n c tio n  to  be tr u e  and th is
com m its him (s in c e  h e  w ill e n d o r se  th e  c la s s ic a l tr u th -fu n c tio n a l a cco u n t  
a s  b e in g  c o r r e c t  a lth o u g h  n ot ex p la n a to ry ) to  h o ld in g  th a t o n e  o f th e  
d is ju n c ts  i s  d e term in a te ly  tr u e  or fa ls e  in  th e se  co n d itio n s  
ir r e s p e c t iv e ly  o f w h eth e r  w e a c tu a lly  can  determ in e or  h a v e  d eterm in ed  
th is .
What we n eed  to  look a t i s  how , g iv e n  th e ir  fa v o u r ed  m eaning
stip u la t io n s , th e  in tu it io n is t  ju s t i f ie s  a p p ly in g  exc lu d ed  m iddle to  
d ec id a b le  s e n te n c e s  and  th e  r e a lis t  to  a n y  s e n te n c e  a t all. Take th e  
la tte r  f ir s t .  The c o n d itio n  in  w h ich  A v-A  is  tr u e  is  ju s t  th e  co n d itio n  
(v ia  th e  m ean ing s tip u la tio n  fo r  "v") th a t A  is  tru e  or  th a t -A  is  tru e  
and th a t co n d itio n  in  tu r n  is  j u s t  th e  co n d itio n  (v ia  th e  m eaning
stip u la tio n  fo r  ’’-" ) th a t  A i s  tr u e  or th a t A i s  n ot tr u e  (i.e ., A is  fa lse ) .
B ut, c le a r ly , we ca n n o t u s e  th is  exp lan a tion  o f  n eg a tio n  and d is ju n ctio n  
to  j u s t i fy  LEM s in c e  h o ld in g  th a t  th e  fin a l co n d itio n  so  ch a r a c te r iz e d  is  
u n iv e r sa lly  tru e  is  j u s t  to  hold th a t  LEM h o ld s for  a ll s e n te n c e s  o f th e  
form  "A is  t r u e ” and  th is ,  g iv e n  th e  e q u iv a le n c e  p r in c ip le  com m its u s  to  
LEM its e lf .  So a s  an  a ttem p t to  j u s t i f y  d eterm in acy  o f tru th  v a lu e s  th e  
p r o c e ss  is  c ir c u la r .
Now le t  u s  tu r n  to  th e  in tu it io n is t ic  exp lan ation  o f Av-^A. For th e  
in tu it io n is t  a p ro o f o f A v -A  i s  a n y  c o n str u c t io n  o f w h ich  it  can  be 
r e co g n iz e d  th a t, i f  a p p r o p r ia te ly  a p p lied , it  y ie ld s  a p roof e ith e r  o f A or  
o f "'A, i .e ., i t  y ie ld s  a p roo f e ith e r  o f A or a c o n str u c tio n  o f w h ich  it  
ca n  be r e c o g n iz e d  th a t ap p lied  to  a p roo f o f A i t  y ie ld s  a b su r d ity . The  
problem  fo r  th e  in tu it io n is t  is  th a t th is  d e fin itio n  o f th e  m eaning o f "v" 
d o e s  n ot g iv e  a c o n s e r v a t iv e  e x te n s io n  o f th e  base c la s s  o f sta tem en ts
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r e la t iv e  to  r e c o g n it io n  o f  tr u th , i .e . ,  r e la t iv e  to p o s s e s s io n  o f :a  proof.
We n eed  to  ex p lo re  a lit t le  fu r th e r  th e  c o n se q u e n c e s  o f th e  
stip u la tio n . M ost im p ortan tly  w e n eed  to  d isc o v e r  w hat p r o p e r ty  o f  
s e n te n c e s  is  p r e s e r v e d  in  in fe r e n c e s . C onsider a  d er iv a tio n  o f  C w h ich
p r o c e ed s  b y  a  s te p  o f v e l  e lim ination  on  AvB, i .e .,  we h a v e  a p roo f o f
AvB, and  p r o o fs  o f C from  th e  a ssu m p tion  o f  a p roo f o f A and B 
r e s p e c t iv e ly . A ccord in g  to  th e  s tip u la tio n  th is  m eans th a t w e h a v e  a
c o n str u c t io n  w h ich  ca n  be r e c o g n iz e d  to  is s u e  in  a  p ro o f o f  A or  o f B
and c o n s tr u c t io n s , r e c o g n iz a b ly , w h ich  tak e  p ro o fs  o f each  o f  A and  B 
in to  p ro o fs  o f C. So w e ca n  form  a c o n s tr u c t io n  w h ich , if  a p p r o p r ia te ly  
a p p lied , r e c o g n iz a b ly  i s s u e s  in  a  p ro o f o f  C by  c o n c a te n a tin g  th e  a b o v e  
c o n s tr u c t io n s  in  th is  way: a p p ly  th e  c o n str u c t io n  w h ich  is s u e s  in  a  
p roof o f A o r  o f  B, i f  th e  outcom e i s  a  p roo f o f  A a p p ly  th e  c o n str u c t io n  
w h ich  tra n sfo rm s th is  in to  a p ro o f o f C and sim ilarly  i f  th e  outcom e is  a  
p roof o f B. Note th a t w e a re  n o t b e g g in g  a n y  q u e s t io n s  b y  a ssu m in g  
th a t th e  d e sc r ip t io n  j u s t  g iv e n  su c c e e d s  in  d e fin in g  a leg itim ate  
c o n stru c tio n ; we h a v e  n ot a ssu m ed  th a t it  is  d eterm in ate  w h ich  o f A or  
B w ill be p r o v e d  w h en  and  if  th e  c o n str u c t io n  i s  a p p lied . We assu m e  
th a t our u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f th e  c o n s tr u c t io n  g u a r a n te e s  th a t no o th e r  
outcom e a s id e  from  a p ro o f o f e ith e r  A or B is  p o ss ib le  and th a t in  
e ith e r  c a se  we can  tran sform  th e  outcom e in to  a p ro o f o f O. (E ssen tia lly  
we are  o n ly  r e p e a tin g  h ere  th e  id e a  th a t if  w e u n d er sta n d  a p r o c ed u re  
th en  e v e n  if  we c a n n o t im plem ent it  we know  th a t im plem entation  o f it  
w ould is s u e  in  a d eterm in ate  c o n c lu sio n .)  Now th is  sim ple sk e tc h  
s u g g e s t s  th a t th e  lo g ic  a p p lie s  c o n s e r v a t iv e ly  r e la t iv e  to  th e  n otion  o f  
h a v in g  a c o n s tr u c t io n  w h ich  r e c o g n iz a b ly  i s s u e s  in  a p roof o f th e  
s e n te n c e  co n c e rn ed .
57 The R elation o f In tu it io n is t ic  P roof to  In tu it io n is t ic  Truth:
What is  th e  re la tio n  o f  th is  n o tion  o f h a v in g  a c o n str u c t io n  w h ich  is s u e s  
in  a p roo f to  tru th ?  We ca n n o t eq u a te  th e se  tw o n o tio n s w ith ou t
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r e lin q u ish in g  th e  id ea  th a t tr u th  d is tr ib u te s  a c r o ss  th e  d is ju n c tio n  s in ce  
a p roof o f A vB  s im p ly  r e q u ir e s  th a t we p o s s e s s  a c o n str u c t io n  w hich  
i s s u e s  in  a  p roo f o f  o n e  or th e  o th e r  and th is  i s  w eak er th a n  h a v in g  a 
c o n str u c t io n  w h ich  i s s u e s  in  a p roo f o f on e or h a v in g  a c o n str u c t io n  
w h ich  i s s u e s  in  a p ro o f o f th e  o th e r . B ut th e  tw o n o tio n s  do co in c id e
w hen  we are  o n ly  c o n s id e r in g  th e  a s s e r t io n  o f th e  se n te n c e  a s  a w hole.
T h ey  o n ly  come a p a r t w h en  w e c o n s id e r  s e n te n c e s  a s  c o n s t itu e n ts  o f  
o th er  s e n te n c e s . We lea rn  from  th e  b eh av iou r  o f s e n te n c e s  in  com plex  
s e n te n c e s  th a t tr u th  is  a w id er  n o tion  th an  p o s s e s s io n  o f a  c o n str u c t io n  
i s s u in g  in  a p ro o f, i .e . ,  w e can  in fe r  from  th e  b eh a v io u r  o f s e n te n c e s  in  
d is ju n c t io n s  th a t a s e n te n c e  m ay be tr u e  a lth o u g h  w e do n o t p o s s e s s  a 
su ita b le  c o n str u c t io n . I t  becom es d iff ic u lt  to  c h a r a c te r iz e  p r e c is e ly  in  
term s o f p ro o f w h at tr u th  is .  But th a t n eed  n ot co n cern  u s  s in c e  we
r e ly  on  th e  e q u iv a le n c e  p r in c ip le  and th e  leg itim a cy  o f a tr u th
fu n c tio n a l d e sc r ip t io n  o f  th e  lo g ic a l c o n s ta n ts  to  a cco u n t fo r  tr u th .
So, h a v in g  c h a r a c te r iz e d  th e  m eta p h y sica l d isp u te  in  term s o f a b e lie f  
in  d eterm in acy  o f  tr u th  v a lu e s  w e can  s e t t le  th e  q u e stio n  o f th e  
ap p ro p r ia te  n otion  o f tr u th  by  a sk in g  w h en  th e  law o f ex c lu d ed  m iddle 
is  ap p licab le . T he, u n s u r p r is in g , a n sw e r  is  th a t we can  a s s e r t  A v-A  ju s t  
w hen we h ave  a d e c is io n  p r o c e d u r e  fo r  A w h ich  is  e f f e c t iv e  in  
p r in c ip le .
The q u e s t io n  now is ,  d o e s  a sem an tic  th e o r y  c h a r a c te r iz in g  p roof  
co n d itio n s  g iv e  an  a d eq u a te  a c c o u n t o f m eaning? The th o u g h t h ere  is  
th a t in  c h a r a c te r iz in g  w h at c o u n ts  a s  a  can on ica l p roof o f  B, sa y , we 
h ave  g iv e n  a com p lete  a c c o u n t o f  i t s  a s s e r t ib il ity  co n d itio n s  and th u s  o f  
i t s  m ean ing. But now  w e are  a sk e d  to  ack n o w led g e  th a t i t s  a s s e r t ib il ity  
co n d itio n s  are  w id er  s in c e  it  m ay be a s s e r te d  a s  th e  c o n c lu sio n  o f a 
" p r o o f  p r o c e e d in g  v ia  a d is ju n c t io n  n e ith e r  o f w h ose  d is ju n c ts  has  
been  p r o v ed . So e ith e r  we h a v e  n ot su c c e e d e d  in  c h a r a c te r iz in g  i t s  
can on ica l p ro o f c o n d itio n s  or i t s  can on ica l p roof c o n d itio n s  do not 
e x h a u st i t s  a s s e r t ib il ity  c o n d itio n s  (it  is  a m atter o f ch o ice  how we
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d e sc r ib e  th e  s itu a tio n ).
We h a v e  now th r e e  n o tio n s  in  p lay: can on ica l proof; c o n s tr u c t io n s  
w hich  r e c o g n iz a b ly  i s s u e  in  ca n o n ica l p roofs; and tr u th . The m eaning o f  
a s e n te n c e  is  d eterm in ed  b y  w h at c o u n ts  a s  a can on ica l p ro o f o f it . Our 
lo g ic  a p p lie s  c o n s e r v a t iv e ly  r e la t iv e  to th e  n otion  o f h a v in g  a  
c o n str u c t io n  w h ich  r e c o g n iz a b ly  i s s u e s  in  a  (can on ical) p roo f, A s e n te n c e  
may be tr u e  a lth o u g h  w e do n o t p o s s e s s  a c o n str u c t io n  w h ich  
r e c o g n iz a b ly  i s s u e s  in  a  (can on ica l) p ro o f o f it .  What I w ant to  show  is  
th a t th e  re la tio n  b etw een  ca n o n ica l p roo f and c o n s tr u c t io n s  w h ich  
r e c o g n iz a b ly  i s s u e  in  can on ica l p r o o fs  a llow s fo r  a m olecular th e o r y  o f  
m eaning and  th a t th e  c o n s e r v a t iv e n e s s  o f  ou r  lo g ic  r e la t iv e  to th e  la tter  
notion  e s ta b lis h e s  a  s u f f ic ie n t  ep istem ic  c o n str a in t  on  th e  notion  o f  
tru th .
We adm it th a t p ro o f c o n d itio n s  tr a n sc e n d  can on ica l p roo f c o n d itio n s  
and th a t tr u th  tr a n sc e n d s  p roo f. The s itu a tio n  th u s  b ears a p ro fou n d  
resem b lan ce  to  th a t d e sc r ib e d  b y  Dummett in  The J u s tif ic a tio n  o f  
D ed u c tio n  w h ere  he n o te s  th a t in  o r d e r  to  a cco u n t for  th e  u s e fu ln e s s  o f  
d ed u ctio n  we h a v e  to  a ck n o w led g e  som e gap  b etw een  tr u th  an d  i t s  
r e c o g n it io n  b y  d ir e c t  or ca n o n ica l m eans (Dummett 1975a, p .314). But if  
can on ica l p roo f c o n d itio n s  are  m ean ing d eterm in in g  th e n  s u r e ly  th e  
sem antic th e o r y  sh o u ld  a p p ly  c o n s e r v a t iv e ly  r e la t iv e  to th e  e x is te n c e  o f  
can on ica l p ro o fs  (in  w h ich  c a s e  we h a v e  to  j u s t i fy  h o ld in g  th a t th e  
n o n -ca n o n ica l p roo f g iv e s  u s  th e  r ig h t  to  a s s e r t  th e  e x is te n c e  o f a 
can on ica l p roo f b e c a u se , sa y , i t  sh o w s how th e  la tter  cou ld , in  p r in c ip le , 
be c o n s tr u c te d  -  th is  d o es  c lo se  th e  c ir c le  o f exp lan a tion ). W hilst, i f  
th e y  do n o t th en  w e h a v e  in tr o d u ce d  a d e g r e e  o f holism  in to  ou r  
th eory; th e  m eaning o f s e n te n c e s  d o es , now, d ep en d  on th a t o f more 
com plex s e n te n c e s  s in c e  c o n s tr u c t io n s  is s u in g  in  can on ica l p ro o fs  may 
p roceed  v ia  more com plex s e n te n c e s . Is  th a t accep ta b le?
The in tu it io n is t  m ust avo id  im paling h im self on e ith e r  horn  o f th is  
dilemma. He m ust, i t  seem s to  me, hold th a t h is  th e o r y  is  n ot h o lis t ic
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and th u s  th a t can on ica l p ro o f c o n d itio n s  are  m eaning d eterm in in g  but  
th a t th e  n o tion  o f c o n s e r v a t iv e  e x te n s io n  n eed  not a p p ly  to  th e
e x is te n c e  o f can on ica l p r o o fs  b u t to  h is  n o tion  of p roof a s  a p p r o p r ia te ly  
exp la in ed . T h is le a v e s  him in  n eed  o f an  a cco u n t o f th e  re la tio n  b etw een  
h is  notion  o f p ro o f an d  ca n o n ica l p roof. H ere I h a v e  no p e n e tr a t in g  
in s ig h t  to  o f fe r  but th in k  th a t  n on e  su c h  is  n e ed ed . The re la tio n , I 
claim , is  tr a n sp a r e n t ly  g iv e n  in  th e  a c c o u n t o f p ro o f in  term s of
r e c o g n iz in g  o f  a c o n s tr u c t io n  th a t  i f  i t  is  a p p r o p r ia te ly  ap p lied  it  y ie ld s  
a can on ica l p roo f. T h is a c c o u n t o f p roo f g iv e s  a  g e n e r a l sa tis fa c t io n  
con d ition  fo r  c o n s tr u c t io n s  to  be p r o o fs  o n ce  th e  can on ica l p roo f  
co n d itio n s  are  know n. H aving th is  a cco u n t e n a b le s  u s  to  claim  th a t
can on ica l p roo f is  s t i l l  d e term in a tiv e  o f m ean ing s in c e  th e  a s s e r t ib il ity  
co n d itio n s  o f  th e  s e n te n c e  flow  from  i t s  can on ica l a s s e r t ib il ity  
co n d itio n s . So I r e s t  my c a se  h e r e  and aw ait a  c h a lle n g e  to  th e
c o h e r en ce  o f h o ld in g  th a t  m ean ing is  d eterm in ed  b y  can on ica l p r o o fs , 
th a t p roo f is  a s  j u s t  ex p la in ed  and th a t th e  sem antic  th e o r y  a p p lies  
c o n s e r v a t iv e ly  r e la t iv e  to th is  n o tion  o f  proof.
The r e a lis t , too , claim s th a t  h is  sem an tic  th e o r y  fo r  lo g ic  sh o w s log ic  
to a p p ly  c o n s e r v a t iv e ly  r e la t iv e  to  h is  n o tion  o f tr u th . So le t  u s  be su r e
ab ou t th e  d if fe r e n c e s  b etw een  th e  r e a lis t  and ou r  in tu it io n is t . The
r e a lis t , f ir s t ly ,  ta k e s  tr u th  to  be a  sem antic  p rim itive  so  it  is  d iff ic u lt  to  
s e e  how he J u s t if ie s  th e  b iv a le n t b eh av iou r  o f h is  n o tion  o f tr u th . In
c o n tr a s t  th e  in tu it io n is t  g iv e s  a c o n te n tfu l a cco u n t o f  h is  n o tion  o f
p roof and e x p la in s  th e  m anner in  w h ich  it  a p p lie s  to  s e n te n c e s  in  term s  
of th is  a cco u n t. The ca n o n ica l p ro o f re la tio n  (i.e ., th e  re la tio n  o f a 
c o n str u c t io n  to a s e n te n c e )  is  a lw ays d ec id a b le . T h us th e  sem antic  
th e o r y  g iv e s  a su ita b ly  r e d u c t iv e  a cco u n t o f our g r a sp  o f u n d ec id a b le  
s e n te n c e s  s in c e  it  n e v e r  c a lls  fo r  u s  to adm it th a t th e  tr u th  v a lu e  o f a 
se n te n c e  m ight d eterm in a te ly  tr a n sc e n d  our c a p a c it ie s  to  d eterm in e i t  in  
p r in c ip le . Our g r a sp  o f a n y  s e n te n c e  c o n s is t s  in  b e in g  s e n s it iv e  to  th e  
s ta tu s  o f c o n s tr u c t io n s  a s  ca n o n ica l p ro o fs  or r e fu ta t io n s  o f it  and th is
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s ta tu s  i s  a lw a y s a d ec id a b le  m atter. E v id e n tly  th e  p roo f re la tio n  is  a lso  
a lw ays d ec id a b le  so  w e e n c o u n te r  no bar to ou r  exp lan ation  o f  
u n d ec id a b le  s e n te n c e s . (A lth ou gh  o b v io u s ly , in  both c a s e s , th e  e x is te n c e  
o f a p ro o f is  n o t a lw a y s  a d e c id a b le  m atter.) The a p p lica b ility  o f  th e  
tr u th  p r e d ica te , in  c o n tr a s t , i s  n o t a lw a y s d ec id a b le  and  th u s  n o t o n ly  
i s  th e  d ir e c t  m eans o f r e c o g n it io n  o f tr u th , on  a r e a lis t ic  in te r p r e ta t io n , 
o fte n  in a c c e s s ib le  to  u s  b u t, s in c e  m eaning fo r  th e  r e a lis t  c o n s is t s  in  
g r a sp  o f b iv a len t tr u th  c o n d itio n s , i t  is  u t te r ly  m y ste r io u s  how a n y  
s e n s it iv i ty  w e sh ow  to  v e r if ic a to r y  p r o c e d u r e s  r e la te s  to  th e  
u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f s e n te n c e s  w h o se  tr u th  v a lu e s  a re  u n d ec id a b le . Our 
in tu it io n is t  a v o id s  e n t ir e ly  th is  problem  w h ich  is  endem ic to  realism . The  
re a so n  for  th is  i s  th a t th e  in tu it io n is t ’s  n o tion  o f tr u th  may tr a n sc e n d  
v e r if ic a t io n  but i t s  o b ta in in g  i s  a lw ays lin k ed  to  th e  sa t is fa c t io n  o f  
g e n e r a l p ro o f p r o c e d u r e s  and  th e s e , in  tu rn , are  exp la in ed  r e la t iv e  to  
can on ica l p ro o f p r o c e d u r e s  w h ich  are  m eaning d eterm in in g . So a lth o u g h  
h is  n o tion  o f tr u th  tr a n sc e n d s  r e co g n it io n  by  d ir e c t  m eans i t  i s  n o t  
tr a n sc e n d e n t  w ith  r e s p e c t  to  a ll v e r if ic a to r y  p r o c e d u r e s . T h ese  
d iffe r e n c e s  p a v e  th e  w ay  fo r  th e  e s ta b lish m en t o f a  c o h e r e n t  
in tu it io n is t ic  p o s itio n  (at le a s t  in  r e p e c t  o f m athem atical d isc o u r se ) ,
To sum  u p , th e  in tu it io n is t  g iv e s  an  a c co u n t o f m eaning by
r e c u s iv e ly  c h a r a c te r iz in g  can on ica l p roof c o n d itio n s . His sem antic  th e o r y  
g iv e s  an  a cco u n t o f lo g ic  w h ich  a p p lie s  c o n s e r v a t iv e ly  w ith  r e s p e c t  to  
h is  notion  o f g e n e r a l p ro o f c o n d itio n s  w h ich , in  tu rn , r e c e iv e  exp lica tion  
in  term s o f th e  n o tion  o f  can on ica l proof. The notion  o f tr u th  is  
ex p lica ted  v ia  th e  e q u iv a le n c e  p r in c ip le . The in tu it io n is t  is  th u s  ab le
both to g iv e  a su ita b ly  m olecular sem antic  th e o r y  w h ich  o b e y s  h is
c o n s tr a in ts  on  an  a c c o u n t o f  m eaning and , in  so  d o in g , he a c q u its
h im self o f h is  o b lig a tio n  to g iv e  a com m unicable a cco u n t o f h is  n o tion  of  
tr u th .
The p o in t o f th e  a b o v e  argu m en t w as to  show  th a t g r a sp  o f th e  
g e n e r a l a p p lica b ility  o f  a d e c is io n  p ro ced u re  ju s t i f ie s  th e  b e lie f in
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d eterm in acy  o f tr u th  v a lu e s  w h en  we can  make s e n s e  o f th e  id ea  o f  
a p p ly in g  th a t p r o c e d u r e . A lth ou gh  c o n s id e r in g  c a s e s  w h ere  th a t  
p ro ced u re  ca n n o t in  p r a c tic e  be im plem ented I h ave  n ot com m itted th e  
s tr ic t  f in it is t  to  th e  in tu itio n ist* s  n otion  o f tr u th . If th e  argu m en t is  
s u c c e s s fu l  it  o n ly  s u c c e e d s  in  q u e s t io n in g  th e  s tr ic t  f in i t is t ’s  m otivation . 
The r e a so n  fo r  th is  is  th a t th e  q u e s t io n  now r e d u c e s  to  on e  o f w hat th e  
s tr ic t  f in it is t  m igh t m ean by  "any num ber", in  p a r tic u la r , d o es  h is  
r e s tr ic t io n  o f  th a t n otion  g u a r a n te e  th a t th e  p ro ce d u r e  is ,  fo r  each  
num ber, im plem entable in  p r a c tic e?  S u r e ly  n ot, s in c e  p ro v id e d  ou r  
m ethod o f r e p r e s e n t in g  th e  n u m b ers is  n ot too com plex we sh a ll be ab le  
to  g iv e  in s ta n c e s  w h ere , a lth o u g h  w e can  s u r v e y a b ly  r e p r e s e n t  th e  
num ber, w e ca n n o t s u r v e y a b ly  im plem ent th e  d ec is io n  p ro c e d u r e . T h us  
our s tr ic t  f in it is t  i s  fo r c e d  to  adm it th e  d eterm in acy  o f tr u th  v a lu e s  fo r  
th o se  in s ta n c e s  w h ere  we h a v e  o n ly  a d e c is io n  p r o c ed u re  w h ich  is  
e ffe c t iv e  in  p r in c ip le . His p o s itio n  th u s  co lla p ses: we h a v e  no r e a so n  to  
su p p o se  th a t  h is  c o n c e p tio n  o f th e  n a tu ra l num bers d iffe r s  from  th a t o f  
th e  in tu it io n is t .
58 S tr ic t  F in itism  R elies  on  an  In te r p r e ta tio n  o f Rule Follow ing w h ich  is  
not O bligatory  to  th e  A n ti-R ea list:
A nother im portant d iffe r e n c e  b etw een  th e  in tu it io n is t  and  th e  c la s s ic is t  
i s  th a t g r a sp  o f th e  in tu it io n is t* s  n o tion  o f p roo f, u n lik e  th e  c la s s ic is t ’s  
notion  o f tr u th , can  be m a n ifested  in  our u n d er s ta n d in g  o f  lo g ic a lly  
sim ple s e n te n c e s . T h is m eans th a t  it  is  ap p ro p r ia te  to  ju s t i fy  ou r lo g ic  
in  term s o f i t  b e in g  a c o n s e r v a t iv e  e x ten sio n  o f th e  b ase  c la s s  r e la t iv e  
to th is  n otion  o f p roo f. For exam ple th e  fu n dam enta l theorem  o f  
arith m etic  s ta te s  th a t e v e r y  num ber h a s  a u n iq u e  prim e fa c to r iza tio n . We 
p ro v e  it  by sh o w in g  th a t it  i s  tr u e  o f an  a r b itr a r y  num ber. Now we can  
o n ly  r e c o g n iz e  th is  a s  a p ro o f i f  we can  r e co g n iz e  th a t we h a v e  a  
c o n str u c tio n  w h ich  a p p lied  to  a n y  num ber y ie ld s  i t s  prim e fa cto r iza tio n . 
A dm ittedly  th e  p r e d ic a te  h ere  is  n ot sim ple but com plex. But th e  id ea  is
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clear: we can , on o cc a sio n , r e c o g n iz e  th a t a p ro ced u re  cou ld  be
im plem ented a lth o u g h  we may not, in  p r a c tic e , be ab le  to im plem ent it . I 
h ave tr ied  to a r g u e  th a t th is  p o s itio n  i s  c o h e r e n t from  an a n t i-r e a lis t  
p o in t o f v iew . I t  i s  c o n c e iv a b le  th a t  W right w ould o b je c t  e v e n  to  th is  on  
th e  g r o u n d s  th a t  in  b e lie v in g  th a t  th e  p ro ced u re  h a s a d eterm in ate  
ap p lica tion  in  c a s e s  w h en  we c a n n o t a p p ly  it  we b e tra y  a com m itm ent to  
th e  o b je c t iv ity  o f  m ean ing. I th in k  th a t th is  a c c u r a te ly  r e f le c t s  W right’s  
p o sitio n . What I w an t to  do now is  to  show  th a t an o b jec tio n  a lon g  th e s e  
lin e s  d e p e n d s  u p on  W right’s  v iew  o f  th e  a p p lica b ility  o f th e  Rule 
Follow ing C o n sid era tio n s, In  th e  la s t  c h a p ter  I tr ied  to  a r g u e  th a t th is  
v iew  is  n ot m andatory  fo r  th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  in  w h ich  c a se  i t  i s  n o t c lea r  
th a t th e r e  is  an  argu m en t from  g e n e r a l an ti^ -realist g r o u n d s  to  s tr ic t  
fin itism  (a s o p p o sed  to  in tu itio n ism ). L a stly  I w ant to  s u g g e s t  th a t th e  
in te r p r e ta t io n  o f th e  Rule F o llow in g  C on sid era tion s th a t I sk e tc h e d  in  
th e  la s t  c h a p te r  le n d s  su p p o r t  to  in tu ition ism .
The in tu it io n is t  j u s t  d e sc r ib e d  r e lie s  on  th e  th o u g h t th a t i f  we
u n d er sta n d  th e  dom ain o f  n u m b ers and  h ave an u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f a
p ro ced u re  a p p lica b le  to  n u m b ers th e n  w e h ave  an  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f th e  
a p p lica tio n  o f  th a t  p r o c e d u r e  to  a n y  num ber. M oreover he s u p p o se s  th a t  
th a t u n d e r s ta n d in g  j u s t i f ie s  u s  in  a s s e r t in g  w hat th e  r e s u lt s  o f
im plem enting th a t p r o c e d u r e  w ould  be w ere  we to  im plem ent it.
W right’s  o b je c tio n  w ould  be th a t th e  p o sitio n  p r e su p p o se s  th a t we 
h ave  co n fer r e d  a  m ean ing on o u r  term s su ch  th a t u s in g  them  c o r r e c t ly  
in  a cco rd a n ce  w ith  th a t  m ean ing r e q u ir e s  a c e r ta in  p a tte r n  o f u se  w h ich  
o u tr u n s  th a t w h ich  w e are ab le  to  m ake. So th e  p ic tu r e  w e are  g iv e n  o f
w hat u n d e r s ta n d in g  c o n s is t s  in  i s  o f g r a sp  o f a d eterm in ate p a tte r n  o f
u s e  w h ich  c a n n o t be d isp la y e d  in  th e  f in ite  s e t  o f  in s ta n c e s  o f u se
w h ich  we make o f  th e  term  nor is  th e  p a tte r n  o f u s e  e v id e n t  to th e
lea rn er  in  h is  e x p o su r e  to  th e  u s e  o th e r s  make o f th e  term . S u ch  a  
n otion  o f  u n d e r s ta n d in g  is  c o m p re h e n s iv e ly  dem olished  in  th e  Rule 
F ollow ing C o n sid era tio n s and  is  on e  th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  can  h ave  no tr u ck
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w ith . So m uch th e n  fo r  an  o u tlin e  o f  w hat I tak e  w ould be th e  b ru n t o f  
W right’s  o b je c t io n  to  th e  a b o v e  p o sitio n .
The o u tlin e  s u f f ic e s  to  m otivate  th e  th o u g h t th a t W right’s  
r e se r v a t io n s  ab o u t in tu itio n ism  are  m otivated  by  h is  v iew  of th e  Rule  
Follow ing C o n sid era tio n s  a s  p r o v id in g  a c r it iq u e  o f . th e  o b je c t iv ity  o f  
m eaning. So, a t th e  m oment, w e h a v e  an  argu m en t b ased  on  W right’s 
in te r p r e ta t io n  o f  th e  Rule F ollow ing C on sid era tion s a g a in s t  th e  
in tu it io n is t  p o s itio n . I w an t now  to  g o  on  to  show  th a t an  a lte r n a tiv e  
in te r p r e ta t io n  o f  th e  Rule F o llow in g  C on sid era tion s d o es  n ot is s u e  in  an  
a tta ck  on  in tu itio n ism . T h is, p r o v id e d  th e  in te r p r e ta t io n  I g iv e  is  
c o n s is te n t  w ith  a n ti-r e a lism  (th is  is  a r g u ed  in  th e  p r e v io u s  c h a p te r ) ,  
w ill sh ow  th a t W right d o es  n o t su c c e e d  in  o u tlin in g  an a n t i - r e a l i s t  
r e a so n  fo r  d ism a n tlin g  in tu itio n ism . I t  w ould be n ice  a lso  to  be ab le  to  
show  th a t a ll s tr ic t  f in i t is t  a t ta c k s  m ust d ep en d  u p on  r e se r v a t io n s  ab ou t  
m eaning w h ich  p a ra lle l th o se  o f  W right s in c e  th e n  I w ould h a v e  a  
co m p reh en siv e  d e fe n c e  o f  an  in tu ition ism  r e su lt in g  from  a n t i-r e a lis t  
p r in c ip le s , H ow ever I know  o f  no argu m en t to d em on stra te  th is . B ut it  
d o es  seem  c lea r  th a t  th e  o n ly  ap p ea l th e  in tu it io n is t  w a n ts  to make is  to  
th e  n a tu re  o f  ou r  u n d e r s ta n d in g  an d  th a t an  o b je c tio n  to  th a t w ould  
h a v e  to  p a ra lle l W right (e v e n  i f  th e  m otivation  for th e  o b je c tio n  w as  
d iffe r e n t  in  th a t, sa y , it  w as g r o u n d e d  in  a s p e c if ic  o n to lo g ica l v iew ) a t  
le a s t  a s  fa r  a s  sh o w in g  th a t th e  ch a ra c ter  o f our u n d e r s ta n d in g  w as  
in s u ff ic ie n t ly  r o b u s t  to  su p p o r t  su c h  an ap p ea l. Now if  I can  show  th a t  
an a n t i-r e a lis t  p o s itio n  w ill allow  su c h  an  ap p ea l th e n  I w ill h ave  sh ow n  
th a t, p e n d in g  an arg u m en t to  sh ow  th a t th is  a n ti-rea lism  m isd e sc r ib e s  
th e  c h a r a c te r  o f ou r  u n d e r s ta n d in g , in tu ition ism  is  a v a lid  p o sitio n .
59 In tu ition ism  D efended:
So now I m ust d e fen d  my brand  o f in tu tion ism . The broad a n t i-r e a lis t  
p o s itio n  I h a v e  been  a d v o c a tin g  in  th e  la s t  tw o c h a p te r s  s e e k s  to  
grou n d  l in g u is t ic  p r a c tic e  in  more g e n e r a l hum an p r a c tic e s  w h ich
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th e m se lv e s  are  s u b je c t  to  n orm ative  c o n s tr a in ts  b u t w h ich  are  n ot  
s u s c e p tib le  to  p h ilo so p h ica l exp lan a tion . T his p o s itio n  allow s u s  to
d e sc r ib e  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  c e r ta in  b asic  e x p r e ss io n s  n ot a s  g r a s p in g  a  
ru le  or in te r p r e ta t io n  but a s  a  w ay o f a c tin g . So Rule Follow ing  
C on sid era tion s g a in  no g r ip  on  th e  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  th e s e  e x p r e ss io n s .  
From th is  p e r s p e c t iv e  th e r e  i s  no tem ptation  to lim it ou r g r a sp  o f
c o r r e c t  u s e  to  u s e  a g a in s t  a s e c u r a b ie  b ack grou n d  o f  comm unal a s s e n t .  
The rô le  o f  th e  com m unity in  th is  a c c o u n t i s  in  p r o v id in g  a n orm ative ly  
c o n str a in e d  p r a c tic e  in  th e  c o n te x t  o f  w h ich  o u r  a c tio n s  and  b eh av iou r  
h a v e  m eaning fo r  o th e r  p r a c tit io n e r s . The im portant d is t in c tio n  h e r e  is  
th a t b etw een  a  com m unity w h ose  m em bers d isp la y  a sh a red  r e g u la r ity  in  
b eh av iou r  and  a com m unity w h o se  m em bers u n d er sta n d  o n e  an o th er  
(ev e n  th o u g h  th a t  u n d e r s ta n d in g  d e p e n d s  u p on  th e r e  b e in g  s u f f ic ie n t  
resem b lan ce  and r e g u la r ity  in  th e ir  b eh a v io u r). The p o s itio n  h a s  been  
c le a r ly  m apped o u t b y  M cDowell (McDowell 1984)1. McDowell claim s th a t it  
i s  an  e s s e n t ia l  a s p e c t  o f  m ean in g fu l u s e  o f an e x p r e ss io n  th a t in  a n o v e l  
s itu a tio n  th e r e  w ill be a s ta n d a rd  o f c o r r e c tn e s s  for  w h eth er  or n ot th e  
term  i s  a p p lica b le  in  th is  new  in s ta n c e . T h is d e p e n d s  p r e c is e ly  on  an  
a c c ep ta n c e  o f g r a sp  o f  r a tif ic a tio n  in d e p e n d e n t  p a tte r n s  o f u s e . McDowell 
w r ite s ,
W right s u g g e s t s  (W right 1980, pp .217-220) th a t th e  em erg en ce  o f a 
c o n s e n s u s  on  w h e th e r , s a y , to  ca ll some n ew ly  e n c o u n te re d  o b je c t  
"yellow" is  s u b je c t  to  no norm s. That is  in d e e d  how it  seem s i f  w e
allow  o u r s e lv e s  to  p ic tu r e  com m unal la n g u a g e  in  term s of
1. McDowell ta k e s  h is  argu m en t to  is s u e  in  a r e fu ta tio n  o f  a n t i-r e a lis t  
c o n c e p tio n s  o f m ean ing and u n d e r s ta n d in g . I th in k  th a t he s u c c e e d s  in  
r e fu tin g  th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  p o s itio n  a s  he s e e s  it  bu t th a t h is  r e s tr ic t io n  o f  
th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  to  d e s c r ip t io n s  o f b eh av iou r  w h ich  do not p r e su p p o se  
norm s is ,  a lth o u g h  s u g g e s te d  b y  som e of Dummett’s  rem arks and  
red o le n t o f W right’s  w ay  o f th in k in g , n o t w ell m otivated . I h a v e  a rg u ed  
th is  p o stio n  in  c h a p te r  2.
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8ub-" bedrock" rese m b la n c es  in  b eh av iou r  and  p h en om en ology . B ut if  
we r e s p e c t  W ittg e n ste in ’s  in ju n c tio n  n o t to d ig  below th e  g ro u n d , we 
m ust sa y  th a t  th e  com m unity " goes r ig h t  or w rong" ... a cco rd in g  to  
w h eth er  th e  o b je c t  in  q u e s t io n  i s ,  or  i s  n ot, yello^v; and n o th in g  can  
make i t s  b e in g  ye llow , or n o t, d e p e n d e n t on  ou r r a tif ica tio n  th a t  
th a t is  how  th in g s  are . (McDowell 1984, p .353)
The p o in t h ere  is  th a t i f  w e a ttem p t to  d e sc r ib e  m eaning in  term s o f  
b eh av iou r c h a r a c te r iz e d  in  n o rm -free  term s th e n  we w ill, in  e f fe c t ,  be 
r e d u ced  to  m aking in d u c t iv e  e x tr a p o la tio n s  in  o r d er  to  p r e d ic t  our  
r e a c tio n s  in  a n y  n o v e l s itu a tio n . S u ch  ju d g em en ts  are  a lw ays liab le  to  
be o v e r tu r n e d  b y  th e  a c tu a l b eh av iou r  o f th e  com m unity. B ut th is  m eans 
th a t th e r e  is  no sta n d a rd  w h ich  th e  com m unity m ust ab id e  by  in  u s in g  
an  e x p r e ss io n  in  a n o v e l s itu a tio n . The so lu tio n  is  to  c h a r a c te r iz e  our  
u se  o f, sa y , th e  e x p r e ss io n  "yellow" in  term s w h ich  p r e su p p o se  norm s 
by s itu a tin g  th a t u s e  w ith in  a  p r a c tic e . The p o s s ib il ity  o f la n g u a g e  can  
th e n  be u n d erm in ed  b y  a  d is so lu t io n  o f r e g u la r it ie s  in  b eh av iou r  but, 
p rov id ed  w e are  n ot tem pted  to  exp la in  m eaning in  th e se  su b -"  bedrock"  
term s, w e allow  th a t  our u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f an e x p r e s io n  can  be ap p ealed  
to a s  p r o v id in g  s ta n d a r d s  o f  c o r r e c tn e s s  for  i t s  a p p lica tion . So it  is  
r ig h t  to  ca ll an  o b je c t  ye llow  ju s t  in  c a se  it  is  yellow .
Note th a t w h at i s  a t i s s u e  h e r e  is  n ot th e  in fo r m a tiv e n e ss  o f  th is  
claim -w e  are  a ssu m in g  we h a v e  g iv e n  an a cco u n t o f w hat it  is  to  
u n d er sta n d  "yellow "- b u t th e  o b je c t iv ity  o f b e in g  yellow . The p o in t is  
th a t an o b je c t  is  ye llow  if f  it  i s ,  in  fa c t , yellow  ir r e s p e c t iv e  o f w h eth er  
or n ot a n y o n e  a c tu a lly  c a lls  it  ye llow . (T his d if fe r s  from  th e  r e a lis t  claim  
th a t an  o b je c t  d e term in a te ly  e ith e r  is  or is  not ye llow  a lth o u g h  is  
u n r e c o g n iza b le  a s  b e in g  one or th e  o th er .)
It is  a p t to seem  a s  if  th e  q u e stio n  h a s , h ere , b een  b e g g e d . But th e  
p oin t w as th a t we do n ot n eed  to  a c c e p t  a n y  acco u n t w h ich  is  sa n itized  
o f norm s. T h ere is  th u s  a lw a y s a norm to w h ich  w e may appeal. So a
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g iv e n  u se  is  c o r r e c t  i f  it  s a t is f ie s  th e  a p p ro p r ia te  norm r a th er  th an  i f  it  
e lic it s  g e n e r a l com m unal c o n se n t, The d is tin c tio n  b etw een  realism  and  
th is  form  o f a n ti-r e a lism  is ,  i t  seem s to  me, ca p tu r ed  w ell in  th e  
fo llow in g  rem ark o f  M cDowell’s ,
The p o in t a b o u t fin itism  is  th is . It r e c o ils , r ig h t ly , from  th e  
m yth o logy  o f th e  su p e r  r ig id  m ach in ery  -  th e  p a tte r n s  th a t ex ten d  
o f th e m se lv e s , w ith o u t lim it, b eyon d  a n y  p o in t w e ta k e  them  to . 
(T his i s  rea lism .! B ut it  e q u a te s  th is  re co il w ith  r e je c t in g  a n y  
co n cep tio n  o f p a t te r n s  th a t  e x te n d , w ith ou t lim it, b eyon d  a n y  su c h  
p oin t. (McDowell 1984, p .353)
The f ir s t  p o s itio n  w h ich  i s  r ig h t ly  r e je c te d  i s  th e  r e a lis t  p o s itio n  o f  
b e lie v in g  in  detem in ate  tr u th  v a lu e s  w h ich  tr a n sc e n d  r e co g n it io n . The  
seco n d  is  th e  a c c ep ta b le  in tu it io n is t  p o s itio n  o f h o ld in g  th a t w e g r a sp  
v e r if ic a t io n  tr a n sc e n d e n t  tr u th  c o n d itio n s . The d is t in c tio n  w as on e I 
reca lled  to w a rd s th e  b e g in in g  o f th is  ch a p ter . T h ere  I tr ied  to  a r g u e  
th a t a fin itism  w h ich  r e je c te d  both  o f th e se  p o s itio n s  is  u n ten a b le . I 
hope now  to h a v e  g iv e n  som e su p p o r t  to  th e  in tu it io n is t ic  p o s itio n  by  
sh ow in g  th a t th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  can  and sh ou ld  a c c ep t th e  u s e  th e  
in tu it io n is t  n e e d s  to  m ake o f th is  notion  o f a v a r ie ty  o f, w h at m ight be 
ca lled , v e r if ic a t io n  tr a n sc e n d e n t  tr u th .
§10 The Re v is io n a r y  Im p lica tion s o f S tr ic t  F initism :
In th is  se c t io n  I w ant b r ie f ly  to  q u e stio n  w h eth er  c e r ta in  o f  
W ittg en ste in ’s  c o n s id e r a tio n s  (ab ou t su v e y a b ility  o f  p r o o fs) sh ou ld  be 
ta k en  to  h ave  re  v is io n a r y  im p lica tion s. W hether or n o t W ittg en ste in  w as  
a s tr ic t  f in it is t  in  a n y  r e le v a n t  s e n s e  o f th e  term , h is  id e a s  h ave  
g r e a tly  in flu e n c e d  th e  form ulation  o f th a t p o sitio n . W ittgen ste in , a t  
v a r io u s  s ta g e s  in  h is  R em a rk s  on th e  P h ilo so p h y  o f  M a th em atics  (1978), 
ta lk s  ab ou t th e  n eed  fo r  a p ro o f to  be su r v e y a b le . A p roo f is  to g iv e  u s
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c e r ta in ty  and  m ust n ot o n ly  c o n v in c e  u s  th a t i t s  co n c lu sio n  is  tr u e  it  
m ust a lso  show  u s  how  it  is  tru e . T hus it  m ust be a b so lu te ly
p e r sp ic u o u s . A p roo f c o n v in c e s  u s  o f th e  w ay th in g s  m ust be, it  
p r e p a r e s  u s  for  a d o p tin g  a c r ite r io n  of c o r r e c tn e s s  fo r  th e  u se  o f th a t
p r o c ed u re  w h ich  is  th e  s u b je c t  o f  th e  p roof. I f  It is  to  fu lf i l  th is
norm ative ro le  th e r e  can  be no room for  r e s id u a l d ou b t o v er  th e  
c o r r e c tn e s s  o f th e  p ro o f (w h ich , o f  c o u r se , i s  n o t to  sa y  th a t w e may 
n ot come to  w ith d raw  ou r a s s e n t  to  a  proof: w e can  a c c e p t  th a t we are  
fa llib le ) s in c e  i f  ou r  a c c ep ta n c e  o f  a p ro o f w as c o n s is te n t  w ith  
h a rb o u r in g  a  d ou b t ab ou t w h eth er  i t  w as a c tu a lly  c o r r e c t  w e w ould n ot, 
in  c ir c u m sta n c e s  w h ere  ou r o p era tio n a l p r o c e d u r e  p ro d u ced  a r e su lt  
c o u n te r  to  th e  p ro o f, be ab le  to  a c c u se  th e  a p p lica tion  o f th o se
p r o c e d u r e s  o f h a v in g  been  m istak en . We w ould in  th e  e v e n t  o f su c h  a 
c o n flic t  h a v e  too m any com p eting  h y p o th e s e s .
Now W ittgen ste in  p e r c e iv e s  th is  norm ative fu n c tio n  o f m athem atics 
and d e v e lo p s  an a c c o u n t o f m athem atical n e c e s s i ty  from  it. (S ee , for  
in s ta n c e , W ittg en ste in  (1978), I §§75-105, III §§9-11 , §§21-44 , V §51, VI 
§23) In  d o in g  so  he is  n ot recom m ending th e  m anner in  w h ich  
m athem atics sh o u ld  fu n c tio n  but d e sc r ib in g  th e  w ay it  d o e s  fu n c tio n . 
For a p roo f to  be tr e a te d  a s  a  p roo f it  m ust be su r v e y a b le . T h us e v e n  
if  c la s s ic a l m athem atics is  to  be c r it ic iz e d  it  i s  n ot to  be fa u lte d  for  
u s in g  u n su r v e y a b le  p ro o fs . All th e  p ro o fs  o f  c la s s ic a l m athem atics, in  
v ir tu e  o f th e  fa c t  th a t th e y  can  be trea ted  a s  p ro o fs , are  su r v e y a b le .  
So no r e v is io n a r y  im p lica tion s fo llow  p u r e ly  from  a ck n o w led g in g  th e  
need  fo r  p ro o fs  to  be su r v e y a b le ,
W ittgen ste in  o fte n  d is c u s s e s  th e  p e r s p ic u ity  or s u r v e y s b il ity  o f  
p r o o fs  in  th e  c o n te x t  o f th e  io g ic is t  fou n d ation a l e n te r p r is e  (S ee  
W ittgen ste in  (1978), III §§12-20, §§45-64), The Io g ic is t  a ttem p ts to  ju s t i fy  
ou r o rd in a ry  m athem atical p r a c tic e  by sh ow in g  th a t u n d e r ly in g  e v e r y  
o rd in a r ily  a c c ep te d  p roo f th e r e  is  a p roo f r e ly in g  o n ly  on  sou n d  
p r in c ip le s  p ro v id ed  b y  th e  io g ic is t . W ittgen ste in  n o te s  th a t th e  Io g ic is t’s
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p roo f ca n n o t p r o v id e  th e  ep istem o lo g ica l b ack in g  th e  io g ic is t  in v e s t s  in  
i t  b eca u se  th e  u n s u r v e y a b iiity  o f th e  io g ic is t ’s  p roo f w ill in  a ll c a s e s  
m ean th a t w e sh a ll a c c e p t  th e  o r d in a r y  p roo f a s  g iv in g  th e  c r ite r io n  o f  
c o r r e c tn e s s  fo r  th e  c o n s tr u c t io n  o f  th e  Io g ic is t’s  p roo f. The Io g ic is t  
program m e th u s  ca n n o t p r o v id e  ep istem ic  a c c e s s  to  m athem atical t r u th s  
s in c e  th a t is  p ro v id e d  b y  th e  o r d in a r y  proof.
So W ittg en ste in ’s  em p h asis  on s u r v e y a b ility  seem s to  h a v e  a cr itic ism  
o f fo u n d a tio n a l e n te r p r is e s  a s  i t s  goa l and to be la ck in g  in  r e v is io n a r y  
im port. I t  i s  n o t too d iff ic u lt , h o w ev er , to s e e  th a t p ro v id e d  w e take  
s e r io u s ly  th e  b u s in e s s  o f  ju s t i fy in g  ou r  m ethods o f  p ro o f a r e v is io n a r y  
p o sitio n  d o es  em erge . I t  is  tr u e  th a t no p u ta t iv e  p roo f, i .e .,  no  
c o n str u c t io n  w h ich  ca n  be u se d  a s  a p roof, i s  u n su r v e y a b le  but m any  
p r o o fs  in c lu d e  s te p s  w h ich  r e ly  on  th e r e  b ein g  determ in ate  ou tcom es  
from  a p p ly in g  an u n s u r v e y a b le  p r o c e ss . The th o u g h t th e n  is  th a t th e se  
p r o o fs  w arran t cr itic ism  b e c a u se  th e y  d ep en d  up on  c o n s tr u c t io n s  w h ich  
are , a t m ost, m ythical^ .
Denial o f th e  ju s t if ic a to r y  program m e draw s th e  r e v is io n a r y  te e th  o f  
a f in it is t  d e sc r ip t io n  o f m athem atics. M oreover W right’s  d e e p e s t  r e a so n  
for  r e je c t in g  in tu itio n ism  lie s  in  w h at he d is c e r n s  a s  a  comm itm ent to  
th e  s tr o n g  o b je c t iv ity  o f m ean ing e n ta iled  by  th a t p o s itio n . B ut if  th a t  
i s  so  w hei'e  d o e s  th e  ju s t if ic a to r y  program m e stan d ?  Our cr itic ism  o f  
n o n -f in it is t ic  p r a c tic e  c e n tr e d  o n  th e  u s e  in  p r o o fs  o f m eth od s of
1. A lexander G eorge (G eorge 1988 p .152 n .l7 )  in  c r it ic iz in g  W right fo r  
n ot a p p r e c ia tin g  tw o d iffe r e n t  s c o p e s  o f th e  in tu it io n is t ic  u se  o f "in 
princip le"  seem s n ot to  a p p r e c ia te  th e  p o in t I am m aking h ere . G eorge  
claim s th a t W right fo c u s e s  on  f in ite  e x te n s io n s  o f our a c tu a l 
re co g n itio n a l a b ilit ie s  b eca u se  he fa ils  to  r e a lise  th a t in  h is  ta lk  o f th e  
a b ility , in  p r in c ip le , to  ' c o n s tr u c t  a  p roo f th e  in tu it io n is t  need  n ot be 
ta lk in g  ab ou t e x te n s io n s  o f ou r  a b ilit ie s  but ab ou t ou r a c tu a l a b ilit ie s  to  
c o n s tr u c t  w hat is ,  in  p r in c ip le , a  p roof. But u ltim ately , if  we are  to  
ju s t i fy  th is  p r o o f- in -p r in c ip le  w e sh a ll h a v e  to g iv e  som e a cco u n t o f th e  
leg itim a cy  of c o n s id e r in g  th e  a p p lica tio n  o f  a p r o c e ss  w h ich  we can  o n ly  
in  p r in c ip le  c a r r y  o u t. The tw o p o s it io n s  G eorge d is t in g iu s h e s  seem  to  
me to co lla p se  in to  on e  a n o th er .
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in fe r e n c e  w h ich  d ep en d  on  th e  e x is te n c e  o f w h at, v iew ed  f in it is t ic a iiy ,  
are  m yth ica l c o n s tr u c t io n s , th a t is ,  p u ta t iv e  c o n s tr u c t io n s  w h ich  a g r a sp  
o f th e  m ean ing o f o u r  term s h a s  n o t p rep a red  u s  to  a c c ep t a s  b ein g  
fu lly  d eterm in ate . From W right’s p o in t o f  v iew , in  u n d e r s ta n d in g  th o se  
term s w e h a v e  made a b so lu te ly  no com m itm ent ab ou t how th e y  are  to  be 
ap p lied  in  th e s e  e s s e n t ia lly  new  c o n te x ts . Our u n d e r s ta n d in g  m akes no  
p r o v is io n  fo r  w h at w e m u st a c c e p t  h e r e  so  th e r e  i s  no m eaning to  w h ich  
th e  p roo f m ust be fa ith fu l or  w h ich  it  ca n  b e tra y . The p ro o f i s  th u s  
u n c o n str a in e d  an d  ca n  im pose a  d e c is io n  on  u s  ab ou t w h at th e
a p p ro p r ia te  u s e  sh o u ld  be. T h u s a n y  s tr ic t  f in it is t  p o s itio n  w h ich  fo llow s  
W right’s  m otivation  w ill n o t be r e v is io n a r y . The p o in t i s  th a t  some
in tu it io n is t ic  p r a c tic e  w ill, i f  ju s t if ie d , ap p ear  to th e  f in it is t  to  im port 
u n ju s t if ia b le  a ssu m p tio n s . B ut th e  u n d e r ly in g  m otive for  th a t p o sitio n  
q u e s t io n s  th e  v e r y  e n te r p r is e  o f g iv in g  a ju stif ic a tio n . A b andon ing  th a t  
p r o je c t  m eans th a t c o n s id e r a tio n s  a b o u t th e  s u r v e y a b ility  o f p roo f h ave  
no r e v is io n a r y  im port. So, fo r  o n e  th in g , it  is  n ot c lea r  w h y  W right, in  
p a r tic u la r , a r g u e s  fo r  a r e v is io n a r y  s tr ic t  fin itism . A lso th is  p o s itio n
le a v e s  it  m y ste r io u s  a s  to  w h y  w e sh ou ld  a c c e p t  a new  p ro o f and
ig n o r e s  th e  r e a so n s , r e h e a r se d  e a r lie r , for  w h y  we g iv e  a ju s tif ic a tio n  
o f  m eth od s o f  p roof.
§11 Summary:
In tu ition ism , in  h o ld in g  to  th e  d eterm in acy  o f tru th  v a lu e s  for  
e f f e c t iv e ly  d ec id a b le  s e n te n c e s , d o es  n ot s u f fe r  from  th e  same d e fe c ts  a s  
realism . The r e a so n s  fo r  th is  are; f ir s t ,  th a t th e  in tu it io n is t ’s  u se  o f  
p r o v a b ility  i s  n ot a n a lo g o u s to th e  r e a lis t ’s  u se  o f b iv a len t tr u th  or to  
th e  id ea l v e r if ic a t io n is t ’s  u se  o f in fin ita r y  p roo fs; se c o n d ly , th a t th e  
in tu it io n is t  can  g iv e  an  a cco u n t o f h is  u n d er s ta n d in g  o f v e l  w h ich  
ju s t i f ie s  u se  o f E xcluded  M iddle for  d ec id a b le  s e n te n c e s . A llow ing for  
th is  p o s itio n  m eans th a t th e  in tu it io n is t ic  lo g ic  is  not c o n se r v a t iv e  
r e la t iv e  to p o s s e s s io n  o f can on ica l p r o o fs  but o n ly  r e la tiv e  to p o s s e ss io n
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o f a c o n str u c t io n  w h ich  y ie ld s  a ca n on ica l p roof. But s in c e  th a t n o tion  i s  
a p p r o p r ia te ly  ex p la in ed  in  term s o f can on ica l p ro o f th e r e  n eed  not be a  
co n c e rn  ab ou t w h eth e r  th e  in tu it io n is t ic  sem an tics c o n tr a v e n e s  
m olecu larity  r e q u irem en ts . What w e do n eed  to r e c o g n iz e  is  th e  com plex  
re la tio n  b etw een  ca n o n ica l an d  in form al p ro o fs  w ith in  an in tu it io n is t ic  
sem an tics . T h is p o s itio n  is  n o t a t  a ll untow ard  s in c e  th e  in tu it io n is t  m ust 
g iv e  som e a c co u n t o f  th e  p lace  o f in form al d em on stra tion s w ith in  
m athem atical p r a c tic e  a s  h e  r e je c t s  (for G ddelian r e a so n s)  th e  notion  
th a t ar ith m etic  can  be co m p lete ly  form alized . (S ee  c h a p te r  6 for  more 
d is c u ss io n  o f th is .)  The th r e a t  to  in tu ition ism  p o sed  b y  a s tr ic t  f in it is t  
p o sitio n  i s  b ased  on  th e  v iew  th a t  in tu itio n ism  m akes illeg itim ate  a p p ea ls  
to  th e  c h a r a c te r  o f  o u r  ow n u n d e r s ta n d in g . But th a t argu m en t h in g e s  on  
a r ep u d ia tio n  o f th e  id e a  th a t  th e r e  are ra tif ic a tio n  in d e p e n d e n t  fa c ts  
a b ou t c o r r e c t  m ean ing. H ow ever th a t  sc e p tic a l a tt itu d e  ab ou t m eaning is  
n ot a  p o s itio n  th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  n eed  h a v e  a n y  sym p a th y  w ith . T hus  
in tu ition ism  h a s n ot b een  sh ow n  to  be an  u n sta b le  p o sitio n .
CHAPTER FIVE: LOGIC AND SET THEORY 
§1 The M eanings o f  th e  I n tu it io n is t ic  L ogica l C on stan ts  
§2 U n d ec id a b ility
§3 Q u an tification  an d  U n d e c id a b ility
§4 Q u an tification , O bjecthood  an d  P red ica tio n
§5 The N eed fo r  C o n stra in ts  on  S e t Form ation
§6 A n ti-R ea list v e r s u s  C o n str u c tiv e  A p p roach es to  S et T h eory
§7 E xten sion a l D e fin ite n e ss  o f  Q uantification
§8 An A ttem pt to  D evelop  a  S e t  T h eory
§9 Sum m ary
205
L ogic and S e t  T h eory
T his c h a p ter  b e g in s  w ith  a n  a c c o u n t o f th e  in tu it io n is t ic  log ica l 
c o n s ta n ts . I c o n s id e r  th e  o r ig in  o f  u n d e c id a b ility  in  m athem atics and th e  
trea tm en t o f u n d ec id a b le  s e n te n c e s  in  in tu it io n is t ic  lo g ic . T h is lea d s me 
to  c o n s id er  th e  a c c o u n t o ffe r e d  o f  ou r g r a sp  o f q u a n tifica tio n  o v e r  
in fin ite  dom ains. I draw  o u t som e lin k s  betw een  th a t a cco u n t and  an  
a cco u n t o f ou r g r a sp  o f  th e  s e t  c o n c e p t. I u se  th e se  r e fle c t io n s  to  
m otivate  a  d ou b t a b o u t th e  d e f in ite n e s s  o f th e  u n r e s tr ic te d  q u a n tifie r s  
in  s e t  th e o ry . I a ttem p t, f in a lly , to  g a u g e  th e  fe a s ib ility  o f u s in g  th a t  
o b se r v a tio n  to m otivate  a  c o h e r e n t  s e t  th e o r y  w h ich  is  r ich  e n o u g h  to  
p ro v id e  for  an  a c c ep ta b le  d eve lop m en t o f m athem atical a n a ly s is .
The ro u te  tow ard s a p o s itio n  in  w h ich  it  is  claim ed th a t we n eed  to  
r e v is e  c la s s ic a l m athem atics b egan  w ith  g e n e r a l c o n s id er a tio n s  ab ou t th e  
n atu re  o f m eaning. T h ose  c o n s id e r a tio n s  led  to  c o n s tr a in ts  on  w hat we 
a re  to  c o u n t a s  m ean in g fu l u s e  o f  lan gu age: th a t w e can n ot c r e d it  
o u r s e lv e s  w ith  g r a s p  o f co n d itio n s  g o v e r n in g  th e  c o r r e c t  u s e  o f a term  
w h ich  are  both d eterm in ate  an d  lie  ra d ica lly  ou tw ith  our reco g n itio n a l 
c a p a c it ie s . In fe r e n tia l p r a c tic e , in  p a r ticu la r , m ust accord  w ith  th o se  
c o n s tr a in ts . So th e  p r o je c t , in  g e n e r a l, g a in s  i t s  r e v is io n a r y  b ite  by  
d ic ta tin g  w h ich  lo g ic  is  a p p lica b le  to  a  g iv e n  re g io n  o f d isc o u r se . We do 
n ot r ep u d ia te  c la s s ic a l  p r in c ip le s  o f  in fe r e n c e  in  e v e r y  in s ta n c e . We do, 
o f c o u r se , r e p u d ia te  th e  r e a lis t  ju s t if ic a t io n  o f in fe r e n c e  by  ap p ea l to  a 
notion  of tr u th  w h ich  d eterm in a te ly  o b ta in s  or fa ils  to  ob ta in  
ir r e s p e c t iv e  o f w h eth e r  w e can  d eterm in e th e  m atter and  w e a lso  a c c ep t  
th a t u se  o f c la s s ic a l p r in c ip le s  o f  in fe r e n c e  u n r e s tr ic te d ly  e n ta ils  a  
commitment to realism . W hether or n ot c la s s ic a l lo g ic  is  ap p licab le  
d ep e n d s  on th e  sem antic  a c c o u n t o f th e  c o n te n t  o f  th e  s e n te n c e s  
co n cern ed . In  th is  se c tio n  I w an t to fo c u s  on r e a so n s  fo r  th in k in g  th a t  
in  th e  m athem atical c a se  th e  c o n te n t  o f some m athem atical s e n te n c e s  
exem pts them  from  u s e  in  c e r ta in  c la s s ic a lly  a c c ep te d  in fe r e n c e s  and
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th u s  for  th in k in g  th a t  th e  p r a c tic e  o f c la s s ic a l m athem atics is  in  erro r . 
To th a t en d  w e n eed  to  look  a t th e  s o r ts  o f s e n te n c e s  c o n c e rn ed  and  
w h ich  in fe r e n c e s  th e y  fa il.
C lassica l s e n te n t ia l lo g ic  is  v a lid  fo r  d ec id ab le  s e n te n c e s . We f ir s t
n o tice  a r e a lis t ic  a tt itu d e  to  a g iv e n  d isc o u r se  w h en  c la s s ic a l lo g ic  is
ap p lied  to  s e n te n c e s  fo r  w h ich  we h ave  (at p r e se n t)  no m ethod  
g u a r a n te e in g  a  v e r d ic t  on  th e ir  tr u th  v a lu e . So, to  u n d er sta n d  w h y  
c e r ta in  m athem atical s e n te n c e s  a re  p re c lu d ed  from  u s e  in  a ll c la s s ic a lly  
v a lid  in fe r e n c e s  we n e e d  to  look  a t th e  so u r c e  o f  u n d ec id a b ility  in  
m athem atics.
S in ce  a g reem en t in  th e  u s e  o f an  e x p r e ss io n  is  ag reem en t ab ou t i t s  
m eaning an  a c co u n t o f  th e  m ean ing o f an  e x p r e ss io n  sh o u ld  d eta il 
co n d itio n s  u n d er  w h ich  th e  s e n te n c e  is  c o r r e c t ly  u se d  or, in  th e  c a se  o f  
d e c la ra tiv e  s e n te n c e s , a s s e r te d , th a t is ,  we w ant an  a cco u n t o f  i t s  o f i t s  
a s s e r t ib il ity  c o n d itio n s . A m athem atical s e n te n c e  is  a s s e r t ib ie  ju s t  w h en  
we h a v e  a p roof o f it  or w h en  w e h a v e  a d em on stra tion  th a t we are  ab le  
(in  some s e n s e )  to  p ro d u c e  a p ro o f o f th e  se n te n c e . So it  is  a s s e r t ib ie  
ju s t  w h en  it is  p r o v a b le . T h us p r o v a b ility  i s  ta k en  a s  th e  c e n tr a l  
co n c e p t in  th e  in tu it io n is t ic  sem an tic  th e o ry .
In tro d u ctio n  o f th e  n o tion  o f p r o v a b ility  in to  th e  sem antic  th e o r y  
m ust en a b le  u s  to  a c h ie v e  th e  fo llow in g: to  exp la in  c o n d itio n s  g o v e r n in g  
c o r r e c t  u se ; fu r th e r , to  exp la in  th e s e  co n d itio n s  in  a w ay th a t d o es  not
d ep en d  on ou r g r a sp  o f d e te r m in a te  co n d itio n s  w h ich  are ou tw ith  our
ca p a c ity  to r e c o g n iz e  a s  h o ld in g; an d , la s t ly , to  a cco u n t fo r  th e se  
co n d itio n s  in  term s w h ich  do n o t p r e su p p o se  a g r a sp  o f th e  th e  
e x p r e ss io n  b e in g  ex p la in ed . Our th e o r y  is  th u s  r e d u c tiv e  a t le a s t  to th e  
e x te n t th a t it  r e c o g n iz e s  an  o b lig a tio n  to  g iv e  a  su b s ta n tia l a cco u n t o f  
th e  c o n d itio n s  u n d er  w h ich  we hold  a s e n te n c e  to  be tr u e .
§1 The M eanings o f th e  In tu it io n is t ic  L ogical C onstants:
Let u s  tu r n  (as a p r e lu d e  to d is c u s s in g  th e  in tu it io n is t ic  a c co u n t o f
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u n d ec id a b ility ) to  th e  in tu it io n is t ic  a cco u n t o f th e  m ean in gs o f th e  
lo g ica l c o n s ta n ts . The m ean ing s tip u la t io n s  can  u s e fu lly  be d iv id ed  in to  
tw o g r o u p s , th e  f ir s t  g iv e n  s o le ly  in  term s o f  p ro o fs  and th e  se co n d  
g iv e n  in  term s o f o p e r a tio n s  w h ich  p ro d u ce  p ro o fs  w h en  ap p lied  to  
p ro o fs  or m em bers o f th e  dom ain o f d isc o u r se .
&, V, 3
A p ro o f o f A&B i s  a n y  c o n s tr u c t io n  th a t is  a p roof o f A and  o f  B,
A p ro o f o f AvB i s  a n y  c o n s tr u c t io n  o f w h ich  it  can  be r e co g n iz e d  
th a t it  y ie ld s  a p ro o f o f  A o r  o f B.
A p roo f o f (3x )F x  is  a n y  c o n s tr u c t io n  th a t is  a p roo f o f Fn  fo r  som e 
n  in  th e  dom ain,
V ,  -
A p roof o f  {Vx)Fx i s  a n y  c o n s tr u c t io n  o f w h ich  it  can  be r e co g n iz e d
th a t ap p lied  to a n y  n  in  th e  dom ain it  y ie ld s  a p roof o f Fn.
A p roo f o f A->B is  a n y  c o n s tr u c t io n  o f w h ich  it  can  be r e co g n iz e d
th a t a p p lied  to  a n y  p ro o f o f A i t  y ie ld s  a p roof of B.
A p roo f o f -A  is  a n y  c o n s tr u c t io n  o f  w h ich  it  can  be r e c o g n iz e d  th a t  
ap p lied  to  a p roof o f A it  y ie ld s  a  p ro o f o f 0=1 (or o f a  co n tra d ic tio n ).
N otice an  o b v io u s  im p r e d ic a tiv ity  in tr o d u ce d  by  th e  s tip u la tio n  for  
th e  m eaning o f (and o f  w h ich , in  a s e n s e , i s  d e r iv e d  from  th e  
m eaning o f i .e . ,  -A  is  A->0=1) s in c e  in  c h a r a c te r iz in g  a p ro o f o f th e
con d ition a l it  im p lictly  q u a n tif ie s  o v e r  p ro o fs  o f th e  a n te c e d e n t  and  
s in c e  th is  domain h a s n ot b een  c le a r ly  c ircu m scr ib ed  it may in c lu d e  
p ro o fs  w h ich  in v o lv e  th e  co n d itio n a l w h ose p roo f c o n d itio n s  are  b e in g  
c h a r a c te r iz e d . T h u s th e  a c c o u n t we g iv e  o f th e  m eaning o f th e  
con d ition a l w ill p r e s u p p o s e  an  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f th e  con d ition a l and w e  
seem  im m ediately to  h a v e  c o n tra v e n e d  th e  la s t  o f th e  th r e e  a d e q u a cy  
c o n d itio n s  I l is te d  a b o v e . I sh a ll n ot p u r su e  th is  som ew hat in v o lv e d  
problem  now but sh a ll tr e a t  o f i t  below  in  c h a p ter  6 .
A sim pler p o in t to n o te  is  th a t c la s s ic a l lo g ic  is  v a lid a ted  for
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d ecid ab le  s e n te n c e s  o n ly . •'-''A s im p ly  a s s e r t s  th a t from  a p roo f o f ••'A we 
can  p r o v e  0=1, i .e . ,  from  a  p roo f th a t from  a p roof o f  A we can  p ro v e  
0=1, we can  p ro v e  0=1. T h is is  o b v io u s ly  w eaker th a n  b e in g  ab le  to  
p r o v e  A i t s e lf  s in c e  a ll i t  claim s is  th a t a s s e r t in g  th a t we can n ot p ro v e  
A lea d s  to  a b s u r d ity  and  th a t d o es  n ot w arrant u s  in  a s s e r t in g  A u n le s s  
w e can  assu m e th a t A is  d e term in a te ly  e ith e r  p ro v a b le  or r e fu ta b le , i .e ., 
th a t A is  d ec id a b le . So th e  law  o f  d ou b le  n eg a tio n  elim ination  (DNE) and  
i t s  e q u iv a le n ts  fa il fo r  u n d ec id a b le  s e n te n c e s .
§2  U n d ecid ab ility :
It is  now tim e to  fo c u s  on  th e  a c c o u n t o f u n d ec id a b ility . In  m athem atics  
q u a n tifica tio n  o v e r  in fin ite  dom ains is ,  a t le a s t  in  th e  f ir s t  in s ta n c e , 
r e sp o n s ib le  fo r  th e  phenom enon  o f u n d ec id a b ility  (co n d itio n a ls  may a lso  
be u n d ec id a b le  b u t o n ly  i f  e ith e r  th e  a n te c e d e n t  or th e  c o n se q u e n t  is  
u n d ec id a b le  and so  u ltim ate ly  th e  u n d ec id a b ility  m ust is s u e  from  some 
o th er  so u r c e ) .
B efore  c o n s id e r in g  th e  in tu it io n is t ic  acco u n t o f u n d ec id a b ility  we 
sh ou ld  c o n s id e r  th e  n a tu re  o f  u n d ec id a b ility  i t s e lf .  A s e n te n c e  is  (now) 
u n d ec id a b le  if  we h a v e , a t p r e s e n t , no m eans o f d e f in ite ly  p r o v in g  or  
r e fu t in g  it. I f  w e can  sh ow  th a t  a s e n te n c e  can  o n ly  be p ro v ed  a t th e  
e x p e n se  o f a c o n tra d ic tio n  th e n  th a t dem on stra tion  am ounts to a p roof o f  
i t s  n eg a tio n . So th e  s e n te n c e  is  r e fu te d . T hus we can  n e v e r  be in  a 
p o sitio n  to  a s s e r t  th a t a  s e n te n c e  is ,  in  p r in c ip le , u n d ec id a b le  nor can  
w e make th e  more g e n e r a l a s s e r t io n  th a t th e re  are  u n d ec id a b le  
s e n te n c e s  s in c e , on  th e  in tu it io n is t ic  in te r p r e ta t io n  o f th e  e x is te n tia l  
q u a n tifier , w e h a v e  to  be a b le  to  d em on stra te  an in s ta n c e  and th a t is  
ju s t  w hat w e h ave sh ow n  th a t we are u nab le to  do. We can , h ow ever, 
a s s e r t  th a t not a ll s e n te n c e s  a re  d ec id a b le  s in c e  th is  a s se r t io n  sim ply  
dem ands th a t w e draw  a  c o n tra d ic tio n  from th e  a s s e r t io n  th a t all 
s e n te n c e s  are  d ec id a b le . The in a b ility  to  a s s e r t  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  an  
u n d ec id ab le  s e n te n c e  d o es  n ot c o n tr a d ic t  GddeTs In co m p leten ess  Theorem
209s in ce  th e r e  i s  no bar to th e  id e a  th a t w e are  ab le  to  r e c o g n iz e  th a t a 
g iv e n  se n te n c e  an d  i t s  form al n e g a tio n  are  not p rovab le  in  a p a r t ic u la r  
form al s^^stem. The in tu it io n is ts  a lso  hold th a t th e  m ethods o f  p ro o f  
w h ich  we can  be b r o u g h t to  a c c e p t  a s  v a lid  are n ot c ircu m scr ib a b le  
w ith in  th e  form al a p p a r a tu s  o f a g iv e n  sy stem . In d eed  th e  
in tu it io n is t ic a lly  a c c ep ta b le  p ro o f o f  GddeTs In co m p leten ess  Theorem , it  
cou ld  be a r g u e d , d e m o n stra tes  j u s t  th is  p o in t.
§3 Q u an tification  and  U n d ecid a b ility :
How d o es q u a n tifica tio n  o v e r  in f in ite  dom ains g iv e  r is e  to u n d ec id a b ility ?  
A lth ou gh  both  c la s s ic a l  and in tu it io n is t ic  lo g ic ia n s  w ill a g r e e  th a t  
q u a n tifica tio n  d o es  g iv e  r is e  to  u n d ec id a b ility  th e ir  ex p la n a tio n s for  th is  
w ill d iffe r  b e ca u se  o f  d if fe r e n c e s  in  th e  sem antic  th e o r ie s  th e y  a c c ep t. 
The a cco u n t g iv e n  o f  w h at it  i s  to  g r a sp  an u n d ec id a b le  s e n te n c e  w ill 
d iffe r  from  on e c a se  to  th e  o th e r  (s in c e  th e  c la s s ic is t ,  in  c o n tr a s t  to  th e  
in tu it io n is t , th in k s  th a t th is  g r a s p  w arran ts  a ttr ib u tio n  o f determ in ate  
tr u th  v a lu e s  to  u n d ec id a b le  s e n te n c e s )  but both  (o b v io u sly , s in c e  each  
a c c e p ts  GddeTs In c o m p le ten ess  r e s u lt s )  w ill h a v e  to  a cco u n t fo r  th e  fa c t  
th a t p r e s e n t ly  a c c e p te d  m eth od s o f  p ro o f w ill n ot g u a ra n tee  a d e c is io n  
p ro ced u re  in  e v e r y  in s ta n c e . C la ssica lly , th e  q u an tified  s e n te n c e  is  
in te r p r e te d  tr u th  fu n c tio n a lly  so  (p ro v id ed  m em bership  o f th e  dom ain is  
both a p r io r i  and n e c e s s a r y  ~ a p la u sib le  su p p o sit io n  in  th e  
m athem atical ca se )  it  i s  lo g ic a lly  e q u iv a le n t  to  th e  in fin ite  c o n ju n ctio n  
(for u n iv e r sa l q u a n tifica tio n ) or d is ju n ctio n  (for e x is te n tia l  
q u a n tifica tio n ) form ed by  a p p ly in g  th e  p re d ica te  to each  elem ent in  th e  
domain. We m ust h a v e  th is  lo g ica l e q u iv a le n c e  e v e n  th o u g h  th e  c la s s ic is t  
may hold th a t th e  c o n te n t, w h a te v e r  it  is  th a t we u n d er sta n d  in  
g r a sp in g  th e  q u a n tifie d  s e n te n c e , is  n ot g iv e n  in  th is  w ay. (W itness  
F r e g e 's  rem ark (reco rd ed  b y  Dummett 1973, p .517) ab ou t th e  A frican  
c h ie f  who is  u n k n ow n  to him b u t who e n te r s  in to  th e  r a n g e  o f h is  
q u a n tified  se n te n c e  a b o u t a ll men. Here F reg e  r id ic u le s  th e  id ea  th a t in
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u s in g  su c h  a  s e n te n c e  he can  be ta k en  a s  in te n d in g  an in d iv id u a l  
r e fe r e n c e  to th a t p a rticu la r  man. C learly  an y  c la s s ic is t  is  g o in g  to be 
fa ced  w ith  d a u n tin g  ep isterao log ica l prob lem s if  he r e ck o n s  th a t  
u n d er s ta n d in g  a  dom ain r e q u ir e s  som e so r t  o f ep istem ic  c o n ta ct w ith
each  member o f th a t dom ain.) S in ce  w e h ave  no m eans o f s u r v e y in g  an  
in fin ite  to ta lity  w e h a v e  no g u a r a n te ed  d ec is io n  p ro ced u re  for  s e n te n c e s  
w h ich  q u a n tify  o v e r  in fin ite  dom ains. So th e  q u a n tified  s e n te n c e  can  be 
u n d ec id a b le  d e s p ite  th e  fa c t  th a t  i t  i s  in te r p r e te d  a s  b e in g  lo g ic a lly  
e q u iv a le n t to  th e  in fin ita r y  tr u th  fu n c tio n  o f d ec id ab le  s e n te n c e s  w h ich  
are each  th u s  s u b je c t  to  b iv a len ce .
R ecall th e  in tu it io n is t ic  in te r p r e ta t io n  o f th e  q u a n tifie r s . Here th e  
q u a n tifie r s  are ex p la in ed  in  term s o f  ou r a b ility  to  p rod u ce  c e r ta in  s o r ts  
o f c o n str u c t io n . U n d e c id a b ility  a r is e s  b eca u se , g iv e n  a n y  d ec id ab le
p red ica te  ( i.e ., on e  fo r  w h ich  we h a v e  an  e f fe c t iv e  m eans o f d eterm in in g  
th e  tru th  v a lu e  o f th e  s e n te n c e  form ed by a p p ly in g  th e  p r e d ica te  to a n y  
o b je c t  in  th e  dom ain) we h a v e  no m ethod g u a r a n te e in g  th a t we can  form  
an ap p rop r ia te  c o n s tr u c t io n  fo r  th e  p roof o f th e  q u a n tified  s e n te n c e  or  
th a t we can  d em on stra te  th e  im p o ss ib ility  o f su c h  a c o n str u c tio n . So, for  
th e  in tu it io n is t  u n d e c id a b ility  a r is e s  n ot b eca u se  we h ave  a co n cep tio n  
o f a p e r fe c t ly  d eterm in ate  dom ain w h ich  o u tr u n s  our ep istem ic  a c c e s s  
but b eca u se  th e  p r o c e d u r e s  b y  w h ich  w e j u s t i fy  an  a s se r t io n  sim ply  
need  n ot a lw ays i s s u e  in  c o n c lu s iv e  v e r d ic ts  on  tru th  v a lu e . The  
c la ss ic a l p ic tu r e  c o n ju r e s  up  a n  im age o f our ep istem ic  lim itations in  th e  
fa ce  o f our g r a sp  o f a c o n c e p t  (tru th  con d ition ) w h ich  d eterm in ate ly  
"matches" or fa ils  to  "match" r e a lity . The in tu it io n is t ic  p ic tu r e  looks to  
th e  w ay  w e j u s t i fy  a s s e r t io n s  w ith in  our p ra c tic e  and lim its i t s e lf  to  
o u tlin in g  w h at w e are  ju s t if ie d  in  sa y in g  g iv e n  th a t p ra c tice , w h ils t
r e fu s in g  to im port m eta p h y sica l h y p o th e s e s  in  c o n s tr u c t in g  
ju s t if ic a t io n s .
T h ese  rem arks h a v e  b een  broad and , o f n e c e s s ity , v a g u e , s u ff ic ie n t  
o n ly  to  g iv e  an im p ressio n  o f th e  in tu it io n is t ic  v iew . To g e t  a t th e
211co n ten t o f th a t p o s itio n  w e m ust look m uch more c lo se ly  a t th e  
in tu it io n is t ic  exp lan a tion  o f  q u a n tifica tio n . Take th e  in tu it io n is t ic  
exp lan ation  o f s e n te n c e s  o f th e  form  {Vx)Fx, w h ere  F  is  a d ec id a b le  
p red ica te . To u n d er sta n d  th is  s e n te n c e  w e m ust h a v e  th e  ca p a c ity  to  
r e co g n iz e  o f a c o n s tr u c t io n  th a t w h en  it  is  ap p lied  to a n y  member n  in  
th e  domain it  y ie ld s  a p ro o f o f Fn, B u t th is  r e q u ir e s  th a t w e h a v e  som e 
co n cep tio n  o f a n y  (or an  a r b itr a r y ) member o f th e  dom ain. So th e  
c h a r a c ter iza tio n  w e h ave  b een  g iv e n  o f w h at i t  is  to  u n d e r s ta n d  a  
q u an tified  s e n te n c e  a lso  q u a n tif ie s , a t  le a s t  im p lic itly , o v e r  th e  same 
domain. How do w e g r a sp  th is  n o tion  w ith ou t h a v in g  an  in tu it io n is t ic a lly  
u n a ccep ta b le  c o n c e p t  o f  th e  com p leted  domain?
The q u e r y  r e c a lls  C an tor's d o c tr in e  th a t each  p o ten tia l in f in ity  
p r e su p p o se s  an  a c tu a l in f in ity . G rasp o f  a  p o ten tia l in f in ity  is  g r a sp  o f  
a notion  o f un lim ited  v a r ia b ility  and  g r a sp  o f  an a c tu a l in f in ity  is  g r a sp  
o f som e com p leted  in f in ite  dom ain. C antor d e n ie s  th a t it  m akes s e n s e  "to 
sp ea k  o f v a r ia b ility  w ith o u t sp e a k in g  o f v a r ia b ility  o v e r  a com pleted  
domain" (H allett 1984, p .25).
It m ight be th o u g h t  th a t th e  th r e a t  o f  c ir c u la r ity  in  th e  in tu it io n is t 's  
u se  o f "any" is  no g r e a te r  th an  h is  u s e  o f "and" in  th e  exp lan a tion  o f  
c o n ju n ctio n . But w e can  v e r y  q u ic k ly  s e e  th e  e v id e n t  d isa n a lo g y . In  th e  
c a se  o f "and" th e  c o n d itio n s  s p e c if ie d  re la te  (at le a s t  in  th e  c a s e  o f  
d ecid ab le  s e n te n c e s , w h ich  are  a ll w e n eed  c o n s id er  fo r  th e  moment) to  
co n d itio n s  w h ich  are  e f f e c t iv e ly  r e c o g n iz a b le . So in  g iv in g  an a cco u n t o f  
th e  co n d itio n s  in  w h ich  a c o n ju n c tio n  is  a s s e r t ib le  we can  u se  "and" 
and r e ly  on  ou r  a b ility  to  r e c o g n iz e  th e  o b ta in in g  o f ju s t  th o se  
c o n d itio n s . That i s ,  a ssu m in g  th a t  w e g r a sp  th e  p roof c o n d itio n s  o f ea ch  
c o n ju n c t we do n ot p r e su p p o se  a  g r a sp  o f c o n ju n ctio n  in  r e q u ir in g  th a t  
som eone be a b le  to  r e c o g n iz e  th a t  th e y  p o s s e s s  p r o o fs  o f both  
c o n ju n c ts . The problem  w ith  th e  q u a n tified  c a se  is  th a t we are in  th e  
p r o c e ss  o f c h a r a c te r iz in g  c o n d itio n s  w h ich  are n ot g u a ra n teed  to  be 
e f fe c t iv e ly  d ec id a b le . T h is is  r e v e a le d  in  th e  in tu it io n is t ic  cr itic ism  o f
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th e  c la s s ic a l exp lan a tion  in  term s o f tr u th  co n d itio n s  w h ich  th e  
in tu it io n is t  r e g a r d s  a s  v a lu e le s s  s in c e  c ir c u la r . T ake, for  exam ple, th e  
c la s s ic a l exp lan a tion  o f  u n iv e r sa l q u an tifica tion : (Vx)Fx is  tru e  ju s t  in  
ca se  Fn  is  tru e  fo r  a ll n  in  th e  dom ain. The exp lan ation  g iv e s  th e  tru th  
co n d itio n  o f  th e  u n iv e r sa l s e n te n c e  bu t in  d o in g  so  i t s e l f  q u a n tifie s  o v e r  
th e  v e r y  same dom ain. But w h ere in  lie s  th e  d iffe r e n c e  b etw een  
r e c o g n iz in g  o f a  c e r ta in  c o n s tr u c t io n  th a t ap p lied  to  a n y  n  in  th e  
domain it  y ie ld s  a p ro o f o f Fn  and  r e c o g n iz in g  o f th e  p re d ica te  F  i t s e lf  
th a t ap p lied  to a n y  n  in  th e  dom ain it  y ie ld s  th e  v a lu e  tru e?  The p o in t  
h ere  is  th a t g r a n t in g  th a t in  a n y  in s ta n c e  a sp e a k e r  can  r e c o g n iz e  a  
p ro o f th a t F  a p p lie s  to  som e num ber n  we seem  to p r e su p p o se  some 
g r a sp  o f q u a n tific a tio n  i f  w e r eck o n  th a t th e  sp e a k e r  a lso  g r a s p s  w hat 
i t  i s  for  F  to  a p p ly  to  a n y  n.
The d iffe r e n c e  th a t th e  in tu it io n is t  w an ts to  make good is  th is . He 
w ill n ot d e n y  th e  c la s s ic a l  exp lan ation , a fte r  a ll th e  in tu it io n is t 's  
ch a ra c ter iza tio n  o f  p ro o f c o n d itio n s  i s  none o th e r  th a n  a  c h a r a c ter iza tio n  
o f tru th  c o n d itio n s , th a t i s ,  o f  c o n d itio n s  in  w h ich  we are  ju s t if ie d  in  
h old in g  th e  s e n te n c e  to  be tr u e .  The d iffe r e n c e  lie s  in  th e  n a tu re  o f th e  
notion  o f tr u th  th a t  th e  in tu it io n is t  r e g a r d s  h im self a s  e n tit le d  to. So 
a lth o u g h  a c c e p tin g  th a t w e h a v e  a n o tion  o f tr u th  w h ich  d eterm in ate ly  
o b ta in s  in  each  in s ta n c e  h e  w ill q u e stio n  w h eth er  th is  ju s t i f ie s  a ssu m in g  
th a t th is  d e term in es a u n iq u e  tr u th  v a lu e  for  th e  q u a n tified  se n te n c e . 
The in tu it io n is t  h o ld s  th a t it  is  exp lan ation  o f su c h  a notion  o f tru th  
w h ich  ra d ica lly  tr a n sc e n d s  v e r if ic a t io n  w h ich  is  prob lem atic for  th e  
r e a lis t . The r e a lis t  w ould exp la in  th is  (if he o f fe r s  a n y  exp lan ation  at 
all) by  sa y in g  th a t th e  tr u th  v a lu e  o f each  ap p lica tion  o f th e  p red ica te  
to  an elem en t in  th e  dom ain is  determ in ate  (s in c e  th e  p r e d ica te  is  
e f fe c t iv e ly  d ec id a b le  th e  in tu it io n is t  w ill not baulk a t th is )  so  th e  log ica l 
p ro d u ct or sum o f th e s e  tr u th  v a lu e s  g iv e s  a d eterm in ate tru th  v a lu e  
for  th e  q u a n tified  s e n te n c e . So in  th e  c a se  o f u n iv e r sa l q u a n tifica tio n  
th e  s e n te n c e  is  tr u e  if  a ll th e  tr u th  v a lu e s  o f th e  in s ta n c e s  are tru e
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p o s s ib il it ie s  m ust d e term in a te ly  o b ta in  sim ply  a ssu m es th e  d eterm in acy  of  
tr u th  v a lu e  w h ich  th e  r e a lis t  w as su p p o se d  to be j u s t i fy in g  (s in c e  we  
can n ot e f f e c t iv e ly  d ec id e  w h ich  p o s s ib il ity  o b ta in s).
A rem ark w orth  m aking at th is  p o in t r e la te s  to  th e  in tu it io n is t 's  n o tion  
o f  tru th . One a ttem p ts to  j u s t i fy  ex p la in in g  th e  n o tion  o f tr u th  in  term s  
o f p r o v a b ility  b y  a p p ea lin g  to  c o n d itio n s  u n d er  w h ich  a m athem atical 
se n te n c e  i s  r e g a r d e d  a s  a s s e r t ib le . B ut p r o v a b i l i t y  is  n ot an e f f e c t iv e ly  
d ecid ab le  p r o p e r ty  o f  a  s e n te n c e , i .e . ,  w e can n ot g u a r a n tee  to  be ab le  to  
te ll w h eth er  a g iv e n  se n te n c e  i s  p ro v a b le . The d iffe r e n c e , a s  I 'v e  ju s t  
n oted , w ith  th e  r e a lis t  v iew  is  th a t tru th  a s  th u s  ex p la in ed  may 
tra n sc e n d  v e r if ic a t io n  but ca n n o t be assu m ed  to  do so  d e term in a te ly  
(i.e ., A m ay be tr u e  a lth o u g h  u n v e r if ie d  but in  th e  a b se n c e  o f a  m eans  
o f p ro o f or  r e fu ta t io n  w e c a n n o t a ssu m e th a t A i s  tr u e  or fa ls e ) .  So  
tr u th  is  c o n str a in e d  b y  ou r  r e c o g n it io n a l c a p a c it ie s , it  i s  g u a r a n te ed  a  
lin k  w ith  c o n d itio n s  w h ich  j u s t i fy  an  a s se r t io n  ju s t  b eca u se  th e  p roof  
re la tio n  is  a lw a y s d ec id a b le  ( i.e ., we can  g u a ra n tee  to  be ab le  to  
r e c o g n iz e  w h eth er  or n o t a g iv e n  c o n s tr u c t io n  is  a  p ro o f o f a g iv e n  
se n te n c e )  and b e ca u se  we can  o n ly  a s s e r t  a  se n te n c e  w h en  w e are  in  a 
p o sitio n  e f f e c t iv e ly  to  c o n s tr u c t  a  p roo f. So we n eed  n e v e r  exp la in  our  
co n c e p t o f tr u th  in  term s o f  a n y th in g  o th er  th an  our r eco g n itio n a l  
c a p a c it ie s .
§4 Q u an tification , O bjecthood  and  P red ication :
We s t il l , h o w ev er , w an t more o f  an a cco u n t o f w hat it  i s  for  u s  to  
r e co g n iz e  o f a  c o n s tr u c t io n  th a t it  a c ts  a p p ro p r ia te ly  on  m em bers o f th e  
dom ain. What is  th e  n a tu re  o f ou r c o n c e p t o f th e  domain if  it  is  not a 
m atter o f s u r v e y in g  th e  dom ain? At th is  p o in t in  th e  d isc u ss io n  I 
c o n s id er  both ou r u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f dom ains o f q u a n tifica tio n  and o f  
c la s s e s  and s e t s .  I in tr o d u c e  c la s s e s  and s e t s  p a r tly  b eca u se  o f  th e ir  
in tr in s ic  in te r e s t  to  m athem atics but a lso  b eca u se  ou r co n c e p t o f th e
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domain o f (p u re) s e t s  i s ,  a s  a  c o n se q u e n c e  o f th e  s e t  th e o r e t ic  
p arad oxes, cr u c ia l.
The in tu it io n is t  w ill r e je c t  ta lk  o f bare e x is te n c e s , th a t  i s ,  ta lk  o f th e  
e x is te n c e  o f e n t it ie s  in  th e  a b se n c e  o f c o n s id e r a tio n s  ab ou t how th e  
e n t ity  m ight be p r e s e n te d  to  u s . From a  F reg ea n  p o in t o f v iew  th is  
m eans th a t a ll o b je c t s  m ust be, in  som e s e n s e , nam eable; o b je c ts  are  th e  
r e fe r e n ts  o f p o ss ib le  s in g u la r  term s. T his link  b etw een  an  o n to lo g ica l  
c a te g o r y  and a s y n ta c t ic  on e  d o es  n o t mean th a t o b je c ts  come in to  b e in g  
o n ly  w h en  nam ed n or d o es  i t  in v o lv e  a  M einongian ex p lo sio n  o f  our  
o n to lo g y , i .e . ,  th a t an  e x tr a - lin g u is t ic  o b je c t  c o r r e sp o n d s  to each  
p u ta tiv e  s in g u la r  term . The f ir s t  id e a lis t ic  p o s itio n  is  av o id ed  (or, a t  
le a s t , d e la y ed ) b e c a u se  th e  e x is te n c e  o f th e  o b je c t  o n ly  d e p e n d s  upon  
i t s  p o s s ib le  n am eab ility  so  how m uch o n to lo g y  r e lie s  on  ou r l in g iu s t ic  
r e so u r c e s  d e p e n d s  o n  how  w e g lo s s  th e  n otion  o f p o s s ib lity  h e r e . We do 
n ot n e c e s s a r i ly  a r r iv e  a t  th e  se co n d  p o s itio n  b eca u se  th e  fu n c tio n in g  o f  
an  e x p r e ss io n  a s  a  g e n u in e  s in g u la r  term  is  n o t p u r e ly  a s y n ta c t ic  
m atter. C erta in ly  w e n e e d  to  h a v e  s y n ta c t ic  c r ite r ia  w h ich  determ in e  
p u ta tiv e  s in g u la r  term s (cf. Dummett (1973, p p .54 -8 0 ); W right (1983, 
p p .53-83); and Hale (1984)) but sem an tic  p r o p e r tie s  are  a lso  d e c is iv e . In  
p a rticu la r , th e  s in g u la r  term  m u st ap p ear a p p r o p r ia te ly  em b edded  in  
tru e  s e n te n c e s  i f  th e  o b je c t  c o r r e sp o n d in g  to  it  is  to  be sa id  to  e x is t . It  
m ust a lso  p o s s e s s  a  g e n u in e  c r ite r io n  o f id e n tity . That is ,  we m ust h a v e  
a c r iter io n  b y  w h ich  w e can  r e c o g n iz e  th e  b earer  o f th e  name a s  th e  
sam e  th in g  p r e s e n te d  to  u s  a g a in  and h a v e  th e  a b ility  to  d is t in g u is h  th e  
b earer  o f th e  name from  o th e r  th in g s . We can  sum  th is  up  b y  sa y in g  
th a t th e  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f a s in g u la r  term  r e q u ir e s  th a t w e can  
r e co g n iz e  i t s  b earer  a s  an  in s ta n c e  o f a so r ta l p re d ica te  w h ere  a  so r ta l  
p re d ica te  i s  o n e  w h ich  h a s  an  a sso c ia te d  c r iter io n  o f ap p lica tio n  ( i.e ., a 
d eterm in ate  co n d itio n  u n d er  w h ich  it  is  c o r re c t  to  r e co g n iz e  th a t  the  
p r e d ica te  a p p lie s  to  th e  o b je c t)  an d  a c r iter io n  o f id e n tity  u n d er  w h ich  
we can  r e - id e n t ify  and  d is t in g u is h  an  o b je c t  o f th a t so r t  from  o th er
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o b je c ts  o f th a t so r t  and can  d is t in g u is h  o b je c ts  o f th a t so r t  from  
o th e r s . So w e g a in  th e  c o n c e p t  o f some o b je c t  o n ly  th r o u g h  an  
u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f a r a n g e  o f o b je c t s , th a t is , th r o u g h  u n d e r s ta n d in g  th e  
ap p lica tion  o f som e so r ta l p r e d ic a te . We can n ot g r a sp  a s in g le  o b je c t  in  
iso la tio n .
It  is  n a tu ra l to  su p p o se  th a t  g r a sp  o f a  dom ain sim ply  c o n s is t s  in  
g r a sp  o f a c r ite r io n  o f m em bership  w h ich  is  d e f in it iv e  o f th a t domain: 
w e u n d er sta n d  th e  dom ain j u s t  w h en  w e know  w h at co n d itio n  an  o b je c t  
m ust fu lf i l  in  o r d e r  to  be a m em ber o f  th e  dom ain. (We n eed  n ot be ab le  
e f f e c t iv e ly  to  d eterm in e m em bersh ip  s in c e  th e  c r iter io n  o f m em bership  
n eed  n ot a lw a y s be d ec id a b le . For in s ta n c e  1 m ight be a member o f a  
domain o n ly  on c o n d itio n  th a t F erm at's Theorem  i s  tr u e .)  So, it  w ould  
seem  th a t a n y  in te llig ib le  p r e d ic a te  s p e c if ie s  a domain. R u sse ll (R u sse ll  
1908, p p .7 2 -3 ) n o te s  th a t th is  i s  o n ly  tru e  in  th e  c o n tex t o f a  p r e g iv e n  
r a n g e  o f s ig n if ic a n c e  fo r  th e  p r e d ica te , th a t is ,  a  r a n g e  o f  o b je c ts  for  
w h ich  th e  p r e d ic a te  is  m ean in gfu l. B ut th e  p o in t ab ou t th e  r a n g e  o f  
s ig n if ic a n c e  s u r e ly  r e la te s  to  ou r  a b ility  to  form  u n iq u e  com plem ents o f  
th e  dom ain, i .e .,  to  w h eth er  w e can  form  th e  domain of ju s t  th o se
o b je c ts  w h ich  do n ot s a t is fy  th e  c r ite r io n  o f m em bership  an d  th a t th is  
domain w h en  u n ited  w ith  th e  o r ig in a l domain y ie ld s  th e  u n iv e r se . It 
would seem  w e can , w ith ou t p r e v io u s  r e s tr ic t io n , c o n s id er  j u s t  th o se
o b je c ts  o f w h ich  th e  p r e d ica te  is  tr u e . T h is d e sc r ip tio n  of w hat it  is  to  
g r a sp  a  dom ain d o es  n o t d ep en d  u p on  u s  h a v in g  a p e r fe c t ly  determ in ate  
g r a sp  o f th e  dom ain o f  a ll o b je c t s . That p o s itio n  seem s to a r ise  from  
c o n s id e r in g  r e a lity  a s  h a v in g  a  p e r fe c t ly  d eterm in ate c o n stitu tio n  o u t o f  
w h ich  we iso la te  j u s t  th o se  o b je c ts  p o s s e s s in g  a  c e r ta in  p r o p e r ty . But 
th is  is  d e f in ite ly  n o t w hat w e do. R ather we o b s e r v e  th a t each  o b je c t  
m ust be cap ab le  o f some lin g u is t ic  p r e se n ta tio n  and  th a t th is  
p r e se n ta t io n  m ust a lw ays be d e f in ite  en o u g h  to  allow  for  p red ica tio n . 
The p red ica tio n  can  fa il  to  h ave  a n y  s e n s e , in  w h ich  ca se  th e  o b je c t
fa ils  th e  m em bersh ip  co n d itio n , or it  d e v e lo p s  a se n te n c e  cap ab le  o f
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tr u th  v a lu e , in  w h ich  c a se  th e  o b je c t  is  a  ca n d id a te  fo r  m em bership  (th e  
ca n d id a cy  i s ,  o f c o u r se , r e so lv e d  b y  s e t t lin g  th e  tr u th  v a lu e  o f th e  
p r e d ica tio n ). The p ro p o sa l i s ,  a t th is  s ta g e , v e r y  g e n e r o u s  in  th e  s o r ts  
o f domain o f  o b j e c t s  it  is  p re p a r e d  to  con d on e a s  in te llig ib le . In d eed  it  
allow s s e n s e  to  be made o f  s ta te m e n ts  ab ou t a ll o b je c ts  p ro v id e d  w e can  
c r e d it  o u r s e lv e s  w ith  a g r a sp  o f w hat it  i s  to  be an  o b je c t , p r o v id ed , 
th a t is ,  we can  c o n fer  d eterm in ate  s e n s e  on  th e  p r e d ica te  " ...is  an  
ob ject."  I f  th is  w ere  a c o n se q u e n c e  o f th e  p ro p o sa l it  w ould n o t be 
e n t ir e ly  u n tow ard  s in c e , a s  Dummett n o te s  (Dummett 1973, p .530) w e can  
m ean in g fu lly  ta lk  ab ou t a ll o b je c t s , e .g .,  a ll o b je c t s  a re  id e n tic a l w ith  
th e m se lv e s . We do n ot im m ediately  in v o lv e  o u r s e lv e s  in  paradox  fo r  two  
r e a so n s . F ir s t , a lth o u g h  we ca n  form  th e  p u ta t iv e  s in g u la r  term  "the  
domain su c h  th a t ..." we ca n n o t a lw a y s  tak e  it  th a t th is  is  a  leg itim ate  
s in g u la r  term . What is  i t s  c r ite r io n  o f id e n tity ?  If  th is  i s  g iv e n  by  
c o e x te n s io n a lity  th e n  we are  c o n s id e r in g  dom ains to  be s e t s .  I sh a ll  
p r e s e n t ly  c o n s id e r  th is  c a se . S ec o n d ly , we h a v e  o n ly  c o u n ten a n ced  th e  
d evelop m en t o f dom ains o f  o b je c t s  so  a ll m em bers o f a  to ta lity  m ust h ave  
a c r iter io n  o f id e n t ity  a s so c ia te d  w ith  them . So if  w e tr y  to  c o n s id er , 
sa y , th e  dom ain o f p r e d ic a te s  we sh a ll h a v e  to  c o n s id e r  w hat th e  
c r iter io n  o f id e n tity  is  fo r  p r e d ic a te s . If th is  is  c o e x te n s io n a lity  th en  
th e  c a se  is  ag a in  th a t  o f s e t s  w h ich  I am about to  c o n s id er .
B efore  em b ark in g  on  th a t  p r o je c t  I w ant to  m ake a rem ark ab ou t  
Dum m ett's com m ent on  s e n te n c e s  w h ich  u n r e s t ic te d ly  q u a n tify  o v e r  all 
o b je c ts  w h ere  h e  claim s th a t w e can n ot tak e  it  th a t a  se n te n c e  so  
form ed a lw ays p o s s e s s e s  a determ in ate  tr u th  v a lu e . It is  som ew hat 
m y ster io u s  a s  to  w h at Dummett ta k e s  th e  r e le v a n c e  o f th is  rem ark to be. 
On th e  one hand it  is  an  u n c o n te n tio u s  and g e n e r a l p o in t ab ou t th e  
in tu it io n is t ic  trea tm en t o f u n d e c id a b ility . Why d o es  Dummett reca ll it  in  
th e  p a rticu la r  c o n tex t o f c o n s id e r in g  th e  p aradoxes?  I t  seem s he in te n d s  
to  avo id  th e  p arad oxes in  th is  fa sh io n  s in c e  he blam es th e  c la ss ic a l  
assu m p tion  o f d eterm in ate  tr u th  v a lu e s  for  lea d in g  to co n tra d ic tio n .
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w itn e ss  th is  rem ark,
...w e c a n n o t tak e  th e  q u a n tifica tio n  o v e r  th e  to ta lity  o f a ll o b je c ts  
a s  a se n te n c e  form ing o p era tio n  w h ich  w ill a lw ays g e n e r a te  a 
se n te n c e  w ith  a  determ in ate  tr u th -v a lu e ;  in  o th er  w ord s, in te r p r e t  it  
c la s s ic a lly  a s  an  in fin ita r y  c o n ju n c tio n  or d is ju n ctio n . If  we attem pt 
to do so , we sh a ll be led  in to  co n tra d ic tio n , (Dummett 1973, p .530))
B ut, i f  th a t is  i t s  in te n d ed  im port, it  is  sim p ly  fa lse . S in ce  p roo f by  
red u c tio  i s  v a lid  in tu it io n is t ic a lly  w e can  p r o v e  —A from
T hus a p aradox  fo r  a c la s s ic a l lo g ic ia n  is  on e fo r  th e  in tu it io n is t  a s  w ell. 
So if  th e  in tu it io n is t  i s  to  avo id  th a t  trap  he m ust do so  b y  m otivatin g  
a d ep a r tu re  from  th e  n a ïv e  e x is te n c e  a ssu m p tio n s and  n ot sim ply by  
a v o id in g  c la s s ic a l  u s e  o f LEM.
To sum m arize th e  p o s itio n  so  fa r , I h ave  tied  g r a sp  o f a  domain o f  
q u a n tifica tio n  to  g r a sp  o f p red ica tio n . We g r a sp  th e  g e n e r a l n otion  o f  
q u a n tifica tio n  th r o u g h  com p eten ce in  th e  p r a c tic e  of p red ica tio n  and we 
g r a sp  p a rticu la r  dom ains b y  g r a s p in g  (som e of) th o se  p r e d ic a te s  w h ich  
su p p ly  c r ite r ia  o f  m em bership  fo r  th e  domain. T his m eans th a t th e  
problem  o f  c ir c u la r ity  w h ich  I tr ie d  to  r a ise  in  th e  in tu it io n is t ic  
exp lan ation  o f q u a n tifica tio n  v a n is h e s . I f  a  sp e a k e r  g r a s p s  a p r ed ica te  
he g r a s p s  i t s  g e n e r a l ap p lica tio n  to o b je c ts  so  he u n d e r s ta n d s  
q u a n tifica tio n  a t le a s t  to th e  e x te n t  o f know in g w hat it  is  for  a n y  o b je c t  
to  s a t is fy  th e  p re d ica te .
The f in a l s e n te n c e  o f Dumm et's c h a p ter  on  id e n t ity  in  F reg e :  
P h ilo so p h y  o f  L a n g u a g e  c o n c lu d e s , "P red ication  can n ot be u n d ersto o d  if  
we tr y  a lw ays to  c o n s tr u e  it  a fte r  th e  m odel o f sa y in g  som eth in g  ab ou t  
an ob ject"  (Dummett 1973, p .583). The p o in t th a t Dummett is  m aking  
a r is e s  from  th e  v iew  th a t a fu n d am en ta l u se  o f p r e d ic a te s  c o n s is t s  in  
a p p ly in g  them  to th in g s  p ick ed  o u t  by u se  o f d em o n str a tiv e s  an d , th u s ,  
to  th in g s  fo r  w h ich  we p r e su p p o se  no p a rticu la r  w e ll-d e f in e d  cr iter io n
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o f id e n tity . (Dummett is  h e r e  a r g u in g  a g a in s t  G each’s  v iew  th a t w h en  we  
ta lk  o f th e  sa m en ess  o f  o b je c ts  we do so  by  p r e su p p o s in g  a c e r ta in  
p r e se n ta t io n  o f th o se  o b je c ts  a s  in s ta n c e s  o f s p e c if ic  so r ta is . A ccord in g  
to Geach th e re  is  th u s  no a b so lu te  sa m en ess  re la tio n  but o n ly  a n otion  
o f id e n tity  r e la t iv e  to  p r e se n ta t io n .)  B u t, d e sp ite  Dum m ett's rem ark, it  is  
s t i l l  tr u e  to  sa y  th a t a  fu ll  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f th e  p re d ica te  w ill in v o lv e  
g r a sp  o f  w hat i t  i s  to  a p p ly  th e  p r e d ica te  to  an  o b je c t  an d  th is  w ill 
p r e su p p o se , im p lic itly  a t le a s t ,  g r a sp  o f  an a p p ro p r ia te  domain o f  
ap p lica tion .
§5 The N eed for  C o n stra in ts  on  S e t  Form ation:
A s e t  i s ,  for  me, a dom ain fo r  w h ich  it  i s  leg itim ate  to  form  th e  
co r r e sp o n d in g  s in g u la r  term  by u s in g  th e  (se t)  a b stra c tio n  op era to r . So 
e s s e n t ia lly  a  s e t  i s  a dom ain w h ich  can  be tr e a te d  a s  an o b je c t  fo r  
w h ich  th e  c r ite r io n  o f id e n t ity  is  c o n s titu te d  by  c o e x te n s io n a lity , 
p ro v id e d  th e  s e t  e x is te n c e  a ssu m p tio n s  are  leg itim a te  i .e .,  (if ^Fx  and  
XGx e x is t  th en ) xFx=SGxs(Vx)(Fxe-»Gx). Now we know  w ith  th e  h in d s ig h t  
p ro v id ed  b y  th e  d is c o v e r y  o f th e  p arad oxes th a t  n a ïv e  a b s tr a c t io n  m ust 
be co n str a in e d  in  o r d er  to  a v o id  paradox. T here are o n ly  two s it e s  a t 
w h ich  a n y  p u ta t iv e  c o n s tr a in t  can  ta k e  hold: th e  d e fin itio n  o f
p r e d ic a te s , i .e ., th e  r a n g e  o f in te llig ib le  p r e d ic a te s , or th e  trea tm en t o f  
th e  r e su lt in g  dom ain a s  a s e t ,  i .e .,  a s  an  o b je c t .
C on sider th e  schem a fo r  n a ïv e  a b stra c tio n , xe^FzsFx , Now u n d er  
c e r ta in  s u b s t itu t io n s  for  th e  p r e d ic a te  F we d ev e lo p  a c o n tra d ic tio n  (or 
a theorem ) w h en  w e ta k e  x  to  be or to be d e fin a b le  in  term s w h ich  
p r e su p p o se  zF z. So, fam ou sly  i f  w e take F  to  be # x  su b s t itu t in g  ÈFz 
fo r  X we g e t  zFze'zFzs^Fzfé^Fz. The p o in t is  th a t in  th e se  c a s e s  we can  
e ith e r  p r o v e  or r e fu te  th e  schem a a ssu m in g  o n ly  s e t  th e o r e t ic  p r o p e r tie s  
o f m em bership  so  th a t th e  p r e d ic a te  la ck s  a c o n te n tfu l c r iter io n  o f  
ap p lica tion  s in c e  so  ap p lied  i t s  c r ite r io n  o f a p p lica tion  i s  e ith er
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c o n tra d ic to ry  or v a c u o u s . T h is o b se r v a tio n  seem s to  len d  su p p o r t to  th e  
id ea  th a t w h a te v e r  c o n s tr a in ts  are  n e c e s s a r y  sh o u ld  be u se d  in  lim iting  
w hat we co u n t a s  in te llig ib le  d e fin it io n  o f a p red ica te : c e r ta in  p u ta tiv e  
p r e d ic a te s  are sim p ly  n o n se n s ic a l. B ut th a t r ea d in g  o f th e  s itu a tio n
w ould be o v e r  h a s ty . For on e th in g  th e  p r e d ica te  o n ly  seem s to  fa il o f  
m ea n in g fu ln e ss  w h en  a p p lied  to th e  s e t  or to a p u ta t iv e  o b je c t  w h ose  
e x is te n c e  is  e n ta ile d  by th e  e x is te n c e  o f  th e  s e t  b e in g  d e fin ed . So it  is  
s t i l l  op en  to  u s  to  c r it ic iz e  th e  trea tm en t o f th e  dom ain d efin ed  by th e  
p red ica te  a s  a s e t .  B ut i f  th e  p r e d ica te  i s  m ean in gfu l it  seem s s tr a n g e  
th a t we can n ot su b su m e th e  dom ain so  d efin ed  u n d er  th e  (o ste n s ib le )  
so r ta l c o n c e p t  o f  se th o o d  an d  so  tr e a t  i t  a s  an  o b je c t . What a ssu m p tion
do we make in  d o in g  th is?  T rad ition a lly  it  h as b een  a r g u e d  th a t w hat we
assu m e is  th a t  su c h  im p r e d ic a tiv e ly  d e fin ed  o b je c ts  are  or can  be
m em bers o f th e  o r ig in a l domain; th a t in  tr e a t in g  th e  domain a s  a  s e t  we 
allow  th e  d e fin itio n  o f, in  som e s e n s e , e s s e n t ia lly  new  o b je c ts  and th e se
w e ca n n o t ta k e  to  be s u b je c t  to  th e  o ld , in  som e s e n s e , su p e r se d e d ,
con d ition  o f m em bership . Dummett su m s th e  p o s itio n  up  lik e  th is ,
If we h a v e  f ir s t  su c c e e d e d  in  s p e c ify in g  a  to ta lity , th en  th e  u s e  o f  
in d iv id u a l v a r ia b le s  r a n g in g  o v e r  th a t to ta lity  h as a p e r fe c t ly  c lea r  
c o n ten t, and we may em ploy it  to  form  e x p r e ss io n s  fo r  a b s tr a c t  
o b je c ts :  bu t we h a v e  no r ig h t  to  su p p o se  th a t th o se  o b je c ts  m ust 
fa ll w ith in  th e  to ta lity  w e o r ig in a lly  sp e c if ie d . I f, h ow ever , we  
attem pt to  c h a r a c te r iz e  th e  to ta lity  b y  r e fe r e n c e  to  th e  k ind  o f
e x p r e ss io n  w h ich  can  s ta n d  fo r  an elem en t o f th e  to ta lity  - a s ,  in  
e ffe c t ,  F r e g e  d o e s -  th e n , fo r  ou r c h a r a c ter iza tio n  o f th e  to ta lity  to 
su c c e e d , it  m ust be su p p o se d  th a t th e  r e fe r e n c e  o f  each  e x p r e ss io n  
o f th a t k ind  h a s b een  f ix ed  in d e p e n d e n tly  o f th e  sp e c if ic a tio n  o f th e  
to ta lity . {F re g e  P h ilo so p h y  o f  L a n g u a g e  p .531)
So a c c o rd in g  to th is  w ay  o f  th in k in g  a s e t  is  illeg itim ate  if  it  is
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su p p o se d  to  in c lu d e  im p r e d ic a tiv e ly  d e fin ed  o b je c ts  or , a lte r n a tiv e ly ,
su c h  o b je c ts  a re  illeg itim ate  if  th e y  are  su p p o se d  to  be m em bers o f th e  
c la s s  in  term s o f w h ich  th e y  are  d e fin ed . I a ttem p ted  a  d eta iled  
d isc u ss io n  o f a p ro p o sa l o f th is  so r t  in  th e  f ir s t  c h a p ter  w h ere  I 
c o n s id er e d  R u sse lT s a d v o c a c y  o f th e  V iciou s C ircle P r in c ip le , The 
q u e stio n  I w ant to  in v e s t ig a te  in  th e  r e s t  o f th is  c h a p ter  is  w h eth er  
th is  re p u g n a n c e  fo r  im p red ica tiv e  d e fin it io n s  is  a c o n se q u e n c e  o f  an  
a n t i-r e a lis t ic a lly  im posed  r e v is io n  o f  s e t  th e o ry .
§6  A n ti-R ea list v e r s u s  C o n str u c tiv e  A p p roach es to  S e t T heory: 
A n ti-rea lism  is  a g lo b a l p o sitio n : a c c ep ta n c e  o f th e  a n t i-r e a lis t 's
arg u m en ts  com m its o n e  to  a n ti-r e a lism  ab ou t a ll r e g io n s  o f d isc o u r se . 
The a n t i-r e a lis t  d o es  n o t a ttem p t to  c o n s tr u e  th e  r e a lity  r e p r e se n te d  by  
ou r ta lk , sa y , o f th e  p a s t  or fu tu r e  a s  h a v in g  been  c o n s tr u c te d  by  u s . 
R ather, th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  s im p ly  r e fu s e s  to  assu m e th a t th a t r e a lity  h a s a  
determ in ate  c o n s titu tio n  in d e p e n d e n t  o f our m eans o f com ing to know  
th e  w ay i t  i s  c o n s t itu te d . C o n str u c tiv e  or id e a lis t  im agery  i s  th u s  not  
o n ly  not fu n d am en ta l to  th e  a n t i-r e a lis t 's  p o s itio n , i t  i s  n o t a n a tu ra l  
concom itant o f  th a t p o s itio n  e ith e r . N otw ith stan d in g  th is , n on -rea lism  
a b ou t m athem atics is  o f te n  e n o u g h  id e n tif ie d  w ith  one or an o th er  v e r s io n  
o f c o n str u c tiv ism . The p r a c tic e  o f tra d itio n a l in tu it io n is t ic  m athem atics is  
a  paradigm atic a ttem p t to  v ie w  th e  s u b je c t  m atter o f m athem atics a s  
c o n s is t in g  in  th e  s tu d y  o f  p r o c e d u r e s  w h ich  are id ea lized , but are  
n e v e r - t h e - le s s ,  im plem entab le, in  p r in c ip le , b y  hum ans. A lso, m any  
a ttem p ts to  m otivate  th e  axiom s y s te m s  o f s e t  th e o r y  h in g e  on  being  
ab le  to  su b s ta n tia te  a  n o tion  o f  p r io r ity  o f th e  m em bers o f a s e t  o v er  
th e  s e t  i t s e lf ,  i .e .,  th e  s e t  i s  r e g a r d e d  a s  (som ehow) b e in g  form ed by  
" b rin g in g  togeth er"  i t s  m em bers w h ich  th u s  assu m e a ce r ta in  p r io r ity  
o v e r  th e  s e t  i t s e lf .  T h is g iv e s  r is e  to (v e r s io n s  of) th e  ite r a tiv e  
c o n cep tio n  o f s e t .  (S ee  fo r  in s ta n c e , B oolos (1983) and Wang (1983).)
H ere, I w ant to in v e s t ig a te  an  ap p roach  to s e t  th e o r y  w h ich  e sc h e w s
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th is  ap p ea l to  a  c o n s tr u c t iv e  m eta p h y s ic s . My r ea so n  fo r  so  d o in g  is  n ot j
prim arily  th a t I r e je c t  th e  tra d it io n a l in tu it io n is t ic  co n cep tio n  and th e
ite r a tiv e  c o n cep tio n  a s  b e in g  in v a lid . More p e r t in e n t ly  to  my c o n cern
w ith  a n ti-r e a lism  I s im p ly  do n ot s e e  a c o n s tr u c t iv e  ap proach  a s  a
n atu ra l outcom e o f a n t i - r e a l i s t  a rg u m en ts . The im plication s o f a p p ly in g
th o se  a rg u m en ts  to  m athem atics is  p r e c is e ly  a n a lo g o u s to  th e  ap p lica tion
o f th o se  a r g u m en ts  to  o th e r  r e g io n s  o f d isc o u r se , nam ely, to  m otivate  a
d oub t ab ou t a ssu m in g  th a t th a t a s p e c t  o f  r e a lity  is  both  determ in ate  and
ep istem ica lly  tr a n sc e n d e n t . A n ti-rea lism  about m athem atics sh ou ld  be a
c o n s is ite n t  p o s itio n  w h ich  r e fr a in s  from  m aking th a t a ssu m p tion  in  th e
p r a c tic e  o f m athem atics. T he a p p ro a ch  is ,  a t le a s t  from  th e  o u ts e t ,
a t tr a c tiv e  b eca u se  m any r e je c t io n s  o f im p red ica tive  m ethods seem  to  r e ly
on an  u n d e r ly in g  c o n str u c t iv ism  an d  b eca u se , c o n v e r se ly , im p red ica tive
m ethods p o se  a s e r io u s  problem  fo r  c o n s tr u c t iv e  a p p ro a ch es . The hope
th u s  is  th a t by  e sc h e w in g  c o n str u c t iv ism  we may m otivate a c o h e r en t
s e t  th e o r y  w h ich  adm its im p red ica tiv e  m ethods.
T h ere  a re  tw o main a p p r o a c h e s  to  e x p la in in g  th e  co n c e p t o f s e t ,  i .e ., 
a p p ro a ch es  w h ich  are  n ot h a p p y  sim p ly  to  ta k e  th e  s e t  c o n cep t as  
prim itive . The f ir s t  c o n s id e r s  th e  s e t  a s  g iv e n  by  a  law determ in in g  
m em bership  o f  th a t s e t .  The se co n d  c o n s id e r s  th e  s e t  a s  a c e r ta in  so r t  
o f  com bination  o f  i t s  m em bers, I sh a ll r e fe r  to  th e s e  a s  th e  p r e d ica tiv e  
(or in te n s io n a l)  and com b inatoria l a p p r o a ch es  r e s p e c t iv e ly .
The p r e d ic a t iv e  a p p roach  is  (b ad ly ) u t ilise d  in  n a iv e  s e t  th e o ry .
T h ere, it  is  a ssu m ed  th a t e v e r y  p r o p e r ty  d eterm in es a s e t ,  i .e .,  th e  
u n r e s tr ic te d  com p reh en sio n  "axiom" is  a ssu m ed . A lth ou gh  th is  p r in c ip le  
i s ,  in  v iew  o f R u sse lT s paradox, a lo g ica l fa ls i ty  i t  d o es  re sp o n d  to  a  
p ow erfu l in tu it io n  th a t a n y  d e f in ite  p r o p e r ty  m ust c a te g o r iz e  a ll o b je c ts  
in to  ju s t  th o se  w h ich  p o s s e s s  th e  p r o p e r ty  and j u s t  th o se  w h ich  lack  it,
(Note th a t e v e n  if  w e r e je c t ,  fo llow in g  in tu ition ism , th is  appeal to  LEM 
th e  in tu it io n  th a t a d e f in ite  p r o p e r ty  d e f in e s  a s e t ,  e v e n  i f  i t  is  
p r e s e n t ly  u n d ec id a b le  w h eth e r  or n ot c e r ta in  o b je c ts  are m em bers o f th e
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s e t , is  s t i l l  s tr o n g  a n d , e q u a lly  p rob lem atic . S ee  ab ove .)
The sim ple p r e d ic a t iv e  a p p roach  o f n a iv e  s e t  th e o r y  m ust be 
r e je c te d . But n e e d in g  to  r e je c t  th e  th e o r y  and f in d in g  th e  m eans to do  
so  (i.e ., d ia g n o s in g  i t s  p r e c is e  e r r o r s )  are tw o d iffe r e n t  m atters. C learly  
th e  trea tm en t o f a s e t  a s  an  o b je c t  on  a par w ith  a ll o th e r s , com bined  
w ith  th e  v iew  th a t a ll p r o p e r tie s  determ in e s e t s  ca n n ot be m aintained  
c o n s is te n tly . One co u ld  t r y  to  a r g u e  e ith e r  th a t  o n ly  c e r ta in  p r o p e r tie s  
d efin e  s e t s  or  th a t  th e  n a iv e  a p p ro a ch  fa ils  b e c a u se  i t  is  in s e n s it iv e  to  
a "stratification"  o f  th e  s e t  th e o r e t ic  u n iv e r se . If  on e ta k es  th e  la tte r  
v iew  th e  com binatoria l a s p e c t  o f  th e  in tu it io n  o f s e t  recom m ends it s e lf  
s in ce  th is  is  n a tu r a lly  a s so c ia te d  w ith  a  s e n s e  in  w h ich  th e  m em bers o f  
th e  se t  are  "prior" to  th e  s e t  i t s e lf .  (So, c r u d e ly  a  s e t  ca n n o t be a  
member o f i t s e lf  and th e r e  i s  no "static"  u n iv e r se  of s e t s  to  form  a s e t  
i t s e lf .  The p arad oxes can , in  th is  w ay , be a v o id ed .)  P ro p o n en ts  o f th e  
form er v iew  m ight a r g u e  th a t a  p r o p e r ty  d e f in e s  a s e t  p ro v id ed  th a t th e  
s e t  w h ich  p u ta t iv e ly  r e s u lt s  is ,  in  som e s e n s e , not too b ig . (It sh o u ld  be 
c le a r ly  n oted  th a t I am n ot s u g g e s t in g  th a t s e t  th e o r ie s  can  c le a r ly  be 
c a te g o r iz e d  a s  b e lo n g in g  to  o n e  or a n o th er  o f th e s e  tw o broad  
a p p ro a ch es . T h ey  ca n n o t, p a r t ly  b e c a u se  some a ttem p ts to  m otivate th e  
"lim itation o f size"  id e a  a c t iv e ly  make u se  o f th e  ite r a t iv e  co n cep tio n  
w hich  is  a v e r s io n  o f  th e  com b inatoria l ap p roach , (S ee  Boolos (1971), 
Wang (1964); and P a r so n s  (1975) and  H allett (1984) for  cr itic ism  o f th e se  
a p p ro a ch es.)  P a r tly , th is  is  a lso  b eca u se  som e a p p ro a ch es  com bine  
p r e d ica tiv e  and com b inatoria l a p p r o a c h e s , e .g .,  th e  in tu it io n is t 's  u se  o f  
both sp r e a d s  and s p e c ie s .)
Most sy s te m s  o f s e t  th e o r y  a c c e p t  th a t th e  a n c e s tr a l o f th e  
m em bership  re la tio n  ( i.e ., e t ,  w h ere  .y e tx  i f f  3x 2.,,x^ ( yEX2E..,6x^Ex) 
e s ta b lish e s  an o r d e r in g  re la tio n  on th e  domain o f s e t s  w h ich  is  
ir r e fle x iv e , asym m etric and  tr a n s it iv e . In ad d ition , i t  is  o fte n  r eq u ired  
th a t we can  h a v e  no in fin ite  c h a in s  o f  m em bership  o f th e  form  
w h ere th e  LHS can  be e x te n d ed  in d e fin ite ly . Now, if  th is
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in tu it iv e  c o n c e p t o f s e t ,  it  w ould seem  th at i t  m ust be m otivated  by  a 
com binatorial a p p ro a ch  (m aking p rob ab le  u s e  o f som e c o n s tr u c t iv e  
m etaphor).
This sh o u ld , h o w ev er , n o t be too r e a d ily  a ssu m ed  s in c e  R u sse lT s  
sy ste m  in  PM  p r o v id e s  an  ex c ep tio n . The sy ste m  o f  PM  a d h e r e s  to  a  
h iera rch ica l o r d e r in g  o f s e t s  (or c la s s e s )  in  w h ich  a ll s e t s  are  
w ell-fo u n d e d . H ow ever th e  m otiva tion  fo r  th is  v iew  is  n o t based  on  a  
c o n s tr u c t iv e  v iew  o f s e t s ,  R u sse ll th e r e  r e fr a in s  from  b e lie v in g  th a t  
c la s s e s  e x is t  so  h e  c e r ta in ly  ca n n o t b e liev e  th a t th e y  are  c o n s tr u c te d .  
In ste a d  R u sse ll a c h ie v e s  th is  o r d e r in g  o f  th e  u n iv e r se  o f s e t s  b y  ta k in g  
a s tr ic t ly  in te n s io n a l v iew  o f s e t s  ( s e t s  a re  d e r iv e d  from  p ro p o sitio n a l  
fu n c tio n s )  w h ils t  in s is t in g  th a t, a s  a  r e s u lt  o f th e  VCP, bound v a r ia b le s  
m ust be ty p e d . T h is, o f  c o u r s e , lea d s  to  th e  ram ified  h ie ra r c h y  o f  
p ro p o sitio n a l fu n c tio n s  in  term s o f  w h ich  s e t s  are d e fin ed  by  m aking  
e s se n t ia l  u se  o f th e  axiom o f r e d u c ib ility . The le s s o n  I w ant to  draw  
from  th is  i s  th a t th e r e  i s  a m eans o f  m otiva tin g  a v e r s io n  o f p r io r ity  (or  
an o r d e r in g  by  th e  a n c e s tr a l o f m em bership  re la tion ) w ith ou t r e so r t in g  
to  a com binatoria l a p p roach  and  th e  a tte n d a n t lu re  o f a c o n s tr u c t iv e  
m eta p h y sic s . The id ea  is  th a t w e can  s t ic k  to  a r e so lu te ly  in te n s io n a l  
ch a ra c ter iza tio n  o f s e t  and  look to  th e  u se  o f th e  q u a n ti f ie r s  (or  
v a r ia b le s )  in  s e t  th e o r y  to  m otivate  th e  r e q u ire d  o r d e r in g . To th is  
e x te n t  th e  a p p roach  I w an t to  ex p lo re  m ight be ca lled  R u sse llian . The 
m an ifest problem  w ith  R u sse lT s a c c o u n t is  th a t h is  c o n s tr a in ts  on  th e  
va r ia b le  lead  to  ram ification  w ith  th e  c o n se q u e n t  n eed  to  in tr o d u ce  th e  
axiom o f r e d u c ib ility . When d is c u s s in g  R u sse lT s w ork  I n oted  th a t a  
la cu n a  in  h is  program m e a r is e s  b e c a u se  he fa ils  to  g iv e  an a cco u n t o f  
th e  s e n s e  o f th e  v a r ia b le . (I w en t on  to  n o te  a lso  th a t h is  in vo lvem en t  
w ith  ram ification  and r e d u c ib il ity  sh ow  a c o n c e rn  w ith  co n d itio n s  o f  
in d iv id u a tio n  g o v e r n in g  c e r ta in  s o r ts  o f item  and th a t th is  co n cern  
sh o u ld  be fo u n d ed  on  a  th e o r y  o f  s e n s e .)  I p ro p o se  to  d is c u s s  an
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a cco u n t w h ich  a ttem p ts  to  do ju s t ic e  to  th e se  co n s id er a tio n s .
§7 E xten sion a i D e fin ite n e ss  o f  Q uantification :
The ro le  o f  ch o ice  se q u e n c e s  in  in tu it io n is t ic  a n a ly s is  is  to  p ro v id e , in  
e f fe c t ,  a lib era liza tio n  o f  th e  dom ain o f s e t s  o f  n a tu ra l num bers b eyon d  
th a t g u a ra n teed  b y  c o n s tr u c t iv e  fu n c tio n s . What I w an t to  in v e s t ig a te  
h ere  is  w h eth er  w e can  p r o v id e , in  an  a n t i-r e a lis t ic a lly  a ccep ta b le  
m anner, a domain o f  fu n c tio n s  or  o f  s e t s  o f n a tu ra l n u m b ers w h ich  is  a) 
su f f ic ie n t  for  th e  n e e d s  o f  a  th e o r y  o f th e  continu um  an d , b) w h ich
d o es n ot make u s e  o f  th e  com b inatoria l ap p roach .
The is s u e  c o n c e r n s  (as Dummett n o te s  in  h is  d isc u ss io n  of ch o ice
se q u e n c e s)  "the c o r r e c t  c h a r a c te r iz a tio n  o f som e p a rticu la r  domain o f  
q u a n tifica tio n  and  of th e  w ay  in  w h ich  i t s  e lem en ts  are  g iv e n  to  us"  
(1977,p .451). I claim  th a t, i) a  dom ain o f q u a n tifica tio n  is  g iv e n  by  som e 
d e fin ite  co n d itio n  or  c r ite r io n  o f  m em bership  o f th e  dom ain, and ii) th a t  
i f  q u a n tifica tio n  o v e r  th e  dom ain is  to  be re g a rd ed  as e x te n s io n a lly  
d e fin ite  (I sh a ll am p lify  on th is  below) th e n  th e  w ay th e  e lem en ts o f th e  
domain a re  g iv e n  to  u s  m ust make c lea r  th e  c r ite r io n  o f id e n tity  (or, a t  
le a s t , o f in d iv id u a tio n ) ap p lica b le  to  th o se  e lem en ts.
The g en e r a l p o in t h e r e  is  th a t h a v in g  se tt le d  th e  c h a r a c ter iza tio n  o f  
th e  dom ain and  th e  m anner o f  p r e se n ta t io n  o f  i t s  e lem en ts , th e  v a lid ity  
o f  sta tem en ts  form ed by  q u a n tify in g  o v e r  th a t domain sh ou ld  flow  
p u r e ly  from  th e  m ean in gs o f th e  in tu it io n is t ic  q u a n tifie r s  and n o t  from  
c o n s id er a tio n s  to do w ith  th e  o n to lo g ic a l s ta tu s  o f th e  e lem en ts o f th e  
domain. So, for  in s ta n c e , an  a s s e r t io n  ab ou t w h eth er  or not cer ta in  
ch o ice  and  c o n tin u ity  p r in c ip le s  a p p ly  to  p a rticu la r  com b inations o f  
q u a n tifie r s , (su ch  a s  Vx3a, w h ere  x  an d  a  ra n g e  o v e r , p o s s ib ly  d is t in c t  
dom ains) is  d eterm in ed  by  th e  c h a r a c ter iza tio n  o f th e  r e s p e c t iv e
dom ains.
The m anner o f p r e se n ta t io n  o f e lem en ts  o f th e  domain is  im portant 
for  two r e a so n s . F ir s t , i t  i s  o n ly  o n c e  we h ave  determ in ed  th is  th a t th e
225
in tu it io n is t ic  e x is te n tia l  quantifiez' h as a c lea r  m ean ing. A sse r tin g  3xFx  
in tu it io n is t ic a lly  d em ands th a t w e be ab le  (in  some se n se )  to  p r e s e n t  
some elem en t, c, o f  th e  dom ain su c h  th a t F c  is  tr u e . The sp e c if ic a t io n  o f  
th e  m eaning o f "3" o n ly  a c q u ir e s  a  c lear  s e n s e  on ce  w e h ave  sp e c if ie d  
w hat it  is  to  be p r e s e n te d  w ith  an  e lem en t o f th e  dom ain. T h ere  i s  no 
d ir ec t  argu m en t from  th is  a s p e c t  o f q u a n tifica tio n  o v e r  a domain to
o th er  fe a tu r e s  o f o u r  g r a sp  o f  th e  dom ain. In  p a r ticu la r , we ca n n o t  
a r g u e  d ir e c t ly  from  c o n s id e r a tio n s  ab ou t th e  m anner o f  p r e se n ta tio n  o f  
e lem en ts to  a c o n c lu s io n  ab o u t th e  e x te n s iv e n e s s  o f th e  domain. T h is  
p o in t can  be i llu s tr a te d  b y  r e fe r e n c e  to  th e  th e o r y  o f  ch o ice  s e q u e n c e s .  
The fo llow in g  r e s u lt  h o ld s  (in  m ost) d eve lop m en ts o f th e  th e o r y  (e .g .,  
th a t o f K leene (1965) and  o f  T r o e lstra  (1969)), 3aA(a)->3iA(X"x.T(x)), i .e .,  
w h en ev er  w e can  a s s e r t  th a t th e r e  i s  a  ch o ice  se q u e n c e  s a t is fy in g  a 
g iv e n  co n d itio n  w e m ust be ab le  to  su p p ly  a c o n s tr u c t iv e  fu n c tio n  
sa t is fy in g  th a t co n d itio n . The r e s u lt  is  a  c o n se q u e n c e  o f th e
in tu it io n is t ic  m ean ing  o f "3" a s  a p p lied  to ch o ice  se q u e n c e s:  th e  o n ly  
w ay w e can  be p r e s e n te d  w ith  a  ch o ice  se q u e n c e  is  a s  a  law lik e  
se q u e n c e , i .e , a s  a c o n s tr u c t iv e  fu n c tio n . B ut, o f c o u r se  th e r e  is  no  
n eed  to id e n t ify  th e  dom ain o f ch o ice  s e q u e n c e s  w ith  th a t o f
c o n s tr u c t iv e  fu n c tio n s  (an d , a s  K leene n o te s  (1965, p .47) to  do so  w ould  
be to fa ls i fy  th e  fa n  th eorem ). S im ilarly , a lth o u g h  we can  o n ly  be
p r e se n te d  w ith  a fu n c tio n  or  s e t  a s  a c o n s tr u c t iv e  fu n c tio n  we sh ou ld  
not be lu lled  in to  th e  b e lie f  th a t  w e o n ly  g r a sp  a  dom ain o f c o n s tr u c t iv e  
fu n c tio n s . (Here " co n stru c tiv e"  m eans " effective" .)
The se co n d  r e a so n  w h y  th e  m anner o f p r e sen ta tio n  o f e n t it ie s  in  th e  
domain is  im portant c o n c e r n s , w hat 1 h ave  ca lled , th e  e x ten sio n a i  
d e f in ite n e ss  o f q u a n tific a tio n  o v e r  th e  domain. G iven a domain, we can , 
by q u a n tify in g  o v e r  th e  dom ain, s p e c ify  v a r io u s  s o r ts  o f item  (e .g ., 
elem en ts o f th e  dom ain, c la s s e s  o f  e lem en ts in  th e  domain, fu n c tio n s  
d efin ed  on  th e  dom ain, e tc .) .  T h ese  sp e c if ic a t io n s  are d e fin ite  p ro v id ed  
q u a n tifica tio n  o v e r  th e  dom ain is  i t s e lf  a  d e fin ite  op era tion .
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by som e (p erh a p s im plicit) c o n d itio n  on  m em bers o f th e  domain. H ow ever  
su ch  q u a n tifica tio n  is  not, I claim , g u a ra n teed  to be e x te n s io n a lly  
d e fin ite  and so  is  n o t g u a r a n te ed  to  is s u e  in  d e fin ite  sp e c if ic a t io n s  o f  
o th er  e n t it ie s .
The ex te n s io n a i d e f in ite n e s s  o f th e  domain is  not a fu n c tio n  o f th e  
m anner in  w h ich  p a r t ic u la r  e lem en ts  o f th e  domain a re  p r e se n te d . In  
th is  I am in c lin ed  to  e n d o r se  G ddeTs v iew  th a t to  a c c ep t a  lin k  b etw een  
th e  e x is te n c e  o f  an  in d iv id u a l an d  a  p a rticu la r  mode o f s p e c ify in g  th a t  
in d iv id u a l b e to k e n s  an  u n d e r ly in g  c o n str u c tiv ism  (and h ere  I am 
exam ining an  ap p roach  w h ich  adm its no n eed  o f a p p ly in g  a c o n s tr u c t iv e  
poin t o f v iew ). H ow ever I do th in k  th a t th e  e x ten sio n a i d e f in ite n e s s  o f a  
domain i s  a  fu n c tio n  o f  th e  s o r t s  o f  in d iv id u a l w h ich  are  c a n d id a tes  fo r  
b ein g  m em bers o f th e  dom ain. I f  th e  so r t  o f in d iv id u a l in  th e  dom ain h a s  
n ot been  c le a r ly  d eterm in ed  w e h a v e  no r ig h t  to  reg a rd  q u a n tifica tio n  
o v er  th e  domain a s  an  e x te n s io n a lly  d e fin ite  o p era tio n  s in ce  we h ave  no  
co n cep tio n  o f  w h at fu r th e r  s o r ts  o f  in d iv id u a l we m ight be b ro u g h t to  
a c c ep t a s  b e in g  in c lu d ed  in  th e  dom ain, or , ra th er , th e  a ssu m p tion  th a t  
w hat p o ss ib le  s o r ts  o f  in d iv id u a ls  may be in c lu d ed  in  th e  domain is  
determ in ate  is , i t s e lf ,  a form  o f  realism . The im age th a t th is  n a tu ra lly  
c o n ju r e s  up is  th a t we a re  n ot fo r c e d  (con tra  realism ) to "carve up" 
r e a lity  so  a s  to  s e e  i t  a s  c o n s t itu te d  o f c e r ta in  s o r ts  o f o b je c ts  ( i.e ., 
r e a lity  h as no d isc o u r se  in d e p e n d e n t , m etap h ysica l jo in ts  (w ith a p o lo g ie s  
to David L ew is)). B ut, h a v in g  a d o p ted  a p articu lar  schem e, q u a n tifica tio n  
is  ex te n s io n a lly  d e f in ite  r e la t iv e  to  th a t schem e. That is ,  th e  in d iv id u a ls  
co n cern ed  a re  n ot " b rou gh t in to  being" b y  our a c t iv ity , th e y  are th e r e  
to  be r e co g n iz e d  by  th e  m eans p ro v id ed  for  by  our schem e. It sh ou ld  
be c lear  th a t I am n o t s u g g e s t in g  th a t q u an tifica tion  w h ich  is  not made 
d e fin ite  by  an ap p ea l to  a g iv e n  schem e is  s e n s e le s s  or in co h e re n t. 
R ather, I am s a y in g  th a t  su c h  q u a n tifica tio n  sh ou ld  be in te r p r e te d  a s  
b ein g  in h e r e n tly  v a g u e  or a s  m aking a c e r ta in  o p e n -e n d e d  comm itm ent.
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i.e .,  a s  sa y in g  "W hatever schem e w e ad op t th en ..." .
The p ro p o sa l I w ant to ex p lo re  is ,  in  v iew  o f  th e  a b o v e , th e  
fo llow in g . Q u an tification  o v e r  a d efin ed  domain is  e x te n s io n a lly  d e f in i te  
(in  th e  s e n s e  th a t  e n t it ie s  sp e c if ie d  by su c h  q u a n tifica tio n  h ave  been  
d e fin ite ly  sp e c if ie d )  i f  and  o n ly  i f  th e  so r t  o f e n t ity  to  be in c lu d ed  in  
th e  domain is  c le a r ly  c ircu m scr ib ed . The minimal c o n str a in t  on  w hat 
c o u n ts  a s  a sp e c if ic a t io n  o f th e  so r t  o f  e n t ity  is  th a t a c r ite r io n  o f
id e n tity  (or o f in d iv id u a tio n ) sh o u ld  be su p p lied ,
SB An A ttem pt to D evelop  a  S e t T heory:
The ta sk  now is  to  a p p ly  th is  p ro p o sa l in  th e  d evelop m en t o f  a
c o h eren t, w e ll-m o tiv a ted  s e t  th e o r y , I sh ou ld  sa y , in  a d v a n ce , th a t my 
co n c lu s io n s  ab ou t th e  fe a s ib i li ty  o f th is  p r o je c t  a re  te n ta t iv e  and , 
p a rtia lly , n e g a tiv e . B ut th a t r e s u lt  i s ,  in  i t s e lf ,  n o t w ith ou t in te r e s t .  My 
f ir s t  s te p  i s  to  d ia g n o se  a fa u lt  in  th e  assu m p tion  o f  th e  ex te n s io n a i  
d e f in ite n e ss  o f u n r e s tr ic te d  q u a n tifica tio n  o v er  th e  u n iv e r se  o f s e ts .  The 
c r iter io n  o f  id e n t ity  fo r  s e t s  is  o s te n s ib ly  p ro v id ed  by  c o e x te n s io n a lity . 
C oexten sion a lity  ca n n o t h o w ev er , on  pain  o f c ircu la i’i ty , p ro v id e  u s  w ith  
a g lo b a lly  ap p lica b le  c r ite r io n  o f id e n tity . C onsider th e  fo llow in g  
sta tem en t o f c o e x te n s io n a lity ,
Vx( zex. s . ZE y) 3x= y
T his s u p p lie s  u s  w ith  a d e fin ite  c r iter io n  o f id e n tity  o n ly  if  th e
q u a n tifica tio n  u se d  in  th e  s ta tem en t is  e x te n s io n a lly  d e fin ite . But th a t  
q u a n tifica tio n  can  o n ly  be d e f in ite  i f  th e  domain o f  q u a n tifica tio n  h a s a 
w e ll-d e f in e d  c r ite r io n  o f  id e n tity . The domain o f q u a n tifica tio n  h ere  is  
th e  u n iv e r se  o f s e t s ,  so  th e  q u a n tifica tio n  is  d e fin ite  o n ly  if
c o e x te n s io n a lity  is ,  i t s e lf ,  d e fin ite . T h us th e re  can  be no n o n -c ir c u la r
ju s tif ic a tio n  o f th e  d e f in ite n e s s  o f  c o e x te n s io n a lity  a s  a g lob a l c r iter io n
o f id e n tity  for  se ts :  ou r g r a sp  o f th e  u n iv e r se  o f s e t s  m ust be trea ted
as in h e r e n tly  v a g u e , a s  p e r p e tu a lly  s u b je c t  to ex ten sio n .
The u se  o f c o e x te n s io n a lity  a s  a c r iter io n  o f id e n tity  for  s e ts  is
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r e g a rd ed  u n iv e r sa lly  a s  a d is t in c t iv e  fe a tu r e  o f th e  s e t  co n c e p t. So d o es  
th e  a b o v e  argu m en t sim ply  d is c r e d it  th e  n otion  of se t?  I do n o t th in k  
w e sh ou ld  r e c e iv e  th e  argu m en t a s  d e liv e r in g  th is  co n c lu sio n . The  
argu m en t a t ta c k s  th e  u s e  o f c o e x te n s io n a lity  a s  a s in g le , g lo b a lly  
a p p licab le  c r ite r io n  o f  id e n t ity  fo r  s e t s .  T h is d o es  not m ean th a t w e may 
n ot be ab le  to  s u p p ly  "ersatz"  c r ite r ia  o f id e n tity  by  r e s tr ic t in g  th e  
r a n g e  o f  q u a n tifica tio n  to  e x te n s io n a lly  d e fin ite  dom ains. M oreover, w e  
can  u s e  th is  req u irem en t to  m otivate  a  su ita b le  r e s tr ic t io n  o n  th e  
co n c e p t o f s e t  (w h ich , n o te , m akes no u s e  o f a c o n str u c tio n a l m etaphor). 
So we can , in  broad term s, a ttem p t to  r e c o n str u c t  or j u s t i fy  s e t  th e o r y  
by in s is t in g , i) th a t th e  axiom s g o v e r n in g  s e t  e x is te n c e  a lw ays allow  fo r  
th e  ap p lica tio n  o f a p r e c is e  v e r s io n  o f c o e x te n s io n a lity , and ii) th a t  
com p ara tively  m ore c o m p reh en siv e  v e r s io n s  o f c o e x te n s io n a lity  ex ten d  
c o n s e r v a t iv e ly  more r e s tr ic te d  v e r s io n s  o f co ex te n s io n a lity .
As a  m ove to w a rd s  th is  program m e I w ant to  c o n s id e r  th e  em erg en ce  
o f c e r ta in  c o n s tr a in ts  on s e t  e x is te n c e  and how th e s e  c o n s tr a in ts  
p rec lu d e  th e  form ation  o f p arad ox ica l s e t s .  We can  o n ly  tr e a t  an  o b je c t  
a s  a s e t  if  i t  h a s  a d e fin ite  c r ite r io n  o f id e n tity  in  th e  form  o f  (a 
v e r s io n  of) c o e x te n s io n a lity . We th e n  im m ediately h ave  a s  a c o n se q u e n c e  
o f my argu m en t th a t  th e  u n iv e r se  o f  s e t s  is  n ot i t s e lf  a s e t  ( i.e ., th e r e  
i s  no s e t  o f  a ll s e t s ) .  So C antor's paradox  is  av o id ed . A lso we can  show  
th a t w e c a n n o t h a v e  s e t s  fo r  w h ich  th e  fo llow in g  hold: x s x  or
XEXiex2 E ....x^ex, fo r  f in ite  n. In  th e  f ir s t  c a se  trea tm en t o f x  a s  a s e t  
w ould d ep en d  on  th e  d e f in ite n e s s  o f  th e  c r iter io n  o f id e n tity  for  x, i .e .,  
Vx(zEX.H,zEy)Dx=y, w h ere  th e  r a n g e  o f q u a n tifica tio n  w ould p e r fo r c e  
in c lu d e  a ll m em bers o f  x. But th e n , w ere  x  to be a  member o f x, we 
w ould n eed  a c r ite r io n  o f id e n t ity  a p p lica b le  to  x  for  th e  q u a n tifica tio n  
to  be d e fin ite . So w e can n ot form  a d e fin ite  cr iter io n  o f id e n t ity  for  x. 
Sim ilarly in  th e  se co n d  c a se  w e w ould sim ply  h ave  to  h a v e  th a t th e  
d e f in ite n e s s  o f a c r ite r io n  o f id e n t ity  for  x  w ould p r e su p p o se  th a t for  
Xjj w h ich  w ou ld , in  tu r n , p r e s u p p o s e  th a t fo r  e tc ., u n til, f in a lly .
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th e  d e f in ite n e s s  o f  th e  c r ite r io n  o f id e n tity  for  x  w ould  p r e su p p o se  
i t s e lf .  So we c o n c lu d e , in  p a r tic u la r , th a t th e  B u ra li-F o rti and R u sse ll  
p arad oxes are  a v o id ed . It w ould  be h e lp fu l to  be ab le  to  co n c lu d e  
fu r th e r  th a t e is  a w e ll-fo u n d e d  re la tio n , i .e ., th a t e v e r y  n o n -v o id  s e t
h as an  e le a s t  m em ber, i .e . ,  Vxi3 w( TVEx).=>.3y(y£x&Vz(zEy.3.z^x))J or
Vxl3w( wEx).=.3y( 1. H ow ever r e a so n in g  in  th e  ab ove
m anner a ll we can  co n c lu d e  is  th a t w e can n ot h a v e  a s e t ,  x, fo r  w h ich  
e v e r y  member o f x  sh a r e s  a  m em ber w ith  x  ( i.e ., 
•‘•3xt3w4 wEx)& Vy(yEx.3.3z(zey& zex))J: th e  argu m en t to  th is  e f f e c t  is  to  
draw  a co n tra d ic tio n  from  th e  assu m p tion  th a t w e had su c h  a s e t ,  x. 
T h is assu m p tion  w ould o n ly  be v a lid  i f  we cou ld  g u a r a n te e  th a t x  had a  
d e fin ite  c r ite r io n  o f  id e n tity . B ut to  g u a r a n tee  th a t w e sh ou ld  n eed  to  
d isco u n t both  th e  p o s s ib il it ie s  o f a loop  o f m em bership  an d  o f a r e g r e s s  
o f m em bership , s in c e  e ith e r  o f th e s e  p o s s ib il it ie s  p r e c lu d e  form ation  o f  a  
d e fin ite  c r ite r io n  o f id e n t ity . B ut if  w e can  d isco u n t th e  p o s s ib il ity  o f a
r e g r e s s  w e m ust be ab le  to  s a y  th a t  fo r  a n y  m em ber, y ,  o f  x  we can
o n ly  form  f in ite  c h a in s  o f th e  form  x i s x 2^ e,„y. I f  we can  d isco u n t th e  
p o s s ib il ity  o f  a  loop o f m em bersh ip  th e n  a ll th e  xj m ust be d is t in c t , in  
p a rticu la r , th e  ch a in  ca n n o t en d  w ith , sa y , x j e x j .  T h us x j m ust con ta in  
no m em bers, and a  fo r t io r i  no m em bers in  common w ith  x. T h is is  n o t to  
sa y  th a t x j is  a m em ber o f x  w h ich  d o es n ot sh are  a  member w ith  x  
s in ce  w e do n ot know  th a t x j is  a  member o f x. B ut, on  pa in  o f  
c o n tra d ic tio n , n o t a ll o f  th e  Xj an d  y  ca n  be m em bers o f x  w h ich  in c lu d e  
on ly  m em bers o f xp i .e . ,  s in c e  th e  s e t  is  f in ite  we can  a s s e r t  th a t a t  
le a s t  one o f th e  x^  or  y  is  a  m em ber o f  x  w h ich  in c lu d e s  no m em bers o f  
X. So we ca n n o t h a v e  a sp e c if ic a t io n  o f th e  s e t  x. H ow ever we can n ot  
co n c lu d e  from  th is  th a t we h a v e  an  e f fe c t iv e  m eans for  f in d in g  a minimal 
se t . (T his lim itation  w ill be o f  s ig n if ic a n c e  below .) T h ere is ,  o f c o u r se , 
a lso  th e  problem  o f how w e are  to u n d er sta n d  th e  q u a n tifie r s  in  th e  
ab ove sta tem en ts .
T h is la s t  problem  h in ts  a t w h at is ,  p e r h a p s , th e  m ost n a tu ra l w ay of
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r e g a r d in g  th e  th e o r y . F ir s t , w e sh ou ld  reca ll th a t  u n r e s tr ic te d
q u a n tifie r s  h ave  n ot been  a c c u se d  o f  s e n s e le s s n e s s  but o n ly  o f
ex te n s io n a i in d e f in ite n e s s . So w e cou ld  h ave  a  c la s s  th e o r y  in  w h ich
u n r e s tr ic te d  q u a n tifica tio n  (o v er  s e ts )  w as u se d  both in  sp e c ify in g
c la s s e s  (so  we cou ld  h ave  an  u n r e s tr ic te d  com p reh en sion  p r in c ip le ) and
in  s p e c ify in g  an  an a logu e  o f id e n t ity  (w hich  I sh a ll ca ll e q u a lity )  for
c la s s e s . What we w ould  be p r e c lu d ed  from  d o in g  is  tr e a t in g  c la s s e s  a s
s e t s ,  th a t is ,  a s  o b je c ts  ca p a b le  o f b e in g  m em bers in  o th er  s e t s .  We
h a v e  to  j u s t i fy  th e  a ssu m p tio n  th a t a g iv e n  c la s s  is  a  s e t  by  sh ow in g
th a t  th a t c la s s  h a s  a p r e c is e  d e f in in g  co n d itio n  and  is  sub su m ed  w ith in
th e  sco p e  o f a d e f in ite  c r ite r io n  o f  id e n tity . In  th is  s e n s e , th e  r e su lt in g
th e o r y  w ou ld  be r e m in iscen t o f a s p e c ts  o f v o n  N eum ann’s s e t  th e o ry .
The tw o a p p r o a c h e s  are  d is t in g u is h e d  by  th e  fa c t  th a t v o n  Neum ann
ju s t i f ie s  h is  trea tm en t o f  a c la s s  a s  a s e t  ju s t  w h en  th e  c a r d in a lity  o f
th e  c la s s  ca n  be sh ow n  to  be s tr ic t ly  le s s  th an  th a t o f  th e  u n iv e r se ;  he
a d o p ts  a  ca rd in a l lim itation  o f  s iz e  th e o r y  (se e  H allett (1984), ch a p te r  8
for  a p e llu c id  d is c u ss io n  o f th e s e  id e a s) . Here I h a v e  tr ie d  to  j u s t i fy
trea tm en t o f a  c la s s  a s  a  s e t  b y  c o n s tr a in ts  on  d e f in ite n e s s  draw n from
c o n sid er a tio n s  o f th e  u s e  o f q u a n tif ie r s  in  s e t  th e o ry .
The c r u d e  p ic tu r e  w e a re  now  p r e se n te d  w ith  i s  o f  an  e x te n s io n a lly  
in d e fin ite  th e o r y  a w a itin g  p r e c is if ic a t io n  th r o u g h  a p r o c e ss  o f  
c ircu m scr ib in g  dom ains o f q u a n tifica tio n . How are  w e to in s t itu te  th is  
p r o c e ss?  L et me b eg in  to  draw  o u t som e o f th e  d iff ic u lt ie s  th a t fa ce  u s  
h e r e  by c o n c e n tr a t in g  on  an  exam ple th a t l ie s  c lo se  to th e  o r ig in a l  
c o n c e rn  a b o u t a n a ly s is :  w ith  w h at g r a sp  o f th e  pow er s e t  o f th e  n atu ra l 
n um bers can  w e c r e d it  o u r s e lv e s ?
From h e n ce  forw ard  I sh a ll be a ssu m in g  w ith ou t ju s tif ic a tio n  th e  
axiom o f in f in ity , i .e ., th a t we h a v e  a domain N  su ch  th a t fjeN  and i f  xbN  
th e n  x\>{x}sN. I sh a ll a lso  be id e n t ify in g  the n a tu ra l num bers w ith  th is  
se t . What I am in te r e s te d  in  e x p lo r in g  is  w h eth er , g iv e n  th a t a ssu m p tion , 
th e r e  i s  an  a n t i-r e a lis t ic a lly  a c c ep ta b le  m eans o f form ing a domain
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ap p ro a ch in g  th a t o f th e  c la s s ic a l  p ow er s e t  of th e  n a tu ra l num bers.
I f  th e  domain o f n a tu ra l nu m b ers is  e x te n s io n a lly  d e fin ite  th en  we  
h ave  a c r ite r io n  of id e n t ity  fo r  e lem en ts in  th a t domain. So, in  
p a rticu la r , a dom ain form ed b y  a p p ly in g  a d e fin ite  p r o p e r ty  to  th is  
dom ain w ill s e le c t  a s u b s e t  o f th is  dom ain w hich  is  e x te n s io n a lly  d e fin ite . 
So w e ap p ear to h ave  a ju s tif ic a tio n  o f an in s ta n c e  o f  Zerm eio’s  
sep a ra tio n  axiom,
3 x V y (  y E x . s .  j'E jV & tp)
We cou ld  tak e  th e  v a r ia b le  y  a s  r a n g in g  o v e r  th e  domain p ro v id ed  by  N, 
T hen w e cou ld  ta k e  3cpVy(yEx.s.yEN&(p) a s  s e t t in g  up  th e  co n d itio n  o f  
m em bership  fo r  th e  dom ain P (i^  w h ich  w ould h ave  th e  c r iter io n  o f  
id e n t ity  V z(z£ x ,s .zey ).3 .x = y , w h ere  th e  v a r ia b le  z  r a n g e s  o v e  N, That is ,  
w e cou ld  u se  th e  axiom o f  sep a ra tio n  to  s e t  u p  th e  co n cep t  
"subset-of-iV " . We can  th e n  a sk  w h eth e r  or not th is  r e s u lt s  in  a  
re in sta tem en t o f th e  c la s s ic a l  pow er s e t  by  q u e stio n in g  w h eth er  we are  
ab le to  d e fin e  a s u b s e t  o f N  by  u s in g  p r o p e r tie s  w h ich  th e m se lv e s  
in v o lv e  q u a n tifica tio n  o v e r  an d  a lso  o v er  a r b itr a r y  s e t  th e o re tic
dom ains. The f ir s t  is  n e c e s s a r y  fo r  th e  p roof o f C antor’s theorem : we  
assu m e th a t we h ave  a  o n e -o n e  fu n c tio n , t\ from  P(N) to N, th en  we  
d e fin e  a={x:3P(f(P)=x&x^P)}. T hen fo r  a e P ( ^ ,  /(a )  is  d e fin ed  and is  a 
member o f M Now a sk  is  t \o )  a  member o f a or not? I f  it  is  th e n , s in ce  
f  i s  o n e -o n e , we m ust h a v e  So  a ssum e th a t f{a)^a. Then w e h ave
f(a)=f{a)&f\a)f!:a, i .e .,  3P(i'(P)=/(a)&/l(a)^a), i .e ., f \a )e a .  C on trad iction .
So no su c h  f  e x is t s .  Note th a t in  o r d e r  to  d e fin e  a w e w ere  req u ired  to  
q u a n tify  o v e r  P(J^, o f  w h ich  a  is  p u ta t iv e ly  a  m em ber. F u rth er , if  we  
are to  c r e d it  o u r s e lv e s  w ith  g r a sp  o f  an  a r b i t r a r y  s u b s e t  o f th e  n atu ra l  
num bers we m ust allow  a s  a  d e f in ite  p r o p e r ty  (a)<p(a,P), w h ere  (a) s ta n d s  
fo r  q u a n tifica tio n  o v e r  a n y  dom ain o f  s e t s .  T hus th e  q u e stio n  we fa ce  is ,  
w hat is  a  d e fin ite  p r o p e r ty  o f  th e  n a tu ra l num bers?
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It m ight seem  th a t  I h a v e  su p p lied  an a n sw er  to  th is  q u estion : a  
p r o p e r ty  is  d e fin ite  j u s t  in  c a s e  i t  is  sp e c if ie d  u s in g  o n ly  q u an tifica tion  
th a t is  e x te n s io n a lly  d e f in ite . H ow ever, th a t a n sw er  sim ply  lea d s  u s  in  a  
c irc le : a  p r o p e r ty  i s  d e f in ite  i f  i t  u s e s  o n ly  e x te n s io n a lly  d e fin ite  
q u a n tifica tio n , c o n v e r se ly , w e ca n  o n ly  d eterm in e th e  ex te n s io n a i  
d e f in ite n e s s  o f th e  pow er c la s s  o n ce  w e h a v e  se tt le d  th e  n o tion  o f  
d efin ite  p r o p e r ty . P la in ly , w e ca n n o t make a n y  p r o g r e s s  a lon g  th is  
ro u te .
A m eans o f c ir c u m v en tin g  th is  d if f ic u lty  m ight be to  a b s tr a c t  from  
th e  m anner o f  s p e c ify in g  s u b s e t s  (and th u s  to  ig n o r e  th e ir  mode o f  
p r e sen ta tio n ) an d  c o n s id e r  th e  c la s s  d efin ed  b y  th e  m em bership  
co n d itio n  g iv e n  by ,
V x (x E y .D .x E ^ .
T h is, p ro v id ed  th e  q u a n tifica tio n  is  e x te n s io n a lly  d e fin ite  s p e c if ie s  a 
d e fin ite  s e t  th e o r e t ic  p r e d ic a te . The th o u g h t now  is  th a t by  r e s tr ic t in g  
th e  dom ain o f  th e  v a r ia b le  x  in  th e  a b ove  to N  (as we r e s tr ic te d  the  
ra n g e  o f v a r ia tio n  o f  x  to  A  in  form ing th e  c r iter io n  o f id e n tity  
V z(zEx.s,2Ey),3.x=y) w e ca n  form  th e  a p p ro p r ia te  d e fin ite  c r iter io n  o f  
m em bership . B ut now it  i s  a p p a r e n t th a t th e  attem pt in  both th e se  
in s ta n c e s  to  m ake th e  c r ite r ia  d e f in ite  is  m uddled. The r e s tr ic te d  form s  
o f th e  c r ite r ia  m isca teg o r ize  in f in ite ly  m any s e t s .  S e ts  w h ich  in c lu d e  
o n ly  e lem en ts  o f N  and  e lem en ts  n ot in c lu d ed  in  th e  domain o f  
q u a n tifica tio n  w ill be m isc la ss ifie d  a s  s u b s e ts  o f N  (e .g ., No{Nl is  
co u n ted  a s  a s u b s e t  o f  iV). S im ilarly , in f in ite ly  m any fa lse  ju d g em en ts  o f  
id e n tity  w ill be m ade.
C learly  w hat we r e q u ire  is  a m eans o f "ignoring" s e t s  w h ich  lie  
ou tw ith  th e  " intended" a p p lica tio n  o f th e  p r e c ise  m em bership and  
id e n tity  c o n d itio n s . It i s  a t ju s t  th is  p o in t th a t one i s  tem pted  to  draw  
on  c o n s tr u c t iv e  p r in c ip le s  to  ju s t i fy  th e  claim  th a t th e  awkward
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e x is t , or h a v e  n o t, a t th is  s ta g e , b een  form ed. The problem  w ith  ta k in g  
th a t tack  (apart from  a n y  a n te c e d e n t  m isg iv in g s  one may h a v e  ab ou t  
c o n str u c t iv ism s)  i s  to  s e e  how on e  com b ines th is  w ay o f ju s t i fy in g  th e  
good b eh av iou r o f  m em bersh ip  an d  id e n t ity  c o n d itio n s  w ith  th e  v iew  th a t  
m em bers o f dom ains so  d e fin ed  can  in c lu d e  im p red ica tiv e ly  d efin ed  
m em bers; if  th e  o f fe n d in g  s e t s  are  not ava ilab le  to  d is tu r b  th e  
fu n c tio n in g  o f th e  m em bersh ip  and  Id e n tity  co n d itio n s  th e n , su r e ly , th e y  
are a lso  not a v a ila b le  to  form  sp e c if ic a t io n s  o f m em bers o f th e  domain. 
As H allett rem arks on  th e  fe a s ib i l i ty  o f com b in ing im p red ica tive  and  
c o n s tr u c t iv e  m eth od s,
No m atter w h at p o w ers o f su r v e illa n c e , or  w hat a b ility  to  ru n  
th r o u g h  in fin ite  c o lle c t io n s  in  a f in ite  tim e, a re  a sc r ib e d  to  a 
p o stu la te d  c o n s tr u c t in g  a g e n t  it  seem s to  me th a t th e  c o n s tr u c t in g  
a g e n t  can  n e v e r  com p lete  w hat we m ight ca ll an  im p red ica tive  
p r o c e ss , i .e . can  n e v e r  c o n s tr u c t  a s e t  (or num ber) v ia  an  
im p red ica tive  d e fin itio n . (1984, p . 236)
No c o n s tr u c t iv e  p r o c e ss  can  be p o s tu la te d  if  a s te p  in  th a t p r o c e ss  
d ep en d s on  th e  r e s u lt  o f th e  p r o c e ss  it s e lf . So im p red ica tive  m ethods  
form  an a b so lu te  bar to  c o n s tr u c t iv e  m ethods. (It is  p a r tly  b eca u se  th is  
rea so n in g  seem s to  me v e r y  p e r s u a s iv e  a n d  b eca u se  im p red ica tive  
m ethods seem  so  in e x tr ic a b ly  in v o lv e d  w ith  m uch o f c la s s ic a l a n a ly s is  
th a t I th in k  it  i s  w orth  m aking th is  attem pt to  g a u g e  th e  fe a s ib ility  o f a 
n o n -c o n s tr u c t iv e , a n t i-r e a lis t  s e t  th e o ry .)
One m ight s u s p e c t  th a t th e  a b o v e  sh ow s th a t we can n ot make s e n s e  
of th e se  e n v e lo p e s  o f  p r e c is e  dom ains n o n -c o n s tr u c t iv e ly , th a t th e se  
dom ains can  o n ly  c o r r e sp o n d  to  s ta g e s  o f d evelop m en t. So a lth o u g h  th e  
m otive for  r e s tr ic t in g  s e t  th e o r y  w ould stem  from  an  u n d er ly in g  
argu m en t ab ou t th e  d e f in ite n e s s  o f  s e t  th e o re tic  q u a n tifie r s  th e  o n ly
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w ay of m aking s e n s e  o f th a t  n o tion  of d e f in ite n e s s  is  th r o u g h  a  
c o n s tr u c t iv e  m eta p h y s ic s .
A, seem in g ly , a t tr a c t iv e  r e sp o n s e  to  th is  su sp ic io n  is  to  reca ll th a t  
u n r e s tr ic te d  s e t  th e o r e t ic  q u a n tific a tio n  h as n ot b een  sh ow n  to be  
in c o h e re n t bu t, m erely , v a g u e . S e t  th e o r y  cou ld  th u s  be d ev e lo p ed  a lon g  
orth od ox  lin e s  a s  an  e s s e n t ia lly  v a g u e  th e o ry . The th e o r y  a s  a w hole  is  
th e n  ju s t if ie d  b y  p r o v id in g  a  p r e c is e  in te r p r e ta t io n  o f th e  domain o f i t s  
q u a n tifie r s . In  o th e r  w o rd s , w e j u s t i f y  a s e t  th e o r y  b y  p ro v id in g  a  
model for  it . Two prob lem s fo r  th is  ap p roach  are  im m ediately a p p a ren t. 
F ir st , i t  is  u t te r ly  m y ste r io u s  how w e are  to  be p r e se n te d  w ith  th e  
dom ains w h ich  are  to  c o n s t itu te  m odels for  th e  th e o r y . S e co n d ly , w e a re  
co n cern ed  h e r e  w ith  p r o v id in g  a ju s t if ic a t io n  o f  th e  (u n cou n tab le) pow er  
s e t  o f th e  n a tu ra l n u m b ers. I t  i s  e v id e n t  th a t th is  ap p roach  can n ot lead  
u s  to adm it th e  e x ite n c e  o f  an  u n co u n ta b le  s e t  s in c e  th e  
L dw enheim -Skolem  r e s u lt s  sh ow  th a t a n y  f ir s t  o r d e r  th e o r y  p o s s e s s in g  a  
m odel p o s s e s s e s  a co u n ta b le  m odel,
§8,1 T y p in g  th e  U n iv e r se  o f  S e ts:
I t  seem s to  me th a t  th e  o n ly  fe a s ib le  a ttem p t to  im plem ent th e  p ro p o sa l 
m ust make s e n s e  o f " stages"  w ith o u t a p p ea lin g  to an u n d e r ly in g  
c o n str u c tiv ism . I f  a so lu tio n  is  to  be fou n d  it  m ust, in  e f fe c t ,  make u se  
o f a  m eans o f  a  ty p in g  fu n c tio n  on  s e t s .  In  o u tlin e , th e  r e su lt in g  
p r o je c t  w ould c o n s is t  in:
i) d e fin in g  a ty p e  fu n c tio n  on  th e  u n iv e r se  o f se ts ;
ii) d e fin in g  e x te n s io n a liy  d e f in ite  dom ains o f q u a n tifica tio n  by u s in g  th e  
ty p e  fu n ction ;
iii) ju s t i fy in g  th e  axiom s o f a  s e t  th e o r y .
I sh a ll now g iv e  a s k e tc h  o f how  th e s e  s te p s  m ight be ca rr ied  ou t  
and sh a ll th en  go  on  to  r a ise  c e r ta in  d iff ic u lt ie s  for  th is  p lan  o f action ,
i) D efin in g  T y p e s :
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R ecall th a t I am a ssu m in g  th a t th e  axiom o f in fin ity , i .e .,  th e  domain N is  
g iv e n . Then d e fin e  T r e c u r s iv e ly  a s  fo llow s.
T{x)~0 i f  xsN
T(x^)=Sup(r(jr):yEx}+l o th e rw ise .
(Where 0 is  and x+1 is  xu(x} and  S u p  is  d e fin ed  on  s e t s  o f n a tu ra l 
n u m bers su c h  th a t  8 u p x = y  w h ere  y s x  an d  if z e x  th en  z< y ,)  Note th a t if  
th e n  T (x)=Sup{T(y):j'E x}-l-l=Sup{T (y):j'Ez}+l=T (z), p r o v id ed  o n ly  th a t  
w e can  assu m e th a t th e  ty p e  fu n c tio n  a s s ig n s  a u n iq u e  v a lu e  to  each  y  
su c h  th a t yE x  (or ^), So, g iv e n  th is  a ssu m p tion  th e  ty p e  fu n c tio n  is  
w e ll-d e f in e d . (Of c o u r s e , w e are  a ssu m in g  th a t a c r ite r io n  o f id e n t ity  
can  be g iv e n , but n o t w h at form  th a t c r iter io n  ta k e s .)  The d e fin itio n  o f  
th e  ty p e  fu n c tio n  th u s  d e p e n d s  o f  th e  v a lid ity  o f tr a n sf in ite  in d u ctio n  
on  E . B ut, d e la y in g  th a t q u e s tio n  fo r  th e  moment, th e  d e fin itio n  s t i l l  
r e q u ir e s  com m ent. A m ore g e n e r a l ty p e  fu n c tio n  cou ld  be g iv e n  in  term s  
o f th e  ran k  fu n ctio n : p(x)=Sup'*'tp(y):yEx^), w h ere  Sup+ is  th e  le a s t  s tr ic t  
u p p er  bound, I h a v e  a v o id ed  th is  d e fin itio n  b eca u se  it is  b la ta n tly  
im p red ica tive  an d  c o n s t i tu te s  ou r d e fin itio n a l a c c e s s  to  th e  ran k s: p(x) 
is  d e fin ed  a s  th e  e lem en t w h ich  is  l e s s  than  or  eq u a l to  a ll e lem en ts  
p o s s e s s in g  a c e r ta in  p r o p e r ty , w h ich  it , i t s e lf  is  su p p o se d  to p o s s e s s .  In  
c o n tr a s t , th e  a b o v e  d e fin it io n  sim p ly  su p p o se s  th a t Sup  is  an in te llig ib le  
s e t  th e o re tic  fu n c tio n  on  a f in ite  (e v e n , i f  not d ec id ab le) s e t  o f n a tu ra l  
nu m bers. (If th e  s e t  is  n o t d em o n stra b ly  f in ite  th e n  w e can n ot a s s e r t  
th a t th e  fu n c tio n  i s  d e fin ed  fo r  th is  argu m en t. S ee  below , w h ere  I 
d is c u s s  th e  n eed  fo r  "ceilin gs"  on  v a lu e s  o f th e  ty p e  fu n c tio n .)  The 
p oin t h ere  e c h o e s  R u sse ll: im p red ica tiv e  m ethods are n ot s u s p e c t  w h en  
th e y  do n ot p r o v id e  ou r  so le  a c c e s s  to  th e  e n t ity  b e in g  d e fin ed . In  th e  
f ir s t  d e fin itio n  o f ty p e  we are  a ssu m ed  to h a v e  in d e p e n d e n t a c c e s s  to  
each  elem en t in  th e  dom ain o f n a tu ra l num bers. So th e  ty p e  fu n c tio n  
d o es not p ro v id e  a  m eans o f in tr o d u c in g  a n atu ra l num ber or d o es  not
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c o n s titu te  ou r  a c c e s s  to  th a t num ber, it  sim ply a s s ig n s  (n o n -e ffa c t iv e ly )  
a n atu ra l num ber to  a n y  g iv e n  s e t .  The rank  fu n c tio n , h o w ev er , is  not 
p ro v id ed  w ith  an  in d e p e n d e n t  m eans o f a c c e s s  to  e lem en ts in  i t s  r a n g e , 
i .e ., to  th e  r a n k s.
I am a ssu m in g  th a t T is  d e fin e d  on  a ll s e t s  and th a t T m aps th e  
u n iv e r se  o f  s e t s  on to  N, The form er a ssu m p tion  i s  e v e n  s tr o n g e r  in  th e  
lig h t  o f th e  la tte r  assu m p tion : w e can  th en  d e fin e  th e  p r e d ica te  S{x) fo r  
"x i s  a set"  a s  '3yEN{T{x)=y)j or b e tte r , g iv e n  th a t th e  in tu it io n is t ic  
in te r p r e ta t io n  o f 3 w ou ld  th e n  r e q u ir e  th a t w e can  e f f e c t iv e ly  com p ute  
th e  ty p e  o f  a g iv e n  s e t ,  d e n y in g  3yE N (T {x)-y)  w ould be to  d e n y  th e  
se th ood  o f x, I am n ot ab le  to  j u s t i fy  th is  a ssu m p tion  but can  p e r h a p s  
a llay  some w o rr ies  it  m ight e lic it . I a ssu m e, f ir s t ,  th a t w e h a v e  an  
in tu it iv e  g r a sp  o f  th e  dom ain o f s e t s  (ga in ed  th r o u g h  ou r g r a sp  o f  
p red ica tion ) w h ich  s u f f ic e s  fo r  th e  d e fin itio n  o f a fu n c tio n  on th is
domain. The a ssu m p tio n  th a t th is  is  leg itim ate  fu r th e r  c h a r a c te r iz e s  th e
n a tu re  o f th a t  dom ain. T h is sh o u ld  be a c cep ta b le  p ro v id ed  th a t th e re  i s  
no te n s io n  b etw een  ou r  in tu it iv e  co n c e p t and th e  leg itim a cy  o f th e
defin ition : th e  la tte r  n eed  n o t be s e e n  a s  a r is in g  o u t o f  th e  form er s in c e  
w hat I am in te r e s te d  in  is  d e v e lo p in g  a s tr u c tu r e  w h ich  is  r ic h  e n o u g h  
to  su p p o rt "enough" m athem atics and n ot in  p ro v id in g  a com p lete  
a n a ly s is  o f  our c o n c e p t  o f s e t .  The program m e is  th u s  to  u se  th e
assum ed  in te llig ib il ity  o f th e  ty p e  fu n c tio n  to  d e fin e  a dom ain o f  
m athem atical e n t it ie s  ca lled  " sets" . The q u e stio n  th en  is ,  w h at 
m athem atical s tr u c tu r e s  w ill th is  dom ain su p p ort?  We can  b eg in  a sk in g  
th a t q u e stio n  b y  a ttem p tin g  to  j u s t i fy  an axiom atic sy ste m  fo r  th e  
domain. The r e s t  o f  th is  c h a p te r  is  an attem pt to  u n d er ta k e  j u s t  th is .
G iven th e  d e fin it io n  o f  ty p e s  w e h a v e  th e  fo llow in g  cru c ia l en ta ilm en t, 
xEy^T{x)<T{y)*  p ro v id e d  T(T)p:0.
ii) D efin in g  D om ains o f  Q u a n tifica tio n :
We w ant ea ch  dom ain to  be e x te n s io n a liy  d e fin ite  and for  th e  dom ains to
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form  a cu m u lative  h ie r a r c h y , i .e .,  w e w ant i?n^^n-M* D efine th e  dom ains 
a s ,
T hen JDq^N  ^nd ea ch  domain i s  g iv e n  by  a d e fin ite
co n d itio n  p r o v id e d  th a t  th e  ty p e  fu n c tio n  is  d e fin ite . So ea ch  is  
e x te n s io n a liy  d e f in ite  i f  a  c r ite r io n  o f  id e n tity  can  be p ro v id ed  fo r  it . 
The c o n s tr a in ts  on  a c r ite r io n  o f id e n t ity  are  th a t i t  conform s to  a  
v e r s io n  o f c o e x te n s io n a lity  and can  be c o n s e r v a t iv e ly  e x te n d ed  b y  
in c r e a s in g  i t s  r a n g e  o f  q u a n tifica tio n . I f  th e  dom ains are e x te n s io n a liy  
d e fin ite  th e n  w e t r y  to  e n s u r e  sa tis fa c t io n  o f th is  req u irem en t a s  
fo llow s. Write fo r  th e n  if  w e h a v e  V x ^ ( a s  a
c r iter io n  o f  id e n t ity  fo r  yjZ , m em bers o f  w e w ant to  show  th a t th is
can  be c o n s e r v a t iv e ly  e x te n d ed  in  th e  s e n s e  th a t fo r  m>n,
Vx^(x^ey.s.x^ez).=),y=^r i f f  Vx®^{x®^ey.s.x®^ez).3.y=2r,
We t r y  to  p r o v e  th is  a s  fo llo w s,
(1) Vx®^(x^ey.s,x?^e^) i f f
(2) V x^lT (x^)<n.3.(x^G y.=,x^E z)j& V x^L T (x^)>n.3.(x^6y:g.x^G z)j i .e . ,  i f f
(3) Vx^ ( x^G =. x^G z ) .
(4) W hence, Vx^(x^Gy.=.x^Ez).^.jc:^ i f f  Vx™(x^ey.=.x®G^).r>.
The tra n sit io n  b etw een  (2) and (3) is  ju s t if ie d  s in c e , T(jd<.n*H and
T(z)^n+1 so , if  T(x?^)>n, th e n  ^ G y  and x® ez are both  fa lse . So th e
b icon d ition a l, x^Eys.x^^Gz, is  th e n  a lw ays tr u e , i .e .,  
Vx^L T(x"^)>n.3.(x^Gy.=.x^Gz)j is  tr u e . W hilst th e  f ir s t  c o n ju n c t in  (2) is  
th e  sam e as  V x^(x^E ys.x^G z).
The prob lem atic  tr a n s it io n  i s  th a t b etw een  (1) and  (2). I t  r e lie s  on  
th e  p r in c ip le : Vx j^Pjs^  ^ i f f  (Vx^ePj^)P!s™&(Vx®^J)j^)jPx®. The "only if" p art  
o f th e  b icon d ition a l is  c lea r  s in c e  a p ro o f o f th e  LHS su p p lie s  a p roo f o f  
each  c o n ju n c t. The "if" p a r t is  n o t c lear . The RHS a s s u r e s  u s  th a t we 
h ave  a c o n s tr u c t io n  w h ich  w ill ta k e  e lem en ts o f Dj^  to  an  a p p rop r ia te  
p roof and  a c o n s tr u c t io n  w h ich  w ill ta k e  e lem en ts  o f n ot in  to  an
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a r b itr a r y  e lem en ts  o f to  an  a p p ro p r ia te  proof, u n le s s  w e can  tak e  
m em bership  in  to be d ec id a b le . So th e  p roof d e p e n d s  on  th e
com p u tab ility  o f th e  ty p e  fu n ction ^ . (More on  th is  below .)
(Note th a t  th e  a ssu m p tio n  h e r e  th a t th e  more in c lu s iv e  dom ain is  
form ed b y  on e  o f th e  D ^s  is  not s tr ic t ly  n e c e ss a r y , w e cou ld  r e p e a t th e  
argu m en t fo r  a n y  more in c lu s iv e , d e fin ite  dom ain. So w e are  n ot b e g g in g  
th e  q u e stio n  ab ou t w h eth er  a p p ro p r ia te  D ^s e x is t .)
We now u s e  in d u c tio n  to  p r o v e  th a t th e  dom ains are  e x te n s io n a liy  
d e fin ite . We assu m e th a t N  i s  ex te n s io n a liy  d e fin ite . A ssum e, for  
in d u c tio n , th a t i s  e x te n s io n a liy  d e fin ite . T hen we ca n  q u a n tify  o v e r  
Z>n to  form  V x^(x*^ey.s.;^e^).3,y=^ w h ich  is  th e  d e fin ite  c r ite r io n  of  
id e n tity  fo r  S in ce , a s  n o ted  a b o v e , each  dom ain h as a d e fin ite
m em bership  c o n d itio n  n iust be an  e x te n s io n a liy  d e fin ite  dom ain. So,
b y  in d u ctio n , ea ch  domain is  e x te n s io n a liy  d e fin ite . (Note th a t we cou ld  
s ta te  th is  r e s u lt  a s  Vn(D^ i s  d e f in ite )  s in c e  a lth o u g h  th e  "n" seem s  
schem atic  is  is  n o t, in  fa c t , so: w e can  elim inate th e  sch em atic  "n" by  
u s in g  th e  d e fin it io n  o f  D^.)
So, a ssu m in g  th e  co m p u tab ility  o f  th e  ty p e  fu n c tio n , we can  u s e  i t  to  
d efin e  a cu m u lative  h ie r a r c h y  o f e x te n s io n a liy  d e fin ite  dom ains o f  
q u a n tifica tio n .
iii) JustifYÎnjÊC A xiom s o f  S e t  T h eo ry :
Axiom o f  C o e x te n s io n a lity .-  From th e  a b o v e  we h a v e  th a t if  T(z)<n and
1. It  i s  tr u e  th a t th e  a ssu m p tio n  o f  com p u tab ility  o f T(x^) o n ly  s p e lls  
o u t a co n d itio n  in  w h ich  th is  p ro o f is  in tu it io n is t ic a lly  v a lid . I t  h a s been  
p o in ted  ou t to  me (b y  Dr.T. Williamson) th a t an  in tu it io n is t ic a lly  
a ccep ta b le  p roo f p r o c e ed in g  v ia  a d ou b le  in d u ctio n  on m and n  can  be 
g iv e n  w h ich  a ssu m e s  o n ly  th a t T(x^) is  w e ll-d e fin e d . So th e  r e s tr ic t io n s  
on  th e  s e t  th e o r y  w h ich  I s e e  a s  em erg in g  th ro u g h  th e  c o n str a in t th a t  
th e  ty p e  fu n c tio n  be com putab le may be more s e v e r e  th an  th e y  n eed  be.
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c o n s e r v a t iv e ly  e x te n d e d . We can  th u s  lea v e  o u t th e  ty p e  in d ex  to g e t  
yx(xEy.3,xE2r),3..y=z, p r o v id ed  w e e n su r e  th a t th e  domain of  
q u a n tifica tio n is  ta k en  a s  b e in g  la rg e  en o u g h . So, p ro v id ed  we can  s e t  an  
u p p er  bound on  th e  ty p e  o f a n y  g iv e n  s e t , we can  e n su r e  th a t we h ave  
a d e fin ite  sta tem en t o f c o e x te n s io n a lity  w h ich  d eterm in es w h eth er  or not  
tw o g iv e n  s e t s  a re  or are  n ot id e n tic a l. B ut, s in c e  w e h ave  a lre a d y  had  
to  assu m e th a t th e  ty p e  fu n c tio n  i s  com p utab le , th is  i s  n o t an  a d d itio n a l  
assu m p tion . The axiom o f  c o e x te n s io n a lity  is  th u s  r e in s ta te d  i f  (and on ly  
if) th e  ty p e  fu n c tio n  i s  com p utab le .
In  ju s t i fy in g  fu r th e r  axiom s we can  now assu m e th a t, p r o v id ed  an
ap p lica tion  o f  th e  axiom y ie ld s  a s e t  b e lo n g in g  to  a d e fin ite  dom ain th e n
it  h as a  w e ll-d e f in e d  c r ite r io n  o f  id e n tity . The g en e r a l p a tte r n  fo r
ju s t i fy in g  th e  s e t  e x is te n c e  axiom s c o n s is t s  in , f ir s t ,  sh o w in g  w hich  
domain th e  p u ta t iv e  s e t  w ould  b e lon g  to  i f  it  w ere  to  e x is t  and ,
se c o n d ly , th e n  sh o w in g  th a t it  d o es  e x is t  b y  form u latin g  a d e fin ite
d e fin in g  co n d itio n  for  it .
Axiom (Schem a) o f  S e p a r a tio n :-  W x3y^z{zEy,s,zex,(^). G iven a n y  s e t ,  th is  
axiom affirm s th e  e x is te n c e  o f  a s e t  com p risin g  ju s t  th o se  e lem en ts  o f  
th e  g iv e n  s e t  p o s s e s s in g  a  sp e c if ie d  p r o p e r ty . G iven x, le t  T(x)=n+1 
th e n , th e  e lem en ts  o f y  m ust a ll be draw n from  We can  th u s  tak e y, 
i f  it  e x is t s ,  to  be a m em ber o f To s a t is fy  th e  e x is te n tia l con d ition
we n eed  to  sh ow  th a t 3j^+lV2r(2Ey*^+l,5.zEx.(p). The o n ly  in te r p r e ta t io n  we 
can  g iv e  to  th e  u n r e s tr ic te d  q u a n tifier  is  in  term s o f a d efin ite  
p r e c is if ic a t io n  w h ich  can  be c o n s e r v a t iv e ly  ex ten d ed . C onsider  
Vz^(z*^Ej^"^l.=,z^ex.(p). T h is is  a d e f in ite  s e t  th e o r e t ic  p r e d ica te  d efin ed
on th e  dom ain X>n+1* and y^  (in  both s a t is fy  th is  p red ica te
th e n  th e y  a re  th e  sam e (s in c e  2 ^ y \  i f f  zEx.(p, i .e ., i f f  So th e
p r e d ica te  d e f in e s  a  u n iq u e  member o f M oreover th e  p r e d ica te  can
be c o n s e r v a t iv e ly  e x ten d ed  in  th e  s e n s e  th at,
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T h is i s  b eca u se  if  T (z^)>n th e n  both  ^n+l and #^E x are  fa ls e , so, 
^E yn+^.s.z^E x.cp is  tr u e . W hence, a ssu m in g  th e  com p u tab ility  o f ty p e s ,  
we g e t  ()K) (in e x a c tly  th e  sam e m anner a s  in  th e  a cco u n t o f
c o e x te n s io n a lity ). T h u s g iv e n  x, w h ere  T(x)=n+1, we have
3 y n + lv ^ (^ y n + l.s .zE x ,(p ). So, g iv e n  a n y  s e t  we can  (a ssu m in g  we can  
com pute i t s  ty p e )  g iv e  a d e f in ite  sp e c if ic a tio n  o f  i t s  s u b s e t  com p risin g  
th e  p o s s e s s o r s  o f a  g iv e n  p r o p e r ty , <p. In  th a t s e n s e  th e  axiom of 
sep a ra tio n  is  ju s t if ie d .
Note th a t  from  th e  a b o v e  w e ca n  o n ly  co n c lu d e  th a t T(y)_<n+1. T here  
i s  no g u a r a n tee  th a t  w e can  e f f e c t iv e ly  d eterm in e th e  a c tu a l ty p e  o f y  
u n le s s  we can  e f f e c t iv e ly  d eterm in e th e  maximum ty p e  o f e lem en ts  o f x  
s a t is fy in g  (p, an d , th is ,  w e ca n n o t g u a r a n tee  to  be ab le  to  do. So we 
can n ot assu m e th a t  th e  ty p e  fu n c tio n  is  com putab le. I r e tu r n  to  th is  
so u r c e  o f te n s io n  p r e s e n t ly .
Axiom o f  U n ion:- Vx3yVx(2Ey,=,3 w(z£ w. t v e x ) ) .  T his a ffirm s th e  e x is te n c e  o f  
a s e t  co n ta in in g  a ll and  o n ly  th e  m em bers o f th e  m em bers o f a n y  g iv e n  
s e t .  Take T(x)=n+1. I f  y  e x is t s  it  m ust be o f ty p e  n . S in ce , if  x  i s  o f  
ty p e  n+1 it  m ust in c lu d e  a  s e t ,  s a y , iv, o f ty p e  n , and none o f a n y
h ig h e r  ty p e . (That i s ,  i f  we ca n  affirm  th a t x  is  o f ty p e  n+1 th e n  we
m ust be ab le  to  affirm  th a t it  in c lu d e s  a  s e t  o f ty p e  n  and none o f a n y  
h ig h er  ty p e .)  w  m ust in c lu d e  a m em ber o f ty p e  n -1 , w h ich  m ust be a 
member o f y . So y  i s  o f ty p e  ^ n . C o n v erse ly , y  can n ot co n ta in  a s e t  o f
ty p e  > n - l  s in c e  th e n  x  w ould  co n ta in  a s e t  o f ty p e  >n. T h erefore  we
n eed  to show  th a t 3y^V x(^ j^ .E .3ty(2E  w. wex)). T h is is  d on e, a s  a b o v e , by  
g iv in g  a d e f in ite  s e t  th e o r e t ic  p r e d ica te  for  m em bers o f and th en
sh ow in g  th a t it  ca n  be c o n s e r v a t iv e ly  ex ten d ed . Note, f ir s t ,  th a t  
3w^(j2E w^. w^Ex) i f f  3 w^(zG w^Ex), w h ere  m>n. From le f t  to  r ig h t  th is  
is  e a s y  s in c e  i s  in c lu d ed  in  D^, C o n v erse ly , if  w e h ave
3 m ^ ( z e  w^.iv^i^Ex) th e n  w e m ust h a v e  som e w E jC ^  su c h  th a t z e w  and t v e x .
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ig n o r e  th e  in d ex  on  w  p r o v id ed  we e n su r e  th a t it  is  g r e a te r  th an  or  
eq u a l to  n. C on sid er  y ^ .=. 3 w( w; WEx) ), T h is i s  a d e fin ite
s e t  th e o r e t ic  p r e d ic a te  o f m em bers o f D^* It is  s a t is f ie d  b y  a t m ost on e  
su c h  s e t  (s in c e , a ssu m in g  y^, y^ both  s a t is fy  it , zey^  i f f  3 w ( z e w . ï v e x ),
i .e .,  i f f  zey^'f . F in a lly , we n eed  to  sh ow  th a t, 
V z^ ~ l(z^ " ley^ .s .3w t2;^ “' le  w. wEx)) i f f  Vx®(z®^ey^^.s.3 w ( z ® e  w. w e x ) ) ,  w h ere  
m ^ n —1 (^  ) .
T his fo llow s in  th e  u su a l m anner s in c e  i f  T(x®^)>n-1 th e n  j^ e y ^  i s  fa lse  
and z ^ e w  is  fa ls e  (s in c e  p v e x  s o  T( w)_<n, i .e .,  T{w);<T{z^)). So
^mEjrn,=,3jy(£rm£p|T,pvEx) is  th e n  tr u e . W hilst if  T (z^ )^ n-1  th e n  w e g e t  th e  
LHS of (*). (*) th e r e fo r e  fo llo w s u n d er  th e  a ssu m p tio n  o f th e
com p u tab ility  o f ty p e s . T h us g iv e n  a n y  s e t , i f  w e can  com pute i t s  ty p e ,  
we can  s p e c ify  i t s  u n ion  s e t .
Axiom o f  P o w er  S e t : -  Vx3yVx(zEy.s.Vw(’fVEx.3.T '^Ex)) T h is a ffirm s th e  
e x is te n c e  o f a s e t  co n ta in in g  a s  m em bers a ll and o n ly  th e  s u b s e ts  o f a n y  
g iv e n  s e t . Note th a t if  w e a re  o n ly  in te r e s te d  in  th e  pow er s e t  o f N, 
P ( ^ ,  th e n  we can  g e t  th is  from  lx :T (x)= l}. The s e t  th e o r e t ic  p r ed ica te  
h ere  is  d e fin ite  and  th e  s e t  i s  in c lu d ed  in  th e  domain D i, so  is  a  s e t  o f  
ty p e  2. But now le t  u s  j u s t i f y  th e  g e n e r a l v e r s io n . Take T(x)=n+1, th en  
th e re  is  a  s e t  w ex su c h  th a t T( w)=n. So T((w})=n+1. ve{w >.3.v=w  and wex  
so  ve{w }.3 .vex , fo r  a ll v. T h us |w }e y , i f  y  e x is t s .  T(y) is  th e n  ^n+2. If  
T(y) >n+2 th e n  th e r e  is  a s e t  z  su c h  th a t zB y  and !T(z)>n+l. So th e r e  i s  a  
V su c h  th a t v ex  and  T(v)>n. B ut if  z e y  and v ex  th e n  vex. So T(x)>n+1, 
w h ich  c o n tr a d ic ts  th e  fa c t  th a t  T(x)=n+1. T hus T(y)=n+2, if  y  e x is t s . We 
now n eed  to  sh ow  th a t 3j^'^‘=^Vx(xej'T1+‘^ .s.Vw( w ex.s. w ex)). C onsider  
Vx^^+l(x^"*'ley^'*‘^ .s.Vw^(w^Ex^‘^ 1.3.Tv^^Ex)). T h is i s  a d e fin ite  s e t  th e o re tic  
p r e d ica te  o f m em bers on  Pn+2‘ h o ld s  o f a t m ost on e  member o f Pn+2* 
T hus it  d e f in e s  a m em ber o f Dj i^+2 p ro v id ed  th a t it  can  be c o n s e r v a t iv e ly  
e x ten d ed . The c o n s e r v a t iv e  e x te n s io n  is  p o ss ib le  but is  not sim ple s in ce
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we n e e d  to  c o n s id e r  th e  r e la tio n sh ip  b etw een  th e  r a n g e s  o f z  an d  w. We 
h a v e ,
yn+2,g,vç^n( p^ne£.n+l,o, w^ex) ) i f f
V x ^ ( x ® ^ e j ^ * ^ ^ . s . V ï i 4 ( w%x)),  w h ere  m>n and  i>.m-l { t)
S in ce  if  T {z^ )> n ^ l th e n  ^mCyn+2 jg fa lse . A lso th e r e  m ust th e n  be some 
V su c h  th a t v e x ^  and T(v)>n. So v^x, vex^^.s.vex is  th e n  fa lse . Now, if
i> m -l th e n  v  is  in  (s in c e  v  i s  a  member o f  a  m em ber o f so
VTvi(w%x*^.3.îi4ex) is  fa ls e . So i f  T(x^)>n+1, ^m^j,n+2,=,vpyi( Tyi^x) is
tr u e , W hilst if  T (^)j<n+1 th e n  w e g e t  th e  LHS o f (*). So (%) h o ld s, 
a ssu m in g , o f c o u r s e , th a t  ty p e s  a re  com putab le. P ro v id ed  th e n  th a t we 
e n su r e  th a t ou r  r a n g e s  o f q u a n tifica tio n  are  la rg e  en o u g h  in  re la tio n  to  
each  o th e r  we ca n  th e n  e x ten d  ou r s e t  th e o r e t ic  p re d ica te
c o n s e r v a t iv e ly . So g iv e n  a s e t  w e can  d e f in ite ly  s p e c ify  i t s  pow er s e t
p r o v id ed  th a t w e can  com pute i t s  ty p e .
Axiom o f  P a ir s : -  VXVy3x(xex.yEx). T h is a ffirm s th e  e x is te n c e  o f  a s e t  
c o n ta in in g  a n y  tw o g iv e n  s e t s .  T h is axiom is  g u a ra n teed  b y  th e  
cum u lative  n a tu re  o f th e  dom ains. We know  th a t i f  n=max{ T(x), T( y ) } th e n  
xbD^ and .yeP^*
Axiom o f  C h o ice:-  V x3 /(V y(y= x .3x (xE y).3 ,/(y )ey ). T his s ta te s  th a t  for  a n y  
s e t  th e r e  is  a m apping w h ich  ta k e s  each  n o n -em p ty  s u b s e t  o f th e  g iv e n  
s e t  on to  on e o f i t s  m em bers. Q u an tifica tion a lly  th e r e  a re  no prob lem s  
w ith  th is  axiom: i f  T(x)=n+1, th e  in d ex  of y  can  be ta k en  to be g r e a te r  
th a n  or  eq u a l to  n+1 and th e  ty p e  o f x w ill be le s s  th an  or eq u a l to n.
In tu it io n is t ic a lly , th e  axiom is  n ot c o n tro v e r s ia l s in ce  if  we know  th a t
th e  a n te c e d e n t  is  s a t is f ie d  w e m ust h ave  a c o n str u c tio n  o f w h ich  it  can  
be r e c o g n iz e d  th a t  a c tin g  on  a n y  s u b s e t  y  o f x p r o d u c e s  a member x o f
y. But th is  is  ju s t  to s a y  th a t th e  a p p ro p r ia te  f  e x is t s .
Axiom (Schem a) o f  R e p la c em e n t:-
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V x (3 iV y V j2 (yE x,zE x.y= x:3 .f(y ) - t \ z )  ) .o .3 TvVy(y€. w ,= .3 z{zE x .f{z)= y)) . T h is  
a s s e r t s  th a t th e  im age o f a s e t  u n d er  a  m apping, w h ich  is  fu n c tio n a l on  
th e  domain form ed b y  th a t s e t ,  is  i t s e lf  a s e t .  T h is axiom is  fa ls if ie d  in  
th e  a b o v e  d eve lop m en t o f  a s e t  th e o r y  s in ce  th e r e  is  a  fu n c tio n a l  
m apping ta k in g  each  n in  7^  on to  th e  domain So, g iv e n  th e  se th ood  
o f th e  form er, th e  se th o o d  o f th e  c la s s  o f a ll dom ains w ould be 
g u a ra n teed  by  rep lacem en t. That c la s s  i s  not h ow ever  a  s e t  s in c e  it  has  
no f in ite  ty p e . We cou ld  rem ed y  th is  s itu a tio n  by  r e p u d ia tin g  th e  
p r e v io u s  assu m p tion  th a t th e  u n iv e r s e  o f s e t s  can  be f in ite ly  ty p e d . We 
can n ot do w ith o u t a ty p e  th e o r y  so  th e  a c c e p ta b ility  o f  th e  axiom of 
rep lacem en t w ould  d ep en d , a t le a s t , on  ou r a b ility  to  g iv e  a  
n o n -q u e s t io n  b e g g in g  a c c o u n t o f  g e n e r a l  d e fin itio n  by  tr a n sf in ite  
r e cu rs io n , an d  th a t, in  tu r n , w ould  im plicate th e  th e o r y  o f  tr a n sf in ite  
o rd in a ls . A lth ou gh  I ca n n o t exam ine th a t program m e h ere  th e  w orry  
w ould be th a t th is  v e r s io n  o f  th e  program m e w ould p r e su p p o se
m athem atical s tr u c tu r e s  w h ich  a re  a s  r ich  a s  th o se  it  a ttem p ts to  
ju s t i fy .  In  p a r tic u la r , th e r e  i s  th e  c o n c e rn  I r a ise d  im m ediately a fte r  
in tr o d u c in g  th e  ty p e  fu n c tio n  th a t  im p red ica tiv e  m ethods w ould be
p r e su p p o se d  in  u s in g  th e  le s s  r e s t r ic t iv e  ran k  fu n c tio n .
Axiom o f  F o u n d a tio n :-  VxC3w( wEx).3.3y(.7Ex.V x(xEy.D .^x)). T h is axiom  
a s s e r t s  th a t e v e r y  n o n -e m p ty  s e t  c o n ta in s  an e lem en t w ith  w h ich  it  h as  
a n u ll in te r s e c t io n . I a ttem p ted  to g iv e  a ju s tif ic a tio n  of th is  axiom
ea r lier  bu t n o ted  th a t (e v e n  s e t t in g  a s id e  th e  q u e stio n  ab ou t th e
in te r p r e ta t io n  o f th e  q u a n tifie r s )  w e cou ld  o n ly  j u s t i fy  th e  
in tu it io n is t ic a lly  w eak er p r in c ip le  th a t
""3x( 3 w{ WEx)&V,y(yEx,=>.3z{zey&.zex) ) ).
If  we now  assu m e th a t r e c u r s iv e  d e fin itio n  o f ty p e s  is  leg itim ate  th en  
i f  th e  ty p e  o f x  is  n (so  x  i s  n o n -em p ty ) we can  fin d  a s e t  y s x ,  w h ere  
th e  ty p e  o f y  can  be at m ost n -1 . If  th e  in te r s e c t io n  o f x  and y  is  
n o n -em p ty  th en  th e r e  m ust be a x e y  w ith  z e x . z  can  be o f  ty p e  a t m ost
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n -2 . A gain , we c o n s id e r  w h eth e r  th e  in te r s e c t io n  o f z  and x  i s  n u ll or  
n ot and th e n  r e p e a t th e  p r o c e ss . We m ust f in a lly , i .e ., a f te r  a t m ost n+1 
s te p s  o f th is  p r o c e ss , e ith e r  d isc o v e r  a d is jo in t  member of x  or e ls e  an  
elem en t o f N  w h ich  s h a r e s  a m em ber w ith  x. S in ce  th e  la tte r  is  f in ite  we 
can  t e s t  each  o f  i t s  m em bers fo r  w h eth er  it  is  a member o f x  n ot
sh a r in g  a n y  m em bers w ith  x  (one o f  them  m ust s a t is fy  th is  co n d itio n ). 
The problem  w ith  th is  d e sc r ip t io n  o f w hat p u r p o r ts  to  be an  e f fe c t iv e  
p r o c e d u r e  i s  th a t, a t a n y  s ta g e , i t  may n ot b e  e f f e c t iv e ly  d ec id ab le  
w h eth er  or  n ot x  an d  i t s  m em ber sh a r e  a m em ber. O nly i f  we bu ild  in  
th is  co n d itio n  ca n  we e n s u r e  th a t  th e  ab ove  d e s c r ib e s  an  e f fe c t iv e
p ro ce d u r e . So, e v e n  u n d er  th e  a ssu m p tio n  of ty p in g , w e can  o n ly  j u s t i fy  
th e  w eak er p r in c ip le  s in c e  it  o n ly  p r e c lu d es  th e  p o s s ib il it ie s  o f an
in fin ite  r e g r e s s  in  m em bersh ip  or o f  a  fa ilu r e  in  th e  o r d e r in g  b y  (th e  
a n c e s tr a l of) m em bership . B oth o f th e s e  p o s s ib il it ie s  w ere  a lso  p r e c lu d ed  
in  th e  e a r lier  argum en t; th e y  fa il  to  d e liv e r  an  e f fe c t iv e  m eans o f
d eterm in in g  an  E-minimal m em ber o f a  n o n -v o id  s e t .
P ro b lem s in  th e  A cco u n t
T h ere are  a num ber o f in te r r e la te d  d iff ic u lt ie s  in  th e  im plem entation o f  
th e  program m e s k e tc h e d  a b o v e . F ir s t , I h a v e  lin k ed  th e  u se  o f  
c o e x te n s io n a lity  a s  a c r iter io n  o f id e n tity  and th e  ju s tif ic a tio n  o f th e  
axiom s (of ch o ice , p a ir in g , p ow er s e t ,  u n ion  and sep ara tion ) to  th e  
com p u tab ility  o f ty p e s . The lin k  h a s  tw o fa c e ts . One fa c e t  is  rev ea le d  b y  
th e  n eed  to p r o v e  th a t  c o e x te n s io n a lity  and th e  axiom s o f s e t  e x is te n c e  
are cap ab le  o f b e in g  c o n s e r v a t iv e ly  ex ten d ed  and  th e  o th er  is  
m an ifested  in  th e  fa c t  th a t th e  ap p lica tio n  o f th e  c r iter io n  and axiom s is  
s e e n  to d ep en d  u p on  a v e r d ic t  on  ty p e  id e n tity . Now, a lth o u g h  th e  
axiom s o f pow er s e t , un ion  an d  p a ir in g , can  be ta k en  to  affirm  th e  
e x is te n c e  o f s e t s  o f d eterm in ate  ty p e s  we can n ot claim th e  same for  
sep a ra tio n . S ep a ra tio n  o n ly  a llow s u s  to  s e t  a c e ilin g  on  th e  ty p e  o f th e
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s e t  w h ose  e x is te n c e  is  a ffirm ed  in  a n y  ap p lica tion . The re a so n  for  th is  is  
tw ofo ld , a) The p r o p e r ty  u se d  in  d e f in in g  a s u b s e t  can , if  th e  th r u s t  o f  
th is  ap p roach  is  a c c e p te d , b e  sp e c if ie d  u s in g  q u a n tifica tio n  an d , in  
p a rticu la r , im p red ica tiv e  q u a n tific a tio n , p ro v id ed  th a t th e  q u a n tifica tio n  
u se d  in  th e  sp e c if ic a t io n  is  d e f in ite . We can n ot g u a r a n tee  th a t a 
p r o p e r ty  so  d e fin ed  w ill b e  a  d e c id a b le  p r o p e r ty  o f m em bers o f a g iv e n  
s e t . So we ca n n o t g u a r a n te e  to  b e  ab le  to  determ in e th e  maximum ty p e  
o f  a member p o s s e s s in g  th e  p r o p e r ty , b) E ven  if  th e  p r o p e r ty  is  
d ec id a b le  w e w ould n eed  to  q u a n tify  o v e r  th e  domain su p p lied  b y  th e  
o r ig in a l s e t  in  o r d e r  to d eterm in e th e  maximum ty p e  o f a p o s s e s s o r  o f  
th e  p r o p e r ty . A lth ou gh  q u a n tify in g  o v e r  th a t dom ain is  g u a ra n teed  to  be  
d e fin ite  it  m ay g e n e r a te  u n d e c id a b lity . We can n ot rem ed y  th is  s itu a tio n  
b y  je t t is o n in g  sep a ra tio n . To fo r e g o  sep a ra tio n  w ould be to adm it th a t  
w e can n ot b e  su r e  th a t th e  in te r s e c t io n  o f a n y  tw o s e t s  is  i t s e lf  a s e t . 
C o n v erse ly , a c c e p tin g  th e  c lo su r e  o f  s e ts  u n d er  in te r s e c t io n  w ould  
r e s u r r e c t  th e  problem  s in c e  w e c a n n o t g u a ra n tee  to  be ab le  to  determ in e  
th e  maximum ty p e  o f  a s e t  in c lu d ed  in  tw o g iv e n  s e t s .  So th e
ju s tif ic a tio n  o f th e  axiom s d e p e n d s  on  an  a ssu m p tion  o f com p u tab ility  o f  
t y p e s  w h ich  is  in  te n s io n  w ith  th e  axiom o f sep ara tion .
T his problem  is ,  I th in k , p e r n ic io u s . The in sp ir a tio n  fo r  th e
in tr o d u ctio n  o f ty p e s  is  th e  n eed  to  g iv e  a n o n -c o n s tr u c t iv e  m eans o f  
s tr a t ify in g  s e t s .  The p u r p o se  o f th a t s tr a tif ica tio n  is  to  allow  exp lan ation  
o f p r e c ise  c r ite r ia  o f id e n t ity  b y  r e s tr ic t in g  th e  ra n g e  o f q u a n tifica tio n  
to  s e t s  below  a  c e r ta in  stratu m . I t  th en  becom es a c r it ic a l m atter to  
show  th a t  th e  fu n c tio n in g  o f  th e s e  c r ite r ia  is  unim paired b y  ex c lu d in g  
s e t s  in  h ig h e r  s tr a ta . We a ttem p t to  d em on stra te  th is  b y  sh ow in g  th a t  
th e  in c lu s io n  of su c h  s e t s  b y  in c r e a s in g  th e  ra n g e  o f q u a n tifica tio n
d e liv e r s  c r ite r ia  w h ich  a re  g u a r a n te ed  to a g r e e  in  ju d g em en ts  o f tru th
v a lu e  a r r iv e d  at b y  u s in g  th e  m ore r e s tr ic te d  c r iter ia . I t  i s  j u s t  a t th is  
p oin t th a t w e w ish  to ap p ea l to  th e  p r o p e r tie s  o f th e  ty p e  fu n ctio n . 
From a r e a lis t  p e r s p e c t iv e  th is  p r o c e ss  seem s s u c c e s s fu l  and
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u n ob jection ab le: th e  ty p e  fu n c tio n  sh o w s th a t, in  r e s tr ic t in g  th e  r a n g e  
o f q u a n tifica tio n  a p p r o p r ia te ly , w e h ave  in c lu d ed  all s e t s  ’'relevan t"  to  
determ in ation  o f tr u th  v a lu e . So n o th in g  is  d is tu r b e d  in  th e  p a ssa g e  to  
more in c lu s iv e  dom ains, v e r d ic t s  on tr u th  v a lu e  are  p r e s e r v e d . From th e  
a n t i-r e a lis t  or in tu it io n is t  p e r s p e c t iv e  w e n eed  to  ta k e  a cco u n t o f ou r  
m eans o f d eterm in in g  tr u th  v a lu e s . To g u a r a n tee  th e  c o n s e r v a t iv e n e s s  o f  
ou r c r ite r ia  w e sh o u ld  n eed  to  sh ow  th a t  our ep istem ic  p o s itio n  r e la t iv e  
to  th e  more in c lu s iv e  dom ain w a s, in  r e le v a n t  r e s p e c ts , u n ch a n g ed . But, 
a s  we saw , we ca n n o t m erely  c o n s id e r  p r o p e r tie s  o f th e  ty p e  fu n c tio n  
w ith o u t c o n s id e r in g  how  w e may come to  know  th o se  p r o p e r tie s  to  
o b ta in . So, fo r  in s ta n c e , we w ant to  be ab le  to  a s s e r t  th a t if  th e  ty p e  o f  
an e n t ity  i s  g r e a te r  th a n  n , s a y , i t  ca n n o t b e  a m em ber o f th e  s e t s  
c o n cern ed  (so  th e  c o n d itio n  is  tr iv ia lly  sa tis f ie d )  w h ils t , i f  i t  is  le s s  
th an  or eq u a l to  n  i t  is  su b su m ed  w ith in  th e  o r ig in a l c r iter io n . But to  
b e ab le  to  a s s e r t  th is  w e m ust h a v e  som e w ay o f com ing to  know  it ,  and  
th is  can n ot be g u a r a n te ed  (w ith ou t d em on stra tin g  th e  com p u tab ility  of 
th e  ty p e  fu n c tio n ) . What th e  in tu it io n is t  n e e d s , th e r e fo r e , to  j u s t i fy  th e  
tr a n sit io n  to  th e  m ore in c lu s iv e  c r ite r ia  in v o lv e s  n o n -tr iv ia l p r o g r e ss  in  
h is  ep istem ic  p o sitio n . The m ore in c lu s iv e  c r ite r ia  h a v e  th u s  not b een  
d em on stra ted , in u t io n is t ic a lly , to  be c o n se r v a tiv e  e x te n s io n s  o f  
com p ara tively  m ore r e s tr ic te d  c r ite r ia .
The s ta n d in g  o f g e n e r a l im p red ica tiv e  m ethods from  a n o n -r e a lis t  
p e r s p e c t iv e  now seem s h ig h ly  d u b io u s . I t  is  d iff ic u lt , a s  I h a v e  n o ted , 
to  r e co n c ile  su c h  m ethods w ith  a n y  form  o f c o n str u c tiv ism , w h ils t  a 
n o n -c o n s tr u c t iv e  ap p roach  seem s to  h ave  a p ow erfu l need  fo r  a ty p e  
th e o r y  and th a t h a s o n ly  b e e n  v in d ica te d  on  c e r ta in  r e a lis t  a ssu m p tio n s.
S eco n d ly , a cr u c ia l a s p e c t  o f th is  program m e c le a r ly  c o n c e r n s  th e  
leg itim a cy  o f th e  r e c u r s iv e  d e fin it io n  o f ty p e s . In tra d ition a l s e t  th e o r y  
o n e  p r o v e s  th e  leg itim a cy  o f r e c u r s iv e  d efin itio n  on  a w e ll-fo u n d e d  
re la tio n  b y  in d u ctio n . (Note th a t th is  proof, in  g en era l, r e q u ir e s  th e  
axiom o f u n ion  in  o r d er  to sh ow  th a t th e  dom ain o f th e  fu n c tio n  i s  th e
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u n iv e r se  o f s e t s .  I h a v e  a ssu m ed  th a t th is  is  so  and u se d  th a t
assu m p tion  to  c h a r a c te r iz e  th e  u n iv e r se  o f s e ts .  So I h a v e  n ot,
e f fe c t iv e ly , a ssu m ed  th e  axiom o f  u n ion  in  ju s t ify in g  th e  axiom its e lf .)  To 
ju s t i fy  th e  d e fin it io n  o f ty p e s  fo llo w in g  th is  m odel w e w ould n eed  to  
show  th at E is  a w e ll-fo u n d e d  re la tio n  (i.e ., we w ould n eed  th e  axiom o f  
fou n d ation ) and w e w ould  n eed  to j u s t i fy  in d u ctio n  on  e, i .e .,  i f
V x[V y(yE x;z).f(y)).3.f(x)] th e n  V xf(x). The ju s tif ic a tio n  o f  in d u ctio n  
r e q u ir e s  th e  le a s t  m em ber p r in c ip le , i .e ., i f  3xf(x) th en  th e r e  is  an
E-minimal o b je c t  fo r  w h ich  f  h o ld s  ( if  3xf(x) th e n  3y ( f ( y ) , V x ( x E f ( x ) ). 
G iven th e  le a s t  m em ber p r in c ip le  an d  th e  a n te c e d e n t  o f th e  in d u c tiv e  
h y p o th e s is  w e th e n  e a s ily  p r o v e  (c la ss ic a lly )  th a t in d u c tio n  h o ld s b y  
draw ing  a c o n tra d ic tio n  from  th e  assu m p tion  th a t 3x^ /(x), i .e .,  we p ro v e  
-^3x^f(x), w h en ce , c la s s ic a lly , w e h a v e  Vxf(x), H ow ever th e  p roo f fa ils  
in tu it io n is t ic a lly  s in c e  f  is  n o t, in  g e n e r a l, d ec id a b le  and  th e  domain is  
n ot s u r v e y  ab le . A seco n d  problem  c o n c e r n s  th e  le a s t  member p r in c ip le  
w h ich  can n ot be assu m ed  fo r  e s in c e  th a t a ssu m p tion  is  th e  same a s  
a ssu m in g  th e  axiom o f  fo u n d a tio n  and th a t, a s  I h a v e  n o ted , can n ot  
i t s e lf  be in tu it io n is t ic a lly  ju s t if ie d .
It w ould seem  th a t, g iv e n  th is ,  we can n ot g iv e  an in tu it io n is t ic  
ju s tif ic a tio n  of in d u c tio n  on  e b u t m ust assum e th a t it  h o ld s. That may 
n ot be an  un com fortab le  p o s itio n  fo r  tw o r e a so n s . F ir st , c o n s id er  th e  
fo llow in g  c la s s ic a lly  e q u iv a le n t  s ta te m e n ts ,
(1) I f  3xf{x) th en  3 x (f(x ) .Vy( y sx ,3 .~ f(y )  ).
(2) If ~ 3 x ( x ) .V y ( y s x .s .~ f ( y ) ) th e n  ~3xf(x).
(3) I f  Vx(VX.ysX.3 .~ f (y ) ) .3 .^ f(x )) th e n  Vx-~f(x).
From (3) w e d e r iv e  c la s s ic a lly  th e  g e n e r a l in d u ctio n  schem a b y  
s u b s t itu t in g  fo r  f  and u s in g  d ou b le  n eg a tio n  elim ination . (1) is  a  
sta tem en t o f a v e r s io n  o f  th e  le a s t  member p r in c ip le  w h ich  is  e q u iv a le n t  
to  th e  axiom o f fo u n d a tio n  (w h ich  is  th u s  c la s s ic a lly  e q u iv a le n t to  th e  
in d u ctio n  schem a). H ow ever in tu it io n is t ic a lly  th e  e q u iv a le n c e s  fa il fo r , at 
le a s t , th e  fo llow in g  r e a so n s . We c a n n o t make th e  tra n sit io n  from  (2) to
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(1) (w hich  r e lie s  on  th e  in tu it io n is t ic a lly  in v a lid  law o f co n trap osition : if  
th en  B^A). So we c a n n o t a ssu m e th a t th e  axiom o f fo u n d ation  is  
in tu it io n is t ic a lly  in te r  d e r iv a b le  w ith  th e  in d u ctio n  schem a. T h us a n y  
in tu it io n is t ic  s u sp ic io n  a tta c h in g  to th e  form er may not n e c e ss a r ily  
in fe c t  th e  la tte r .
S e c o n d ly , tra d itio n a l in tu it io n is t ic  a ttem p ts to  j u s t i fy  tr a n sf in ite  
in d u ctio n  a re  c o n te n tio u s . M ost n o ta b ly , B rou w er's p roof o f Bar 
In d u ctio n  (w hich  i s  d em o n stra b ly  e q u iv a le n t  to  th e  g e n e r a l p r in c ip le  o f  
tr a n sf in ite  in d u ctio n ) r e lie s  on  th e  notion  o f a fu lly  a n a ly sed  p roof in  
assu m in g  th a t w e may fu lly  c ircu m scr ib e  th e  s o r ts  o f  in fe r e n c e s  w h ich  
m ight be in v o lv e d  in  p r o v in g  a  sta tem en t o f  a c e r ta in  form . Dummett 
recom m ends th a t r a th e r  th a n  r e ly in g  on  su c h  a  p roo f we sh o u ld  assum e  
th e  p r in c ip le  o f Bar In d u ctio n  a s  an axiom or axiom schem a, (See  
Dummett (1977, p p .1 0 2 -3 ) .)
I t  w ould seem  th e r e fo r e  th a t  an  a n t i-r e a lis t ic a lly  a ccep ta b le  s e t  
th e o r y  d ev e lo p ed  a lon g  th e  l in e s  s k e tc h e d  a b o v e  is  n o t in c o h e re n t.  The 
sco p e  o f th a t th e o r y  w ou ld  be d eterm in ed  b y  h a v in g  to  e n su r e  th a t  
m ethods o f  s e t  form ation  g u a r a n te e  th a t th e  ty p e  fu n c tio n  rem ains  
d ec id ab le . So, a t th is  p o in t it  is  u n c lea r  w hat th e  sco p e  o f su c h  a  
th e o r y  w ould be. A com p arison  o f  th is  ap p roach  w ith  th a t o f tra d itio n a l  
in tu it io n is t ic  u se  o f  ch o ice  s e q u e n c e s  w ould be in s tr u c t iv e .
§9 Summary:
T his ch a p te r  b e g a n  w ith  an  a c c o u n t o f th e  p relim in ary  ex p la n a tio n s of 
th e  in tu it io n is t ic  lo g ica l c o n s ta n ts . I looked  a t th e  so u rce  o f  
u n d ec id a b ility  in  m athem atical d isc o u r se , nam ely, a t q u a n tifica tio n  o v er  
in fin ite  dom ains, I g a v e  a  d e sc r ip t io n  o f ou r  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f su ch  
dom ains in  term s o f a  g r a sp  o f  p red ica tio n . T his led  me to co n sid er  
p o ss ib le  a p p ro a ch es  to  s e t  th e o r y . I n o ted  th a t th ere  w as no sp e c if ic a lly  
a n t i-r e a lis t  im pu lse tow ard s a  c o n s tr u c t iv e  (or com binatorial) app roach
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to s e t s  so  th a t i f  su c h  a  p o s itio n  w as ad op ted  th e n  it  w ould h a v e  to  
r e su lt  from  a s p e c if ic  c o n c e p tio n  o f  s e t  My in te r e s t  th u s  c e n te r e d  on  
th e  ta sk  o f g a u g in g  th e  p o s s ib il ity  and sc o p e  o f a  n o n -c o n s tr u c t iv e  
a n t i-r e a lis t  s e t  th e o r y . A m ajor m otive in  th a t e n te r p r is e  stem s from  th e  
d iff ic u lty  o f  r e co n c ilin g  th e  u s e  o f im p red ica tive  m eth od s w ith  a 
c o n str u c tiv ism . The c o n s tr a in t  th a t I u se d  in  m otiva tin g  a s e t  th e o r y  
em erged  from  c o n s id e r in g  th e  e x te n s io n a l d e f in ite n e s s  o f q u a n tifica tio n . 
For q u a n tifica tio n  to  b e  e x te n s io n a liy  d e f in ite , I a r g u e d , e lem en ts in  th e  
domain m ust p o s s e s s  a  d e f in ite  c r ite r io n  o f  id e n tity . So c o e x te n s io n a lity  
w as fou n d  to  be c ir c u la r  if  tr e a te d  a s  a g lob a l c r ite r io n  o f id e n tity . The  
p r o je c t  th u s  becom es on e o f  c ir c u m scr ib in g  dom ains o f  q u a n tifica tio n  to  
allow  for  sp e c if ic a t io n  o f  p r e c is e  c r ite r ia  o f id e n tity  and  m em bership . 
That p r o c e ss  r e q u ir e s  a  th e o r y  o f ty p e s  (w h ich , in  tu r n  d e p e n d s , up on  
th e  v a lid ity  o f t r a n s f in ite  in d u c tio n ) . The prom ise o f th is  program m e w as  
th a t  im p red ica tiv e  m eth od s co u ld  b e  r e in s ta te d  p ro v id e d  th a t  th e  
ap p ro p r ia te  dom ains o f q u a n tific a tio n  cou ld  be sh ow n  to be e x te n s io n a liy  
d e fin ite . But a  c r u c ia l s te p  o f  th is  program m e r e lie s  on  th e  
d em on stration  th a t c r ite r ia  m ade p r e c is e  b y  c ircu m scr ip tio n  o f dom ains 
can  be c o n s e r v a t iv e ly  e x te n d e d . I t  w as fou n d  th a t th is  is  p o ss ib le  o n ly  
i f  th e  ty p e  fu n c tio n  is  com p u tab le . T hat w ould b r in g  ab ou t a s e v e r e  
r e s tr ic t io n  on th e  sc o p e  o f th e  th e o r y . It w ould th u s  seem  th a t th e  
prom ise to r e in s ta te  im p red ica tiv e  m eth od s b y  ta k in g  th is  ro u te  rem ains, 
at p r e s e n t , u n fu lfille d .
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§5 An A ltern a tiv e  C h aracteriza tion  o f C anonical P roof
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C anonical P roof
The in tu it io n is t ic  sem an tica l th e o r y  is  an  a ttem pt to s a t is fy  a p h ilo so p h ica l  
h a n k er in g  fo r  a sy ste m a tic  a c c o u n t o f th e  m eaning o f m athem atical 
sta tem en ts  in  term s o f  a s s e r t ib i l i ty  c o n d itio n s , th a t is ,  in  term s o f  
c o n d itio n s  w h ich  w e can  p e r fo r c e  ta k e  o u r s e lv e s  to  be cap ab le  o f  
r e c o g n iz in g  and w h ich  c o n s t itu te  a  w arran t fo r  th e  a s s e r t io n  o f th e  
se n te n c e . So, for  ea ch  m athem atical s e n te n c e  th e  th e o r y  m ust g iv e  a  
sy stem a tic  w ay  o f c h a r a c te r iz in g  th e  p a r t ic u la r  r e co g n itio n a l c a p a c ity  
w h ich , if  e x e r c ise d  b y  a sp e a k e r , w ou ld  j u s t i fy  u s  in  a sc r ib in g  to  him an  
u n d er s ta n d in g  o f th a t  s e n te n c e . In  m athem atics a se n te n c e  is  a s s e r t ib le  
ju s t  w h en  it  i s  p ro v a b le  so  th e  in tu it io n is t ic  sem antica l th e o r y  ta k e s  
p r o v a b ility  a s  i t s  c e n tr a l sem an tica l co n c e p t. In o th er  w o rd s, th e  
in tu it io n is t ic  sem an tica l th e o r y  m u st g iv e  a  sp e c if ic a tio n  for  each  se n te n c e  
o f w hat is  to  co u n t a s  a p ro o f o f  it . The sp e c if ic a tio n  g iv e n  m ust be  
in form ative , it  m ust n o t p r e s u p p o s e  an  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f th e  se n te n c e  b e in g  
exp la in ed  and  th e  c o n s tr u c t io n  th a t  th e  sem antica l th e o r y  sa n c tio n s  a s  a 
c o r r e c t  p roo f m ust, o f c o u r s e , b e  o n e  w e are  cap ab le  o f r e c o g n iz in g  as  
su c h . The f ir s t  c o n s tr a in t  i s  n e e d e d  i f  th e  th e o r y  is  to  d e sc r ib e  la n g u a g e  
in  su c h  a  w ay th a t i t  i s  p e r s p ic u o u s ly  lea rn a b le  and th e  seco n d  to  e n su r e  
th a t th e  th e o r y  d o es n ot lo se  s ig h t  o f  i t s  p o in t o f  d e sc r ib in g  m eaning in  
term s o f u se . T h us th e  sem an tica l th e o r y  can  be cr it ic ize d  e ith e r  fo r  not  
is s u in g  in  in form ative  s p e c if ic a t io n s  o f th e  a s s e r t ib il ity  c o n d itio n s  o f  
in d iv id u a l s e n te n c e s  or fo r  a c h ie v in g  th is  o n ly  v ia  th e  a sc r ip t io n  of  
im plausib le  re co g n it io n a l c a p a c it ie s . A p r a c tic e  ca n  be c r it ic iz e d  if  it  can  
o n ly  b e  d e sc r ib e d  b y  sem an tica l th e o r ie s  w h ich  bear th e se  fa u lts . My 
p u r p o se  in  ca llin g  to mind th e s e  g e n e r a l i s s u e s  is  sim ply  to  s e t  in  co n tex t  
th e  cr itic ism s Dummett m akes o f th e  p relim in ary  exp lan ation s o f th e  
m ean in gs o f th e  in tu it io n is t ic  lo g ic a l c o n s ta n ts .
R ecall th e  inform al in tu it io n is t ic  ex p la n a tio n s o f th e  m ean ings o f th e  
lo g ica l c o n s ta n ts . T h ere  th e  aim w as to  g iv e  an acco u n t o f th e  m ean ings o f
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th e se  c o n s ta n ts  b y  g iv in g  a  r e c u r s iv e  a cco u n t o f w hat c o n s t itu te s  a  v a lid  
p roof o f a lo g ic a lly  com plex s e n te n c e , th a t is , to  c h a r a c te r iz e  w hat c o u n ts  
as a p roo f o f a  lo g ic a lly  com plex s e n te n c e  in  term s o f a k n ow led ge  o f w hat 
c o u n ts  a s  a  p roo f o f th o s e  o f i t s  c o n s t itu e n ts  w h ich  are  com bined u n d er  
th e  dom inant lo g ica l o p e r a to r . In  th is  w ay  th e  m eaning o f ea ch  lo g ic a l  
op era to r  is ,  i t  is  in te n d e d , c a p tu r e d . P la in ly , w h eth er  or n ot th e se  
exp lan ation s do or  do n ot u ltim a te ly  co n fer  c o h e r e n t m ean in gs on th e  
lo g ica l o p e r a to r s  th e y  do s e t  up  a  fram ew ork w ith in  w h ich  th o se  m ean ings  
m ust b e  e s ta b lish e d . T hat i s ,  i f  w e ta k e  it  th a t th e  s t ip u la t io n s  m ust 
assu m e a n otion  o f p ro o f (so  do n o t c o n s t itu te  c o h e r e n t  e x p la n a tio n s  o f th e  
lo g ica l o p era to rs) th e  form  o f th e  s tip u la t io n s  d o e s  c o n str a in  th e  
a c c e p ta b ility  o f  th e  n otion  o f  p ro o f w h ich  can  be assu m ed  u n le s s  w e are  
p rep ared  to  a llow  a  ra d ica l d is lo c a tio n  b etw een  ou r in fe r e n tia l p r a c tic e  and  
th e  m ean in gs o f th e  lo g ic a l c o n s ta n ts . For in s ta n c e , e v e n  i f  w e a c c ep t  
c la s s ic a l p roo f p r o c e d u r e s  in  th e  s tip u la t io n s  th e n  th e  c la s s ic a l  u se  o f  
ex c lu d ed  m iddle u n r e s tr ic te d ly  w ill n o t b e  a c o n se q u e n c e  o f th e  m eaning of  
d is ju n ctio n  a s  th u s  ex p la in ed  s in c e  a d is ju n c tio n  th e n  w ill o n ly  be  
a s s e r t ib le  w h en  w e h a v e  a p ro o f o f  on e or o th er  d is ju n c t  and  in  m any  
c la s s ic a l u s e s  o f  LEM w e do n ot h a v e  a  c la s s ic a l  p ro o f o f e ith e r  d is ju n c t .
§1 A Problem  in  th e  I n tu it io n is t ic  E xp lan ation s o f  th e  L ogical C on stants:  
What th e n  are  Dum m ett's r e a so n s  fo r  s u s p e c t in g  th e  ex p la n a tio n s are  
in co h eren t?  D um m ett's p r in c ip le  r e a so n  stem s from  th e  o v e r t ly  im p red ica tive  
ch a ra c ter  o f th e  s tip u la t io n s . He a r g u e s  th a t if  th e  n otion  o f p ro o f a s  u se d  
in  th e  ex p la n a tio n s is  th a t  o f  in form al d em on stra tion  th en  th e  exp lan a tion s  
a re  in e v ita b ly  c ir c u la r , th e  e x p la n a tio n s  fa il to  is s u e  in  in form ative  
sp e c if ic a t io n s  o f th e  m ean in gs o f  in d iv id u a l s e n te n c e s  o f th e  la n g u a g e .
C onsider th e  m eaning s tip u la t io n  r e la tin g  to con d ition a ls: a p roof o f A^B 
is  a n y  c o n str u c t io n  o f w h ich  it  can  be r e co g n iz e d  th a t ap p lied  to  a  p roof  
o f A it  y ie ld s  a p roo f o f B. The problem , o f c o u r se , is  th a t in  th is  
stip u la tio n  w e are r e q u ir e d  to  q u a n tify  im p licitly  o v e r  p ro o fs  o f th e
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a n te c e d e n t  and if  w e ta k e  th is  to ta lity  to  c o n s is t  o f a ll th o se  in form ally
a ccep ta b le  d em o n stra tio n s th e n  w e m ust allow  it  to  in c lu d e  th o se  in form ally
a ccep ta b le  d em on stra tion s w h ich  p r o c e ed  v ia  th e  co n d ition a l i t s e lf  (or v ia
s e n te n c e s  of a r b itr a r y  d e g r e e s  o f com p lex ity ). B ut th en  ou r sp e c if ic a tio n  o f
th e  m eaning o f a c o n d itio n a l w ill h a v e  b een  g iv e n  in  term s w h ich
p r e su p p o se  an u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  th e  co n d itio n a l i t s e l f  (or o f th e  e n tir e
la n g u a g e ). The p o in t i s  th a t  u n d er  th is  in te r p r e ta t io n  o f  th e  ex p la n a tio n s
th e  n otion  o f com p lex ity  becom es v a c u o u s  s in c e  i t  i s  im p ossib le  to  im pose a
p artia l o r d e r in g  on  s e n te n c e s . Or, to  be more ex a ct, a p o ss ib le  p a rtia l
o r d e r in g  u s in g  s y n ta c t ic  c r ite r ia  h a s  no sem antic r e le v a n c e . The n eed  fo r  a
p artia l o r d e r in g  o f s e n te n c e s  b y  com p lex ity  r e s u lt s  from  th e  m olecu larity
req u irem en t. I f  we are  to  allow  fo r  ou r  s te p w ise  p r o g r e ss io n  in  com p eten ce
w e m ust sh ow  how th is  p r o g r e ss io n  r e la te s  to  a p a rtia l o r d e r in g  o f
s e n te n c e s . The m anner in  w h ich  w e a c h ie v e  th is  e s ta b lis h e s  th e  sem an tica lly
r e le v a n t  n otion  o f com p lex ity  fo r  s e n te n c e s . So Dum m ett's problem  becom es
o n e  o f  c o n str a in in g  th e  in te r p r e ta t io n  o f th e  ex p la n a tio n s to on e a llow in g
th e  im position  o f a  (sem a n tica lly  r e le v a n t)  p artia l o rd er  on  s e n te n c e s . He
r e q u ir e s  no more and  no le s s  o f a so lu tio n .
§2 Com plexity and C anonical Proof:
S in ce  our problem  a r o se  th r o u g h  in te r p r e t in g  th e  c o n s tr u c t io n s  u se d  in  th e  
exp lan ation s a s  o r d in a r y  inform al d em o n stra tio n s it  seem s n a tu ra l to  look  
fo r  a so lu tio n  b y  d is t in g u is h in g  th o se  can on ica l c o n s tr u c t io n s  w h ich  are  
u se d  in  th e  ex p la n a tio n s  from  th e s e  inform al d em on stra tion s. So we m ust 
f ir s t ly  c h a n g e  th e  s t ip u la t io n s  so  th a t th e y  are  fram ed in  term s o f  
can on ica l p r o o fs  and th e n  add a s tip u la tio n  w h ich  e n s u r e s  th a t a p a rtia l 
o rd er  can  now be im posed . Two form s o f s tip u la tio n  p r e s e n t  th em se lv es;
1. A can on ica l p ro o f o f A is  a p ro o f o f A  w h ich  d oes n ot in v o lv e  
se n te n c e s  w h ich  a re  m ore com plex th an  A.
2. A can on ica l p ro o f o f A is  a p ro o f o f A w h ich  o n ly  in v o lv e s  s e n te n c e s  
le s s  com plex than  A.
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in vo lvem en t in  a proof. I s  a  s e n te n c e  in v o lv e d  in  a p roof if  i t  is  a c tu a lly  
p ro v ed  in  th e  c o u r se  o f a p roo f or d o es  i t  sim ply  need  to  be in v o k e d  a s , 
sa y , an assu m p tion ?  B ut, fu r th e r , th e s e  d e fin it io n s  o f  can on ica l p roo f  
sim ply  ra ise  th e  q u e s tio n  o f how  w e g iv e  c o n te n t to  th e  n otion  o f
com p lexity . T h ere  are  o n ly  th r e e  a s p e c ts  o f a s e n te n c e  to w h ich  we can  
lin k  th e  n o tion  o f com p lexity: i t s  exp lanation ; i t s  proof; or i t s  sy n ta c t ic a l  
s tr u c tu r e . So, w e g e t  th e  fo llo w in g  th r e e  n o tio n s  o f com plexity;
(a) A i s  le s s  com plex^ th a n  B i f  A m ust be u n d er sto o d  p r ior  to
u n d e r s ta n d in g  B.
(b) A is  l e s s  com plexp th a n  B i f  A m ust b e  in v o lv e d  in  a  p roo f o f B.
(c) A is  l e s s  com plex g th a n  B if  A i s  a  c o n s t itu e n t  o f bA
The q u e stio n  now is  w h ich  g lo s s  on  th e  n o tion  o f com p lex ity  com bined w ith  
w h ich  d e fin it io n  o f ca n o n ica l p ro o f f r e e s  our ex p la n a tio n s  o f  c o n c e p tu a l  
c ir c u la r ity .
F ir st , n o te  a fa c to r  common to  each  n otion  o f com p lex ity . None 
e s ta b lis h e s  more th a n  a p a r tia l o r d e r  o f s e n te n c e s . S e n te n c e s  m ay sim p ly  
be u n r e la ted  b y  com p lex ity . We can  q u ick ly  s e e  th a t th is  o b se r v a tio n  
s u f f ic e s  to  ru le  o u t, a b  in itio , th e  f ir s t  (w eaker) d e fin itio n  o f can on ica l  
proof. S in ce , a c c o rd in g  to  th is  d e fin it io n , a  p roof may s t i l l  b e  can on ica l if  
it  in c lu d e s  a s e n te n c e  u n r e la te d  b y  com p lex ity  to th e  s e n te n c e  p r o v e d .2
1. An a lte r n a tiv e  d e fin tio n  o f com p lex ity  g s u g g e s t s  i t s e lf  and I sh ou ld  
exp la in  w h y  I do n ot c o n s id e r  it . R ather th an  d e fin e  s y n t a c t ic . com p lex ity  in  
term s o f th e  re la tio n  o f  b e in g  a c o n s t itu e n t  w e cou ld  d e fin e  i t  in  term s of  
th e  num ber o f a p p e a r a n c e s  o f lo g ica l o p e r a to r s  in  th e  s e n te n c e . In  fa c t  it  
m akes lit t le  d iffe r e n c e  to my a rgu m en t w h ich  d e fin itio n  is  u se d  s in ce  both  
co h ere  w ith  th e  p o ss ib le  n o tio n s  o f com p lexity  in  th e  co n tex t o f  
norm alization.
2. T h is, o f  c o u r se , i s  n ot tr u e  i f  w e tak e  th e  d e fin itio n  o f  sy n ta c t ic a l  
com p lex ity  a s  m en tioned  in  th e  p r e v io u s  n o te  s in c e  th a t notion  d o es n o t s e t  
up a  p a rtia l o r d e r in g . H ere a lth o u g h  e v e r y  se n te n c e  is  r e la ted  to  e v e r y  
o th e r  b y  com p lex ity  th e  r e la tio n  is  n o t an tisym m etric  so  we o n ly  h a v e  a  
p re o r d e r in g  ie . we can  h a v e  s e n te n c e s  th a t are d is t in c t  y e t  are  o f eq u a l 
com p lexity . We can  ru le  o u t th e  f ir s t  d e fin itio n  o f can on ica l p roof b y  
sh ow in g  th a t w ith  s e n te n c e s  o f e q u a l com p lex ity  on e  may b e in c lu d ed  in  a  
can on ica l p roo f o f th e  o th e r  an d  v ic e  v e r sa .
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So a  co n d ition a l (A) w h ich  is  u n r e la te d  b y  com p lex ity  to  th e  a n te c e d e n t  o f  
an o th er  co n d ition a l (B) w ill be in v o lv e d  in  a  can on ica l p roo f o f th e  
a n te c e d e n t  o f B (sim p ly  b y  in c lu d in g  r ed u n d a n t s te p s  in  i t s  p ro o f). T h us  
w h en  we q u a n tify  o v e r  th e  ca n o n ica l p ro o fs  o f  th e  a n te c e d e n t  w e w ill 
p r e su p p o se  an  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f A. T h is in  i t s e l f  sh ow s th a t w e ca n n o t s e t  
a bound on  th e  com p lex ity  o f s e n te n c e s  th a t  n eed  to  be u n d er sto o d  p rior  
to  u n d e r s ta n d in g  a  g iv e n  co n d itio n a l. B ut it  is  a lso  c lea r  th a t w e cou ld  fin d  
co n d itio n a ls  w h ich  w ere  ea ch  u n r e la te d  b y  com p lex ity  to  th e  a n te c e d e n t  o f  
th e  o th e r  an d  in  th is  w ay  d ev e lo p  a  c o n cep tu a l c ir c u la r ity  (sim p ly  b y  
ta ck in g  th e  p roo f o f th e  on e  co n d itio n a l on to  a p ro o f o f th e  a n te c e d e n t  o f  
th e  o th e r  an d  v ic e  v e r s a ) .  T h u s, i f  a n otion  o f can on ica l p ro o f i s  to  be  
a c h ie v e d , i t  m ust em erge  th r o u g h  a g lo s s  on th e  notion  o f com p lex ity  a s  it  
is  u se d  in  th e  se co n d  d e fin it io n  a b o v e .
T h is d e fin it io n  r e q u ir e s  th a t a n y  se n te n c e  s e t s  a b oun d  on  th e  
com p lex ity  o f s e n te n c e s  in v o lv e d  in  a p roo f o f th a t s e n te n c e . So  
u n d e r s ta n d in g  th e  s e n te n c e  w ill n o t, on  th is  schem e o f  th in g s , dem and  
g r a sp  o f s e n te n c e s  o f a r b i t r a r y  com p lex ity . But th is  s t i l l  a llow s a  
c ir c u la r ity  in  th e  s t ip u la t io n s  s in c e  if  th e  notion  o f com p lex ity  w e a re  u s in g  
i s  n o t ir r e fle x iv e  th e n  a  can on ica l p ro o f o f a  g iv e n  se n te n c e  may in v o lv e  
th e  se n te n c e  it s e lf .  T h is, d e p e n d in g  on  o n e 's  in te r p r e ta tio n , may or may n ot  
be harm ful: in  on e s e n s e  a ll p r o o fs  in v o lv e  th e  se n te n c e  b e in g  p r o v e d  s in c e  
th a t  s e n te n c e  i s  a s s e r te d  a s  th e  c o n c lu s io n  of th e  proof. I t  w ould b e  w ell 
th o u g h , to in s is t  in  a ll c a s e s  th a t th e  n otion  o f com p lex ity  be ir r e fle x iv e . 
T his n eed  n ot b e g  a n y  q u e s t io n s  s in c e  we s t i l l  h a v e  to  s e t t le  th e  p r e c ise  
n a tu re  o f in v o lv em en t in  a p roo f. T h us w e u se  a n otion  o f in v o lv em en t in  a 
p roo f w h ich  w ould lead  to  c o n c e p tu a l c ir c u la r ity  w ere  th e  n otion  of 
com p lex ity  n ot ir r e f le x iv e . That i s ,  in v o lv em en t o f a s e n te n c e , A, in  a p roo f  
o f B m ust lead  to c ir c u la r ity  w h en  B is  le s s  com plex th an  A or w h en  B is  
A. So, s in ce  w hat we are  tr y in g  to c h a r a c te r iz e  is  a p roo f re co g n it io n a l
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a b ility , A  is  in v o lv e d  in  a  p ro o f o f B j u s t  w h en  r e co g n it io n  o f a  can on ica l  
p roof o f B r e q u ir e s  r e c o g n it io n  o f a can on ica l p roof o f A.
(a) w ill c le a r ly  n ot to le r a te  a  n o n - ir r e f le x iv e  n otion  o f com p lex ity  s in c e  
if  i t  w ere  n o t ir r e f le x iv e  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  a  g iv e n  s e n te n c e  w ould  
p r e su p p o se  an  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f th a t  s e n te n c e , (c) can  be made ir r e fle x iv e  
b y  in s is it in g  th a t th e  n o tion  o f  c o n s t itu e n t  be r e s tr ic te d  to  p rop er  
c o n stiu e n t . F in a lly , th e  ir r e f le x iv ity  o f  (b) w ill d ep en d  on  th e  n otion  o f  
in vo lvem en t in  a p roof. In v o lv em en t in  a p ro o f is  a re la tio n  b etw een  a  
s e n te n c e  and a  p roo f. So th e  n o tion  o f r e f le x iv ity  d o es  n ot a p p ly  to  it  
d ir e c t ly . H ow ever w e h a v e  in s is te d  th a t w e u se  a n otion  o f  in v o lv em en t in  a  
p ro o f w h ich  is  s tr o n g  e n o u g h  to  p r e v e n t  a se n te n c e  b e in g  in v o lv e d  in  i t s  
ow n p roo f. So com p lex ityp  becom es ir r e fle x iv e . It  is  im portant to  rea lize  
th a t th e se  are  a ll a d e q u a c y  c o n s tr a in ts  on  our a cco u n t. We s t i l l  h a v e  w ork  
to  do in  ex p la in in g  th e  p o ss ib le  a c c o u n ts  o f com p lexity .
§2.1 Can C anonical P roof b e  E xplained  u s in g  Com plexity^?
Dum m ett's w o rry  ab o u t th e  im p r e d ic a tiv ity  in  th e  s tip u la tio n  ab ou t th e  
con d ition a l can  be sum med up  in  th e  a b o v e  n ota tion  a s  a w orry  ab ou t  
w h eth er  e v e r y  co n d itio n a l is  m ore com plexg th an  i t s e lf .  I t  m ight seem  
th e r e fo r e  th a t a n y  p ro p o sa l w h ich  s e t  o u t to  g lo s s  ou r  notion  o f com p lex ity  
a s  com plexity^  w ould be boun d  to  fa il s in ce  it  m akes u s e  o f th e  v e r y  notion  
th a t is  prob lem atic . In  o th e r  w o rd s, w e w ant to  s a t is fy  o u r s e lv e s  th a t th e  
exp lan ation s do allow  fo r  an  o rd er  in  u n d e r s ta n d in g  so  it  i s  illic it  sim ply  to  
ap p ea l to  th e  o rd er  o f ou r u n d e r s ta n d in g  to  e v a d e  th is  d iff ic u lty . But th a t  
c ru d e  o b se r v a tio n  p a s s e s  o v e r  som e o f th e  s u b t le ty  o f  ou r p o sitio n . The 
n atu re  o f th is  r e sp o n s e  is  to a c c e p t  th e  c ir c u la r ity  r e v ea le d  b y  Dummett 
and so  to a c c ep t th e  n eed  fo r  a d is tin c tio n  b etw een  o rd in a ry  inform al 
d em on stra tion s and ca n on ica l p r o o fs . Fram ing th e  exp lan a tion s in  term s o f  
can on ica l p ro o fs  is ,  i t  is  in te n d e d , su f f ic ie n t  to ban in te r p r e ta t io n s  lea d in g  
to  c ir c u la r ity  ju s t  b e c a u se  th o se  in te r p r e ta t io n s  a re  in c o h e re n t, i .e ., th e y  
are illeg itim ate  a s  in te r p r e ta t io n s  s in c e  so  fram ed th e y  c a n n o t  be
256
u n d ersto o d . The p o in t is  th a t w e d e v e lo p ed  th e  in c o h e re n c e  b y  im p ortin g  a 
n otion  of p roo f. But th e  ex p la n a tio n s  are  in te n d ed  to s e t  up  a  notion  o f  
p roof so  th e y  assu m e a n a iv e t y  in  m atters o f p ro o f on b eh a lf o f a r e c ip ie n t  
o f th e  ex p la n a tio n s . The c h a r a c te r  o f  o u r  s tip u la tio n  s e r v e s  th e n  to  e n s u r e  
th a t a ll p roo f p r o c e d u r e s  r e s u lt  from  e x p lic it  im plem entations o f  th e  
e x p la n a tio n s , th a t i s ,  w e ta k e  s e r io u s ly  th e  r e c u r s iv e  s p ir it  o f th e  
exp la n a tio n s. Our e f fo r t  to  s a t is fy  o u r s e lv e s  th a t th e  ex p la n a tio n s a re  
c o h e r e n t  now  c a lls  fo r  u s  to  s c r u t in iz e  th e  form  o f  th e  ex p la n a tio n s  
th e m se lv e s . I f  w e do th is  w e s e e  th a t  th e  s tip u la tio n  a t le a s t  h a s  th e  e f f e c t  
o f a llow in g  u s  to  r e p h r a se  th e  q u e stio n  we a re  fa c in g . In s te a d  o f  
w o n d erin g  w h eth e r  ea ch  co n d itio n a l is  more complex^ th an  it s e lf  we are  now  
c o n cern ed  w ith  th e  q u e s t io n  o f  w h eth e r  a  co n d ition a l ca n  be le s s  complex^  
th a n  i t s  a n te c e d e n t . C learly  th e r e  i s  no g en e r a l a n sw er  to  th is  q u e stio n  
e x c ep t b y  a p p ea l to  som eth in g  lik e  th e  r e c u r s iv e  s p ir it  o f th e  e x p la n a tio n s . 
It m ight be f e lt  th a t  th is  a s p e c t  o f  th e  c h a r a c te r  o f our u n d e r s ta n d in g  
sh ou ld  be made m ore e x p lic it , (I sh a ll r e tu r n  below  to  c o n s id e r  w h y  we 
m ight f e e l  th is  n eed . For th e  moment I sim ply  w ant to  r e g is te r  th a t som e, 
a s  y e t  v a g u e  se a r c h  for  e x p lic itn e s s  p u s h e s  u s  to  look  fu r th e r  th a n  th is  
sim ple, p e r h a p s  sim p le-m in d ed , so lu tio n . My aim in  d o in g  th is  i s  to  t r y  and  
c la r ify  w h y  Dummett is  so  d raw n  to  a  so lu tio n  in  term s o f norm alized  
p ro o fs .)
§2.2 Can C anonical P roof be E xp lained  u s in g  C om plexityp?
Our n ex t p ro p o sa l a r is e s  from  co u p lin g  th e  seco n d  d e fin itio n  o f can on ica l 
p roof w ith  th e  n o tion  o f com p lex ityp . T h is p ro p o sa l h a s th e  odd  
c o n se q u e n c e  th a t (at le a s t  som e) d is ju n c t iv e  se n te n c e s  and e x is te n tia lly  
q u a n tified  s e n te n c e s  h a v e  no ca n on ica l p ro o fs  s in c e  it  may be th a t no  
se n te n c e  m ust be in v o lv e d  in  a p ro o f o f th e  d is ju n c t iv e  or e x is te n tia lly  
q u a n tified  s e n te n c e . So a n y  co n d itio n a l w ith  su c h  a s e n te n c e  a s  i t s  
a n te c e d e n t  i s  tr iv ia lly  s a t is f ie d . B rack et, for  th e  moment, th o u g h , th is  
(se r io u s )  d if f ic u lty  and le t  u s  c o n s id e r  w h eth er  th e  broad form  o f th e
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p ro p o sa l h o ld s o u t a n y  h op e o f so lv in g  th e  problem  ab ou t th e  con d ition a l. 
It  d o es  in d e e d  seem  p rom isin g  s in c e  p resu m ab ly  it  is  a lw ays p o ss ib le  to  
p ro v e  th e  a n te c e d e n t  o f a c o n d itio n a l w ith ou t h a v in g  to  p r o v e  th e  
con d ition a l it s e lf .  So th e  p roo f in v o lv in g  th e  con d ition a l w ill not be  
can on ica l and  so  w ill n ot h ave  to be q u a n tified  o v e r  in  a p roof o f th e  
con d ition a l. B ut how do w e d em on stra te  th is?  We cou ld  do so  e ith e r  b y  
"m oving up" and  c o n s id e r in g  th e  form  o f th e  s tip u la tio n s  th e m se lv e s  or b y  
"m oving down" and  c o n s id e r in g  th e  s tr u c tu r e  of p r o o fs . The problem  is  to  
show  th a t com p lex ityp  e s ta b lis h e s  a  p a rtia l ord er  and th is  m eans sh ow in g  
th a t it  is  im p ossib le  for  tw o s ta te m e n ts  ea ch  to  b e  n e c e s s a r ily  in v o lv e d  in  
th e  p roo f o f th e  o th e r . If  w e c o n s id e r  p ro o fs  a s  s e t s  o f s e n te n c e s  o rd ered  
b y  in c lu s io n  (th a t i s ,  i f  w e, v e r y  in a d e q u a te ly , r e fu s e  to  read  a n y  in te r n a l  
s tr u c tu r e  in to  p ro o fs  and so  tr e a t  th e  c o n s tr u c t io n s  m erely  a s  s e t s  form ed  
from  th e  s e n te n c e s  u se d  in  th e  p roof) th e n  th is  o r d e r in g  w ill n o t s u ff ic e  to  
ru le  o u t th is  p o s s ib il ity , i .e .,  s e t  in c lu s io n  p r o p e r tie s  a lone w ill n ot  
p r e c lu d e  th e  p o s s ib ilty  th a t  th o se  s e t s  c o r r e sp o n d in g  to  can on ica l p r o o fs  o f  
A a lw ays in c lu d e  B and  v ic e  v e r sa . T h us it  is  ap t to  seem  th a t it  is  o n ly  
b y  c o n s id e r in g  th e  th ir d  o f our p ro p o sa ls  b a sed  on  th e  n o tion  o f  
com p lexity  g th a t w e g e t  a fu lly  e x p lic it  d em on stra tion  o f th e  p artia l  
o r d e r in g  o f s e n te n c e s . It  is  p r e c is e ly  a t th is  p o in t th a t th e  notion  o f  
norm alized p roof recom m ends i t s e lf  a s  ta ilor  made to  su it  ou r d iff ic u lty .
§2.3 Can C anonical P roof be E xplained  u s in g  C om plexity^?
The r e su lt  w h ich  w ould su c c e e d  in  r e s c u in g  th e  s tip u la tio n s  would be one  
w h ich  sh ow ed  th a t th e r e  w as no pair  o f s e n te n c e s  each  n e c e ss a r ily  
in v o lv e d  in  a  p roof o f th e  o th e r . The norm alization  theorem  sh ow s th a t each  
s e n te n c e  h a s a  p ro o f w h ich  p r o c e e d s  o n ly  v ia  s e n te n c e s  w h ich  a re  o f le s s e r  
com p lex ity  g th an  i t s e lf .  So, b y  th e  norm alization  r e su lt , i f  we h ave  two  
s e n te n c e s , each  o f w h ich  is  n e c e s s a r i ly  in v o lv e d  in  a p roo f o f th e  o th er , 
th en  we m ust h ave  tw o s e n te n c e s  w h ich  are le s s  com plexg th an  each  o th er , 
i .e .,  each  m ust be a p ro p er  c o n s t itu e n t  o f th e  o th e r , w h ich  is  im p ossib le . So
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a norm alization  r e s u lt  w ould in d e e d  so lv e  ou r d iff ic u lt ie s . But is  n ot th e  
norm alization  r e s u lt  m uch s tr o n g e r  th an  we n eed ?  Could th e re  n ot be  
sy s te m s  w h ich  s a t is fy  th e  f ir s t  c o n s tr a in t  b u t fo r  w h ich  norm alization  fa ils  
to  hold?
P la in ly , we ca n n o t a n sw er  th is  u n til we g iv e  a m ore p r e c is e  sp e c if ic a tio n  
of th e  n otion  o f b e in g  in v o lv e d  in  a p roo f. D oes th is  e n ta il a c tu a lly  b e in g  
p ro v ed  d u r in g  th e  c o u r se  o f th e  p ro o f or d o es  it  m erely  en ta il b e in g  
in v o k ed  a s , sa y , an  assu m p tion ?  T he u s e  o f norm alized  p r o o fs  seem s to  
in c lin e  on e tow ard s th e  f ir s t  in te r p r e ta t io n  s in c e  in  a  norm alized p roo f each  
se n te n c e  is  a c tu a lly  c o n s tr u c te d  in  th e  p r o c e ss  o f c o n s tr u c t in g  th e  
co n c lu sio n . But if  th a t is  th e  c o r r e c t  in te r p r e ta t io n  th e n  norm alization  is  
far  s tr o n g e r  th an  w e n eed  s in c e  b a s ic  n o n -c ir c u la r ity  req u irem en ts  s u ff ic e  
for  b a n n in g  a s itu a t io n  w h ere  to  p r o v e  on e  se n te n c e  w e n eed  to  p r o v e  
an o th er  and  v ic e  v e r s a . C erta in  form aliza tion s o f  c la s s ic a l  lo g ic  w ill, o f  
c o u r se , s a t is fy  th is  req u irem en t b u t  do n ot p o s s e s s  norm alization  r e s u lt s .  
(S ee  P raw itz  1965 p p .3 4 -5 ). R ecall th a t, s in c e  w hat w e are  a ttem p tin g  to  
c h a r a c te r iz e  is  a  p ro o f r e c o g n it io n a l a b ility , m utual in v o lv em en t is  
p e r n ic io u s  ju s t  w h en  th e  in v o lv em en t in  each  c a se  im p lica tes th e  p roof  
re co g n itio n a l a b ility  fo r  th a t  s e n te n c e . So if  A is  in v o lv e d  in  a  p roof o f B 
it  m ust be in v o lv e d  in  su c h  a w ay  th a t i t  in v o lv e s  th e  a b ility  to  r e co g n iz e  
a p roo f o f A* T h ere are o n ly  tw o w a y s  in  w h ich  th is  can  come ab ou t. F ir st , 
i f  A is  p ro v ed  en  r o u te  to  p r o v in g  B an d , s e c o n d ly , if  w e u s e  an  op eration  
on p ro o fs  o f A, i .e .,  co n d itio n a liza tio n  (or n e g a tio n ). But th is  sim ply  
r e g e n e r a te s  th e  o r ig in a l c o n c e rn . So now th e  q u e stio n  o f th e  re la tion  o f  
norm alization  and  n on -m u tu a l in v o lv em en t h in g e s  on  th e  q u e stio n  of  
w h eth er  th e r e  is  a so lu tio n  to th e  o r ig in a l problem  w h ich  d o es n ot h ave  
r e c o u r se  to  norm alization .
C on sider, th e n , th e  s y n ta c t ic  v e r s io n  o f  th e  p rop osa l. O b v iou sly  th e  
problem  ab ou t th e  m ean ing s tip u la tio n  for  co n d itio n a ls  is  so lv e d  on  th is  
schem e o f th in g s  s in c e  we ca n n o t r e a lis t ic a lly  d ou b t w h eth er  com plexityg  
e s ta b lis h e s  a p artia l o r d er . B ut o u r  problem s are  not y e t  o v e r  s in c e  we
259s t i l l  need  to c o n v in c e  o u r s e lv e s  th a t p r o o fs  o f th e  ap p ro p r ia te  form  
a c tu a lly  do e x is t . A norm alization  theorem  w ill s a t is fy  u s  on  ju s t  th is  poin t. 
G iven my r e c o n str u c tio n  o f th e  d eb a te  a norm alization  theorem  a p p ea rs  to  
be a ttr a c tiv e  b e c a u se  it  a v o id s  trou b lesom e a p p ea ls  to  th e  ch a ra c ter  o f our  
ow n u n d e r s ta n d in g  an d  to th e  n a tu r e  o f th e  ex p la n a tio n s w h ose  v e r y  
c o h e r en ce  is  a t q u e stio n . A lso , norm alization  seem s to  exp lo it th e  m ost b asic  
le v e l  o f com p lex ity , th e  v e r y  so u r c e  o f ou r com p ositional u n d e r s ta n d in g  
w h ich  m otiva tes th e  n eed  fo r  a m olecular sem an tica l th e o r y . So, r a th er , 
th an  u n d erm in in g  th e  o th e r  n o tio n s  o f  com p lex ity  we g iv e  c o n ten t to  th o se  
n otion s b y  fo c u s s in g  on  th e  s y n ta c t ic a l  le v e l.
63 Norm alization:
What i s  a norm alization  theorem ? A norm alization  theorem  is  a  r e su lt  ab ou t  
th e  "geom etry" o f d e r iv a tio n  w ith in  a  g iv e n  form al n a tu ra l d ed u ctio n  
sy stem . A n a tu ra l d ed u ctio n  sy s te m  is  on e w h ere  th e  u se  o f  th e  lo g ica l  
c o n s ta n ts  is  c h a r a c te r iz e d  b y  a  s e t  o f  in tr o d u ctio n  and elim ination  r u le s  
-o n e  o f each  ty p e  o f ru le  b e in g  a sso c ia te d  w ith  each  c o n s ta n t-  and in  
w h ich  th e  p r o c e ss  o f in fe r e n c e  is  exam ined in  th e  c o n str u c t io n  o f form al 
d ed u c tio n s  b a sed  on  in tr o d u ce d  a ssu m p tio n s . So, for  in s ta n c e , th e  u s e  o f  
is  ch a r a c te r iz e d  b y  m eans o f th e  in tr o d u ctio n  and  elim ination  r u le s  
g iv e n  r e s p e c t iv e ly  b y ,
&I) A B  &E) A&B A&B
A&B A B
(A) {B)
v l)  _A_ vE) AvjB C C
A vB  A vB  C
The norm alization  theorem  te l ls  u s  th a t  it  is  a lw ays p o ss ib le  to  r e a rr a n g e  a  
d er iv a tio n  to f i t  a p a rticu la r  p a tte r n . To be more p r e c ise  we sh ow , in  th e  
norm alization theorem , th a t a n y  v a lid  d e r iv a tio n  can  be rea rr a n g e d  to form
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a n oth er  v a lid  d er iv a tio n  o f th e  sam e form ula w ith  th e  p r o p e r ty  th a t it  
c o n ta in s  no maximal form ula, th a t i s ,  co n ta in s  no form ula w h ich  r e s u lt s  from  
th e  u se  o f an in tr o d u ctio n  r u le  an d  is  u se d  a s  a  p rem iss  in  an  elim ination  
ru le . The d er iv a tio n  can  th u s  be d iv id ed  in to  tw o se c t io n s  (e ith er  o f  w h ich  
m ight be em p ty). The f ir s t  c o n s is t s  s o le ly  o f th e  u s e  o f e lim ination  r u le s  on  
th e  p r e m isses  o f th e  d er iv a tio n  an d  on  r e su lt in g  form ulae to c o n s tr u c t  
p r o g r e s s iv e ly  le s s  compleXg form ulae. T h is is  fo llow ed  b y  a  s ta g e  w h ere  
o n ly  in tr o d u ctio n  r u le s  are  u se d  to  c o n s tr u c t  p r o g r e s s iv e ly  more com plexg  
form ulae cu lm in atin g  in  th e  c o n c lu s io n  o f th e  d er iv a tio n . C on sider th e  






T h is d ed u ctio n  is  n ot in  norm al form  b e c a u se  A kB  i s  a maximal form ula, i t  
r e s u lt s  from  an ap p lica tion  o f &I and i s  im m ediately fo llow ed  b y  a s te p  o f  
&E. The norm alization  theorem  sh o w s q u ite  g e n e r a lly  th e  p o s s ib il ity  o f  
m aking th e  o b v io u s  rea rra n g em en t o f  th is  p roo f to  elim inate th e  maximal 




The in tr o d u ctio n  and elim ination  s te p s  are  s e e n  to  be red u n d a n t. (The 
th e o r y  h as b een  d e sc r ib e d  lu c id ly  b y  P raw itz  (1965).)
The p o in ts  we n eed  to  ta k e  n o te  o f  h e r e  are th e s e . F ir s t , i f  a theorem  is  
b e in g  d er iv ed  th en  all th e  form ulae u se d  in  th e  d er iv a tio n  are  e ith e r  le s s  
com plexg th an  an axiom or le s s  com plexg th an  th e  co n c lu sio n . So norm alized  
p ro o fs  can  be p a r tia lly  o r d e r ed  b y  th e  com plexityg o f th e  form ula d e r iv e d .
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S eco n d ly , elim ination  r u le s  are  in a d m issa b le  in  th e  fin a l in fe r e n c e  o f th e  
d er iv a tio n  (u n le s s  ap p lied  to  som e form ula le s s  compleXg th an  an  axiom ). (So  
Dum m ett's problem  ab ou t th e  u s e  o f elim ination  r u le s  in  a p p ly in g  
c o n s tr u c t io n s  deem ed to  b e  d e r iv a t io n s  of co n d itio n a ls , n e g a tio n s  and  
u n iv e r sa lly  q u a n tified  form ulae d o e s  n o t a r ise . I h a v e  n ot a s  y e t  c o n s id er e d  
th is  problem . I sh a ll do so  below  b u t a n tic ip a te  m y se lf  h e r e  sim ply  to  
reco rd  th a t norm alization  d o es  s o lv e  th e  problem .) L a stly , th e  norm alization  
theorem  is  o n ly  a  p ro o f a b o u t th e  form  o f p ro o fs  w ith in  a  s p e c if ic  form al 
sy stem . What is  th e  re la tio n  o f th e s e  form al c o n s tr u c t io n s  to  p r o o fs  in  our  
in tu it io n is t ic  m athem atical th eo ry ?
§4 The U se  o f  Norm alized P ro o fs  to  E xplain  C anonical Proof:
N atura lly  Dummett w a n ts  to  s e e  a v e r y  c lo se  lin k  h e r e  b e c a u se  th e  
p r o p e r tie s  o f norm alized p ro o fs  a re  so  w ell su ite d  to  so lv in g  both  problem s  
he h a s s e t  h im self. H ere is  Dummett on  th e  re la tio n sh ip ,
...norm alized  n a tu ra l d e d u c tio n  p r o o fs  p r o v id e  an  ex a ct a n a lo g y  fo r  
w hat i s  r e q u ire d  o f  ca n o n ica l p r o o fs  if  th e  in tu it io n is t ic  ex p la n a tio n s o f  
th e  lo g ica l c o n s ta n ts  are  to  form  a sy ste m  fr e e  o f co n cep tu a l 
c ir c u la r ity . N atu ra lly , it  d o es  n ot fo llow  from  th e  norm alization  theorem  
for  f ir s t  o r d er  lo g ic , th a t  a sim ilar theorem  w ill hold  good fo r  a n y  f ir s t  
ord er  th e o r y  o f  in tu it io n is t ic  m athem atics. (Dummett 1977, p .396)
So Dummett w an ts  th e  p r o p e r tie s  o f norm alized p ro o fs  to be m irrored  
e x a c tly  b y  ca n on ica l p ro o fs . He a lso  l in k s  th e  p o s s ib il ity  o f m aking s e n s e  o f  
th e  n otion  o f can on ica l p ro o fs  to  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  a norm alization theorem  
for  a form alization  o f th e  th e o r y  c o n s id e r e d . The can on ica l p roof h ow ever  
can n ot b e  th e  norm alized  p roo f s in c e , if  th e  can on ica l p roof is  to  fu lf il  i t s  
m eaning d eterm in in g  rô le  it  m ust be som eth in g  for  w h ich  a sp e a k e r 's  
fa ilu re  to  r e c o g n iz e  it  a s  su c h , is  to  be ta k en  a s  g r o u n d s  for  w ith o ld in g  or  
und erm in ing  an a sc r ip t io n  o f  u n d e r s ta n d in g . We can n ot, h o w ev er , t ie  a
262sp e a k e r ’s u n d e r s ta n d in g  to  an a b ility  to  r e co g n iz e  a c e r ta in  c o n str u c t io n  
w ith in  som e form al sy ste m . T h is w ou ld  b e  w ron g  fo r  a num ber of r e a so n s .  
F ir st , it  fa ils  to  sq u a r e  w ith  th e  n a tu re  o f our p r a c tice  w h ere  com p eten ce  
w ith  o rd in a r y  in form al p r o o fs  is  ta k en  a s  c r iter ia l and not sim ply  good  
g r o u n d s  fo r  a sc r ip t io n s  o f  u n d e r s ta n d in g . A lso, th e  p rop osa l is  w ild ly  
im plausib le  s in c e  r e c o g n it io n  o f a c e r ta in  c o n str u c t io n  in  a g iv e n  form al 
sy stem  can  o n ly  be c o n s t itu t iv e  o f an  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  th e  o r ig in a l th e o r y  
i f  it  i s  lin k ed  to  an  a b ility  to  r e c o g n iz e  th e  sy ste m  a s  a c o r r e c t  
form alization  o f ou r o r ig in a l inform al th e o r y . It w ould be a b su rd  to  dem and  
th is  le v e l  o f s e l f - r e f le c t iv e n e s s  ab o u t h is  p ra c tic e  from  a sp e a k e r  o f th e  
la n g u a g e .
We cou ld  t r y  to re la x  th e  c o n n e c tio n  b etw een  can on ica l and norm alized  
p ro o fs  b u t s t i l l  m aintain th a t, in  som e s e n s e , th e  la tte r  p r o v id e  an  a n a ly s is  
of th e  form er. T h ese  d iff ic u lt ie s , to  do w ith  th e  re la tio n  o f th e  a n a ly sed  
p roof and s p e a k e r s ’ p r a c tic e , w ould  n o t, h ow ever , b e  o b v ia ted  b y  th e  
d em on stration  o f a n e c e s s a r y  o n to lo g ic a l lin k  (w hich  is  a ll an  a n a ly s is  cou ld  
rev ea l)  b e tw een  c e r ta in  inform al p r o o fs  and  form al norm alized p r o o fs , w h ere  
th e  th o u g h t w ould be m otivated  b y  an  in ten tio n  to  a sc r ib e  to  sp e a k e r s  
im plicit k n ow led ge  o f th is  lin k , s in c e  th e  b a s ic  d iff ic u lty  a r is e s  from  
in su la t in g  sp e a k e r s  from  th e  m eaning d eterm in in g  a s p e c ts  o f th e ir  p r a c tic e . 
Once we do th is  th e  lin k  b e tw een  th e  tw o so r ts  o f r e c o g n itio n a l c a p a c it ie s  
becom es, at m ost, c o n t in g e n t  an d , u n le s s  su p p o rted  b y  an  a s  y e t  u t te r ly  
m y ster io u s  argu m en t fo r  id e n t ify in g  th e  tw o s o r ts  o f c a p a c ity , th e  
dem on stration  o f a  n e c e s s a r y  o n to lo g ica l lin k  ju s t  m isses  th e  p o in t. I f  th e  
lin k  b etw een  r e co g n it io n a l c a p a c it ie s  w h ich  w e a c tu a lly  ex h ib it  and  
r e co g n itio n a l c a p a c it ie s  c o n s t itu t iv e  o f  u n d e r s ta n d in g  is  c o n tin g e n t  we allow  
s e n s e  to be made o f  th e  a b su r d  s c e p tic a l  w orry  th a t we m isu n d ersta n d  our  
ow n la n g u a g e . So Dummett can  o n ly  dem and th a t th e  norm alized  p ro o fs  
w ith in  a g iv e n  form alization  are  a th e o r is t ’s  tool w h ich  p o in t, in  som e  
n atu ra l w ay, to  inform al can on ica l p r o o fs  (w here th e se  are p ro o fs  w h ich  we 
a c tu a lly  m ight g iv e  and w h ich  w ou ld  a n yw ay  und erm ine an a sc r ip tio n  o f
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u n d e r s ta n d in g  w ere  th e y  n ot r e c o g n iz e d  a s  su c h ).
I f  one h eld  th a t th e  p u r p o se  o f  ou r sem antic th e o r y  w as to  p ro v id e  a 
sem an tics  for  a form alization  o f  a n y  in tu it io n is t ic  sem an tica l th e o r y  th en  th e  
w o rr ies  I h ave  ju s t  a ired  sim p ly  m iss th e  p o in t s in c e  th e n  th e  a d e q u a c y  o f  
th e  sem antica l th e o r y  is  a  q u e s t io n  r a ise d  a f te r  w e h a v e  b een  g iv e n  th e  
ap p ro p r ia te  form al th e o r y . I tak e  it  th a t n e ith er  are w e in  th is  p o s itio n  nor  
sh ou ld  w e be in  th is  p o s itio n . F ir s t , th is  can n ot b e  th e  n a tu r e  o f our  
c o n c e rn  fo r , if  it  w ere , Dummett w ou ld  n ot h ave ra ise d  h is  q u e stio n  ab ou t  
c ir c u la r ity  a r is in g  in  th e  in tu it io n is t ic  exp lan a tion s o f th e  lo g ica l c o n s ta n ts  
i f  th e  c o n s tr u c t io n s  u se d  in  th o se  ex p la n a tio n s are  ta k en  to  be in fo rm a l 
d em on stra tion s. S e c o n d ly , th e  in tu it io n is t  h o ld s th a t th e  m ean in gs o f h is  
m athem atical e x p r e ss io n s  a re  n ot to  b e  id e n tif ie d  w ith  th e ir  u s e  w ith in  a n y  
p a rticu la r  form al sy ste m . Dummett a r g u e s  (in  The P h ilo so p h ica l S ig n ific a n c e  
o f  G odeV s Theorem ) th a t  G ddel’s  In co m p le ten ess  Theorem  can  be in te r p r e te d  
a s  a  dem on stra tion  th a t  th e  s e n s e  o f m athem atical sta tem en ts  sh ou ld  be  
g iv e n  "in term s o f th e  in h e r e n tly  v a g u e  notion  o f an in tu it iv e ly  a c cep ta b le  
p roo f, and n o t in  term s o f a p ro o f w ith in  a n y  form al system " (Dummett 
1978, p .201). In  E le m e n ts  o f  In tu itio n ism  Dummett c la r ifie s  th is  p o s itio n  b y  
claim ing th a t w h at h a s  to  be a c c e p te d  is  th a t a n y  form alization  o f a 
m athem atical th e o r y  s u p p lie s  u s  w ith  a m eans o f e x p r e ss io n  w h ich  en a b le s  
u s  to  tra n sc e n d  th e  b o u n d s o f p ro o f w ith in  th a t form alization . We can , 
h o w ev er , m aintain th a t, a t a n y  s ta g e , th e  m eaning of th e  lo g ica l c o n s ta n ts  
i s  g iv e n  r e la t iv e  to ca n o n ica l p ro o f a s  d efin ed  w ith  r e s p e c t  to th a t form al 
sy stem . In  tr a n sc e n d in g  th e  form al sy ste m  th e  m ean in gs o f th e  log ica l 
c o n s ta n ts  (and , h e n c e , o f all m athem atical s e n te n c e s )  c h a n g e . The p o in t is  
th a t th e  in form al e x p la n a tio n s  m ust p r o v id e  program m atic m ean in gs, i .e ., 
th e y  m ust g iv e  th e  form  of p r e c is e  exp lan a tion s of th e  m eaning o f th e  
lo g ica l c o n s ta n ts . I w an t to  sa y  th a t  e v e n  if  th e y  are  to fu lf il  th is  
program m atic rô le  th e  inform al ex p la n a tio n s  sh ou ld  be s e e n  to be c o h e r en t  
w ith ou t th is  d ep e n d in g  on  ou r a b ility  to  come up w ith  an ap p rop r ia te  
form alization , s in c e  th e  in form al ex p la n a tio n s  sh ou ld  g iv e  an  a c co u n t o f  our
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inform al p r a c tic e , a lb e it  on e w h ich  r e c e iv e s  e lu c id a tio n  v ia  form al 
exam ination, th e  m eaning o f  th e  inform al p ra c tice  sh ou ld  not be made to  
d ep en d  on th e  form al e lu c id a tio n . I f  we g iv e  m eaning to th e  in tu it io n is t ic  
lo g ica l c o n s ta n ts  v ia  a n o tion  o f  can on ica l p roof w h ich  is  o n ly  g iv e n  
co n ten t r e la t iv e  to  som e form alization  th e n  th a t is  p r e c is e ly  w hat we h ave  
done. In  c o n tr a s t , i f  w e g iv e  th e  m ean in gs o f th o se  c o n s ta n ts  r e la t iv e  to  
ou r p r e s e n t  p ro o f re co g n it io n a l c a p a c it ie s  th e n , a lth o u g h  we m ight  
c h a r a c te r iz e  th o se  c a p a c it ie s  m ore p r e c is e ly  r e la t iv e  to  some form alization , 
i .e ., show  th a t th o se  c a p a c it ie s  h a v e  c e r ta in  p r o p e r tie s , p ro v id ed  we can  
r e co g n iz e  th o se  ex p la n a tio n s  a s  c o h e r e n t  in  th e  a b se n c e  o f su c h  a  
form alization , we do n o t r e q u ir e  th e  form alization  sim ply  to  be su r e  o f th e  
m ea n in g fu ln ess  o f th e  p r a c tic e .
A llow ing, th e n , th a t  th e r e  i s  a  n eed  fo r  a form alization , th e  n ex t and  
o b v io u s  q u e stio n  i s  to  a sk  w h at m akes for  a  c o r r e c t  form alization . In
a sk in g  th is  q u e s tio n  I hope to  c la r ify  fu r th e r  th e  lim its o f th e  ro le  o f
form alization . Two e s s e n t ia l  d e s id e r a ta  im m ediately s u g g e s t  th e m se lv e s .
F ir st , each  m ean in gfu l s e n te n c e  o f th e  th e o r y  sh ou ld  be a sso c ia ted  w ith  on e  
w ell-form ed  form ula o f th e  form al sy ste m  and v ic e -v e r s a . T his is  to
g u a ra n tee  a m orrorrin g  o f  e x p r e s s iv e  pow er. S eco n d ly , a  s e n te n c e  is  to  be  
p ro v a b le  ju s t  w h en  i t s  form al a n a lo g u e  is  d er iv a b le . T his is  to  g u a ra n tee  a  
m irroring  o f in fe r e n t ia l p ow er. (Note th e r e  is  no c o n flic t  h ere  w ith  G ddel’s  
In co m p leten ess  Theorem . S in ce , a s  Dummett n o te s , we can  allow  th a t  
inform al m ethods o f p ro o f are  in d e f in ite ly  e x te n s ib le  and so  not s u sc e p tib le  
to  com plete form alization  b u t a lso  in s is t  th a t, a t  a n y  s ta g e ,  th e  th e o r y  m ust 
b e cap ab le  o f b e in g  form alized . The e x te n s io n  o f m ethods o f  p roof th en  
becom es lin k ed  to  a c h a n g e  in  ou r n o tion  o f can on ica l p roof and so  o f th e  
m ean ings o f s e n te n c e s  in  th e  th e o r y .)
I f  w e h ave  s a t is f ie d  th e s e  d e s id e r a ta  and can  co n v in ce  o u r s e lv e s  th a t  
we h ave done so  th e n  w e ca n  e a s ily  fe e l  sa tis f ie d  th a t can on ica l p ro o fs  
w ith  th e  a p p ro p r ia te  p r o p e r t ie s  do, in  fa c t , e x is t  p ro v id ed  o n ly  th a t a 
norm alization theorem  h o ld s  fo r  th e  form al th e o ry . S in ce  th en , for  e v e r y
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theorem  o f th e  th e o r y  we h a v e  a  d er iv a tio n  o f i t s  form al an a logu e . 
M oreover, b y  th e  norm alization  r e s u lt  we h a v e  a norm alized d er iv a tio n  o f  
th e  an a logu e . S in ce  ea ch  form ula o f th e  d er iv a tio n  h a s  an in form al an a logu e  
we can  "translate"  th e  form al d e r iv a tio n  in to  an  in form al c o n str u c t io n . T his  
c o n str u c t io n  w ill be an  in form al p ro o f o f th e  se n te n c e  s in c e  ea ch  in fe r e n tia l  
s te p  sa n c tio n ed  in  th e  form al c a s e  b y  an e x p lic it ly  g iv e n  r u le  w ill be  
ju s t if ie d  a c c o rd in g  to  th e  m ean in gs o f th e  lo g ica l c o n s ta n ts . (I sh a ll rev iew  
th e  s ta tu s  o f th is  a ssu m p tio n  below .) S in ce  th e r e  i s  th u s  a c lo se  s tr u c tu r a l  
isom orphism  b e tw een  th e  tw o sy s te m s  we can  be su r e  th a t th e  inform al 
p ro o fs  p o in ted  o u t in  t h is  w a y  w ill b e  p ro o fs  h a v in g  th e  p r o p e r tie s  o f  
norm alized d e r iv a t io n s  an d  w ill th u s  be su ite d  to  f il l  th e  rô le  o f can on ica l  
p ro o fs . T h is, I ta k e  it , m ust form  th e  "bare bones"  o f  Dummett’s  
program m atic so lu tio n .
T h ere i s  e n o u g h  to  q u e s t io n  in  th is  o u tlin e . How, fo r  in s ta n c e , are  w e to
s a t is fy  o u r s e lv e s  th a t th e  tw o d e s id e r a ta  are  sa tis f ie d ?  T h ere is  a
co n sid er a b le  a ssu m p tion  in  th e  f ir s t  d esid eratu m  in  i t s  su p p o s it io n  th a t we  
can  com p lete ly  c a p tu r e  th e  gram m atical r u le s  o f our la n g u a g e  in  a
r e c u r s iv e  sp e c if ic a t io n  o f  a llow able sy n ta c t ic a l  s tr in g s . P erh a p s, h o w ev er , it  
could  be a rg u ed  th a t su c h  an  a ssu m p tio n  is  p r e su p p o se d  b y  a n y  se a rc h  for  
a sy ste m a tic  th e o r y  o f  m ean ing. I sh a ll an yw ay  p a s s  o v er  th is  la rg e
q u e stio n  h ere . I m ean to  c o n c e n tr a te  on  how w e d em on stra te  th a t th e  
seco n d  d esid eratu m  h as b e e n  fu lf ille d . We can  o n ly  e n s u r e  th is  b y  g iv in g  
an in d u c tiv e  p roof on  th e  com p lex ity  o f s e n te n c e s . That is ,  we w ould h a v e  
to  show  th a t c o n d itio n s  w a rra n tin g  th e  u se  o f in tr o d u ctio n  r u le s  
c o r re sp o n d ed  p r e c is e ly  to  c o n d itio n s  w h ich  w e tak e to g o v e r n  th e  a s se r t io n  
o f a  s e n te n c e  h a v in g  th e  c o r r e sp o n d in g  lo g ica l op era to r  a s  dom inant. We 
w ould , th a t is ,  h a v e  to  e n s u r e  a m atch b etw een  th e  in tr o d u ctio n  r u le s  and  
th e  m eaning s t ip u la t io n s  (or, a t le a s t , assu m e an  u n d e r s ta n d in g  of th e  
lo g ica l c o n s ta n ts ) , We cou ld  th e n  fram e th e  elim ination  r u le s  e ith e r  b y  
in s is t in g  on  harm ony w ith  th e  in tr o d u ctio n  r u le s  or b y  aga in  r e so r t in g  to  
th e  m eaning s tip u la t io n s . The c h o ice  d oes not m uch m atter s in ce  the
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m olecu larity  req u irem en t m eans th a t w e in s is t  on  harm ony in  both  sy s te m s. 
So w hen we assu m ed  a b o v e  th a t th e  form al p roo f tra n sla ted  in to  an  
inform al p roof, th a t a ssu m p tion  w as e q u iv a le n t  to  h o ld in g  th a t, th e  seco n d  
desid eratu m  had b een  d em o n stra b ly  fu lf ille d . The p o in t m ust, h o w ev er  be  
gran ted : som e ap p ea l to  th e  m ean ing s tip u la tio n s  is  in e v ita b le , I am
co n cern ed  w ith  tw o a s p e c ts  o f th is . F ir s t , i t  seem s to me to  be d o u b tfu l  
w h eth er  su c h  an  ap p ea l i s  leg itim ate  if  we are in  th e  p r o c e ss  o f sh ow in g  
th o se  s tip u la tio n s  to  b e  coheren t*  S ec o n d ly , on e o f th e  recom m endations o f  
th e  sy n ta c t ic  a p p roach  w as i t s  prom ise to  s id e - s te p  su c h  trou b lesom e  
a p p ea ls  to  th e  m ean ing s t ip u la t io n s  th e m se lv e s . T h is prom ise h as b een  
show n to be em p ty . D oes th is  m ake th e  p r o je c t  red u n d an t?
L ooking, now , to  th e  a c c u sa tio n  o f c ir c u la r ity , it  seem s to  be ju s t if ie d  if  
w e are p r e su p p o s in g  an  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f th e  lo g ica l c o n s ta n ts . S in ce  in  
th is  ca se  a d em on stra tion  o f  th e  c o h e r e n c e  o f th e  ex p la n a tio n s w ill d ep en d  
on b e in g  ab le  to  d em on stra te  c e ta in  p r o p e r tie s  ab ou t th e  n otion  o f  
com plexityg . But d em on stra tion  o f  th o se  p r o p e r tie s  d e p e n d s  on  an  
u n d er sta n d in g  o f th e  lo g ica l c o n s ta n ts  and so  a ssu m es th e  ex p la n a tio n s a re  
c o h eren t. H ow ever, th a t i s  p r e c is e ly  w h at w e s e t  o u t to  show . Of c o u r se , 
su ch  a d em on stra tion  n eed  n ot b e  e n t ir e ly  w o r th le ss  s in ce  a t root we m ight 
b e c o n v in ced  o f th e  c o h e r e n c e  o f th e  exp lan a tion s and  th is  d em on stra tion  
m ight, g iv e n  th a t c o n v ic t io n , r e v e a l w h y  w e are  so  co n v in c ed . B ut th e  
d em on stration  d o es  becom e im p oten t in  th e  fa ce  o f th e  so r t  o f s c e p tic a l  
w o rr ies  Dummett h a s r a ise d  ab ou t th o s e  exp lan a tion s.
What is  le s s  c le a r , h o w ev er , i s  w h eth er  we n eed  to  ap p ea l to  a fu ll  
u n d er sta n d in g  o f th e  lo g ic a l c o n s ta n ts  or o f th e  m eaning stip u la tio n s . I s  it  
not p o ss ib le  th a t w e can  im plem ent th e  program m e w h ils t  r e ly in g  o n ly  on  
an a p p rec ia tio n  o f th e  fo rm  o f th e  s tip u la tio n s?  But it  is  at ju s t  th is  p o in t  
th a t th e  program m e is  a p t to  seem  r e d u n d a n t and for  a m uch more d ir ec t  
exp lo ita tion  o f su c h  an  a p p rec ia tio n  to  seem  more natu ra l.
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§5 An A ltern a tiv e  C h aracteriza tion  o f  C anonical P roof not R ely in g  on  
Norm alization!
So, look in g , a t le a s t , to  th e  form  o f th e  m eaning s tip u la tio n s  is  in e v ita b le  
b u t is  it  c o h eren t?  I can  se e  no r e a so n  w h y  it  sh ou ld  n ot be. No 
c ir c u la r ity  is  in v o lv e d  s in c e  w e are  n ot a ssu m in g  th a t  th e  ex p la n a tio n s  
c o n fer  c o h e r e n t m ean in gs. R ather w e are  sim ply  look in g  at th o se  
exp lan ation s in  th e  l ig h t  o f a d e fin it io n  o f can on ica l p ro o f to  s e e  w h eth er  
th e y  are , th u s  in te r p r e te d , c o h e r en t. How e ls e , in d e e d , cou ld  w e attem p t to  
exon era te  th e  exp lan a tion s?
When I d is c u s s e d  th e  p o s s ib il ity  o f  a  so lu tio n  b a sed  on  th e  n otion  o f  
com plexity^  I n o ted  th a t  th is  a p p roach  allow ed u s  to r e d u c e  th e  problem  to  
one of w h eth er  a co n d itio n a l can  be l e s s  complex^ th a n  i t s  a n te c e d e n t  (th is  
r a th er  th an  th e  q u e s t io n  o f w h eth e r  a con d ition a l i s  m ore compleXg th an  
I tse lf) . I a lso  s u g g e s te d  th a t w e m ight se ek  to  m ake th e  r e c u r s iv e  
ch a ra c ter  o f th e  ex p la n a tio n s  r e sp o n s ib le  fo r  s e t t lin g  th is  q u e stio n . I th in k  
th a t th is  lin e  o f r e sp o n s e  i s  r o u g h ly  r ig h t  and th a t i t  c e r ta in ly  c a p tu r e s  
ou r in tu itio n  th a t th e  ex p la n a tio n s  are  u n d er sta n d a b le
Compare th e  m ean ing stip u la tio n  r e la tin g  to co n d itio n a ls  w ith  th a t  o f, 
s a y , co n ju n ctio n . We ca n  g iv e  a p roo f o f A w h ich  p r o c e e d s  v ia  A&B b u t we  
do n ot tak e  th is  a s  g r o u n d s  fo r  s u s p e c t in g  th a t th e  exp lan ation  o f  is  
c ir c u la r . The r e a so n  w h y  w e do n ot i s  th a t th e  r e c u r s iv e  c h a ra c ter  o f th e  
exp lan ation s m eans th a t w e im p lic itly  assu m e an  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f A  w h ich  
can  be a r r iv e d  a t in d e p e n d e n t ly  o f an  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f A&B,
What th e n  is  th e  d iffe r e n c e  in  th e  c a s e  o f th e  s tip u la tio n  r e la tin g  to  th e  
con d ition al?  Of c o u r se , th e  d iff ic u lty  ra ise d  h ere  is  due to  th e  im plicit
1. The o b je c tio n  to  b a s in g  th e  a cco u n t o f com p lex ity  on  com p lexityg  is  not  
th a t th is  m ust be c h a r a c te r iz e d  form ally  b u t th a t u se  o f com plexityg  
r e q u ir e s  th a t we sh o w  th a t th e  a p p ro p r ia te  p ro o fs  e x is t . That d em on stration  
dem ands, at le a s t , an  in form al a n a lo g u e  o f a norm alization r e su lt . T h is could  
o n ly  be fu r n ish e d , I claim , b y  a r g u in g  from  th e  m eaning s tip u la tio n s  to a 
s e t  o f r u le s  g o v e r n in g  th e  u se  o f lo g ic a l c o n n e c tiv e s . The e s s e n t ia l  point  
rem ains, i .e ., in  a d em on stra tion  o f th e  c o h e r en ce  o f th e  m eaning  
s tip u la tio n s  w e m ust m ake u s e  o f th e  form  o f th e  s tip u la tio n s  th e m se lv e s .
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q u a n tifica tio n  o v e r  p r o o fs  o f th e  a n te c e d e n t . Dumm ett’s  r e sp o n s e  is  to  se ek  
to  c ircu m scr ib e  th e  dom ain o f q u a n tifica tio n  so  a s  to  ban th e  p o s s ib il ity  o f  
c ir c u la r ity . The p ro p o sa l b a sed  on  com plexity^  m akes e x p lic it  u s e  o f th e  
u n d e r s ta n d in g  w e h a v e  o f A  a r r iv e d  a t in d e p e n d e n tly  o f A-^B to  
c ircu m scr ib e  th e  dom ain o f q u a n tifica tio n . S p e c ific a lly , th e  fa c t  th a t we can  
a r r iv e  a t su c h  an  u n d e r s ta n d in g  m eans th a t th e r e  i s  no th r e a t  o f  
co n cep tu a l c ir c u la r ity .
Now is  th is  e x p lic it  ap p ea l to  su c h  an  u n d e r s ta n d in g  d iffe r e n t  in . k in d  to  
th e  im plicit a ssu m p tio n  th a t  is  b u ilt  in to  th e  w hole r e c u r s iv e  p r o jec t?  Well, 
le t  u s  look  at th e  n ew  s tip u la tio n  w h ich  read s: a  (can on ical) p roo f o f  A-^B i s  
a n y  c o n s tr u c t io n  o f  w h ich  it  can  b e  r e c o g n iz e d  th a t a p p lied  to a  can on ica l 
p roo f o f A (a p ro o f o f A in v o lv in g  o n ly  th o se  s e n te n c e s  w h ich  m ust b e  
u n d ersto o d  p rior  to  u n d e r s ta n d in g  A) it  y ie ld s  a  p ro o f o f B* S in ce  in  a n y  
o f  th e  s tip u la t io n s  w e assu m e th a t  th e  s e n te n c e s  in  term s o f w h ich  th e  
exp lan ation  i s  g iv e n  a re  a lre a d y  u n d er sto o d  th e  o n ly  ad d ition a l a ssu m p tion  
in  th is  s tip u la tio n  i s  th a t  w e ca n  e x p lic it ly  u se  th is  u n d e r s ta n d in g  to  
c ircu m scr ib e  a dom ain o f s e n te n c e s , i .e . ,  w e assu m e th a t i f  we u n d er sta n d  A 
we know  w h ich  s e n te n c e s  are  r e q u ir e d  to  g a in  su c h  an  u n d e r s ta n d in g . That 
may be a c o n tr o v e r s ia l  a ssu m p tio n  an d  w e may w an t m ore o f an  exp lan ation  
ab ou t how  we d eterm in e th is  (I sh a ll c o n s id e r  th is  p r e s e n tly )  b u t rem em ber  
th e  p ro p o sa l w as m ooted to  s o lv e  a problem  ab ou t a s p e c if ic  so r t  o f  
c ir c u la r ity , i t s  in te n tio n  w as to  rem ed y  a  p a rticu la r  fa u lt , i .e ., w e do not 
n eed  to  h a v e  a more e x p lic it  c o n c e p tio n  o f can on ica l p roo f th a n  i s  n eed ed  
to  e n s u r e  th e  c o h e r e n c e  o f th e  e x p la n a tio n s  and w h ich  can  th e n  be tak en  
to  em erge from  th e  ex p la n a tio n s  th e m se lv e s . We need  now o n ly  q u estio n  
w h eth er  w e ca n  r e c o g n iz e  w h eth er  or n ot a g iv e n  c o n s tr u c t io n  s a t is f ie s  th e  
m eaning stip u la tio n  fo r  th e  con d itio n a l.
F aced  w ith  a p u ta t iv e  p roo f o f  a con d ition a l we h ave  to determ in e  
w h eth e r  or n ot i t  tra n sfo rm s can on ica l p r o o fs  o f A in to  p ro o fs  o f B. Now we 
may h ave  no e f fe c t iv e  m ethod fo r  d eterm in in g  w h eth er  a  g iv e n  p roo f o f A 
is  or  is  n o t can on ica l bu t th a t is  n o t q u ite  th e  p o in t. The u se  o f th e  notion
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o f can on ica l p roo f sim p ly  l ic e n c e s  c e r ta in  a ssu m p tio n s  {w hich may 
th e m se lv e s  h a v e  to  b e  a r g u e d  for) ab ou t th e  so r t  o f p roof we n eed  to  
c o n s id er . I t  w ould b e  u n r e a so n a b le  to  e x p e c t  th a t w e cou ld  e f f e c t iv e ly  
c ircu m scr ib e  ca n o n ica l p r o o fs  s in c e  th e  n otion  o f a fu lly  a n a ly sed  p roo f is  
i t s e l f  prob lem atic and  it  is  a s  w e ll th a t we do n ot make th e  c o h e r e n c e  o f  
th e  in tu it io n is t ic  m ean ing s t ip u la t io n s  h an g  on  m aking s e n s e  o f  th a t notion; 
w h ich  w ould b e  to make a  la rg e  and d u b io u s a ssu m p tion  ab ou t th e  n a tu re  
o f in tu it io n is t ic  m athem atics. Dumm ett’s  p ro p o sed  so lu tio n  in  term s o f
norm alized p r o o fs  em b races th a t o p tion .
We do, h o w ev er , w an t som e a c c o u n t o f th e  re la tio n  b e tw een  p ro o fs  and  
can on ica l p r o o fs , p a r t ly  b e c a u se  w e sim p ly  w an t som e a cco u n t o f w hat 
m akes fo r  a v a lid  p roo f p e r  s e  an d , p a r t ly , b e c a u se  a lth o u g h  th e  m eaning  
s tip u la tio n  for  th e  co n d itio n a l i s  o n ly  g iv e n  in  term s o f can on ica l p ro o fs  o f  
th e  a n te c e d e n t  w e a lso  w an t it  to  be sa t is f ie d  b y  a ll p r o o fs  o f th e  
a n te ce d e n t. Norm alized p r o o fs  p r o v id e d  a good  m odel fo r  th is  s in c e  th e  
norm alization  theorem  sh ow ed  th a t a n y  p ro o f cou ld  be tran sform ed  in to  a  
norm alized on e so  th a t if  th is  tran sform ation  is  fo llow ed  b y  th e
tran sform ation  e f fe c te d  b y  th e  p ro o f o f th e  co n d ition a l w e h a v e  a w ay  of
tran sform in g  a n y  p roo f o f th e  a n te c e d e n t  in to  a  p roo f o f th e  c o n se q u e n t .
So th e re  is  a fu r th e r  p r o je c t  to  b e  p u r su e d  b u t, I subm it, th a t th is  
e n te r p r is e  b e g in s  w ith  an  a c c ep ta n c e  th a t th e  in tu it io n is t ic  m eaning  
s tip u la tio n s  form  a c o h e r e n t, if  s t r ic t ly  inform al, sy s te m  o f exp lan ation .
C h aracteriz in g  can on ica l p ro o f in  term s o f com plexityp  p ro v ed  
im m ediately prob lem atic  b e c a u se  d is ju n c t iv e  and e x is te n te n tia l sta tem en ts  
cou ld , it  tu r n e d  o u t, be can on ica l p roof le s s .  The a lte r n a tiv e  im age we g e t  o f  
can on ica l p r o o fs  in  th e  lig h t  o f  th is  is  th a t can on ica l p ro o fs  are  minimal 
p ro o fs  in  c e r ta in  c h a in s  o f p r o o fs . That is ,  a  p ro o f o f A is  can on ica l if  
th e r e  i s  no p ro o f o f  A  p r o p e r ly  in c lu d ed  in  it. We can  ta k e  in c lu s io n  h ere  
to  be g iv e n  sim ply  b y  s e t  in c lu s io n  r e la t iv e  to s e n te n c e s  u se d  in  th e  p roof. 
Note th e  r e v e r s a l  in  ou r s tr a te g y  h ere . B efore we d e fin ed  can on ica l p roof  
in  term s o f com p lex ity  and  th en  so u g h t  to  exp la in  th e  notion  o f com p lexity .
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H ere w e h a v e  d e fin ed  can on ica l p ro o f d ir e c t ly  and now h ave  to  sh ow  th a t it  
can  be u se d  to  e s ta b lish  a  p a r tia l o r d e r  o f s e n te n c e s  and more e s p e c ia lly  
th a t  it  s o lv e s  th e  prob lem  a b o u t th e  con d ition a l. So, we n eed  to show  th a t  
a p roof o f A  p r o c e e d in g  v ia  A-^B ca n n o t be minimal. Well, a  p roo f o f i s ,  
b y  th e  m ean ing s t ip u la t io n s  a n y  c o n s tr u c t io n  w h ich  can  be a p p lied  to  a  
p roo f o f A to  y ie ld  a  p ro o f o f  B. Now e ith e r  th e  p roo f o f  A-^B is  n o t u se d  
in  th e  p ro o f, in  w h ich  c a s e  th is  r e d u n d a n t s te p  ca n  b e  elim inated  so  th a t  
th e  p roo f i s  n o t m inimal, or i t  i s  u s e d . B ut th e  o n ly  w ay  w e ca n  u s e  it  
o th e r  th an  in  b u ild in g  up  m ore com p lex  s e n te n c e s  i s  to  a p p ly  it  to  a p roof  
o f A, But th e n  th e  p ro o f m ust co n ta in  a  su b -p r o o f  w h ich  is  a  p roo f o f A* 
So ag a in  it  i s  n ot minimal. T h is s im p le-m in d ed  co n s id er a tio n  is ,  o f  c o u r se , 
o n ly  an  in form al v e r s io n  o f  a  cu t-e lim in a tio n  theorem . I th in k  th a t we  
sh o u ld  a c c e p t  th is  in form al argu m en t s in c e , a s  I a rg u ed  a b o v e , e v e n  th e  
form al r e s u lt  w ill in v o lv e  a  sim ilar a p p ea l to  th e  form  o f th e  m eaning  
s tip u la t io n s  and th e  c h a r a c te r iz a t io n  o f  can on ica l p roo f d o es g iv e  u s  an  
e f fe c t iv e  m ethod o f d eterm in in g , g iv e n  a n y  p roof, w h eth er  or n ot it  is  
ca n on ica l -  s im p ly  c h e c k  w h eth e r  it  c o n ta in s  a su b -p r o o f, I th in k  th a t th is  
p r o v id e s  an  a d eq u a te  c h a r a c te r iz a tio n  o f  can on ica l p roof.
The tw o n o tio n s  o f  ca n o n ica l p ro o f, i .e . ,  th a t b a sed  o n  com plexity^  and  
th a t  on  m inim ality o f  a  p ro o f s e q u e n c e , are  n ot q u ite  th e  sam e. S in ce  th e  
f ir s t  c o n s id e r s  a n y  p ro o f can on ica l p ro v id e d  o n ly  th a t it  u s e s  s e n te n c e s  
n eed ed  in  th e  exp lan a tion  o f th e  co n c lu sio n : we can  c o n s tr u c t  su c h  p ro o fs  
w h ich  are  n ot minimal, e .g . ,  w e cou ld  h a v e  a s  a can on ica l p roo f o f AvB a  
p roo f o f A w h ich  in c lu d ed  a s  a r e d u n d a n t s te p  a  p roof o f B. B ut th e se  
s lig h t  d if fe r e n c e s  are  n ot r e a lly  s ig n if ic a n t , we cou ld , for  in s ta n c e , w iden  
th e  n otion  o f a ca n o n ica l p ro o f o f C b ased  on  minimal p ro o fs  to  in c lu d e  
p r o o fs  w h ich  are  e ith e r  m ininm al or  w h ich  in c lu d e  o n ly  s e n te n c e s  o c c u r r in g  
in  o th e r  minimal p r o o fs  o f C. (So if  C w ere  AvB th en  a can on ica l p roo f o f C 
w ould be a minimal p ro o f o f A (B) or a p roo f o f A (B) w h ich  in c lu d e s  B (A), 
b u t no o th e r  s e n te n c e s  n ot in c lu d ed  in  a minimal p roof o f A or B. C learly  
th is  can n ot e f f e c t  th e  e s ta b lish e d  p artia l o rd er  s in ce  su c h  p ro o fs  can  o n ly
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in c lu d e  s e n te n c e s  w h ich  are p r e su p p o se d  b y  C, and w h ich  th u s  can n ot  
p r e su p p o se  C th e m se lv e s .)  T h is w ould  e n su r e  c o e x te n s iv e n e s s  o f th e  two  
n otion s.
§6 Dummett’8 S u p p lem en ta ry  A rgu m en ts fo r  th e  N otion o f C anonical Proof: 
Dummett h a s tw o o th e r  r e a so n s  fo r  se a r c h in g  for  a notion  o f can on ica l 
p roo f a s  d is t in c t  from  th a t o f in form al d em on stration . The f ir s t  o f th e se  
c o n c e r n s  th e  s t ip u la t io n s  r e la t in g  to  th e  con d ition a l, u n iv e r sa l  
q u a n tifica tio n  an d  n e g a tio n . Each o f  th e s e  s t ip u la t io n s  c h a r a c te r iz e s  th e  
m eaning o f th e  lo g ic a l c o n s ta n t  in  term s o f  an o p era tio n  ap p lied  to p ro o fs  
In th e  f ir s t  and la s t  c a s e s  and  to  a r b itr a r y  m em bers o f th e  dom ain in  th e  
seco n d  c a se . Dummett n o t ic e s  th a t i f ,  in  th e  a p p lica tion , w e are  e n tit le d  to 
u se  th e  elim ination  r u le  r e la t in g  to  th a t c o n s ta n t  th e n  th e  s t ip u la t io n s  
becom e v a cu o u s: a n y  c o n tr u c t io n  w e c h o o se  to  r e g a rd  a s  b e in g  a p ro o f o f a  
con d ition a l, s a y , w ill j u s t  in  v ir tu e  o f  th a t  b e  a  p roof o f th e  con d ition a l. 
T his is  b e c a u se  for  th e  c o n s tr u c t io n  to  be a  p ro o f o f  th e  co n d ition a l we 
m ust s e e  it  a s  tra n sfo rm in g  a n y  p ro o f o f th e  a n te c e d e n t  in to  a p ro o f o f  th e  
c o n se q u e n t . I f  we allow  m odus p o n e n s  in  th e  a p p lica tio n  o f  th e  c o n str u c t io n  
th e n  p ro v id e d  we se e  it  a s  p r o v in g  th e  co n d itio n a l it  s a t is f ie s  th e  m eaning  
s tip u la tio n  s in c e  a p p e n d in g  th e  c o n s tr u c t io n  to a  p roo f o f  th e  a n te c e d e n t  
fo llow ed  b y  a s te p  o f m odus p o n e n s  g iv e s  u s  a p roo f o f th e  c o n se q u e n t. 
Dummett sum s up  th e  problem  th u s ,
The c o n s tr a in ts  on w hat c o n s t itu te d  a p ro o f o f s ta tem en ts  o f th e se  
k in d s  w ould th e n  a ll come from  w h a tev er  in tu it iv e  p rior  n otion  o f  
inform al p oof w e w ere  a p p ea lin g  to; th e  ex p la n a tio n s o f th e  lo g ica l  
c o n s ta n ts  w ould n ot, th e m se lv e s , im pose a n y  c o n s tr a in ts  w h a tev er , b u t  
w ould m erely  la y  dow n c o n d itio n s  w h ich  are  au tom atica lly  sa t is f ie d ,  
g iv e n  c e r ta in  e lem en ta ry  and  in d isp u ta b le  p r o p e r tie s  o f inform al p r o o fs .
O b viou sly , h o w ev er , th is  is  not w hat is  in te n d ed  w hen  th e  
ex p la n a tio n s o f th e  lo g ic a l c o n s ta n ts  are g iv en ; we a re  not a p p ea lin g  to
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an a lre a d y  u n d er sto o d  n o tion  o f proof, o f w h ich  th e  v a lid ity  o f th e  
elim ination  r u le s  is  p a r tia lly  c o n s t itu t iv e , b u t la y in g  dow n w hat is  to  
c o u n t a s  a  p roof in  su c h  aw ay th a t  th e  v a lid ity  o f th o se  r u le s  fo llow s  
a s  a  c o n se q u e n c e . (Dummett 1977, p . 393)
Why is  not Dumm ett’s  seco n d  o b se r v a tio n  su f f ic ie n t  to  a lla y  th e  w orry  h e  a t  
f ir s t  e x p r e ss e s ?  An exp lan ation  n eed  n o t b e  fa u lte d  sim ply  b e c a u se  it  m akes 
c e r ta in  a ssu m p tio n s  a b o u t w h at c o n s t i tu te s  a f it  s ta te  for  in te llig e n t  r e c e ip t  
o f th o se  ex p la n a tio n s. S u ch  a ssu m p tio n s  are  o n ly  prob lem atic if  th e y  
p r e su p p o se  c o n c e p ts  w h ich  th e m se lv e s  r e q u ire  exp lan ation . P a te n tly  th is  i s  
n o t th e  c a s e  h ere  w h ere  w h at i s  r e q u ire d  of th e  p u p il i s  th a t he is  a  
com plete n o v ice  in  th e  p r a c tic e  o f p roof. So on  th is  p r o v iso  th e  
ex p la n a tio n s su c c e e d  in  in d u c t in g  him in to  th e  p r a c tic e  if  th e y  are  
c o r r e c t ly  r e c e iv e d . The ru b  h o w ev er  l ie s  in  g iv in g  c o n ten t to  th e  notion  o f  
c o r r e c t  r e c e ip t  o f th e  e x p la n a tio n s . P ro v id ed  ou r  p u p il b e lie v e s  he h as  
m astered  th e  ex p la n a tio n s  th o se  ex p la n a tio n s  w ill be p o w er le ss  to  d isu a d e  
him. So in  th e  e v e n t  o f a  d isa g reem en t, sa y , th e  ex p la n a tio n s can n ot be  
r e so r te d  to  to  a r b itr a te . T h us w e c a n n o t make s e n s e  o f th e  id ea  th a t th e  
ex p la n a tio n s s e r v e  to  exp la in  a p a r ticu la r  p ra c tice .
We ca n n o t e x c u se  th is  s ta te  o f  a ffa ir s  b y  c o n s id er a tio n s  ab ou t "the  
lim its o f explanation"; th a t  a n y  exp lan ation  is  s u b je c t  to  in te r p r e ta t io n  and  
so  is  a p t to be m isu n d ersto o d . The p o in t h ere  is  th a t th e  term s o f th e  
exp lan ation  can  b e  p e r fe c t ly  w ell u n d er sto o d  and a g r e e d  upon  and  y e t  s t i l l  
th e y  perm it ir r e so lu b le  d isa g r e e m e n ts  to  a r ise . B ut can  w e n ot u s e  th a t  
c o n s id er a tio n  to  so lv e  th e  d iff ic u lty ?  S u r e ly  we can  in s is t  th a t a w o u ld -b e  
p ra c titio n e r  m ust be p re p a r e d  to  j u s t i f y  e v e r y  a s p e c t  o f h is  p r a c tic e  a s  an  
ex p lic it  c o n se q u e n c e  o f th e  e x p la n a tio n s . The o b v io u s  r e p o s t  to  th is  is  ju s t  
to  rem ind o u r s e lv e s  th a t  i f  w e allow  th e  u s e  o f elim ination  r u le s  th en  a n y  
c o n str u c t io n  v iew ed  a s  a p ro o f o f  a  co n d itio n a l w ill be a p roof o f th e  
co n d ition a l b y  an  e x p lic t  im plem entation  o f th e  s tip u la tio n  r e la tin g  to  
co n d itio n a ls . But how do w e form  th e  c o n str u c t io n  in  th e  f ir s t  p lace?  It
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form ed in  a cco rd a n ce  w ith  th e  m ean ing s t ip u la t io n s  -  so  we h a v e  no rea so n  
for  r e g a r d in g  it  a s  n o n -s ta n d a r d  -  or  it  w as form ed in  a m anner n ot 
e x p lic it ly  r a tif ied  b y  th e  m ean ing s t ip u la t io n s . In  th e  la tte r  c a se  th is  w ill 
m ean th a t w e e v e n tu a lly  u n c o v e r  som e u s e  o f  a se n te n c e  in v o lv in g  an o th er  
o f th e  lo g ic a l o p e r a to r s  w h ich  is  n o t sa n c tio n ed  b y  th e  u nam bigous
d eterm in ation  o f i t s  m ean ing. T em pting  a s  th is  r e sp o n se  is ,  i t  i s  n ot s tr o n g  
en o u g h  to r e so lv e  th e  d if f ic u lty  s in c e  it  a llow s th a t we ca n  h a v e  a s  a p roof  
o f  a  co n d ition a l a n y  c o n s tr u c t io n  w ith  im p eccab le  c r e d e n tia ls  b u t y e t  i s  not 
a p roo f o f th e  co n d itio n a l s in c e  it  i s  a  bona f id e  p roof b u t o n ly  o f  som e 
o th e r  se n te n c e . So w e h a v e  th e  a b s u r d ity  th a t a n y  p roof can  be tr e a te d  as  
a p roo f o f a con d ition a l.
We can n ot sim ply  r e so lv e  th e  d if f ic u lty  b y , in  som e m anner ou tlaw in g  a s  
c a n d id a tes  fo r  p ro o fs  o f th e  co n d itio n a l, c o n s tr u c t io n s  w h ich  are  p r o o fs  o f  
o th e r  s ta tem en ts  s in c e  th e  problem  is  on e w h ich  a f fe c ts  a ll co n d itio n a ls  
(and n e g a tio n s  and u n iv e r sa l q u a n tif ic a tio n s ) . I f  w e allow  a c o n str u c t io n  to  
be a ca n d id a te  for  a p ro o f o f o n e  c o n d itio n a l th e n  it  m ust be ta k en  to  be a 
ca n d id a te  fo r  p roof s ta tu s  o f a n y  con d ition a l. T his m eans e ith e r  th a t  
n o th in g  is  a llow ed  to  co u n t a s  a p ro o f o f a co n d ition a l or th a t co n d itio n a ls
can  a ll sh a r e  th e  sam e p roo f. We ca n n o t g e t  rou n d  th is  "all or noth ing"
trap  u n le s s  w e h a v e  som e w ay  o f  d is t in g u is h in g  b etw een  how  a
c o n str u c t io n  i s  leg itim a te ly  a p p lied  an d  how n ot. So we do need  to look at  
th e  w ay th e  c o n s tr u c t io n  is  a p p lied .
Dummett’s  so lu tio n  i s ,  a g a in , in  term s of can on ica l p ro o fs  b a sed  on  
norm alized d e d u c tio n s  s in c e , in  th e  la tte r , u s e  o f elim ination  r u le s  is  
ex c lu d ed . T h is is  a  s tr a n g e  p o s itio n  fo r  Dummett to  assu m e. In  th e  ab ove  
ex tr a c t  from  Dumm ett’s a p p r a isa l o f  th e  problem  he m entioned  th a t "we are  
la y in g  dow n w hat is  to  c o u n t a s  a p ro o f in  su c h  a  w ay th a t th e  v a lid ity  o f  
th o se  [elim ination] r u le s  fo llo w s a s  a co n seq u en ce ."  T his o b se r v a tio n  is  a s  
ti'ue o f in tro d u ctio n  r u le s  a s  it  is  o f elim ination  r u le s , So r e ly in g  on p roo fs  
ch a r a c te r iz e d  b y  in tr o d u ctio n  r u le s  i s  e q u a lly  to  p u t th e  s y n ta c t ic  ca rt
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b efo re  th e  sem antic h o rse .
The tru e  so u r c e  o f th e  d if f ic u lty  i s  th e  notion  of ap p lica tion  as u se d  in  
th e  s t ip u la t io n s . The s t ip u la t io n s  fa il to Inform u s  how a c o n str u c t io n  is  to  
be ap p lied  so  a s  to r e s u lt  in  the a p p ro p r ia te  p roof. In d eed  it m ight be ju s t  
th is  p o in t th a t Dummett h as in  m ind, i .e .,  w e in form ally  "build .into" th e  
stip u la tio n  th e  c o r r e sp o n d in g  in tr o d u c tio n  ru le . So, a c o n s tr u c t io n  is  a 
(can onical) p roof o f A->B if  it  can  b e  r e co g n iz e d  th a t w hen  ap p en d ed  to an  
in itia l se q u e n c e  o f a n y  (can on ica l) p roo f o f  A it  y ie ld s  a p roo f o f B. And, a  
c o n s tr u c t io n  is  a (can on ica l) p roo f o f  (Vx)A(x) if  it  can  be r e co g n iz e d  th a t a 
uniform  su b s t itu t io n  o f n fo r  a f r e e  v a r ia b le  in  th e  c o n str u c t io n  y ie ld s  a 
p roo f o f A n. Note th a t a s  a c o n se q u e n c e  o f th is  la tte r  s tip u la tio n  we m ust 
assum e th a t th e  in d u c tio n  sch em a p r o v id e s  u s  w ith  a uniform  op era tion  
a p p lica b le  to m em bers o f th e  dom ain. We c a n n o t th e n  attem p t to j u s t i fy  
in d u ctio n  in  term s o f  a f in ite  num ber o f a p p lica tio n s  o f MPP s in c e  th e  
num ber of a p p lica tio n s  w ill d ep en d  on  th e  p a rticu la r  m em ber of th e  domain 
and  so  th e  o p era tio n  ca n n o t be ta k en  to be uniform .
Dummett is  n e v e r  v e r y  e x p lic it  ab ou t how h e  in te n d s  th e  n otion  o f  
norm alized p ro o fs  to  be u se d . S in ce  he lin k s  th e  p o s s ib il ity  o f a notion  o f  
can on ica l p roof so  c lo s e ly  w ith  th e  p o s s ib il ity  o f form alization  it  seem s c lear  
th a t he in te n d s  th e  n o tion  to  be more th an  a lo o se  m odel for  how th e  
m eaning s tip u la t io n s  sh o u ld  be am ended  so  a s  to g iv e  a c o h e r en t a cco u n t of 
can on ica l proof. In d eed  it o fte n  seem s a s  if  Dummett in te n d s  to  g iv e  an  
in d e p e n d e n t  a cco u n t o f th e  n o tion  w h ich  can  th en  be u sed  in  th e  
ex p la n a tio n s. (But in  th a t c a se  w h at p u r p o se  would th e  ex p la n a tio n s se rv e ? )  
I f  th a t is  Dum m ett’s p r o je c t  I th in k  and  th in k  I h a v e  g iv e n  good r ea so n  
for  h o ld in g  th a t it  is  m isg u id ed . W hether, th o u g h , it  is  or is  n ot h is  
p r o je c t  I hope to h a v e  sh ow n  th a t a so lu tio n  in  term s o f an inform al 
am endm ent th e  s t ip u la t io n s  is  v ia b le .
But my co n ten tm en t is ,  p e r h a p s , p rem atu re s in c e  Dummett a r g u e s  th a t as  
part of an informal demonstration of a co n d itio n a l it  may be n e c e s s a r y  to 
g iv e  a d em on stra tion  th a t th e  p u ta t iv e  p roof d o es in d eed  h ave th e
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a p p rop r ia te  p r o p e r ty  o f tra n sfo rm in g  p r o o fs  o f th e  a n te c e d e n t  in to  p ro o fs
o f th e  c o n se q u e n t . T h is p o in t i s  s t i l l  p e r tin e n t  g iv e n  my in te r p r e ta t io n  of
th e  n otion  o f can on ica l p roof. In d e e d , i t  i s  p a r tic u la r ly  so . I n o ted  a b o v e
th a t th e  n otion  o f can on ica l p ro o f a llow ed  u s  to  make c e r ta in  a ssu m p tio n s
ab ou t th e  form  o f p r o o fs  b u t th a t t h e s e  a ssu m p tio n s w ould o fte n  h a v e  to
be a rg u ed  fo r . T h is i s  o n e  c a se  w h ere  an  in form al argu m en t becom es
in te g r a l to  th e  fu n c tio n in g  o f  th e  p ro o f. Dummett e n v is a g e s  a c a se  w h ere  it
is  sim ply n o t im m ediately r e c o g n iz a b le  th a t th e  c o n str u c t io n  s a t is f ie s  th e
m eaning s tip u la tio n  and it  r e q u ir e s  an  argu m en t to  c o n v in c e  o u r s e lv e s  o f
th is . The problem  now  is  th a t ou r  e f fo r ts  to  c o n fin e  th e  com p lex ity  o f
p ro o fs  w h ich  w e n eed  to  c o n s id e r  v ia  th e  n otion  o f can on ica l p roo f th r ea te n
to come to n o u g h t s in c e  w e h a v e  no w ay  o f c ircu m scr ib in g  th e  com p lex ity
o f th e se  inform al d em o n stra tio n s. Dumm ett n o te s  th a t,
.. .i t  i s  a t j u s t  th is  p o in t th a t a n y  c o n fin e s  w ith in  w h ich  we s e e k  to  
e n c lo se  th e  com p lex ity  o f a p ro o f o f a g iv e n  c o n c lu s io n  w ill b u r s t . As a 
r e su lt , th e  p o in t  o f  in tr o d u c in g  th e  n o tio n  o f  can on ica l p r o o f  
evapora tes', and w e are  on ce  a g a in  fa ced  w ith  th e  d a n g er  th a t th e  
in tu it iv e  ex p la n a tio n s  o f th e  lo g ic a l c o n s ta n ts  con ta in  a  v ic io u s  c ir c le . 
(Dummett 1977, p ,399) [m y em p h asis]
P raw itz sim p ly  d ism isse s  th is  c o n c e rn  o f Dummett a s  in v it in g  a r e g r e s s :  
we cou ld  e q u a lly  w ell a sk  for  a d em on stra tion  th a t th e  dem on stra tion  h a s  
th e  ap p ro p r ia te  p r o p e r tie s  an d  so  on  ad in fin itu m . But th a t  r e sp o n se  to ta lly  
m isc o n str u e s  th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  problem . Dummett is  p o in tin g  to a fa c t  
in te g r a l to  th e  a c tu a l  fu n c tio n in g  o f inform al p ro o fs . The problem  o f  
r e g r e s s  d o es  n ot a r ise  b e c a u se  inform al p ro o fs  can n ot be r e g r e s s iv e :  we 
can n ot r e c o g n iz e  a r e g r e s s iv e  s tr u c tu r e  a s  a  proof.
The o r ig in a l p o in t o f in tr o d u c in g  th e  n otion  o f  can on ica l p ro o f w as to  
c ircu m scr ib e  th e  com p lex ity  o f p r o o fs  o f a c e r ta in  sta tem en t th a t we need  
to  c o n s id er  w h en  q u a n tify in g  o v e r  p r o o fs  o f  th a t sta tem en t. The r ea so n  for
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th is  w as th a t w ith o u t th is  p r o v iso  w e are  fo i'c ed  to  q u a n tify  o v e r  p ro o fs  
w h ich  in c lu d e  th e  co n d itio n a l in  th e  exp lan ation  o f  th a t con d ition a l. So th e  
notion  w as in tr o d u ce d  to  e v a d e  a d e f in ite  c ir c u la r ity  a cc o rd in g  to  th e  
exp lan ation s a s  th e y  th e n  sto o d . As Dummett n o te s  w e a re  h e r e  o n ly  fa ced  
w ith  th e  th r e a t  o f c ir c u la r ity  so  i t  i s  p rem ature fo r  him to  co n c lu d e  th a t  
th e  o r ig in a l p u r p o se  o f in tr o d u c in g  th e  n otion  o f can on ica l p roo f h as b een  
com prom ised. To sh ow  th a t th e  tw o c a s e s  w ere  sim ilar it  w ould  h ave  to  be  
show n th a t j u s t  a s  w e do h a v e  v a lid  in form al p ro o fs  o f a  s e n te n c e  w h ich  
u se  more com plex s e n te n c e s  so  we do u s e  d em on stra tion s, i .e ., ex p la n a tio n s  
o f ce r ta in  c o n s tr u c t io n s , w h ich  u s e  m ore com plex s e n te n c e s . In  th e  f ir s t  
c a se  we do h a v e  v a lid  in form al p r o o fs  w h ich  we do n ot w an t to  ou tlaw  a s  
su c h  y e t  w h ich  in e v ita b ly  in v o lv e  th e  ex p la n a tio n s in  c ir c u la r ity , i .e .,  w e  
can n ot b u t ta k e  th e  c ir c u la r ity  th a t  a r is e s  in  th is  w ay  a s  a r e fle c t io n  on  
th e  sem antic th e o r y . In  th e  seco n d  c a se  we o n ly  h a v e  th e  th r ea t o f a  
p o ss ib le  c ir c le . The se co n d  c a se  is  th u s  m uch more lik e  th e  s tip u la tio n  
r e la tin g  to  co n ju n c tio n  th a n  it  i s  to  th a t  o f th e  con d ition a l. A fter all, in  a 
ce r ta in  s e n s e , s in c e  A ca n  be p r o v e d  v ia  AàB  th e r e  i s  som e th r e a t  o f  
c ir c u la r ity  h e r e .
The p o in t a g a in s t  P raw itz , th a t w e do n ot, in  fa c t , in v o lv e  o u r s e lv e s  in  
r e g r e s s iv e  ex p la n a tio n s o f th e  w o rk in g  o f a con d ition a l, a lso  is  a r ea so n  to  
w on der w h eth er  Dumm ett’s  w o rry  n eed  be ta k en  to  h e a r t. If th e  q u e stio n  
r e la te s  to th e  a c tu a l u se  w e m ake o f th e se  ex p la n a tio n s we n eed  to  b e  
g iv e n  some g r o u n d s  fo r  th in k in g  th a t w e do, in  fa c t , u se  ex p la n a tio n s  
w h ich  in v o lv e  u s  in  c ir c u la r ity . The p o in t is  th a t th e  exp lan a tion s are  u se d  
b e c a u se  th e y  are p s y c h o lo g ic a lly  a p p ea lin g . If th is  is  so  th en  s u r e ly  i f  
th e y  are  to  be e f f e c t iv e  th e n  th e y  c a n n o t be c ircu la r . On th e  o th e r  hand if  
we d ism iss  th is  ap p ea l to  p s y c h o lo g y  w h y  can  w e n ot sim ply  tre a t  th e  
exp lan ation s a s  so  m uch m athem atica lly  ir r e le v a n t  b u t p sy c h o lo g ic a lly  
fo r c e fu l accretio n ?  We can  allow  c ir cu la r  exp lan a tion s in  th e  s e n s e  th a t  
th e s e  may h ave  som e h e u r is t ic  v a lu e  b u t th en  th e y  are  n ot trea ted  a s  
in te g r a l to  th e  p roof. So we do n o t n eed  to h ave a m ethod for  b a n n in g  in
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a d v a n ce  ex p la n a tio n s im p ortin g  a c ir c u la r ity . We can  sim ply  tak e th e  
d evelop m en t o f a  c ir c le  a s  r e f le c t in g  on  th e  ex p la n a to ry  v a lu e  o f th e  
p u ta tiv e  exp lan a tion  r a th e r  th an  on  th e  c o h eren ce  o f th e  sem an tica l th e o ry . 
I am n ot s u g g e s t in g  th a t th e r e  is  n o t an  im portant program m e o f
sy ste m a tic a lly  d em o n stra tin g  th a t  th e  p r a c tic e  o f in tu it io n is t ic  m athem atics  
is  fr e e  o f su c h  c ir c u la r ity . In d eed  I th in k  th a t th a t i s  a s e n s ib le  and
p r o fita b le  program m e. B u t, f ir s t ,  i t  sh ou ld  not be th o u g h t th a t th is  
program m e is  r e q u ire d  a s  a d em on stra tion  th a t th e  m eaning s t ip u la t io n s  are  
c o h e r en t. A nd, s e c o n d ly , th e  d is c o v e r y  o f a c ir c u la r ity  in  ou r a c tu a l 
p r a c tic e  can  be ta k e n  a s  r e a so n  to  c r it ic iz e , and so  to  r e v is e  ou r  p ra c tic e  
(of c o u r se  th e  a d e q u a c y  o f th e  sem an tic  th e o r y  w ill, in  p a r t , d ep en d  on th e  
e x te n t o f r e v is io n  th u s  d em anded). I am u r g in g  a  program m atic d e fe n c e  o f  
th e  in tu it io n is t ic  a c c o u n t o f th e  m eaning s t ip u la t io n s . The d iffe r e n c e  
b etw een  Dummett, w ho a lso  u r g e s  a program m atic so lu tio n  to  th e se  
d iff ic u lt ie s , an d  m y se lf, i s  th a t Dummett th in k s  th a t th e  c o h e r en ce  o f th e  
ex p la n a tio n s d e p e n d s  on  th e  s u c c e s s  o f  th e  program m e w h erea s  I th in k  th a t  
o n ly  th e  a d e q u a c y  o f  th e  sem an tic  th e o r y  is  a t sta k e .
Why is  i t  th e n  th a t  Dummett s e e s  su c h  a fo r c e fu l problem  h ere?  The
an sw er  to  th is  l ie s , I b e lie v e , in  Dummett’s  c o n s is te n t  c o n ten tio n  th a t
norm alized d e d u c tio n s  p r o v id e  th e  m eans w h er e b y  we can  e s ta b lish  a  
p artia l o rd er  w ith in  ou r  m athem atical la n g u a g e . Norm alization e s ta b lis h e s  an  
ex p lic it  and r ig id  h ie r a r c h y . T hat c e r ta in  p ro o fs  in c lu d e  e lem en ts  w h ich  
p o s s ib ly  tr a n s g r e s s  th is  o r d e r in g  m ust be of v ita l c o n cern  to  Dummett 
s in c e  th e  w hole ra tion a le  fo r  lo o k in g  to  norm alization  i s  ch a lle n g e d . So it  is  
n ot th a t "the p o in t o f in tr o d u c in g  th e  notion  o f can on ica l p roo f evap ora tes"  
b u t th a t th e  p o in t o f in tr o d u c in g  can on ica l p roof a s  b a s e d  on n o rm a lized  
d e d u c tio n s  e v a p o r a te s .
Dummett h as h is  ow n p r e fe r r e d  so lu tio n . Once aga in  it  b ased  on the  
notion  o f norm alized d e d u c tio n s . T he problem  is  th a t g iv e n  a  s e n te n c e  C we 
no lo n g er  h a v e  a g u a r a n te ed  m ethod o f c ircu m scr ib in g  th e  com p lex ity  o f  
p ro o fs  o f C b e ca u se  th o se  p r o o fs  may im port a rgu m en ts  to  th e  e f fe c t  th a t
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th e  c o n str u c t io n  p u r p o r tin g  to  b e  a p roof p o s s e s s e s  th e  r e q u is ite  
p r o p e r tie s . Dum m ett’s  so lu tio n  i s  to r e p la ce  C b y  w h ere  CK is  th e
con d ition a l w h o se  c o n s e q u e n t  i s  C and  w h ose  a n te c e d e n t  is  th e  c o n ju n ctio n  
o f axiom s o f th e  form  ’’A-»there is  a p ro o f o f A o f  s u c h -a n d -s u c h  a kind"  
w h ere  A is  a  c o n s t itu e n t  o f  C% T h en  w e c o n s id er  ca n on ica l p r o o fs  o f C a s  
an a logou s to norm alized  p r o o fs  o f  The problem  w ith  th is  so lu tio n  is  th a t  
i t  i s  h e a v ily  program m atic and  r e lie s  on  m aking s e n s e  o f th e  o b sc u r e  notion  
o f a fu lly  a n a ly se d  p ro o f w h ich  h a s  b e e n  q u estio n e d  e v e r  s in ce  B rou w er’s  
u se  o f th e  n otion  in  th e  p ro o f o f th e  Bar Theorem . Dummett adm its th a t "we 
h ave  no c lea r  id ea  o f how  to  form u late  su c h  Eixioms, le t  a lon e how  to  fin d  a  
s e t  o f g e n e r a l p r in c ip le s  fo r  g e n e r a tin g  them" (Dummett 1977, p .400) b u t, 
he g o e s  on  to  s a y  th a t, w e h a v e  no r ea so n  for  th in k in g  su c h  a  ta sk  
im p ossib le . P erh a p s n o t, b u t it  i s  s tr a n g e  th a t th e  v e r y  c o h e r en ce  o f  th e  
in tu it io n is t ic  sem a n tics  sh o u ld  d ep en d  so  th o r o u g h ly  on  a  su b s ta n tia l  
assu m p tion  ab ou t th e  p o s s ib le  c h a r a c te r  o f in tu it io n is t ic  m athem atics. Why 
sh ou ld  it  be th a t th e  c o h e r e n t  d e sc r ip t io n  o f a m athem atical th e o r y  w h ich  
a d h e r e s  to  g e n e r a l c o n s tr a in ts  draw n from  c o n s id e r a tio n s  ab ou t m eaning  
sh ou ld  d ep en d  on  b e in g  ab le  to  g iv e  su c h  a h ig h  le v e l  o f e x p lic it  
form alization? T h is r e s u lt ,  i f  tr u e , seem s to me to  be h ig h ly  s ig n if ic a n t , I 
do n ot f e e l  th a t it  h a s , a s  y e t ,  b e e n  e s ta b lish e d .
§7 Summary:
A lthough  I c o n ced e  th a t th e r e  is  a  u s e fu l  ro le  for  norm alization  r e s u lt s  fo r  
form alization s o f in tu it io n is t ic  m athem atical th e o r ie s  I do n ot th in k  th a t  
su ch  a r e su lt  is  n e e d e d  to  e s ta b lish , nor do I th in k  th a t it  can  e s ta b lish  
th e  co h e r en ce  o f  th e  in form al m ean ing  s tip u la t io n s . T h ose s tip u la tio n s  are  
req u ired  to g u id e  a n y  form aliza tion , so  th e  p r o c e ss  o f form alization  can n ot  
be u sed  to show  th a t th e y  are  c o h e r e n t  (it may h ow ever  help  to  make 
c e r ta in  a s p e c ts  o f o u r  p r a c tic e  e x p lic it ) . The co h e r en ce  o f th e  s tip u la tio n s  
is  p r e su p p o se d  in  th e  form alization  p r o c e ss . C o n v erse ly , I th in k  th a t a 
notion  o f com p lex ity  i s  to  be fo u n d  b y  c o n s id e r in g  th e  form  o f th e
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stip u la tio n s  th e m se lv e s . T h is le s s  form al c h a ra c ter iza tio n  o f  com p lex ity  h as  
th e  welcom e e f f e c t  o f n o t b e in g  firm ly  tied  to  a n y  p a rticu la r  form alization . 
T hus w h en  p roo f m eth od s are  e x te n d e d  so  a s  to tr a n sc e n d  th e  b o u n d s o f a 
g iv e n  form alism  w e ca n  s e e  th e  r e s u lt in g  th e o r y  a s  s t i l l  a d h e r in g  to  th e  
inform al s tip u la t io n s . The d ev e lo p m en t o f th e  new  th e o r y  can  th e n  be s e e n  
a s  an  e x te n s io n  o f  th e  old  th e o r y , r a th e r  th an  sim ply  a s  a  new  th e o ry .
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C onclusion
In  th is  e s s a y  I h a v e  a ttem p ted , f ir s t ,  to  m otivate an a n t i-r e a lis t  
ap proach  to som e fo u n d a tio n a l i s s u e s  in  m athem atics and th e n  to a r g u e  
th a t su c h  a  p o s itio n  c o in c id e s  w ith  a  v e r s io n  o f in tu ition ism . That 
c o n c lu sio n  is  s u b je c t  to  a num ber o f  q u a lifica tio n s  and r e se r v a t io n s .
The c o h e r en ce  o f  a d o p tin g  th is  ap p roach  d e p e n d s  on th e  a b ility  to  
form ulate s u c c e s fu l ly  an d  a p p ly  th e  a n t i-r e a lis t ’s  sem antic  p r in c ip le s . 
H ere I h a v e  o ffe r e d  no arg u m en t fo r  a n ti-rea lism  w h ich  w ould h a v e  a n y  
fo rc e  fo r  th o se  w ho fin d  a n ti-r e a lism  ra d ica lly  m isgu id ed , I h a v e  
d efen d ed  a n ti-rea lism  from  c e r ta in  a c c u sa tio n s  th a t it  is  in te r n a lly  
in c o h eren t. T h ose  a c c u sa tio n s , d e r iv e d  from  Haack and  W right, q u e stio n  
th e  a n t i-r e a lis t ’s  a b ility  to  c o n c e r n  h im self w ith  sem antic  ju s t if ic a t io n s  
(of lo g ic , in  p a r tic u la r ), I tr ie d  to  g iv e  d ir e c t  r e b u tta ls  b oth  o f H aack’s  
a tta ck  and  o f a s p e c ts  o f W right’s  a tta ck . But W right’s  p o s itio n  can  o n ly  
b e c o m p re h e n s iv e ly  d ism issed  b y  sh o w in g  th a t th e  in te r p r e ta t io n  o f th e  
Rule F ollow ing C o n sid era tio n s , u p on  w h ich  h is  p o s itio n  is  b a se d , is  
w ron g . R ather th a n  ta c k lin g  th a t  is s u e  I h a v e  o ffe r e d  an a lte r n a tiv e  
in te r p r e ta tio n  o f th e  R ule F o llow in g  C on sid era tion s w h ich , I claim is  
c o n s is te n t  w ith  a n ti-r e a lism . So h e r e  th e r e  is  a c lea r  c a se  o f u n fin ish e d  
b u s in e ss .
The la s t  th r e e  c h a p te r s  d ea l w ith  d iff ic u lt ie s  in  th e  d eve lop m en t o f  
th e  a n t i-r e a lis t ’s  p o s it iv e  program m e fo r  m athem atics. A n ti-rea lism  is ,  
h ow ever , a g lob a l p o s itio n . So i f  i t  can n ot be made to  g iv e  a c o h e r en t  
accou n t o f  a n y  r e g io n  o f d is c o u r s e  i t s  b asic  m otivation  w ill h a v e  b een  
u n d ercu t. The a n t i- r e a l i s t ’s  p o s it iv e  program m e for  m athem atics th u s  
d e p e n d s  on h is  a b ility  to  g e n e r a liz e  th a t a cco u n t a c r o ss  la n g u a g e  a s  a 
w hole. For em pirica l d is c o u r s e  th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  e n c o u n te r s  th e  su b s ta n tia l  
problem  o f d e fe a s ib ility .
My c o n c lu s io n s  a b o u t th e  s u c c e s s  o f th e  p o s it iv e  program m e for  
m athem atics are , th e m se lv e s , te n ta t iv e . F ir st , th e  im plem entation  o f th a t
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program m e r e q u ir e s  th a t w e ‘ g iv e  c lear  c o n te n t  to  th e  n o tio n s o f
can on ica l p roof and o f h a v in g  a  c o n str u c t io n  w h ich  i s s u e s  in  a can on ica l 
proof. The f ir s t  m ust be ex p lica b le  in  term s w h ich  p rec lu d e  th e  
em ergen ce  o f c ir c u la r ity  in  th e  in tu it io n is t ic  s tip u la t io n s  o f th e  m ean ings  
o f th e  lo g ica l c o n s ta n ts . I s u g g e s te d  th a t th is  m ay be p o ss ib le  b y  
u t ilis in g  th e  n a tu r e  o f ou r u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f th e  form  o f th o se  
stip u la tio n s . The n o tion  o f  h a v in g  a c o n str u c t io n  w h ich  (reco g n iza b ly )  
i s s u e s  in  a can on ica l p ro o f i s  n e e d e d  s in c e  I took  th is  to  be th e  notion  
w ith  r e s p e c t  to  w h ich  o u r  lo g ic  a p p lie s  c o n s e r v a t iv e ly . B oth o f th e s e  
program m es n eed  to  b e  m ade m ore e x p lic it  b e fo re  th e y  ca n  be a c c u r a te ly  
a p p ra ised .
L arge q u e s t io n s  s t i l l  rem ain a b o u t th e  n a tu re  o f an  a n t i-r e a lis t  s e t  
th e o ry . I a r g u e d  th a t  th e  a n t i-r e a lis t  sh ou ld  a c c e p t  a  c o n str a in t  on  h is  
s e t  th e o r y  w h ich  a p p lie s  th r o u g h  th e  req u irem en t th a t he fu r n is h
d e fin ite  c r ite r ia  o f id e n t ity . T hat argu m en t r a is e s  m ore g e n e r a l i s s u e s  
ab ou t ou r u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f id e n t ity  and o f th e  lo g ic  o f id e n tity . I h ave  
n ot in v e s t ig a te d  th e s e  is s u e  h e r e . The pow er o f th e  s e t  th e o r y  w h ich  
w as f in a lly  s k e tc h e d  n e e d s  c a r e fu l ev a lu a tio n . A lth ou gh  th e  com p u tab ility  
o f th e  ty p e  fu n c tio n  d o es  n o t, in  i t s e lf ,  p r e c lu d e  th e  p o s s ib il ity  o f some 
im p red ica tive  m ethods it  seem s c lea r  th a t im p red ica tive  m ethods can n ot, 
in  g e n e r a l, be v in d ic a te d  in  th is  fram ew ork. So th e  q u e stio n  o f  w h eth er  
we can , in  th is  w ay , p r o v id e  fo r  an  ad eq u a te  th e o r y  o f m athem atical
a n a ly s is  rem ains to  be a n sw ered .
The n otion  o f e x te n s io n a l d e f in ite n e s s  w as u se d  to  c o n str a in  ou r u se  
o f  q u a n tifica tio n  in  g iv in g  d e f in ite  sp e c if ic a t io n s  o f item s o f v a r io u s  
s o r ts . T h is r e fle c t io n  w as th e n  u se d  to d ia g n o se  fa u lts  in  th e  
d evelop m en t o f th e  s e t  th e o r e t ic  p arad oxes. An in te r e s t in g  a v e n u e  o f  
in v e s t ig a t io n  l ie s  in  d eterm in ig  w h eth er  and how th is  v iew  sh ou ld  be 
ex ten d ed  to th e  in te n s io n a l an d  sem antic  v e r s io n s  o f th e  paradox. It  
w ould seem  th a t th e s e  c a s e s  in v o lv e  q u a n tifica tio n  o v er  in te n s io n a l item s  
w h ich , n ot b e in g  su p p lie d  w ith  c r ite r ia  o f id e n tity , is  ex te n s io n a lly
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in d e fin ite . So we c a n n o t u s e  su c h  q u a n tifica tio n  to  s p e c ify  d e fin ite  
item s. A lth ou gh  th is  p rom ises  to  g iv e  a c o n tr a d ic t io n -fr e e  sy s te m , i t  a lso  
seem s to  be too r e s tr ic t iv e ;  can  we a c c e p t  th a t a ll p r o p o s itio n s  w h ich  
in v o lv e  q u a n tific a tio n  o v e r  a dom ain o f  p r o p o s itio n s  a re  in h e r e n tly  
v a g u e ?  I f  n o t, w h en  a re  su c h  p r o p o s itio n s  d efin ite?
VLADIMIR: I d on ’t  u n d er sta n d .
ESTRAGON: U se  you r in te llig e n c e , c a n ’t  you?
V ladim ir u s e s  h is  in te llig e n c e ,  
VLADIMIR: {fin a lly ) , I rem ain in  th e  dark . 
(B eck ett, 1956, p .l7 )
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